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Introduction
The year 1995 marked a number of anniversaries in lhe developnlen! of satellite
conmnmications:
• The thirty-fifth anniversary of the launch of Echo 1, the firsl passive comml|nications
balloon
• The thirtieth anniversar,v of the April 1965 launch of Early Bird (Intelsat 11, (',omsat's
tirst satellite, which effectively began global satellite conmlunicatioYls
• The twenly-tiflh anrfiversary of the latuwh of NAT()S,XI', lilt" tivsl satellite stationed
over the Atlantic ()cean to carry military tvattic belweell Ihe United States and its
NATO allies
* Most notably, the tiftieth anniversary ot Arlhur (]. (;larke's article pld)lished ill V_Vreh'__
_brl(f, in which he proposed the use of geosynchronoltsly orbititlg satellites [by com-
illtllli(ati()llS le[ay sill'S k
Satellite comnlltlficatit)ns are at the very heatt ()t +the notion of a "glol)al village +`and
ct)nstittHe a continually growing, muhibil[i()n-d<)llar, nearly ubiqtfilous civil and mililarv
enter-prise (Icsevving recognition. Much thnlitre accom])anied the litst satellile televisi()n
bro,_tlcasts. _i't, as the techn<)h)g_' has gvo,,vtl itlc|easiYlgly I)erv_tsive. satellites t|ave t)ecmlw
an almost invisible part of the cultural latldscal)e. Simuhaneouslv, satellite communicatio|l
has t)ec()tlle a tlelllen(lotls illlelnalional (Ollllllt'l(iitl Sll((css, (lll-IenIIv worth aroiln(i
$15 billion dollars pet year; it is on the vetge ()f expanding specta(ttlarly ill the near
filture, t)t'tllat)s to $30 billion per year by tilt" end of the decade, l)espite the expanding
network t)f fiber optic cables, apl)roxinl_tely 60 percent t)t all overseas ct)mnnmicalions
])ass via satellites. More than 200 cotmlries and levt-il()ries rely t)n Yleatlv 200 satellites fo|-
ttelcnse, (livc(t l)t-oa(hast, navigational, and mol)ile conlnluni(ations, not t() nlenti<)v| data
collecti(m and faxing, via domestic, regional, and global liHks.
I)esl)ite the c(mHnetcial success and ttl)iquily of satellite (-onlnluni(ations, fay too little
attellli()11 has I)eetl paid to its (levelol)metlt. Fof th(' most ])aft, schol,lrs have ti)('ttsett ()tl
politics and p()li(y silt(lies of file period roughly tiom 1(.158 to the mid-1970s ((ustonlarily
tentertrig tilt'iv (tis('llssi()nS (m lilt' I)assage ()f the (;onlYnlmi(ati()tls Satellite Act of 1962
and Intelsat negotiations), negh,'(ting economic and lethtlological questions and slight-
ing the earlier work of the 1940s and 1950s. Re(etltlv, however, some scholars have
atietnl)ted to addtess these overlooked areas <)f resear(h. I saw a need to bring the vesuhs
<)t their tesearch to light, while in the l)t-o(ess stimulating (,tilers to take up research in
satellite (-omnnmications history. Roger I,atmius, NASA's Chief Historian, and the NASA
ttistorv ()fli(e slat] gtaciously oiTeved Io hel l) organize a syml)osium on lhe developmetlt
of saleilite commtani(ati()ns litled "Beyond the l<)n()sphere: The Deveh)[)ment of Satellite
(',onmltmi(ati()ns." Through their eftbrts and hatd work, lhe symposium look l)la(e at
NASA I h'adtttmttevs, 17-18 October 1(,)(,15,and a toltv ol (;o|nsat's research lat)()rat()ries
loll()v,,e(t, thanks it)John V. Evans, Vice F'|-esi(tetat anti l)irect()r of (]omsat I,al)otatories. In
adttiti()n, (;eorge _,_lshingt(m Universit_ hosted a otle-(lav ('e]cl)ration of g()vernmetlt-
inttuslry c()operalion 1)riot to flat" NASA Ilistorv ()tfite symposium.
1, At Ihllt (i. ('.l_lvk(', "F.xtla-T(quvslli;d R,.'la', s: (;_m Ro_ kt'l Sl_lliollS ( ;i',[' W.I l(I-Wid,.' Radi(_ ( ;_)',('Hl_v?,"
115_'b,_ Ili,_td 51 ((),.tob('* 19t51: ?)05-08. S,vlial isslws at,.' id('l_lilit'd _)lfl,, ,:,h('l_ t'_,.h i_.sl_( • is l:,agit_,_tvd S('l),_-
_tl('l',; oth('l "e,is(', (ml_ Ih,v '_)hm_(' l_umb('l a_d ;('al ()l puhli(ali_)ll _11(' pl(_.idv(t.
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Thatsynq)osiumservedasa formnforpre-
sentingnotonl,vtheresearchrestthsofschol-
ars,but;list)theexperiencesof practitioners.
Indeed,oneofthemotivesfororganizingthe
syml)ositmlwastocreateavehiclethatwould
tacilitatefiuifful interactionatnongscholars
an(tpractilioners.A tkrw pal)ers llOl presented
during the s_lnposium have been inch,ded in
/his book to provide additional temporal,
geographk:al, and thematic coverage of the
symposiuln'S vast subject--the deveh)pmenl
of salclliw COmlnunicatiollS. \Vhile contplew
coverage of such a stthjecl is iml>ossihle at t>re-
scm, these "proceedings" alwmpt to present a
br<md, but systematic survey of the evolution
of satellite comnnmications. It is h.pcd that
this <tifl'usion of scholarly rescarch and practi-
cal experience ',++'illboth fill gaps in the liter;t-
mtc att(t provide a ti-amework tk)r future
stttdies. Finally, this work will have achieved its
goal ifit stimttlates others to take tip research
in satellite comnutnicatiotls history.
Fi_tre 1
A Hh ur C. C lmke dural K a i,i_il Iv the (;odda_d 5,pru.,, t"[ight
(._'nltr i. /q76, Iti_ milch' rm "t'_xtra-'l)-rn,*t_al Ib4m'_, '"
published i. 1945, [n_pov.d a series o/y,mtatimmr,) sateb
tiles, TodrPh flu, K+.o_talit)tta_y mbtl is k.men also as the
Clm, h;' +,Int. (( :ota tcsy (>l NASA, i)h_)t<) no, 7(i4)07277,)
The contributions to this volumc demonslratc, if nothing else, the dramatic temporal and
geographic breadth and thematic richness of satellite conmmnications history. The nar-
rative, which has not a single strand, but many, t+eachcs back nearly a half century to the
tirst attempts to commtmicate via natttral and artificial satellites; it extends ft_)nl tile
United States and its noltheill and southern neighllors to the countries of V_k+stern and
Eastern Europe, to India, Australia, and Asia, and to the l+est otthc gl<_he. This book, then,
is organized along temporal and geographical lines.
The Three Stages of Satellite Communications Development
The lemp<wal ordering of the deveh>plnent of satellite comnmnications is somewhat
probleinatic. As the readings make clear, satellite commtmications developed ahmg
several ewflutionary lines that variously intersected and diverged. In addition, there is the
difficuhy of pcriodizing somelhing whose existence was only dreamed 50 years ago. This
work posits lhree stages of satellite conmmnicalions dcveh)pment as a suggested t+rame -
work for tittttre research and discussion, bttt also to provide the diverse contril)tttiotls of
this vohtme with a rational organizalion.
The first stage ot +development, extending from the t940s into the early 1960s, was distin-
guished by experimettts with passive artificial and natural satellites. Long before the
launch of Sputnik, investigators in the United States and Europe attempted to establish
hmg-distance commtmications using the Moon as a passive relay satellite, while others
sought to ct+eate an artilicial ionosl+herc (Project Needles) or to use meteor i<mization
tt+ails (mete<>r bttrst comnmnications). Military and httsiness timding and the comnmni-
cations needs of both shaped these experiments.
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Preceding these expcrilnents wag, of ('otlrs¢', seveFa] decades ()[ experience with ra([i()
cc, ntnnnlications, dating hack Io the pioneering work of (;ttgliehno Marconi and others in
Europe and the United States. To achieve transmission distances heyond the horizon,
hmg-distance radio systems ricocheted signals off an ionized portion of the atmosl)here
called the ionosphere. The ionosphere retained this communications role until the
a(tvent of satellite conununications, initially in the guise of lunar relay experiments. Thus,
the developntent of satellite conlnnmicalions can he thought of as a prolonged attetnpt I(5
achieve long-distance conmttuticalions hy going "beyond the ionosl)here."
The second stage of satellite communications development hegart in 1958, not with
Si)utnik, but with the launch of the first conlnnlnications satellite (SCORE) and the tirst
teletyl)e relay by satellite ((:ourier I B). Pro.jet! Echo followe(I, launched in 1960, then
came Telstar (t`'quipl)ed with an active repeater) and Relay (tilt.' first satellite to transmit
television worldwide) ill 1962, Syncom 2 (the first geosynchrtmous communications satel-
lite) in 1963, the th+sl operational commercial communications salellite (lntelsat I, alias
"Early Bird") in 1965, and in 1966 tile t]rst operational military communications satellite
lIDS(iS). By 1(.)6(_, then, the era of satellite comnnulicatic, ns "**,'aswell on its way.
The 1)lacentent of tltese satellites in orhil hy the United States alone signaled that coun-
lry's dominance of the lield and 1)recipitated at series of highly political negotiations on
hoth sides of the Atlantic Ocean that eventually led to the creation in 1964 of Intelsat
(International Teleconnnunications Satcllile organization), an international tiamework
fol- the growth of satellite communications. Comsat, a corporation create(I hy congres-
sional passage of the (]ommunications Satellite Act of 1969, became lilt" key organiza-
tional instrument lhrottgh which the Unile(t States influenced the making of decisions
atnd lilt' letting of contracts within Intelsat. This second stage of developt|lenl, then, saw
the creation of satellite COlnlnunications institutions and the estahlishntent <ff n|anage-
men| at the intet+national level, while a single country, the United States, donlinatetl satel-
lite communicati<ms technolog 3' and services.
Although that domination continued Ihroughoul the 1960s anti 197(Is, more ius(I ln()re
countries acquired access to comtnunicalions satellites,especiallyin Europe, and chal-
lenged the U.S. ln<m<)l)oly. The nature of salellite comnnuaications has un(tergotle deep
ch+anges since the late 1970s to the t)resent, the period of the third stage of satellite (ont-
nnuticalions developntent. During this period, the U.S. lead in satellite connnunications
technologies anti services established during tile 1960s and 1970s waned, while Eurot)e
and.Japan invested heavily in satellite colnnnltficalions research and devel<qmtent in tilt'
hopes of harvesting e<<montic tsenelits and began to pose a major technoh>gical and
economic <halh'nge lo the United Stales. Ahht>ngh the United Stales relaille(I a leading
position ill lilt" ntarketl)lace, it h)sl groun<l in the technologies and syslents that held the
key to future communications ntarkels.
More than ever betore, the geopolitics of satellite communications came into ils own dtu-
ing the third stage of dew'lopment, as the small club (5| countries wilh satcllile access g,ew
into a global lsuhlic enterp,ise, entbracing lit+st the countries of North Anterica and
Western Europe, then out,,vartt into Easterta Europe, Asia, Afiica, and South America. As
satellite geographic coverage increase(l, tilt' types of services offered muhil)lied. Fixed (as
opposed to mohile) satellile conlmunicalions services reached Inaturily tlurirlg Ihe 1960s
and 1970s, while ntohile and hroadcasl services underwent explosive growth during the
third slage of satellite c()llnnunicati()ns development. (;rowth ill tixed satellite services
slowed to an alllltlal rat(" of ah()tll I0 percelll, while hr<)adcast and mobile (C,lllllltlnica-
ti<ms services thrived (growing more than 90 percent annually). The Inlernational
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Figure 2
77.' teh'phom, _hmv. here will provide voice, [ax, and
dala _ervi_t'_ vi. the IHdium _alellile communicatio_
c_tem, ._ wall a_ thr.ugh te_._hial celhdar telephone
.etwmk_ (availabili(_ a.d _.mpatibili(v pe_mitli,_g),
lwkri..i,qZ i. / 998. (( '.o1111t'sv ot.]ohll Windolph)
Maritime Satellite Organization (lnmarsat)
introduced maritime service; it then
hranched out into aircraft and tnobile land
services. By the mid-1990s, the fastest grow-
ing field was personal communications ser-
vices via satellite using hand-held transceivers
similar to those used in cellular radio.
Put in geopolitical terms, thottgh, what char-
acterized the third stage of satellite commtmi-
cations development was the creation of a
tltle international satellite svstem--a system
that was international not only because satel-
lile coverage was global, hut hecause of the
increasing number of countries with satellite
access. Indeed, the glohal satellite system was
huih cotmtry hy country'. The nation-state was
a fimdamental engine of growth, serving as
both the initiator and chief consumer of satel-
lite communications services in a given
geographical and political territory. This cir-
clnnsLance was to he expected; in nlos[ ('olin-
tries of the world, the state traditionally was
the sole provider and major user of commu-
nicalions systems. Those syslelns embraced
everything f?om postal services (including
financial services) and teleconnnunicatiollS
(telegraphy, telephon> and telex) to roads,
hridges, and waterways (comnnmications
understood in the hroa(test sense of the word).
Because the glohal satellite system was built largely at the slate level, to understand the
character of the third stage of satellite communications development, we lnnst consider
each country (each telecommunications system provider) as a separate case. The results
would mirror the complexity and heterogeneity t)f factors that influenced the develop-
ment of satellite communications across the planet. Political and cuhural factors likely
would dominate these country-foctised case studies, as the contributions to this vohnne
aflirnt, ahhough certainly tcchnolog T and economics would play roles as well.
The Organization of This Book
The three overlapping stages of satellite comnmnications deveh)plnent outlined above
provide the three-part framework for the organization of the papers contained in this
book. Part I, "Passive Origins," treats the first stage of satellite communications develop-
ment, extending front the 1940s into the early 1960s, when passive artificial and natural
satellites fimded by the military and private enterprise established the tield. Part It,
"Creating the Global, Regional, and National Systems," addresses events that constituted
the second stage of development. Early in this stage, which stretched fiont the 1960s into
the 1970s, satellite systems began to make their appearance in the United States, while
domestic and international efforts sought to bring order to this new, but chaotic, tield in
the form of(:omsal and Intelsat.
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While the first two parts of this book involve the United States and Western Europe, Pat|
Ill, "The Unfolding of the WotId Systmn," explores the dc'¢elopment of slm'llite commtt-
nications in the remainder <+f the world, with a stlong emphasis tm Asia. Thus, while the
positing ot + three stages of salellite cOlnlllttni(ations development serves as a tt,lltpota]
fianmwot-k, the course taken in Part III is less determined by temporal limits than by geo-
graphical expansion. The polilical and cldtutal landscape of each cotmttv takes the lead
in shaping thai countt+v's atccessitm It) satcllile c<mtnnmications capabilily.
Politics and culture utilize salellite comnnmicalions within the national space in one of
two ways: to create internal ])olilical and cttlttual cohesion or t<) creale cohesion ant<rag
nation-states. (',ountries o¢'Ctlpyiltg largc land masses, suth as the United SIales, ('+anada,
the Soviet Union, (3tina, ov the hid;an subcontinent, inaugurated thmteslic satellite
services to ibster national cohesion, and st) did the smaller states of Asia, bill f_)l differenl
reasons. On the other hand, Western Etnope initiated slttellite programs in the nante of
regional integration, and the Soviet Union created Intevsplttnik, its owtt chine of Intelsat,
to interconnect its clienl slates (including (htba). Moreover, It) bolster colonial ties in lhe
postcohmial era, Britain and l:vance holwd to use satellites to communicate with their for-
lltel" colonies.
These ate but some examl)h's of the geopolitical tool;rations of states in acquiring satel-
lilt commttnicati<ms capability, tlowever tnotivated the stales were, though, Ih<.' question
o1 how tilt" salcllite comnnltlicalions capability was utilized must be addressed as well.
Therefi)re, Palt III includes at seclion on satellite applications in educatiott and tnedicinc,
in tn<)bile contmunications and navigation, and in corporate I)usiness strategies.
The three temporal stages of satellile communications development, and the locus iu Parl
Ill on geographical expansion linked It) f;:ttlots of politics, cttlture, and national space, rep-
resenl o]tly a tentative l_atnework fi)r studying the developnwnt of satellite cotnnnmi¢ali<ms.
lndee(l, many Ihemes not alhtdett to in this analvtical schema merit stutlv. Several of these
themes will beconte apparent after a brief teview t>t the papers contained tit flits voltmte.
Passive Origins
+I_>untlevstand the civcutnstanccs leading to the emergence of global satellite cont,tnmica-
tions, we first inust exalnine the technological+ econotnic, atttl political world of cable teh'g-
raphy and telephony. That is Iht" raison tl'i'lre for Daniel R. Headrick's study of the rivalry
It:.t!lween radio and cabh'. Until the advent of wireless radio a century ago, all
eleclrical t:omnnutications ttaveled t)y cable. (;able and ratlio cohabited peacefull i, t<)1 at cou-
ple of decades tmtil the iuvival of shortwave vail;o, which was faster and cheaper than con-
ventional long-wave t+adio. 1 leadrick sees a pat+allel between the 1920s' rivalry of shortwave
and old)It anti lodav's tivahv belween satellites and titter optic cabh +.Also ft-om lhe era dis-
cusscct by t [eadtick came the intevnalional carviet-s of record, such as American Telephone
and Telegraph (AT&T), Internalional Telephone and Telegraph (ITF), and V%_'Stel-ii Union
Inleltl.ational, which lalc'v playetl a key rol(' in shaping U.S. satellile communicalit)tlS.
Ahhough natural (mete<Hs) and artificial (l'rqject Needles) objects served its early passive
rehtv satellites, the era of space communicalions actually began with the effolIs on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean to use the Moon as a passive communications satellite. The
Massachttsetts lnstitlltt: ol Ik'chnologT,"s (MIT's) I+incoln I+abot+atory carried oul Pvojecl
Needles, fot-ntetIv kn<>wn as Prt!+ect West For(l, on l)ehalf of the l)epattmenl of [)elbnse
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(I)ol)). This project involved launching nearly 500 million hair-like copper wires into
orbit in 1963, thereby forming a belt of dipole antennas. I,incoln l,aboratory then used
this artificial ionosphere to send messages between Camp Parks, California, and Wesfford,
Massachusetts. British radio astronomers, including Sir Martin Ryle attd Sir Bernard
I,ovell, as well as optical astronomers, ol_jected fervently to Project Needles, and the
Council of the Royal Astronomical Society formally protested to tire U.S. President's
Science Advison _
Meteor burst communications outlived Project West Ford and has endured to tire present.
The purpose of meteor I)urst comnmnications is to ohtain secure, point-to-point radio
connections. It originated in the United States in radio propagation work at Stanford
University carried out initially during the early 1950s. Von R. Eshleman, an electrical
engineering graduate student, laid out in his dissertation a general theory of detecting
meteor ionization trails and its application in actual experiments. After graduation, he
developed this method of comnmnicating in collaboration with his Stanford colleagues
and with funding from the Air Force? The Stanford research had nontrivial
consequences. Eshleman's dissertation has continued to provide the theoretical limnda-
lion of niodern nteteor hurst conununications--a communications nlode that promises to
flmction even after a tmclear holocaust has rendered useless all normal wireless
communications. The pioneering work at Stratford, as well as at the National Bureau of
Standards and the Air Force's Cambridge Research Laboratories (without leaving otlt
Jodrell Bank in Britain), received new allention in the 1980s when the Space Defense
Initiative ("Star Wars '+) revitalized interest in using nreteor ionization trails for jam-l)roof
commtmications. Nonmilitary applications of meteor burst communications also have
arisen ill recent years.*
(:oncm-rent with the research on meteor hurst communications and Project _2_st Ford,
civilian and military investigators on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean attempted to use the
Moon as a passive comnmnications satellite. These hmar comrntlnications eftirrts
succeeded. As a resnh, they constitute the first passive satellite communications link--
a place in history usually accorded to the Echo balloon experimenls. Those eltorts are the
subject of papers bv l)avid K. van Keuren ,mdJon Agar.
2. ()verhage to Ft'rguson, 26June 1963, 1/24/AC 134, Mrl' Archives: Overhage and Radfiwd, "l'he
[,imoln Laborattwy West Ford Program: An Historical Perspective," Proceedinl+_ o/the I1,'+i£1'25 (1964): 452-54;
"t'lt!je_ t Wesl F_wd Releases and Reports," tiJlder, Lincoln I,aboratory Library Archives. Much of V<_lume 52 of the
1+5o¢_'edin+_o/the IFFI" adthesses exclusively Project West Ford. On the antag.nism ,f radio astronmners to Pr,!jet t
Needles, see Bernard l.ovell, Aqronomer tO' (;liana' (New _brk: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 331-3,i; Martin Ryle and
Bernard lx_vell, "Interfk'reme Io Radio Astronomy fi'om Belts of Orbiting Dipoles (Needles)," Quarterlv]our_ml o 
the Ro, al A_trmtomical _%cie(_'3 (1.q621: IO11-{18;D.E. B1ackwell and R. Wils_m, "Interference m Opdcal Astmlmmy
fiom Bells o[ ()fbiting l)ip_des (Neediest," ibid., pp. 109-17; Hermann Bond|, '_Fhe _r_k'slFold Proiect," ibid., p. 99,
3. Von R. Eshlcman, interview with Andrew Butt|ca, !1 May 1994, Stan[ord University, JPL Archives; Von
R. Eshleman, "The Met hanism of Radio Rellet lions ffom Mele_wic hmization," Ph.l). diss., Stanford Universily,
1952; Von R. Eshleman, The Mechanism o] Radio Reflrrtbm_ [_,m Meteoric lrmizatton, Technical Report No. 4tl
(Stanford, CA: ,";tanford Eh'ctronics Research l,ahoratory, 15 July 1952), pp. ii-iii, 3; Laurence A. Mmming,
"Meteoric Radio Echoes," 7}ansaclion_ o/the lu_titutr r_JHadio FngTm,ers 2 ( 1954): 82-!10; I.aurence A. M;mning and
Von R. Eshleman, "Mete,tws in the hmosphere," lbv_eeding_ _jthe lost|lute t!/Radio ET_Lrtneers47 (19591: 186-199.
4. Robert l)esom-dis, telephone c<mversation, 22 September 1994; Donald Npeclol, telephone conver-
sati<m, 22 Seplembef 1994; l)mlaM [. Schilling, ed.. Meteor Bin:st Communications: "l'heo+i+attd 15act|re (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1993_;.]aoc*b Z. Schanker, Meteor Bunt (:ommunications (B<_ston: Artech House, 1990). ()11
lhe civilian use of meteor t:,urst communications, see llenrv S. Santefind. Meteor Bm:_t Communicalion ,_i],glem:
Alaska Wmler I"ieM 7)_t 15%mzm (Si[',m Spring, Nil): U.S. [)_'partment of (_ommerce, National ()ceanic and
Allnospherie Adminislralion. Nati_mal Weathew Service, ()[fit e _ff Hvdmh_g),, 19761.
xviii
The Mi)ol_ Cmnlnunic_uioI+S Ix'lay had ils origins in radar expcrilmmts ct)nducted in 1946
by a team oI invcstiff, ators at the U.S. Arln,V Signal (:orps's Evans Sigtlal l.al)oratorv, |+car
l))clmar, New Jersey, workin_ tmdet+ the ]al)()ralot+v's din¢u''tlor, .lois II. DeWitt..l r. They
sttcc(_',ss[ttlly detected radar "_+:[t_+rt'strmlstniltcd to the Moot+ <)n I0 ]alm;U>' 1946. :\s caIlV ;is
I(.)40, l)eWitt had l_tilcd to l)outlt't ` radio signals t)ff tile Moon, to study the l+'+arth's ;itmos-
])here, using th(" translnillcr ()f N;tshvilh"s radio sl:tti<)n WSM. ih' wr()tc in his notchook:
"Ii t)ccurred to mc lhal it might l)t" l)()ssiblc Io rtqlcct uhr;tsh<)rt ;v;tves frt)nt tlt¢+ Moon. 11
this could tw d()nc it would ot)t+n up wide p()ssit)ilitit's I_)r the stutlv of 1he upper atlnos-
phere. St) far as ] know+ ill) c, n0 has 't"<(u St'lit wlt'.<('s off Ill(" t'at-th itll(| tne;tstucd tilt?it
return throttgh the entire atttlosphcrt" <)1 the emth."" l+ater, in lq46, il t lttngarimt ph',si-
cist antl director of the rcsear¢h lal)t)rlttorx t)l+ tile !Jnil't'tl Incanth'sccnt l.;tmps antl
Elccti'ic Company (Tui+ffsriltn), Z<)hfin Bay, succeed(_'d in l)ouncin_ rltdal-wavcs oil thc
Mot)is+ ()liter eXl)erilnctllcts had l)icccdcd l)('Witl and Bit.',:, bul tiler had l+til('tt It) d't't('cl
lunar r;td+tr ech<)es. '+The Icnt,ltivc+ but succcssful trailblazing clfi)rls ()I l)cWilt and l+)itx
opened up lit?v,,' vistas ill i<mt)spheric mid t'<)lllllllllliC;.tlil)ns research using radio t.cllocs
rellecl<.'d oil tlt(_' Mr)oil.
Piivat( + ,+.+lltCl])rise sll<)wt'd ri() l:tck of illter('st ill developing a hlllar ¢'OllllltlllticatioIlS VCI:tv.
Experilncnls conductt'd ilt ll"l"s Fcdcrltl Tt,lccolnlttuniciI1i<)ns l+id>(mm)rics, hie., ill Ncw
h_)rk (',it>:, shorllv itttvr World Wm I], mtt'ntptct[ It) ill( + Ihe M()t)ll ,is it passivc i('];t.+:,l(+r radio
tclcl)hont+ colnt_ittnicatit)its bctwt'cll New York ,ultl l'ilris+ l'h( • luiiiu rt'lm, would ,tlh)w II'T
to cmnpctc with .L\T_+_+2T,which held a| m(m<+polx oil tralisittlantic ¢itl)Ic tr;iflic. What tilt"
Fcdcral l+clcc<mlmtII]icatim+s [.al)()ratorics ilnltgined, h<)wcvt'r, the (',ollins R;l<li()
(_t)ittl)an,,+ in (]edar Rapids, l<)wlt, and lit(' Nittionitl _tllC_lti ,o1 Stuntllu-ds's (:cntrill Radio
Pl()pagatioll l,aboriltorv in Sterling, Vir_,inia, ;tcc()tnplished <)n 8 Nt)vcn/ht'r 1931, when a
sh)wlv ltluM-kevcd tclegritph mt'ss,tgc was sent <)vcr Ihe I<)wiI-Vh'gilfill ¢ircttit st+vcra] timcs.
The message was the same scnl b+v Siuuucl Morse over thc thsI tr.S. public telegraph line:
"Wh_tt hath God Wl()ttght?":
*,leunwhilc, though, the lhst use of tlt(" Mo<m its it relay in a c<)nmluMc;Iti<ms circuil ]uld
l:.u(..rl achicved <mlv :t l(.+w days emqit'r l)v ntililm'V r('st'illcll't'l's ill thv Nilx':tl Rcse_lrch
I,al)orat<)rv (NRI,). The ellofts ol +lilt" NRI+ It) use tit( + Moon ;is a l)amsivu ('mnlnunicati()IIS
satellite alt' tlt<_'stil)ject oF l)itvid vltn Kcurcu's c()ntributit)n. For Ill(" N;)+'+)',S(+CtlI'U, l+cliabh •
hmg-distat;c(' ct)mnlunic:tlions w('rc it tactical necessity, cspeci,llly dut-in_ the (_old War ()t
3. [)('Wht m)Ichook, 21 M_t', I_II(), :+t+<l l)cWitl l)i<)g]:q>hit:ll ,,kvtth, III, Di;uut 16 ((11), 11i',n()ni(;tl
.\i( hixvs, [:.,_. A.t inx (:Olllmtmicati<)tv.,-l'_h'( It(mi('s (:omm;md. FI. P'+lOnlnmlth, N.].
li. Atn(mg those wc_(' lh(mt;t '+, (;(lid, V,m R. l+Nhh'mm+, :.tt1(:l ;\.(;. l+)ctn;ud l,oxt'll. (;old. a ivlilcd
(_()_ncll (nixm,,itv })rl)It'ss<)l ()I ;tslloll(')tll _+, (hthus to hax(' p_oposed _t IHnat i:+dat VXlW_imvnt to Ihc lhiti',h
AdIIm _tllx dUlmg V','m Id \++:_I II; l'_',,hh't+l;tll, ;t St;IlIIoItl t "lli",t'l+,it ', pt ol('n+',_)r ol clc( t_ R;_I cn_int'c_ i_, tltlntl( + c',s
hflI_ :_t_cmptcd _t llm_u i;M;u ('Xpt'l hl+('lll ;tb(mrd lht' I :.mS".+'. MiV'm+H it+ 1916, :"hilv _ctttt I+hL_ h (mS tht' "S;_I : m_l]
l.oxcll p_Ol),)scd ;t hlll_tt I)otltl(t' ('Xl;'l'tittlt'llt ill ;t p:llWl ()1 Mm It.tt6. "l'holY_ts (;old, +lllt.lVit'x'_ xxith ._lldl t.'_;
lhmica, llh:_c;1., NY, II Dc(t'ntl>('t l¶)¶r.+,; "Gm R. l'ishlt'm;m, inter+dew whh l))lllli(+;t. (_;tllcch. (.) 5,1;ix 1991; ;tnd
l_Jt.tll;tld Loxc]l, ".-'_Sll()llOlll('i ])',' (:h:mct'+" mmtt_sttipt, Fel)rt;arv I(.1_, p. 18:_,. pctn(;+l+M p:qwrs, Si_ l+,c_ mud
l .o's'i'll.
7. I).I), (',i +('<_, _+ _',]('t..'_t'l. _llld R. X_,';tt'i, "( :(msid('r;tti()us (,i M<)())+-Rch> (:(ms+tiM< ;tti()t+," l'.>+r+'d_.,¢:, ,,/
the IH/'. S(i (M;t', I_) I_): 6F)_-(;2,; "Vill 11)(' ,",,1()<)t_: Rchr,. F;t;m(m t<)'I)_u)s()( (..rod( (:()IUHHmi( ;)tits.'" .V_'_r'_',J_ _7 ( 1 1
l:+.'l))mt)x I!)16): 6h l)('It't (;. Sul]ct. (;. Ft;tnklit_ Nl(mtj4(m)cI_., m_d hxiI_ 11. (;czks. -,x, t'-11-F M(),m R(']a,..'"
/',+*_+_,_,r//J,_so] ll_v 11¢]",I(I (I(.I.'-)2): 561..\ R'v+ x(';u', lat('), thlt't' _Ull;ll('tl)ladi()(>l)Cl;tt<)),,, "'h;un'.," v,h() t.Ui()x,,d (h't('( I-
iiL_ h)u_-<listal)( (' tr_tnslmssimp, (1)XiH_), su((('c(Icd in l)<,tm(in_ 114-mcgMwi_] _:)<li<)x_;txcs ()If th(' M()<,I_ ())) '.2>:+
:tnd L>7.]anu;u ,. 19.")3. E.I), I., "[.tu+m lIX <)n 1 :ii 5,11 t," (.)+']'++7 ( ]9_+_+)): 11-12+ 116. lhcit st|< (('...+ '-.l);U kcd ;Ill ()11_()-
]11_ II;1111 itllt'T('_t ill hltl_ll I)Nhll4. xxl)i( II ( ()lltillll(", It)till', ill th(' I'_)1it1 ()1 ( ()111('_,1_,1() dclv( I II111;I.I );tdi() t'( h()t"_.
xix
the1950s.Moreover,ionosphericstormshadshowntilevulnerabilityof radiotransmis-
sionsto naturaljamming.TheNavy'sprojectcalledCommunicationMoonRelay(also
knownas"OperationMoonBounce")sot,ghtto exploitheMoonasahigh-techcom-
municationsoptionin theyearsbetorethelaunchofthefirstartificialsatellite.Through
hisdiscussionfOperationMoonBounce,moreover,vanKeurenshowsthecloselinkages
belweenclassified and nnclassilied research and development programs that existed with-
in U.S. military laboratories dming the Cold War.
.Ion Agar takes np the hmar conmmnications relay program undertaken on the other side of
the Atlantic Ocean by Sir Bernard Lovell and his colleagues at the Nuffield Radio Astronomy
Laboratories at Jodrell Bank. Unlike the work at the NRL, the Jodrell Bank experin|ents
received underwriting from private enterprise--namel}; Pye Telecommunications I,td., a
British electronics firm based in Cambridge. Thus, this early stage of satellite conmmnica-
tions development not only witnessed activity on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, hut inlm=
est and flmding came from both military and husiness sources. Agar also points out the role
of demonstration--that is, public displays of scientific spectacle such as the bouncing of sig-
nals off the Moon--in flmding the construction and operation of the giant .]odrcll Bank
radio telescope, as well as in supportingJodrell Batik research in general.
Creating the Global, Regional, and National Systems
The United States and Canada
In light of the NRL,Jodrell Bank, and other lunar relay tests, as well as the West Ford anti
meteor bnrst experiments, Project Echo can be tmderstood as a turning point, rather than
a starting point, in the development of satellite communications. Similar to its predeces-
sors, Echo was a passive comnnmications relay; howeven unlike them, it was an artiticial
satellite. Iamar echo and meteor burst techniques used natt,ral satellites. Although
Project Needles created an artificial ionosphere, it was not placed in orbit until 1963,
three },ears alter the launch of the first Echo balloon. As a passive relay, then, Echo con-
tinned past practice, but as an artificial satellite, it symbolized the future of space com-
nnmications. Part II of this volume begins with two papers on this transitional satellite
c()mmmfications program.
In the first paper, Donald C. Elder, drawing on research conducted tot a lengthier and
more detailed study? reviews the origins of Project Echo. Echo received inheritance ti'om
the military interest in satellite communications begun with the first hmar passive relay
experiments. Initial flmding for Echo came from l)ol)'s research and development
agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), as well as NASA's predecessor,
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACre_). The Pentagon was interested
in space surveillance, such as taking photographs from space, and doing so involved the
principle of overflight: who owned the space above each country?
Elder also argues that Echo originated with a prophetic science fiction article written by
Jotm Robinson Pierce, the director of research at AT&T's Bell Telephone Laboratories.
Ahhough Arthur C. Clarke. first published the m)tion of space communications via geo-
8. Donald C. Elder, Out b'rom Behind the l_ight-Ball: A llisto_ _?[ lSqleH E_ho, AAS llistor_ Series, Vol. 16
(San Diego: American Astronautical Society, 199r_).
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Fi_tre 3
/oh. l_.hm_o_ I'u,_ e, Ih,. /i.m,._ di,_': t.r o  _ewarch at AT&7"_ Ball "l"eh,phone Lahmalo_#_. In a p.'_ e o/ _ciem e jictio_J, l'.,_ce
prrd_h.d in 1952 lht, p.lenlml Iwnefit_ o/ wttellile _ommltnicati:m_. t p_, y,':t_ lah*l; he helped reali:a, Itw [h:_l artificial
c.mmll ni_ ation_ _e_tdlite, t(dro. ( ( _Otll tt's_, o1' NASA)
synchronous satellites, seven years later Pierce putflished in 1952 a story in A._toundin_
Science Fiction in whi<'h he discussed the potcnlial bone|its of satellite communications.
Echo came into exist<m<e, th<mgh, <rely aflcr Ihe EiseHhower adminismtti<m gave its
approval in 1955 to the launch of a satellite as part of the 1957-1958 International
(;eophysical Year (1(;_3. Thus, Echo uhilnalely involwxt collaboration by AT&T, NASA (as
NA(',:Vs successor), and lhe I(;Y coordinators. Elder also l'ec(}tllltS the technical difficul-
lies encountered in constructing a balloon appropriate lot Ihc Echo experiments--
namely, one that wouhl nol 1all apart beforc being placed in orbit.
Also signilicanl for the future development of satellite communications is that Project
Echo saw t}t_" htt(_rtwh_htg of private" et_t_rf_tis_ • att_t the t_a_iot_'s space agency: The rela-
tionship between NASA and business was to color the future development of salellite com-
munications. The association of NASA--through the.let Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)--
and AT&T's Bell Telephone l,aboratories is the substance of Craig B. WaiFs conlrihution.
Continuing lhe Echo story, Watt tocuses on the problem of target acquisition, which is a
prerequisite tot all satelliw communications. Indeed, as the geosynchronous orbit reach-
es satluation, and as hidittm and other salellile communicalions sysltems create a growing
demand for low and medium orbilal slots, the problem of acquiring satellite targets, first
entounlered (m Pro.jeer Echo, lakes (m l_ew relevance. R(:calling lhe lunar communica-
lions tests of Ihe 1950s, .]Pl, and Bell personnel conducled a range of wsts, inchuling a
lunar bounce eXl)Cviment, m prepare fi)t t'roject Fcho. Taking par! in P,qjecl t:.cho also
scrved.lPl:s new research direction, fin it was a key milestone in the crealion of Ihe l)eep
Space Nelwotk, NASA's worldwide space ¢ommunicalions network.
That NASA would play a cenlral role in the development of satellite communicalions was
determined by its monopoly on civilian launchers, Daniel R. Ghwer reviews NASA's exper-
imemal c_)mmunicaliol_s salellile program liom Ihe ag('n(y's tounding to lbe I)reseHI.
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NASA'slaunchermonopolyassureditsplaceonProjectEcho,aswellasAT&T'sTelstai,a
systemof communicationssatellitesto beplacedinpolarandequatorialorbits.Telstal,
similartoEcho,involvedNASAandAT&Tgoingforwardin tandeminspaceconmnmi-
cations.Forlaunch,tracking,andtelemetryservicesonTelstar,AT&TpaidNASA$6mil-
lion.Foritspart,AT&ThopedtouseTelstartoextendintospaceitshistoricalmonopoly
onAmericanwireandtransatlanticcabletraffic.
AfterreviewingNASA'srolesinProjectRelayantiSyncom,GloverdiscussesNASA'sgen-
erationofexperimentalconmmnicationsatellites,knownastheApplicationsTechnology,
SatellitetATS)series.NASA'ssearchforATSseriesfundinghighlightedtheongoingrela-
tionshipbetweenthespaceagencyandprivatenterprise.Thistime,though,thebusiness
wasnotAT&T,buttheCommunicationsSatelliteCorporation(betterknownasComsat).
CongressobjectedtoNASA'scontinuationofSyncom(builtbyHnghes)outoftearthat
thespaceagencywasdevelopingtechnolo_,for thebenefitofasingleprivatecompany,
namelyComsat.AsGloverexplains,NASArespondedbybroadeningtheproject'sobjec-
tivestoinchldemeteorologyandotherscientiticexperimentsandrenamingit theATS
series.Yearslater,in 1973,theATSseriescanietoahah,whenCongresscanceledit asa
budgetreduction leasure,st)thecomnmrcialsatellitecommunicationsi dustry,not
NASA.wouldhavetosupporti sownresearchanddevelopnient._XqwnNASAres/uned
itsexperimentalconinnulicationssatelliteprograniwiththelaunchof theAdvanced
ComnnulicationsTechnolog0,Satellite(ACTS)inSeptemher1993,thespaceagencynlade
it availableto indus(r),tmiwwsities,andothergovernmentagenciesto conduct experi-
lllents. A(]TS cnierged only after a long and lorlllOUS debate carried OI]I tt'lrollgholll the
l{)80s by (;ongress and tile White House over whether NASA should develop technology
for lhe IT.S. satellite commnnicatioils indnsii+y.
lit tile background of that debate, as well as throughout the history of satellite conlinuni-
calions ill the United States, was tile role of the military. After NASA and private
enterprise, the nlilita,y constitutes a third strand in tile development of U.S. satellite com-
munications. As we have seen, [)oD supported space connnunications research and devel-
opnicnl as early ;is the l{}40s and l{,tS0s. Later, the Pentagon inthienced NASA to inchlde
in its ATS series technology till' gravity-gradient stabilization (on ATS-2, ATS-4, and
ATS-5) and for nlediuln ahitnde orbits tATS-2). These are only two examples drawn fronl
a long llistory of development outlined by David N. Spires and'Rick W. Sturdevant in their
paper. Focusing on Air Force satellite conlmunications ti'oln the 1960s to the present,
these two writers show ilia! the Air Force, as the chief provider of military launcli vehicles,
supporting infrastructure, and communications satellites, conflonted a variety of interre-
lated technical, political, and institutional problenls. Although Air Force engineers often
surpassed their commercial counterparts in the design of conlmunications satellites,
Spires and Sttirdevant point out that the special endurance reqniremenls of niililarv com-
lllnnicalions satellites drove l]leir ((:,sis upward even as cominercial costs dropped. The
high cost of military communications satellites persuaded Congress to pressure the
Pentagon to cut costs and to consider using commercial satellite systems.
Although the inilitary ellen is portrayed as a unified entity, Spires and Stnrdevant denion-
strafe its organizational disunity, at least for the case of satellite communications. Within
DoD, inoreover, tilt' fi-actured, conlplieated sysleill of satellite conlnnmications nlanage-
Inert( has inlpeded the inlegralion of military satellite COllimilnicatiolis plailning and
activities across tile Ihree services, as well as the transition of new iechnolog,3_ |ioln the
research and devclopuleni lal)oratory io the operalional satellite.
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A keymilitarysatelliteconnnunicationsre earchfacilitywasMIT'sLincolnI,ahoratory,
whichoversawProiect West Ford. By 1963, when Project _st Ford was launched, IAncoln
Laboratory had established a reputation as a major defense research laboratory and as a
vital center for state-of-the-art electronics and coinputer research. Heir to MIT's Radiation
Laboratory, which had been at the heart of U.S. radar research and development during
World War II, Lincoln Lahoratory was underwritten jointly by the three armed services.
The Mr Force provided most of the flmding, though. The laboratory designed and
developed what became known as SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), a digi-
tal, integrated computerized North American network of air defense. SAGE invoh,ed a
diversity of applied research in digital computing and data processing, long-range radar,
and digital communications. Ifincoln l_ahoratory also worked on die Distant Early
Warning (DEW) Line, a network of radome-enclosed radars intended to search for incom-
ing enemy aircraft, and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Early _5_rning System (BMEWS).
William W. Ward and Franklin W. Floyd, drawing on lheir personal experiences, describe
the military satellite communications development work that took place at Lincoln
Laboratory tmder their direction--primarily Project Needles and the Lincoln
Experimental Satellite (LES) series. In particular, they focus on the development and test-
ing of communications satellite hardware and electronics. Scholarly studies of satellite
communications have tended to concentrate on politics and policy studies, in contrast to
the conspicuous enlphasis on technology' offered hv Ward and Floyd.
Through the Lincoln Laboratory's research and deveh)pment work described by Ward and
Floyd, as well as the efforts outlined by Spires and Slurdevant, the nlilitary sough! to create
a system of space communications. The military is only one thread of the story of the devel-
opment of U.S. satellite communications, however. The second thread is the independent,
though at times intertwining, development of satellite communications by NASA. Yet a
third thread is woven through this strange narrative fahric: private enterprise. Businesses
interacted with the military side of satellite commlmications, as well as with NASA, but as
seen in the case of hmar relay communications, private enterprise look an active interest
in and fimded tests ot'sl)aCc communications technologies as era'Iv as Ihe 1950s.
The iml)ortance of private enterl)rise in Ill(" development of satellite comnllmications is
tile core of I)avid J. Whalen's offering. (kmventional wisdom, Whalen argues, holds that
tile government dewdoped satellite ctmmmnications technology, because industry was
either unwilling or unable to face the high costs and high risks of research and develop-
ment. Before the launch of Echo in 1960, private in(lustrx_notahly AT&T and IS'F--
invested substantial alnottnts ill satellite communications research and development and
exl)ected it> reap a profit. AT&T's lmrticipation in Project Echo was a flu-ther exlnessi<m
of its commitment it) and competence in satellite commlmicalions. AT&T--n<)t a
government lat>(watory--had tna<le that I)ossihlc.
The government curtailed AT&T's involvement in the developmetlt of satellite communi-
cations, according to Whalen, largely out of fear that AT&T wonld extend its terrestrial
teleconmumications mont)poly into space. The Kennedy adlninistrati<m, while not against
l)rivate industry, stood firnlly against AT&T enjoying a monopoly of space communications.
In some ways, this moment marked the beginning of the end of AT&T's monopoly. As
Whalen s() convincingly argues, the problem was not ;hi industry unwilling or tmable to face
the ('OSt_; and risks of developing satellite communicatitms svstems, but the eftorts o[ the gt)v-
ernment (including NASA) to restrain ;\T&T fiom exletl(ling its monopoly into space.
xxiii
Figure 4
The U.S.S. Kingspcn'l car_q_g thr /i_s! shipbrm_l satellite commu_lication_ station i_to the Pac!fi: m 1964. t%'viousl_,,tt_i_
_atellitestatiot_ had wrved in the [t/atttit m_d the Mediter_anea_t [¢_rmili/m 7 ¢ommuni_atio_ts via ,_,ytl:om.(CouI'Ius} of
NASA)
NASA checked the AT&T monopoly by awarding contracts to RCA and Hughes--not
AT&T--to build Relay and Syncom, respectively. Congress and the White House reaf-
firmed their belief in private enterprise by establishing a private corporation (Comsat)
through the Communications Satellite Act signed by President Kennedy in August 1962.
Nonetheless, the intent behind the creation of Comsa! was to ensure that any existing
telecommunications company could not establish a monopoly on space communications,
ahhough the new law did grant Comsat a monopoly on satellite communications.
Comsat's monopoly did not come to an end until the June 1972 decision by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that opened up domestic satellite communications.
Subsequently, Western Union launched WESTAR in 1973, and ComSat General launched
COMSTAR in 1975. The 1980s saw the launching of several hundred transponders for
domestic uses by ASC (:Mnerican Satellite Company), FORDSAT (Ford Aerospace),
GAIAXY (Hughes), GSTAR ((;TE), SPACENET (GTE Spacenet), SBS (Satellite Business
Systems), and Telstar (AT&T).
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Whalen's c<mtribution also considers (_()msat's sclecti<m of the ultinlate satellite orbit for
tile single global satellite conmnmicati<ms system that the firm was entrusted with creat-
ing. The choice was neither simple nor easy. AT&T and 1)oD f'avored the tried-and-true
medium-ahitttde satellite, while others, inchtding NASA, favored geosynchvolmUS satel-
lites. Tentatively, Comsat selected the geosynchronous Early Bird satellite, launched in
March 1.q6:3, attd only decided on the geosync]ll+ot|ous ,.)t+t)it afte, additional study con-
tracts and satellite design studies.
For the most part, howew'r, Whalen's paper sketches the role of private enterprise in U.S.
satellite Cotttllt/lllicatiqttls development. It is a tht-ead of develolmwnt, as with that of the
military or NASA, that sometimes intertwines with the other threads of developntent, but
often develops on its own. The (h.'veh)pment of satellite c onmtunications thus has not olte
unified past, but rather it retlects the sometimes c()nnected attd sometimes separate rela-
tionships amoYtlg those three threads.
Europe
Thesv three threads, however; illuminate the deveh>pment of satellite communications
only in the United Stales. Part lI, therefore, contains a second section, which addresses
the developmetlt of European satellite eo|nn|unications and the relationship between
U.S. and Eurol}ean satellite c<)mmunications. The view of European satellite commutlit:a-
lions p|esented I)y these c{mlvil)tllions ech{}es lhe ntultitaceted nature {}f U.S. satellite
communications develol}|nent.
Western Europe necessarily ti_llowed a different evohttionary pattern, shaped by each
country's distinct ctthure, politics, and economy, as well as by the nt<)ve toward Etnopean
integration that slatted after Vxbrld War II. }_+estel-n Europea|t nations created collective
organizations to achieve a variety of ends. The ('.ouncil of Europe, created in 1¢.14_.) with
headquarters in Strasl)ourg, France, provided metal)e,- states a political organization,
while the European (;oal and Sit:el (:otnnnulity, created in It,):")2, stimulated the produc-
lion of coal and steel by reducing trade barriers. The European Atomic Energ T
Conmmnity (known as Euratom) promoted joint exploitation of the peaceful uses of
atomic energ T, and the European Economic Commtmity (known as the Common Market),
cteated in 1957, sought to eliminate all economic barriers among meml)er states. Despite
the ntov<.' toward European integration, the diversity and passi<m of European national
politics cannot I)e overlooked.
Although Ettropc delayed humching its own satellite communications program, some
European cottnllics participated in U.S. ettovts. For exanlple, investigators ytt France's
national tch.((mmn|nications research center, the Centre National d'Etudes des
T6h"communications, received signals tnmsmiued from AT&T's Hohndel facility thai
bounced off Echo in Attgust l t.16(). _' Symphonic, a bilateral Franco-German communica-
tions satellite, preceded the 1978 humch of the first European communications satellite,
the ()vbiting Test Satellite. By then, however, Canada and several other countries had
satellite capacity, too.
_.). Jean P.F. \_v, "T(,h'.t ommunit aliollS spatiah's <'l Ivat_smisnions a _lalldt' distance pat satclliles al ti-
ficicls," l,'hM.slm' ,\rltio:ml," 13 (1!161): 1-16, csp. I1,
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Two key aspects of the development of satellite communications in Europe were the drive
toward European integration and cooperation with tile United Stales. The nalure and
extent of that cooperation was not at all ohvious to all European governments, especially
the French. Should a united Europe develop its own satellite launchers? Should Europe
institule its own system of satellite comumnicalions? The answers to those questions were
undeniably and necessarily coupled to tile character of cooperation with the United Stales.
As the 1960s hegan, lilt' United Stales held a monopoly on satellite commtmications--
a monopoly that would not ease possihly until the next decade. What AT&T was to U.S.
comnmnications, the United States was to Eurupean--and global--telecommunications.
A fllrther complication was the creation of a single global satellite communications sys-
tem, a goal the United States touted. In any unified global system, the United States wou'ld
have a donlinant place because of its lead position in the field and its monopoly on launch
vehicles. In negotiating with the United States over the creation of a global satellite com-
nnmicalions system, unity served Europeml interests well. The countries of Western
Emol)e decided Io negotiate its a hloc, not individually, its had heen the practice in past
lelecommtmications negotiations.
The European side of satellite communications development starts with a paper by Arturo
Russo on the beginnings of the Europeml effort to launch a communications satellite.
Referring to research performed for the European Space Agency (ESA) history project
wilh colleagues John Raige and Ix)renza Sebesta, Russo attempts to answer the question:
Why did it take such a long time to develop a European communications satellite program?
He tinds two major factors that liutited Europe's ability to act. The first was the institu-
tional framework. Getting the two muhinational European space organizations--the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European Launcher
Development Organization (ELDO)--involved in satellite conmmnications implied a
change in their purpose and progrmns, which was a difficult task. Strong disagreements
existed among EIJ)O n_ember states, and a European satellite commnnications effort
required a comprehensive international policy framework in which national econotnic
interests and political goals could be satisfied. The second factor was the question of
users--namely, the state telecommunications administrations. While interested in sup-
porting research and development studies of satellite c<mmmnications, these potential
users worried about the economic prospects of a European satellite system. The mlution,
Rttsso points out, came in the form of two so-called package deals--a pair of sweeping
agreentents that aimed to satis[_' national interests and trausformed ESRO's mission.
In none of the studies conducted did the economics of tile European satellite communi-
cations program demonstrate its potential to yield revenues in excess of costs. Russo
argues that the uhimatejnstification for the program's approval was a handflfl of noneco-
nomic factors, namely:
(1) the assertion oJEurope ) political and technolog4rrd independence from the two super-
powers, which was a ko, element particularly of the French government_, space polio';
(2) the reeogmition of the aerospace _ector as strategically important /br the development of
advanced industrial techmdogg'; (3) the need to quali]_ _European industry Jor competitive
participation in b_telsat procurement contracts; (4) the understanding that the Orbiting
7_,st Satellite attd European Communi_vztion Satellite pr%wams were the heart of an evolu-
tionary program leading to other application fieMs, such as aeronautical and maritime
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telecommunication.s, direct teh'vi_io, broadcastinL,, a,d Earth observation; (5) the watch
]or autonomy o[political a,d cultural expre._sion (rt_ the influential French ,ewspaper l,e
Monde declmvd i_l 1967: "The trrm.wni.s_ion O/ radio and television prog'rams i._rme _( the
too.st supple and dive_:_!/ied mean._ to a_sure a prese,ce and influence abroad'); a,d (6) the
!4eneral d_4ve toward lfumpea, ecrmomic and tech,ical i,tecration. I''
.Moreow'r, a key part of the European slory was Ihe negatixe role pla)ed by lhe various
national postal and telecommunications administrations. Working through liw European
Telecommunications Satellite (;ommiltee (known bv its French acronym (;ETS), Ihese
administrations opposed lhe i)lacement of a communications satellite over Emol)e,
althougll not above the Atlantic Ocean, on economic grounds: tile syslelll would not
nearly pay fi)r itself. ESRO then turned to the Etnope:m Broadcasting Union (EBU), a
frustrated customer of the national postal and telecommmfications administrations; as
operator of the Eurovision television hey, york, the EBU depended on its network of ler-
resn-ial cables. _,quql the EBU proposed to replace dmt terresnial network wifll a
European salellite, the deadlock (Teated t)v If'it national postal and telecommunications
administrations tinallv ended."
l,orenza Set)esta. also with the Emopean Space Agency history project, exmnines the impact
that the availability {}t U.S. launchers had on the development of European stUellile com-
munications. Ik'nsions between the Uniled Slales and the Soviet Union, as well as 1)etween
the Uniled States itll¢l Ftatlce, played a role, as well as the comnlonlv held lwlief that the
teclmological rese:uch ilecess;uy [of the develol)ment of a Eurol+eml launcher would stim-
ulate economic gl'OW1]l. Silt" p:tys close attention to Ihe intluence of U.S. policy on the
Etu-Ol)ean nations' decision Io design and build their own hmnchers--;md t)articularly to
the shifting (T.S. position on the ottk'ring of launcher lechnolog,n' and thcililies over time.
A nunlber of faclols shaf)ing tile developmenl of salellite communicaficms in Europe
emerge from Sebesta's perceptive smdv. She demonstrates Ihe interweaving of U.S. and
Eurol)ean satellite comnmnicalions policy. She also discusses how the Uniled States cotthl
use its (omman(ting I)Osilion 1o dominate lh¢' negolialions tha! led to lhe ere;ilion of
Intelsat (the ttmt)rella organization for the unit]cd global satellite (:ommunications sys-
tem) :tlad to g:t.rtleF ti)r U.S. industry, as a consequence of that commanding position, the
largest share of In/elsat contracts. The United States sought to impose its will on Etnol)e
through these negoli.ttions, CSl)ecially the clause relating to the creation of regional satel-
lite systems and the geographical definition of the European broadcast space. However,
the U.S. position was no! based solely on its teclmological and industrial lead; it was close-
lv associated with security concerns, specifically the transfer of sensitive technolo_' and
generally the NXI'O alliance. Sebesta sheds light, too, on some of file motives behind
NASA's attempts Io foster cooperation wifll its European partners, such as lhe desire to
charade1 fimding away [rom military ends and loward peacefifl uses of space. In lurn, fiw
example, West Germany hoped to acquire military-related technologies denied it by
treaties daling from the en(t of World War II.
10. Scc A]tmo Rttsso's ¢(mchtsion in (J+aptt't IO <d tiffs bo_)k, lilh'd "l.mm(hing the |'_utopt'an
Ttqt.¢ onmmni_ all,ms _alt'llite Ih,_ql am."
11. Ren(" ('..Ih'uc, "Sl);Uc (;otnmtmitalicms in l'Stlopc: th,x_ did w¢' Make it IlaplWn_," tl+stms a.d
]_'_hnolol,_ 9 (1992): _'3-9:_,.
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Sebestapointsoutthatnotonlywastherediscordanceoveracollectivesatellitecomnlu-
nicationspolicyamongWesternEuropeanstates,but that within those states discord
reigned. At the European level, France and Britain were at odds. France favored an inde-
pendent European launcher and had taken a number of steps to establish a .]_m_ deJiappe
separate fronl tile nuclear umhrella held out hy the United States through the NATO
alliance. Nonetheless, not everybody in France was in favor of a EtHopean launcher.
In contrast to the French position, the British generally favored collaborating with the
United States and relying on U.S. launch services. As with France, Britain was not tmified
on satellite communications policy. British disunity is the subject of Nigel Wright's contri-
bution. Scholars, he argues, haw_ tended to portray Britain as an obstructionist player,
holding up satellite communications development to protect its substantial investment in
tmderwater telegraph and telephone cables, and they have concentrated on the role of
the British Post Office to the exclusion of other government offices. Here, Wright focus-
es on the part played by the Foreign Office to illuminate the spectrmn of views that shaped
the British position on satellite commtmications vis-fi-vis Etnope and the United States.
_Aqfile British officials were aware of the potential threat that a U.S. satellite system posed
fi)r British cable interests, they did not act "automatically" to fiustrate early satellite devel-
opment. Rather, they viewed satellites and cahles as playing complementary roles, as
Daniel tleadrick notes in the case of cables and radio. Moreover, according to Wright,
many people both in and out of British government law)red construction of an indepen-
dent satellite system in collaboration with Europe and the British Commonwealth. The
Foreign Office, however, supported cooperation with the United States for diplomatic rea-
sons, mainly to preserve good relations with that country. The Ministry of Aviation, on the
other hand, backed an independent satellite system--a position arising fiom that min-
istry's role as Britain's voice in ELDO. The position of the British Post Office deriw_d
chiefly fiom its interaction with the membership of the Commonwealth
Telecommunications Partnership. The Post Office at first favored an independent
Commonwealth-European satellite system, believing that a satellite system controlled by
the United States (and serving mainly the highly profitable transatlantic telecommunica-
tions routes) would not meet Commonwealth needs. Thns, Wright manages a convincing
argument that opposes the established historiographyinamely, that with the exception
of the Foreign Office, British governnlental agencies early on preferred a satellite system
independent of the United States.
The lion's share of deliberations between Western Europe and the United States over satel-
lite communications took place within the framework of negotiations over the creation of
a unified global satellite colnmunications system--what eventually came to be called
lntelsat. In 1972, Jonathan E Galloway exanfined those negotiations from a policy studies
perspective, shortly after their resolution in the Intelsat Definitive Agreements signed in
May 1971. '2 I-Ie returns a quarter century later, in this w_lume, to reconsider those events
and his conclusions.
(;alloway finds that Iris original theines "remain very relevant, despite the more coh>rfnl
and even dramatic new vocabulary introduced by the likes of Newt (;ingrich, the Toffiers,
and Kenichi Ohmae." Thcsc themes are as folh>ws:
12. Jonathan E (;alloway. The Politic_ aml 7_,thnology o] Satellite Communi(ations (Lexington. MA:
Lexington Books, 19721.
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" Revolutionary or evolutionary technological change
• The breakdown of harriers between making and understanding foreign and domestic
policy
• Models of rationality in policy-making appropriate It) changing contexts
Seeking It)understand the decision-making process, (;alh)way considers the mixture of
cooperation, competition, and conllict manifested by the lntelsat negotiations as eluding
understanding at the global ()rcomprehensive level, because they operated in a way that
was "pragmatic, incremental, and muddled." Indeed, he asserts, "The world is not a tidy
place. There is chaos, and at the edge of chaos one new world order is not emerging. S()
it was in the fiwmative period of satellite communications. ''_'
As for the development of satellite commtmications, (;alloway takes the reader through
the maze <ffagencies rest)onsit)le for establishing U.S. satellite contnnmications policy and
tor determining the country's hargaining position vis-a-vis the httelsat negotiations. While
Russo, Sebesta, and Wright present the Ettropean rationale, Galloway presents that of +the
United States. a ln+_jor obstacle in those negotiations was the U.S. penchant for privately
owned telecmnmunicati<ms monopolies. Ifat private company, such as (;omsat, were to
enter into negotiations with foreign governments over satellite communications poliQ.
what would he the role of government? ttow woukt the State Department, the Pentagon,
or the F(;C participate in those negotiations? Galloway explores these questions and shows
how riley influenced U.S. satellite commtmications discttssions with Europe. Traditionally,
European state telecomtnunicatiollS adntinistrations had contracted on it hilateral hasis
with AT&T, not the U.S. government. With the creation of Comsat, XI'&T was out of the
negotiating picture, but Europeans still expected to negotiate with it private business.
Although the U.S. military had been developing passive space contmunications tech-
niques since the 1950s, I)ol) use of the civilian satellite systent was resolved in 1964.
I htwevcr, actor(ling to (;alloway, this issue arose again on more than one oc(,tsion, ht the
end, l)oD bought satellite access f?ttm (',onlsal. As with the Intelsat negotiations, the
Pentagon's use of civilian satellites involved both domestic and foreign considerations. In
a final section, (;alloway discusses Soviet satellite communications and the diplomatic
motives behind the creatitm of an Intelsat clone known as Intersputnik. In this context,
the theme of state versus bttsiness interests echoes, as the Soviet Union proposed a world
satellite svstent that only states, not private entities such as (]OlnSat, could join. This posi-
tion was equally an expression of Cold War diplomacy.
The Unfolding of the World System
Geography, Politics, and Culture
Part III contains the themes of the third stage of satellite comnnmications development
and consists o[ two sections. The first addresses the geographical growth of satellite cont-
munications, while the see(rod considers satellite applications. By examining the growth
of satellite communications in North America (Canada and Cuba) and Asia (China, India,
anti htdonesia), the first section draws attention to the inlhtence of geography, politics,
13. St'<' thc intmdtt(to, }. p;ua_lal)hs in .].nathan 1:. (;allowas. "()riginatinR (]ommunit alions Satellite
S'_sI_'IIIS: |hc [llt(T;l{ Iil)ll% Ot TcchnoloRi(al (;llitllR(',])()lll('%ti(" P_lili( s, filial Folcign IMlicv," whi(h is t_ll;Ipl01 l_{
of this book,
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andcultureonsatelliteconunnnicationsdevelopmenti lhoseregions.Aboveallelse,
though,thepapersimplicitlyhighlighttilecreationoftheglobalsatellitesystemcountry
by country.
Among the first countries t¢, establish domestic satellite connntmications systenls were those
that span vast distances, such as the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, China, and
India. Snch vast nation-states require a unified national telecommunications network, and
satellites serve that need efficiently and effectively. Bert C. Blevis, drawing on his personal
experience in the field, outlines the case of Canada. Appropriately, he begins with the
ionospheric research that preceded satellite communications efforts; early Canadian satel-
lites continued that research tradilion. As in the United States, Canadian investigators
considered lunar and meteor commtmications techniques. That work merits additional
exploration by scholars to provide a greater understanding of the origins of satellite com-
tnunieations.
Political decisions were important in the shaping of Canada's satellite communications
program. As Blevis notes, Canada did not follow the U.S. or European lead in deveh)ping
its own launchel, relying instead on those of NASA and ESA. The governnlenl was not
unaware of the econonlic benefits of supporting a space l)rogranl, however, hi 1963, the
Cana(tian government decided to transfer space technology from the Defence Research
Telecommunications Establishment to industry. Also, after the 1967 (]hapman rel)ort rec-
ommended encouraging the Canadian space industry, the (_ommunications Technoh)gy
Satellite program sought to improve Canada's satellite and spacecraft design and mann-
t_tcturing capability. While Blevis addresses geographical and political questions in his
overview of Canadian satellite communications developnlent, the impact of satellites <m
Canadian cuhure remains for a flmlre study. The apparent strength of the resurgent
Frcnch separatist movement in Quebec argues against the nolion that satellites tend to
homogenize national cultures.
Fronl Canada we turn to China--another country that occnpies a large land nlass, not to
mention a tonrth of the world's population. Zhu Yilin, a member of the Chinese Academy
of Space Technolog T, provides an overview of satellite communications development in
thai country. Geography was a key factor, but, unlike the United States and Canada, China
lacked an extensive national telecommunications systenl until tile inauguration of its satel-
lite program. The cuhural and political impact of satellites in China, therefore, has been
all the more dramatic. Satellite connnunications served to establish a national edncation-
al television network, provided long-distance telecomnnmications, an(t assisted in the
nlodernization of tile cOtnltry's banking system. The use of nationwide television broad-
casts to foster political unity and to insert the Be{jing political line into each and every vil-
lage cannot be overlooked.
Yet another geographically large country to establish a domestic satellite communications
system is India. Participation in the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE),
carried out in cooperation with NASA, and India's first communications satellite, INSAT,
fornl the heart of tile contribution by Raman Srinivasan. I)rawing from research carried
out for his doctoral dissertation, Srinivasan shows llow India's earliest experiences with
satellite commnnicati<ms served as a flflcrttnl for social and cuhural change and econom-
ic development during a critical period in that country's evohltion.
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SH'E was a massive exl)erinwnl in social engineering. It involved placing televisions in
5,000 remote villages, some of whicl) lacked electricity. One of Ihe major challenges to
making the experiment work was to create six hours of programming every day. SITE also
proved "dud in inculcating technical and managerial expertise necessary [br India to cre-
ate its own domeslic satellite syslem, known as INSNF. This syslem was geared to serw"
rural India; a weathm s'¢stem was added specifically It) aid tin-reefs.
Brian Shoesnfith draws on his research as a mcdia sch()lar to discuss India and (:hina, as
well as Indonesia, and highlights the inHuence (if cuhure and polilics in the Asian "medi-
ascape." The signiticance (if satellites is their al)ilily to undermine slate control cJf mt'dia
and to force g<)vermnents to rethink their t)foadcasling and comnmnic,_tions policies.
Because Asian satellites have broad footprints, sometimes cowwing Ihe entire Eurasian
land mass, politicit] btmndaries and geographical ]fil)dlat)t:t,s are SUl+inomlted.
I"I)(" develol)menl of salcllile communications in Asia, according I() Shoesmilh, took pla(c
in three stages, all of which arc linked u) the d()minant trends in the gr()wlh (if left,vision
on the contirmnt. In the livsl stage, from 1962 It) the I(.)80s, satellil('s were perceived its a
tool of social engineering in devc]()ping econ<mfies. Stage lwo spans the late l(.)80s and
was characterized by the response of Asian governments to tilt, end (if thc Cold War.
The third stage, 1991 to the present, is dislinguishcd l)y the dominan(e (if comnu'rcial
considerations.
Shoesmith makes some cog, enl ol)servali(ms. Rather than killing off old media technolo-
gies, such as newspa|)e/s, salellites have actually r('i1_forced (hem, espi'cially tit(' vernacu-
li(l" pfess. Satellites, ill()leOVel, have II()l [)rot|it)led lhe ]lOlll()gelliZali()ll t)l standavdizalitm
supposedly inherent in the lechnolog9', In a(ldifi<)n, Sh()esmilh Ilt)les tha! the gr()wth (if
satellite-related applications in Asia has resuhed from it linking (if Western techn()h)gQ' and
local capital.
The intro(tuction of satellite communications into (',anada, (:hina, and India served an
iHll)Ol'lltnl internal need I)y providing tclec<)lllllllllli('aliolls services ('fl]cienllv alld efli,c-
lively over a vast exl)anse c)| territory. Sate]lil(' c()mmtmi(iltions als<) linked counlries it)
each oflwv. Maintaining communicalions links with the rest (if the wt)vld is m<)sl (rici('al
for island nations. The case of (]tlba illushates this geopolitical Feqt|ilelnent, its w('ll as
some of the eullura] a/ld political aspecls of satellite COlllllllltlJcalJotlS in it cottnlrv that has
been a member of both the lnterspuhfik and lntelsal of_allizaliollS.
.]os_" Ahshuler, drawing on his extended tesearch into the history <)t electricity, and his
participation in the (;ul)an space l)rogram, begins wil]l St)hie ttseftl] 1)ackgr<)und (m long-
disla.twe shortwave radio ('ommutlications and an ingentt()tts altem]3t Io Yelay the telex'i-
s|on broadcast of Ihe World Series l)asel)all games I() (',ul)a via an airplane. Radio also
linked (:uba t() Eastern Eurol)e and tither c()umries heft)re si:tl(.,llil+,'s became availahh,.
The creation of the Soviet satellite system, s('paral(" from lhal COlllFOlled I)y ]tllelsat, pro-
vided Cuba its |hsl experience wilh satellite communications, beginning in 1(.)7!{.
Howeven lntersl)umik provided only limited coverage until the rel)lacenlenl o[ lit("
Molrtiya series with (h(" gi'ostatJo)lary | |orJzotlt and Statsiol)ar satellites.
The Molniya satclliles had 1)ten placed in it highly elliplical orbit, Ihe so-(alh'd Molniya A
orb|l, which made them visible ovt'v it wide area (if Soviet territories fi)r al)oul eight hours
a day. The Molniya A orbit was l)euer suited li)r (<)verage (if tlt<' Soviet Uni(m titan a
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geostationaryorbit.It coveredareasgeoslationarysatellitescouldnotserve,andlaunch-
esfromhighlatitudesmoreeasilyenteredthisorbitthanageostationaryorbitoverthe
equator.TheMolniyasatelliteswereusedfortelephoneandfaxservicesandto distribute
television programs from a central point near Moscow. During the 10 years following the
launch of Molniya I, twenty-nine more were placed in orbit.
Historian Roberto l)iaz-Martin continues Altshuler's discussion of Cuban satellite com-
munications. A technological difficuhy that arose as a consequence of Cuba joining the
socialist bloc was the switch from NTSC to SECAM. Cuban television, which dated from
the 1950s, used the NTSC broadcast standard and operated on 110 w_lts at 60 hertz, while
SECAM receivers required 220 volts at 50 hertz, the European standard. In the end, geo-
graphical and cultural tactors decided in favor of NTSC, the standard used hy most
Caribbean countries. Using SEC&M would have isolated Cuba from its neighbors. Diaz-
Martin also relates how Cuba joined Intelsat, as well as some of tim cuhnral uses (program
exchanges) of satellite communications.
Atcpticatio..s
Departing from the preceding discussions of the development of satellite communica-
tions systems, the second section of Part III examines satellite applications--that is, the
ends to which people use the comntunications capability made available by satellites. This
topic is sufficiently hroad in scope as to merit its own vohnne. Howevel; we present three
case studies of satellite applications in the fields of education, medicine, and mobile com-
munications, as well as their integration into corporate strateg T.
Joseph N. Pehon discusses Project SHARE (Satellites fi)r Heahh and Rural Education),
which he conceived as lntelsat's director of strategic policy to commemorate the organi-
zation's twentieth birthday. The program makes free satellite capacity available to provide
health and educational services to rural and remote areas. Project SHARE provided a
fresh fi'alnework tbr international cooperation and engendered dozens of projects that
affected nearly 100 countries and millions of people. Currently, fifty countries participate
in Project SHARE.
Pehon concludes that the most successflfl progrants were those designed and developed
by the participating country. The technolo_, that made the program succeed, especially
in the rural areas where it was most needed, opposes the dictum that "big is beautififl."
Small, low-cost ground pieces of eqnipment--nol the large ground stations and heaxy
streams of traffic that typify satellite communications--were best suited to delivering edu-
cational and medical services to rural and remote districts. Tiffs technolog 3, was part of a
larger satellite communications "revolution" that saw a number of new services and
ground technologies enterge.
.Mnong the satellite applications perceived as new is mobile communications. Edward J.
Martin draws on Iris personal experience in this field to discuss the development of mobile
satellite communications from the 1950s to the present. He begins with hmar relay cont-
munications and Project West Ford. Just as an airplane served to relay the World Series
between Miami and tlavana, one of the earliest tests of mobile communications involved
the use of an airplane.
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Martin relates the ;udttous struggle" to create ;In ahcraft-lo-satellilc navigation and com-
municmions system, called Acvosm, t)[qWt+<.l] It.)(i_ _llld 1975. Several t_tctovs l]'untl'_llt'd ;IIR[
0vontli;tl|y dOOlnCd _ttlUli]pls If:, bring Acrosal to lift.':
• The lack of a unified policy within the Federal Aviatioil Axhninistration (I£-L&)
• European Ol)p<)siti<>ll to the prosl>eCt of U.S. dotninmion in an_,tht'r satellite applicalion
• l)isagreetllenl t>n which hcqucncy band It> use
• The failure to includ¢' Iht' airlines in tilt" princess
Itthe airline indusuv c<mld not ]c:dizc a salellitt' system, the m;tritinlt _ trade was mort suc-
cessfifl, l)c,-haps l)ccatlst' the cFi_;>rl l)t'g,tn h] 1066 tmdt'r the :t¢'gis of lht' United N,tlioi]s"
lnlcrnution:t] Maritime (]onsttltalivc ()r_anization, which inclttdcd (Iclcgatcs [lOltl the
w<_vld's majoF sc;ti_lriilg cottt]trics. '[']]t+ restt]l ,.v_ts Int]iarsat (hllt+rIt_iti<+tl_d M_irilinic
Salt|lilt ()r_uiizati<in--latt'f the w<_rd "Mobile" would bc substitulcd t_)r "Nlaritinic"),
A|lt.r i-t'l_tiili_ iht" iiiililil |lrot)h,iiis lltct'd 1)1 ]liili_liSlil, Mttrlill coiisidt'rn lilt" Ol'_CtiliZ_lli<lii'_+
t'×tt+nsioil ii/Io itt'ronltlllit'_ll scrvict,s.
hi the last |)apt!r, M(:l's ]lisloriatl, Adam
I,. (',|lit'n, C)Gllliin('s lilt' tlst" of COlllilltllli-
cltlion sitlt'lliit_s l))' lh;tl I!.+. it'lcc<llilniliili-
('itti()lis ||FIll. :\hilotl_h not it i)r</I]l_it)l('
vt'llliiit ", the t()ltip;in)"+ lilt" <if satt'llitcs
x++'_lsII()l {t iilisl;tkt'; it was it IIU(+t!s_,;.ll) ' pal-t
of it g-I+C+llt't ' ;illtl d_'lil>t'r_ltc btlsint'ss
,+.+cllt'int'. Ilid_'t'd, M(;I kilt';++ ' ill;il it wits
_lcquirillg ;t illOill'):-l_lsin_ t'lilt'l'pl'iSl_"
(S:ttt'llil0 BUSill¢'s++ _}slt'lllS), Scliol_ti"+ who
<;oiisidcr <lilly tilt' iliilncdi_itt + ])r<ltllabilit) +
<if corp<lr:llt' ,_lr+tlt',_-it's ++ll_>/il<| l_ikt' ilt't'd+
(;ivt,n lite I)v a t:Otilt dt,cision, M(]I iit,,t'd-
i'd lo bu'ild it lt'lt't-itll/llitlliil';iliilns
ilclWol'k quickly, ttct+c, we |flight st'l" ;I
parallel with (]}liil_l, witicil a(quircd it
tl_ilionwidl' lt!lt't<iiilniilnitiitioll+ _)'P+I('IIi
;ihil_lsl iil_+iltillltticou_+lv tIv llitllichili_ _l
{'Ollililililit'illioll_, salcllitt', M(]I ili_ili+i_t'-
lilt'ill cotlsidcrt'd iw<l teclln<ll<_i_'s, s_tlt'l-
litcs and i]l/cr optics, ;Lind opted I_/r both. (;rllt'll ;<tl+l.(ilt'S that MC]l's |)ltfClillst" o| S+ttcllilt'
Btisint,ss +)'sit'ills it;is Io tit + iindcrnlotld within lilt" conlc,'+.l of l{t_()s t)u,_illt-ss |)r_tclict's,
wlit'n l;ik('oVt'l,_, corpora-tit+ l++lidt'r+, .junk t)oiids, lind pension |)hindering Wt'lt" COllllllOll,
Tll dt!lt'iid itself +lg+tiilsi it tlttslii_+ ink_'ovci +, M(]I ilt:qilif/'d "sh+ti+k rci)cil¢'iH" in lilt" t_>rill <if
it stock salt' to IBM. Pvl(]l's purcl+ase of Siitelliic _tl,_illt'_,_+ +v_,l¢'lii+, partly owiit'd I))' IBM,
_ave ii littess Io lh_il tillll'_ |)ll+ili+.'_P+ cti_,lOllit'r,_. ,,\+_ (il+llCn ctlill.'hldc+, "()lit" IllIs Io ill" will-
int4 to exp+u+ld ont"s dothlitioil of f)rolillibilit) ' fFOlll lilt" li;ilT()W I]'_tlil(" of I't'ltll'l+i-l>ll -
iilvt+_+lilicill to lhl" Ifi<_gcr l)iCltlrP. "t+
ll+ S,,c tit( +i(lil( lunil_il ,)1 (]haptct 27 ()t lilts I>()+_kI)x Ad_iin I. (,i tictl, "N_'I (;:till; ']h(' I 'st >,+l S+tl,'llitt's
_il M( ;I."
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(;ruen's paper also echoes the cable-versus-radio theme addressed by t teadrick, ahhough
with MCI, as with Nigel Wright's discussion of British satellite communications, it was a
matter of cables versus satellites. The two technologies today have found their niche based
on the advantages of each over the other. Whereas cables are best suited to point-to-point
circuits, satellites provide point-to-multiple-point service. Also, the cost of cable circuits
increases with distance, while satellite circuit costs are independent of distance between
ground terminals. Satellites, too, can ford physical and political barriers that impede cable
placement, and satellites are uniquely suited to mobile commtmications.
Conclusion
The contributions to this volume do not begin to exhaust the subject of satellite commu-
nications development; that would be impossible given the present state of" research.
Nonetheless, the papers that follow present a broad, hut systematic survey of the devel-
opment of satellite communications. It is hoped that this book will stimulate readers to
tm<lertake flesh research, adwtncing knowledge in this field and leading eventually to the
writing of a synthetic work. In addition, one can hope that a benelicial interaction
between scholars and practitioners will be part of that synthetic work.
Appended to this voh|me are two aids fi)r understanding the development of satellite com-
munications. One is a chfonolog3_ of key events synthesized fi'om timelines submitted by
this book's contributors, as well as from selected works on the subject. The other is a list
of suggested additional readings on the development of satellite communications. Those
wishing complete technical details on satellites, or a list of satellites currently in service,
should consuhJayne's or NASA's Satellite Situation Report, published hy the (;oddard Space
Flight Center.
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PART I:
Passive Origins

Chapter 1
Radio Versus Cable: International
Telecommunications Before Satellites
by Daniel R. Hcadrick
The currcnl rivalry belwccn satellites and tiber optic cabh's in long-distance and itm',-
('OllliIICllI_l] (c]c('Ollllllltni('_tliOll is 1101 l|lC [/1"5;I (',_I.+';,t' ()t I",VO technologies covxisting 1o mvcl
a sinfilar d_'tmmd. (;_msid('r trucks versus railroads, cat)It v¢'rsus 1)road(-ast tch+vision, and
IIIC, Vi<.'s VCI'SIIS ",,'i(|coS. NOIIlCIilIICS I]IC 1WO rival technologies coexist bc(atlS(" I]lCy C()lllt)]('-
m¢'tH ca(-h other, such :is lrucks and railroads. In other (ases, they compete unlil one
displaces the olht:r, such as sleanlships for sailing ships. By studying atl cal+lieY rivah+v in
illlClcontillcllla] tch'c<)nlllltlni(+aliOllS--llalllCl'+ ', that I)ctwc('ll sllblllal-inc lclcRraph cal)lcs
and radi<_teleg,aphy in the ill+St half of this <.t'nttu),iwc inav lind some paralh'ls and
tiuitful insiRhts into the currcnl rivalry l)clwt'en satelliles and til)cr optic cables.'
Intercontinental Telecommunications Before 1907
Bctorc 1907, all intc,confincntal tclecom,ntlnications used submarine telegraph
cal)l('s with :t COpl)_'r core instflatcd with gtttta-pcrcha and pzol<.'ct¢'d it)-+,:,m armor of iron
wires. Sulmlarim' cabh's, in tttrn, werv svilollvln(+tts with an owrwh¢'htfitlg British p,c-
p()lldCt-atllCC ill t|lC itm+rnalional telccom,nunications ])ttsincss. Thus ill 190<% British firms
()wtl('d 5(+._2 l)ct+ccnt of the w(>rl(t's submat+in( ` cable tl('tw()tk, (<)mpar('d with a I!.S. sll:ue
ot +l!L5 ])crccnt and a Ft+en(+h share of !L.t ])cr('ent.: Taking into ac('otmt the commcr(ial
use <)f (ables, tit(+ British shar(' shrinks, 1)('(aus(' th(* most h('avilv usc'd (al)l('s across the
Atlantic b<+'hmgcd to two Amcri(:an titres, Vfestcrn Uni(m and (_ommcrcial Cable: in 191 I,
\%'slcrn l/ni()n leased the last two cables owned I)v British thms.' ]t+ h`owever, w_' focus on
the military and politi('al value ()t cat)los, Britain had an cvcn grt'alcr advantage than its
share indicates, for t_:t_ r torcign cables passed thr<m+.lh Britain o]- its colonies; lhc domi-
llalll British th+ms, Eastt'ln and Associated Tch'gl+al)h (_oml)anics, conlrollcd bolh tim
Danish tclt:graph lhm l]lat opcralcd the land lines from Ettropc across Russia to (_hina
atnd the American co,npatly Ihkttt ot:,¢'ratcd the Amczica,l lYansl)aci[]c cablc.'
I. This papt'r is ha+,cd <m Daniel R. I h'adrick, The lp+vi+ibl+' W+,apo*J. 7}'lec.mm++ttigalioT++ +tPld I_+l+'_++ati+++++d
I'+diti+:_. 1++_1-19'15 (Nt"+v Y<>rk: Oxlbrd Utfi'+msitv Press, 1991 ).
i>p. 3-t-3B+
3. ('+hal h's lhighl, "Extension .I Sttlm_arim' Telvgraph', in a Quar_m (_enlm +x."E_+,g_e_,riP_Magr_:iP_ 16
7;,[t_._apt U. 77_' 7)at_salla_lic ¢.'r*/_/_,_!/1_¢66 (Satz I"zancis(_: Nalll l_+l;lll( is((i Pl cs_,, 1{171)), (}1+ ]; Alvin F. tLulm_, OM
I_,'m'_ e*t_d .\'e+t, I_,ke*,e_: The tlisto U o/the "l_le_..raph, 7_'lephot_e ¢_t_/ l+,_eb'_ (Ne_ "fi_]k: Appicton4',cnlu_}. l_.);+,(i),
t25-_8; (,cz aid R. M. (;azTdll, ()t*_' tl_M**'d }}'a*x o/,Sul_n_ar_*_e (,}d,l+<_ (l_ondon: t I.M.S.()., I_+tBO), .q,(I; Kcilllt'lJl R.
] laight. ()+hb_+t+ips a_+d L_+l/Illl_lFill,+'Cables (Washit]gtm_, l)(_: t :,F,. t ndt'tst'as (iahh' (_orporali_m. 19{i8). i)1 ). 311_-21.
,l. ()n Iht' l+,_itish table nt,lwl)]k, sc,p Ilugh I+,a_t',-KinR. (;i_l/,' I¢_**M the /_a_lh: 7"/*_"._to_ T o  (,'e_/_h" _.'_d
t_7_'l,'_ a_M it_ I%,d_,_,s_o_:_ to Me_rl; the (;_wup'_ ]l_bihr. 10291979 (l,<mdon: ] |CillCiilatllll+ 1_.)7!_). ()n their stlatcgic
value, st'c Paul M. Kctmcd',< '*hnpt'rial ('+al)lc (:onmmni_ atim_s aud Str:m.u-,, 1879-1':_1 I," lC_£_li_/_ lli_lor_+a116"+,/e_t'
8(; (1_171): 7_S-B_.
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It is important to understand this preponderance because it gave Britain the power to
scrutinize, censor, or ban toreign telegrams around the world--a power thai it first exer-
cised during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. This power naturally irritated Britain's
rivals, France and Germany. Around the turn of the century, both countries tried to build
up rival submarine cable nctworks--a hopeless endeavol; for cables were too costly and
remained vulnerable to cutting by British cable ships in the event of war. What the world
learned dtuing the turn of the century, an<l even more clearly during World War I, was
that international communication was not just a lechnolog)' or a husiness, but an instru-
ment of power in lhe rivalry hetwcen nations.
The Era of Complementarity:
Cables and Radio, 1907-1927
Gugliehno Marconi did not invent radio all by himself, but he certainly was the tirst
to think of commercializing it as a communications system. His first customers, not sur-
prisingly, were the British and Italian navies, the major shipping companies, and Lloyd's
of I:)ndon insurance. Thus, he created--and quickly occupied--a new niche in telecom-
munications. Marconi had greater aml)itions, howevm; for he wanted to create a global
telecommunications nem'ork that would rival the Eastern Telegraph Company's subma-
rine cable network. In 1907, he opened the first transatlantic stations at (;lifden, Ireland,
and (;lace Bay, Nova Scotia, challenging the cahles on their home ground."
Some countries adopted radiotelegraphy without Marconi's help. The German gov-
ernment encouraged its two electrical equil)ment manufacturers, Siemens and AE(;, to
tound a new compan}, Telefunken, to provide equipment and service to German ships.
By 1906, Telefimken began building a gigantic station near Berlin to communicate with
North Anterica and the Gerlnan colonies in West Africa. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Na_ T
buih a station in Arlington, Virginia, which was the first of a chain able to reach any ship
in tll(, North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. r
During this period, radio not only reached ships at sea, but it also competed with
cables between land locations. The COml)elition, however, was restrained for both eco-
nomic and technological reasons. It musl be remembered that long-distance radio during
that period used hmg winces--that is, wavelengths measured ill kilometers with frequencies
of 100 kilohertz or less. Propelling such waves across an ocean required enormous and
_'_, Charlcs I,csagc, La _ivalil+; /ian¢a-bdlanniquc: lws _db&_ _mtg-malipl_ alh'maud_ (Paris: ['Ion, 1915); Avtm
Kuncl I, (h<whi+hle del deut_chen I'_'r_tmddekal#,l. II. 7;,h,g'_*tphe_l-Neekabe[ (( ;c_lognc-Mfilhcim: l_u'l ( ;litschcr, 1962). ()n
<ablcs an<l lhc glcat-i)m+'cr rivahics al the ttlrH of lilt' (t'nlul _, scc I [cadrick, '/'he lnvi_ibl*" B_'apon, chs. 5 aud fi.
{;. Hugh (;:]. Ailkcn, ,S)'ntony and Spark: The ()riAqn_ r4 Radio (Pvim'cton: Princeton Uniw'rsi[v Press,
1985), pp. 218-32, 286-D(I; Rowland E Po{ock, The Iqat(_, Ihqti_h Radio I_Mughy (Man<'hcstcr: Manchester
lTnivcrsity Press, 19b18); W.E]olly, Marconi (New _wk: Slcin & l)ay, 1972), pp. 32-91; W:]. Baker, A llistorv tJt the
Marconi Colnpany (l,mMon: Mcthucn, 197(I), pp. 25-51; Rowland l;. Po(<wk and (;cram R.M. (;avratL The
Origins o[ Marilimc Radio (I:m<lon: [ |.M.S.O., 1972), i>l). 34-44.
7, On the I)cginnings M" (;crman ladiolch'graphy, scc I ]crm;dlm Thurn, Die k)+nhentelel4rt_phie, 5th cd,
(l,cipzig and Berlin: B.(;. ']_'ubncr, lglb_); "Tclcfunkcn-Chr<mik" in I:e.slstlllift zum 50jiihrigen Jut:'iliium det
Telefunken (;e._dl_,hafi /ii_ drah/&_e Telegrapla'e m. b. H., special issue o[ Tel(fitnken-Zeitang'26 (May 1953): 133-47.
On lhc early years ot American radio and the Nax T, scc Susan .l" Douglas, Inventing ,,tmertca*_ Broadcastinlz+
1899-1922 (Baltimolc: Johns tlopkins Univc_siw, Press, t9;g7); (]aplain l.mwood S. Itowcd_, ttiqm-_, oJ
Communicatio*_.s-l:Tlectmnicg _, the l _nited State_ Na*_) (Washington. DC: Bureau of Ships and ()flicc of Naval Hismt )',
19(_3); Hugh (;:I. Ailkcn, The ('ontinuou_ W<n,e: T+'rh+mbJ£,) am1,4mema_+ Radio, 190(]-1932 (Princeton: l'rin('cton
University Press, I':tRS). ()n lhc inlpa(t of hmg-wa_c nadi<_ on inh'rnali(mal politics up io 1919, see Hca<h'ick, The
lnvi_ibh' B}'apoa, _hs. 7-9.
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costly stnlions. The French station buih at St|in|e-Assist after World War l, for instance,
had an amenna supported by 1(5 towers, each one of which was alntost its high as tit(" Eiffi'l
tower. Moreover, the station c<msumed 1,000 kilowatts of electricity, its mttch its a small
town. The cost wits stttpendotts. A pair of transatlantic start<ms cost up to $4 million dol-
lars-at a time when a Model-T atttom<d)ilc cost $300. A transatlantic cable in that same
period cost $7 million.
Across the Atlanlic, the lwo technol<>gics were l+airly evenly balanced, fin if radio was
slightly cheal){'r, cables were more reliable, worked 94 hours a (tlt)', and were ]('ss vuhwra-
hie 1{:. Sl{}l'mS {)1"equipment failures. As radi<} technt>h}go' iml)r{}v<.'d--m<}ving from spark
transmitters to ;ll'(.'s and alternatt>rs att{I then to vacuum tubes--st} did cable technolo_'--
tirst with Ieg(ql(qative repealers and atttontalic printers alld then with loaded cables and
tinw-division nuthiplexing that could can-v a higher vohtmc than their 1)leW;:tl pt-edeces-
SOFS.
During W<wld War I,every cable and radi<+slati<mwas fullyoccttpbrd"e,,ifllmi imty and
wat+-related traffic. Ahhough the lwo technol<>gies were evenly matched teclmologically,
after lhc war radiotelegraphy grad|tally expand('d its market share. By 1923, the Radio
('.(>rl)Oration of America (RCA), toundt'd l)y (;eneral Electric and lit(" U.S. Nax T, ha(t cat)-
lured 30 percctH of the Not+th Atlautic traffic and 50 percent of the Pat|lit lraftk. _ The
l'(';t+sotl +,+.+'asnot technical supefi<)fity; it was becattsc thu cables were all operalinR to capac-
ity in those years, and it took tnttch hmger Io llt'+' cables than Io build radio transmitters.
Radiotelegraphy politicized tclecommtmications even tnote than had been the case
tmtorc dr|ring pea(etinm, fin it oh|raged the playing field 1)ctwcen nations. (;ermany had
lost its cables in the war. I_,fitain's radio c<mlpany, Marconi, was imshcd out of lhc
Antericim market by (;eneral Electric and the U.S. Na,, T. The British govcrnlllent, ill (]nan-
cial straits and ah+eadv well connected to its "en|pirc" by cables, hesitated to sttbsidizc
radio. In contrast, Ffance, which had fi'w ('abh.'s, invested h<.'avilv in radii) It) bypass the
British cabh" network. And in th+:' United States, where demand was greatest and capital
was abun([anl, investors were eager to ])ul their m<mey into radio enlcrpt+ises. '' Th(" r('stth
"+,,+itsthat by 1923, the United SlaWs had 3,400 kilowatts of high-1)<wcered hmg-distance sta-
lions+ France had 3.150 kilowatts, and the British Empire had (mlv 7()0 kil<),ecalls, hardly
more lhan d,tdeated (k.nnany's {-_()(1kilowatts. > I+,vitain's erstwhile f)t+ed,_:,l+ninance in glob-
al tclec<mmntnications ha(t vanished.
The Shortwave Revolution
In 1924. it bon|l)sltell overturned the cozy modus vivendi between cable and radio:
shortwave radio. Ironically, it +,,+'itsthe rest,h of efforts by the same ntan who had |nit-o-
dttccd long-wave radio lhirty years earlier: (;ttgliehno Marconi. The lechnolog_ +,which is
well ktlovcn, is not discttsscd here. Its economic impacl, however, is not well understood,
and the politics Ix,hind it+ <.W('ll less."
8. ()n Iht' _uigins ot R('.\. sv<' Aitkcn, Th,,' ([._+li*+um+ +, l'_.,t,+'. ('hs. (;-8: Rohcll Sol:,cl, R(_A (Nov, York:
Stein & 1)a}, 1986); Kcnnclh I+,ilb_,, Tilt' (,,+'*++'_r,'l.'I)a+,id ._;a_ no[[ and I/le tli',; r4 t/+; (+'um:nu+ii+alirmx lmtu_l U (Nm.. York:
I lalpt't & Row, 198(_).
9. ()It It'lt'conlnlmficati_ms ;rod imelnati<mal _onllicls afler World War I, s,:',r |t,eadri_k. The lm,i',ibh'
H}.,tpon. (h. 10.
I0. Sir (:ha|los Bright. "'T]w l-hnlmt,',.+ "I't.]egfaph and 1 fade.'" bbrDteghtl'_ l{m,i,,'w 113 (192'.:;): t57-7.t.
1 I. ,";t't' l)anicl R. ][cadti(k, "Nhorlwavt. Radio and its Iml)a{I on ]ntCl ilattiOll;t] Tel<,conlnnuli(ali,ms
I)_.'IW(+UII the \'Vars," ///sl. 0 aml "/i'_ h,'*r_/_/..,7,,11 (1':t91 ): '-' I-'._2: I t,rad. Rk. "/'1,_, lm,isib/, +Weal.,... (It. I I.
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In tile tall of 1924, Marconi dispatched exl)erimemal shortwave sets to several places
around the world. Transmissions tYom England were received ill Canada (Montreal),
eM'gentina (Buenos Aires), and Australia (Sydney), twenty-three and a half hours a day.
Not only was shortwave radio a technical su(:cess, it was also incredibly cheap. From dm
very heginning, a shomvave transmitter cost one-twentieth as much as a hmg-waw" station
of equivalent reach, and it used one-fittieth of the elecn-icity. Furthermore, it could
transmit up to 200 words per minute, as fast as tile newest cables and much taster than
hmg-wave radio. In a speech to the Institute ot Radio Engineers in Octoher 1926, Marconi
conlk'ssed: "1 admit that 1 am resl)onsil)le for tile adoption of hmg waves tk)r hmg-distance
communication. Everyone followed rne in building stations hundreds of times nlore pow-
erful than would have been necessary had short waves heen used. Now I have realized my
mistake.""-'
From 1926 on, manufacturers I)egan building shortwave equipment, and radio con>
munications companies adopted them as qtfickly as possible. For the first time, radio con>
lntmication was wifl_in the reach of small towns and previously isolated outposts around
Ihe world. Because the equipment was cheap to buy and operale, shortwave services could
offer rates that cat>lc companies could not begin to match. For instance, radiograms
hetween England and Australia via l}le British Post Oft]ce shortwave service cos! four
pence per word, one-twelfth as much as a cablegram. Within six months of opening fin
business, tile British Post Office shortwave service cal)lured 65 percent of the cahle lraffic
Io India and Australia, as well as 50 percent of the tvanspacilic traftic. Between France and
lndochina, shortwave service captured 70 percem of the trallic within the tirst year.':'
This was a completely ditIerent kind of competition compared with the genleel rival-
ry of the early 1920s. This time, the cable companies faced ruin. Eastern and Associated
atmounccd it would sllttl down, sell off its cahles, and distrihule reserves to its sharehold-
ers. The British goverlllnelll, ill a rare disl)lay of energ)', merged all British overseas
telecommunications systems--public as well as private--into one company called Imperial
and International (:ommunications, later renamed (',able and WirelessY' The purpose of
this merger was to make xadio subsidize the preservation of !he nox_)hsolete cable nel-
work. Needless to say, this was a hea_ T burden on the new company. The Depression,
which began soon thereatlet, weakened it even turflmr. In the United Stales, _Ak'stern
Union kep! only ils most protitable cahles in operation, while France simply abandoned its
cahles. Companies ltlal had no cables, such as RCA, profiled at the expense of their rivals.
Strategy Versus Business: Cables After 1928
Why did Britain [)reserve its cables--including barely used ones between such out-of-
the-way places as Sierra Leone and Ascension Island or Lagos and Saint-Vincent--at a cost
estimated at $2.5 million dollars a year? Because tile British government knew, through
hmg experience, that radio was vtflnerahle to eavesdropping and espionage. Indeed, dur-
ing World War 1I, as in _._,k)rld War I, Britain's cahle communications with the United
States and the rest of the British Empire remained secret, while (,erman and Japanese
12. ()uolcd tiom Douglas (:oe, Marconi: l'ioneer oJRadio (New York:.]. IVlessner, 1943), p. 237.
13, Bakm, A Hi+tory o/the Marconi Company, p. 229; Batty-King, (;irdle Round the I".arth, p. 203; 1.. (;allin,
+'Rcnst.ign<..ntcnts slatistiqut.s sut It' d6vt'l<)l)l)('ment des (ommuni¢ati(ms 1-adi<)t(_16grahiques cn Indo(hin(',"
Bulletin &onomique de l'h,h, hine 32 ( 1929): 370-74.
14. Barry-King, (;iMb" Round the Earlh, pp. 20?,-26; Bakm; ,4 Hi,to U o[ the Marconi Company, pp. 223-31:
I [eadrick, "Shortwave Radio." passim.
BEY()NI) T!IE ]()N()_PItERE
F;tdio communic_tliotls, as wc llOW kllow, were re_uhu]y })rcach¢'d. Furlhermore, during
the war and tot severed years flwreafler, every chmmel of commmfic_tlion was filh'd to
capacity. No! until tll¢' 1950s wcrc the last of flw old copper cables finally laid to rest on
I}1(" ()(C;HI floor.
Conclusion
What can file story of cables and radio belore \_,%rld War I1 k'll us al)otn flw current
rivalry l)et,,v('en satellites and lil)(,r optic cabh,s? First+ the two modern tt'chnologics st'¢'nl
ev('tfly matched, l_ut not idcntical. Satellites are besl al nlobilc c()mllltltlic_itioll with ships
and planes and the like. Fiber optic cal)Ics, nlcanwhih', are best at h;mdling high-vohunc
tr_l+|lic l)elWt+en ilnport:inl urban cetlters in the dcvt'hq)cd cotmtrics, l+olh technoh)git's
iln|)ro",._( • daily, (|em;tnd is slr()ng, and there is plenty ()t +r()()ttl 1()1+ I)olh to gr()w. Th(' ,dtua-
ti<)n is uncannily reminis(cnl <)f Ihc situati(m in the early 1920s: a 1)i! of c<)mpetiti<)n,
mu('h ((nnl)Icmcntarity, and <go<)d lim('s fi)r all. Sec()nd, if inl('rnati()nal tel,rc_>mmunic,_-
tions wt'r(' (()t_sidcred str:ttcgi( rcs()tutcs t)cli)r,t + World War l, and <:yen m<)r(' s() })ctwct+n
the wars, thcr(' is n<) reason to think tlm! th(,+v art" l('ss sirate<_ic to(lay. _dtho_,gh such
m,ttters art' never dis(usst'd l)ttl)li(ly.
Bttl does history hel l) l)rc(lict the futurt'? Based ()n th(' hist()rv of telec<)nmmnit:tlit)t+is
l)t'ft)re World War II. ()n(' can prt'dict n<_t one, l)u! two luturt-s+
Tht" first <+( these tw() :dtct+nativ( + futur(+s (an I)(, (alh'd "the s('t+n:l+fio ()f (+()ntinuitv." It
assttmt's rt,finements in techn<)h)g T, l)ut no rtwohltiomuy (h_:tnges. Thor( +,,,,+ill1)(, m()r(' an<l
in(:,t+t+ sal('llitt's until every +-\mt'ri(an, Et,r()l)t'an. and .]apant'sc can g() an'+_,d+crt + with a
1)<_(kct ()F wrislwatch l)hon( • and call u l) anyone anvwht+r(' in the world 1)v his ()r her per-
sonal i(h'tnifi(ation cod( +. (:al)l<:s, mcanwhih', will 1)(. t)flly (+(ctq)ied wilh +(Oml)ttt('r data+
vid('() itnagt's, and tim "(+hatter" ()f dcskt)otmd ])e<)l)l(', talking t() [ii('n(ls ()',('rs<.'as li_t next
to nolhing. Ahcady, d<)zens of I+l)cr optic (+:tl)lcs (ross the Atl:mti( ,tnd I'acitk ()c('_ms.
:\cc()rding t() th¢+ Briti_+h +j()urnal P,b/i+ Ntqwork Euro/,', the "]:ib('r()l)ti( I,ink Aroun<l the
(;l()l)e, +' slated I<) ()p('n in 1997, stret(hing li<)m Britain toJa])an, will c()nt_dn 120,(t0<) dig-
ital cir(uits, each (al)at)h' ()f (-arrying im;tg('s and video as w('ll as v()ic('. _' ()tht'r (+_tl)l(,s m( +
pl_tllllt'd _tl'<)tlnd Africa, l)etwt't'n l'hu()])c and Solllht'+tsl Asi_t+ _tlld ()I+ ahn()sl every t)lhcr
Itl;+!j()r l'<)tlt('. Alth<nt.gh satellites alw_tvs ,,',+illbe needed, (at)los ;alt' likely I() ill(+l('_|s( ' lilt'iv
market share itno the early twentx-lhst (('nlurv. Fiber optic (,tl)l('s hay(' th(" same a(lvan-
t:tgc :is thcir (<q)l)t'1-(()rcd an(('st()t+s: lht'v arc F,racti(ally iml)<)sqbh" to caves(h(> I) on, and
they arc mtt(lt less vuh+('ral)Ic than radio ()r satellites t() (']c(+lt+<)n+agneti( inlerfer('n(c,
in('Juding nu(l(+ar ('xl)h)si(+ns.
['ht" other thturc, '+the s(-('nari<_ ()f dis(-ontimfity," inv()h'.rs an Unl)r,_'ccdt+ntcd and rcv-
oluti()nat+y l('(ht_()h)+..,_' that might mak(" (al)h's and/or sat<.'llitcs <d)soh+t(', just ;is ShOltWaV('
radio ruin('d the stfl+marinc leh'gral)h (at)les. l)isc()ntinuitit's, 1)v d('finiti()t_, (ann()t 1)(+
l)r(,dict(,(I.
Whi(h ()f the two s(et_,u-i()s is likely t() take pla(e? It is anv()nc'_, ,_ut'ss.
15. l'uhli+ ,Vrla,.Pl+ I'+._+_[.' I.lul'.-Augu_t 1995): 31. <lU(ncd iu lht' monthl'+ bulh'tiu t,! tlm |nlt'I I_+tti_>md
"['('l(.(<_lllllltllli( AI+,)II _, ( !lli()ll, 'l;,l+.Hq;[,'_,_', !)_9 (.\u,_ust I!19-)): ?,5.

Chapter 2
Moon in Their Eyes: Moon
Communication Relay at the Naval
Research Laboratory, 1951-1962
by David K. van Keuren
On 2,t July l(,)54,James tt. Trcxler, an engineer in the Radio Countermeasures Branch
al the Naval Research Lal)or;alorv (NRI,), spoke cavetiflly inlo a microl)hom, al lhc labo-
ratory's Sn,mp Neck radio iUllCnllil. [acility in Maryland. Two and a half seconds later, his
words sl)ccded back io him a! Slump Neck, atu't traveling 500,()00 mil(-s via an Eavth-
M()on civctfit. L For the firsl time err'r, lhc so(rod of a hmnan voice had l)cen transmitted
|)cV()lld t]lc ionosphere all(| FCllll'ncd 1() l_;lI-lh.
Trcxh,r's a(:hicven_cn/ marked ;m cm-lv wau'rshed in lilt' [)epartmcn! of the Navv's
(;ommunicalion Moon Relay plt!jccl (also' known as "Operali(m Moon l_ouncC'). The
ultimal(' goal was to create tht" longcsl commmlicalions circuit ill hutllan history, with the
Earth's salelli/e acting as a passiw' relay. Military strategists had h)ng considered secure
and rclial)le commmfications lines to I)(. a laclical necessity. Dm'ing the l(.)50s, lh(" heyday
()f the (]old War, with the U.S. Na'_):'s tlccts encircling lhe gh)be, secure and reliable com-
mmfitalions links were considered crilical It) national securilv. Ionosl)ht'ric storms had
r(.'tt'nllv cttl ()['f radio transmissions to lhc [;.S. t]('cl ill lhc Indian Oct*an, thereby demon-
slrating drat)laticalh' lh¢" xldn(,rabililv <)f conm)unicalion lines/ Th(' ()|)jcclive <)F the
(_ommtmication Moon Relay [)r(!jc(l was It) add anoflwv high-tccll option within lilt"
Nmy's im_('nlory of se(:Hrt' gh)l)a] co)))mmfit;alions )echnologit's.
The origins of Communication Moon Relay, however, lie not in poslwm- conmnmica-
tions r('scarch and deveh)pment, but rather within the secm'e world of electrical intclli-
g('n(c gathering. The project was the spinoff of a deeply classifi('d program centered on
the surveillance of Soviet radar tcchn()logit, s, kn()wn as PAMOR (Passive Moon Relay).'
The cmlv history of the two progtams demonstrates just how close the linkages between
('la,ssificd and unclassified rcsearth and dcvelopmerlt programs ohen were within the
American military laboral()rics dming Ih(.' (]old IA'a.i-.
I. A Fcti'v('ntC it) lhc 195t ',()i(c uansmission is fi)mM in chc James tt. Trcxh'] I)i()gjaphical tilt', NRI,
] Iisl,))im)"; R('I('I('))('(' Colh'clio)_, Naval R('s('mcl) I.;)l)o):m))'y, Washi))glon, I)C. '1"1)("li)sl l)ans)))issio)) on 2 l.)ul',.
l)('t mlsc ()I sccurity con( erns, (ollsislt'd. only ol the r(*])('liliol| o[ '¢owtq SOllll(llS, _I'hc |')ro;ld( aM c,| aCULlalv¢ords l()l-
lo_+(.d ,,t; 22 Augtts(.Jamcs I I. 'l')cxlcr, plivate ¢<)mnmni( alit)n. 15 ()clol)ev I(.)(.15.
2. l)isc usscd in Jamcs tl. "l')t'xh'r, imcrxicw with Da,,id K. Allison, 30 ()(-l(d)(') 19_¢), llist()vian's ()trice,
Naxal Rcscar( h I AII)OF;IIOI'}', Wanhingt()n, I')( '..
3. This (list ussion ot I)AM()R is I)asc(I ()n i)v('_i()usl_, t I;tssifi('d dot'mn('nts wilhin )hc NRI. )('cold (ol-
h'( li()n m)w in st()1 age al Ihc F('dcral Rcc(>ltls (i(,lllCi, Suitland, MI). Iml)()rlanl d()('lllllCllls :11 t']amcs 11. Trt'xh'),
((roll)., "A (',h)<)nt)logi( al tlis)m v ()t l_.S. Naxal R;idi() Rcsem(h Slalion (NRRS), t)()m I!llli I() It April t9(i2, p)('-
p;ut'd 22 ]ul?, I!)(12"; ;m(mymous. "['))ignc :\sp(,( Is ()1 Jh(" Elim leh'clri('al intt'lligcntc] C()lh'( li()n I)()tcntial ()1
thc t'.S. Naval Radio Rt'st'ar(h ,'_tatioll. 5;tlg_ll (;I()X(', ]a)'t'M Vilgillia.,]alltlar} 19(;2." This rt'|k'lt'n((" is to t'ditcd
vmsi.ns in thc fih's ()[ th(" l listorian's (llti(<,, NR1.. ,\dditi<)nal kc', (|ot'tltllt,nts in(IH(Ic "f:()mmunit'ali()ns by
S;mqliu, R('Lt_." MaJch 195!), NRI. |lis.)ria.'s Fih*s;.J:m)('s I[, |'I'(.x1c[. "PVOl)<)scd I'RY;I l';t[>v)fi)F May 1955:
lama) Ra(li() (:i) ( uil',," colh'cfi<)n ()I (:oxmtc) lllt.asttl('s l),) ant h m('mt)_mMa d;llillg t() 19F)-I, NRI. _('t()_ds. ];cdc)al
Rotor(Is ( :chit't, Si)ill;md, MI).
P\ss,IX.'l,()RI(;IN,S
I
Figure 6
N_tebook entr T _J/,]ame_ tt. "l)exler, dated 2,_.]an ue_ry 19.t 5, _howi_tg _al( ulathm _ ]i. a Im_g-di gtam e c¢m_mu_6cation,s link
hetn,ee_t Los A nL_ele_,(.'ali]_rnia, and Wa_hingmm, 1).(,'., z'ia the" Mmm. ((iotlrtesy _Jt"lht' Naval Rcscan _h l.al'_ ral v'?.)
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Naval Radio and Radar Research
Radio c(mllnunicalions, parlicul.ul', high-trcqucncy connnunicalions, had long b¢'cn
a topic of interest ill NRI,. ()nc of lhc original iw_l laboralory divisions, when it opcncd in
1923, had llccn Radial, imdcr Ihc dircclion of A. Hovl Tayhm Under T, tvl(i,"s, direction,
NRI, [)crsoliliCl ihioligholli ill(> ]9<'lOs and 1930s cx[)l¢li-ed lhc api)iicalioil of high-tic-
(lllCllC,V radio Io Nax) COIlillltlllil'iiliCtllS. ()lit' side cfti'cl of l]lCSC sludics was lhc a('cidcnla]
discovery in 1929, by Ix'o YOilllg and [,ilWlCllCC ]lyialld, 0]" Ihc lindcrlyill<'g, l)rinciplc of
wh;ll later (illllC l(i lit' klloWll ;is lad;ll. SllliSCqtlt'lll work by NRI, ])t'rsllnncl ill lhc l/,130s
led lo lilt: dcvclol)nlcnl ot (lllcr<llional lild;ll dclcction scls Ily lhc end of Ill(" dccadt'. *
Siinilarly, colhtl)oralivc work ill lhc 1920s by l<lylor and physicisl E.(). I hilburl Oll lh¢'
propagation o1 high-frequency radio wavcs ill Ihe tl])I)Cl" ailll(Isphcl'C h'd 1o lhc discovery
o[' radi(i skip distance."( ]oliSC{llll'litly, t/'c, lhc I)l'<_il/liillg of World {{:ill II, NRI, |lad evolved
illlo ;1 leading CClllCl +tor i-csearch (ill lilt' al)plicalion of high-flcqucncy i-adi_l lo hlng-dis-
lailcc colililllinitalions aild delctlion.
%{'olld Iv_i';lr 11 1)i(nigili lilOSl lal)_>lallliv it'scarlii plolz, raillS Io a IClllilOl-ary hall, as [)cr-
S_lllil('l llilill'd lhch allcnl, ioll lo illCi-cil/cilla] iili])rovcllieills in " " "t Xlsllllg Iccinlologics, as
Wt'I] as lhc Icsling and cvalualion ()t(¢miraclor-i)l_l(hiccd war iilalcrials." l I_)v,'cvcr, llic war
did si)alk l'csC_il('h ;lid dcvchlpnicnl in applied ])l/)gl'alllS., inciudhig I';ldal" COllllICllllt'ii-
SIII'CS. A dual-pronged a,geilda lit tt'chnlca] dcvcioi)nleilt aimed al shnullani,oilSlV c(lllli-
Icring (;Clllllill and,]al)ancsc i-:.idai, while ilii[)l(iviiit 4 ilic t![t{'cliveness of AlllCFiCal/ cquip-
li/clil, tt'a_ [)i/l /lifo ill;co ill _'ach' i 947. lit ] 945, lii(',_c i)rog/a/lis lli¢'r_'(I i_lio a li_'wll _',_lal;'-
lishcd (]ouilICl'llieasilrcs Brmlch wilhin ill{, Stlil)-Shore Radio Division. t/i-anch rest;i-oh
;llld dcvclOplllCnl conlinllc(| ;|lit'l lhc Will', Wil]l it shili ill [i)cus lo;vard lhc cleclronic I'il])il-
bililics o['all illCl't'aSil/giy b0lligcrcni Soy|el [liiioll.
()liC i)l-Ogialn of [)arlicular intcresl lo Ihc (]OllillcrillCaSllleS llranch was the inlcI-cci)-
li(in of wlial was referred lo |is "'anOllllilollS pr¢li)agalion.": Tilt, sludv of iiilldOlll, aiiOili-
aloiis signals [rlllll alOlllld Jill' world had t)Cl,li o1 illlt'resl, IO Radio Division i-t.scarchclS aiS
t{Ir back as lhc ulid-1 {tTl)s. _ hilcresl in Ibis phenonienon hcigtllt,ned during _,%'oi]d _,%:ar 11,
;is illcr{'asiligly l)ow(!l'till illld s¢'lisilivc Nii_, ' iaflar recl'ivt'i-s picked II l) sir;'( radio sigllals
Ji'Olll l_]Ul'Opc and Japan. ,,'lltlCl lilt" war, ilndcr Trexler's direction, s(,t'(,1-;ti (;l'l'lllitll
li%'llCi-/blll-g itlllCiIIlilS lVCl'C shipped lo "Qi'iishillglOil ;lid scavellgcd Jill i)allS. {4tSilel'Zblil_
aillcnna arrays wcre stil)scqllcnlly erccied al X'RL's Blue Plains fit'id Slalioil in f.q47 filr a
proglani ailliCd al dcvch)lling inlcrcc])l dircclion-tinding equipmeYIl tin allOlllalOilS sig-
nals origillalillg ill l:.ur(ipc and |ill" N(ivicl l_:nillll."
t. David K. Alli',_,n, X,'n, I'._; /in 77.' Xat,y: 771,' (.Irit._. o/ lfadai at lh; ,\'m,al Ib'w'(mh l.abomtml
(W;ishillgum, 1)(]: Nmal Rcscallh [.al)(_lalllr_. 19bll); l)a_id K. _an Kl'urcn, "The MililaI_ (]oim'xl ol Eail_
AlliClil all Radar. 1930-1'940," in ()skar ]_hunliili, t [ariinul l'clzol(I, aiid William Anpla}. ('(is.. I7a(ki,_ l'be tli_t,*_
.//¢adar (Pis(alawaV, N]: ]liSlillill" ot Elcllii(al ;lid ]']h'(llOlliCs l_]llgilit't'l'S, 199't).
7>. Allison, ,\)_v l'TI,r/O# It|,' ,\'alg, lip. 56-57; l/iu(t' _%'illiain llcvly. "Basi( Rl'st'ai(ll Within a Mililar_
(7<)lllCXl; "|'fit' X'_lxli[ i_t'st'illl I1 L_llllll;llOl x atl(t |Ill' I_'(itlll(l_t[i(lliS ()£ l']X[lCIIIC (lll_txioll,'( ,.in(I X+l,l_{iv ,,ItS{lOlll)lll%.
1923-19iili," l'h.1). _liss., I_dlns ltopkhls I'niversiiv. 1987, pp. 11-53.
(L Alhcd [. DI illV, "'l, li'_ll I tisloF_ _lfThc Nav_tl RcSCalch l._ll)(ll'{tllll'y," I_.i,t6, Ulil)ul)liniu'd hisloly hi lhc
sclics, "1 '.5;. Na_al ,\dlliillisil_ilill' ] lisiolies _)1 W+>rM Vt]tr ll," dcposhcd in I]1#.' l)_'l)al I1111,111o] I)ll' N;iv'¢'_ libi;il _,
7. Trcxlcr illl('l_i_"_, 30 (it ll>t)cl l{),R0.
8. Scc Allison, ,\'_,/:w'/i, the ,\(a m, /Ja_im; t Iml'>, "Basic Rcse;u _h Wiihh_ a Miliuu _ (;onicxi," p,_i,i,
9. Trexlci inlci_im_, 30 ()(tollcl I{tNO,
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(]onse(lnentl }. with this history of research in the long-range propagalion of radio
waves, lhe Army Signal Corps's deleclion of radar waves bounced off the Moon in March
1(.146 (lid not come as a surprise to NRL researchers. '') Indeed, there is evidence that lab-
oratory researchers had unsuccessfidly attempted to retrieve echoes from the Moon as
early as 19287' Effi)rts ceased during World War ll and did not resume until 1948.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Signal Corps program did attract the aHention of Dr.
Donald Menzel of the Harvard College Observatory. In 1946, Menzel, a commander with
lhe U.S. Naval Reserve during World War II, as well as a member and the chair of the radio
propagation cominittee of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Slaff, proposed to the
l)epartment of the Na_ T that it use Moon-reflected radio signals fi)r secure communica-
tions. _e
The response to Menzel's suggestion within the Department of the Na W is unclear.
There does not seem to be a copy of the Menzel proposal or a Nax_¢ Department response
withiu del)artmenlal records. A Na_ T program for using the Moon' tot aclive communica-
tions, as sttggesled hy Menzel and l)ioneered hy the Army, was no! immediately fo,th-
coming. However, the idea of using tim Moon for communications and radar intercept
purl)oses came under active considcralion within two years. The moving |orce in Otis case
was NRI, engineer James Trexler.
James Trexler and Electronic Surveillance
Trexler had studied electrical engineering at Southern Methodist University (SMUt,
where his father taught in the Political Science Department. He had demonstrated little
interest in traditional academic subjects , to his family's disappointment. I lowever, he did
prove himself to be an excellent, hands-on electrical engineer and amateur radio techni-
cian, thereby able to support himself during his undergraduate dws.
In 1942, he came to NRL as a.junior radio engineer, following in the footsteps ofa fbr-
met SMU engineering professor, Dr. Samuel Lutz, and simultaneously avoiding imminent
induction into the U.S. Army. At NRL, Trexler was assigned to tht" Measnrement and
Direction-Finding Unit, where he spent much of the war working with various fo,'ms of
high-flequency direction-finding units, belore being assigned to the new electronic coun-
termeasures group in 1945. 's
D,qfile at SMU, Trexler had exl)erimented with the reflection of high-frequency radio
waves off" meteor ionization trails as [)art of a study on the impact of atmospheric ioniza-
lion on radio propagation. He continued in the mid-1940s to follow the work of investi-
galors probing lhe upper almospher(, and near space with high-liequency radio
lransmissions. A paper hy D.D. (;rieg, S. Metzger, and R. Waer of FVF's Federal
Telecommunication I,aboratories in New York City, puhlished in May 1948, proved It) be
particularly intriguing." Trexlcr noted in his scientific notehook on 24June 1948 lhal in
(;rieg, Metzgcr, and Waer's paper:
10. John H. DeWitl, Jr., and E. King Stodola, "l)etection of Radii) Signals Reth'cted fiom )lie Moon,"
I')'oreedi)zg_ <¢the liCE 37 (1949): 229-42; Jack Mofi'nson, "Radar Echoes fiom the Moon," Electronic._ 19 (1946):
92-98:1 levi)err Kauffinan, "A DX Record: To the Moon anti Back," QST 30 ( 1946): (15-68; James Trcxler, "l,t may
Radio Echoes," I)roceedinff_ of the IRE (January 19581): 286--92.
] 1. See torrt'spon(lt'nct" I)t'lwccn Kenneth B. Warner and A. Hov! Tavhm 31 .]anuary-7 February 1946,
NRL ttist()vian's Files, NRI., Washington, I)C; Trexler intervim_; 30 ()ctoi)er 1980.
12. See Trexler, "% Chronological History": Trexhw interview, 30 Ocl()her 1980.
13. Tvcxler inlerview, 3() October 1980.
14. I).D. (;ri('g, S. M('tzger, and R. Watt, "Consithwations t)f Moon-Relay Communication, '+ l'roceedings o/
the IICF 36 (May 1(.)t8): 652-(')3.
F_EY()ND l't IE I( )N( )SI'IIIGRE ] !_
[l]t war Doin/ed out thai thtq'e is a pot_sibility that the Momt has an iono_sphere, !/" this i_
true then there is a poL_sibility that certain radio /_equemqe,s will be r_flectedJrom the Moo_t _
iwwsphere with rvnsiderably higher q[ficie_try thatl /ram the rulcL_ed sur[ace O[ the Mmm.
The po.s._ibiliO_ o[Ihis heing true was su,_F_ted h_' the rt'cent experiments i_+Au._tralia reprot-
ed t_, [(;rote] Reber at the Radio Astrot_omy meelin,t_ rece_Hly. In the._e tests s/aPtdard tra_-
mitlinL_ a_d receiving equipmentt were u_ed i_ a pul_e ,_)'stem wheretO' the identit'¢ _?[ the
reJlected sig,'nal wa,g determined t_, rwdi_t,_. Delru_ _] the correct maK_titude were m_ticed. ![
there is an_, pos._ibility o/this mode r?] trrmL_mitti_¢ being useJ-al to RCM [Radio (;ounter
Measure_] it _houbt be l_riz,e_tsome _,el)' carl,till thm_Lrht. _'
Trcxlt'r pondered how a test might t)c set up to explore this possibility and whal s_wt
of cquipmcm might hc required. "The mclhod of lest could consist of usit_g a beamed
antcnmt having a sharp Easl_West p_tll(wn ;lll(I _1 I)l'o_td Norll_-Somh shapt'," hc wtol,_" i|l
his scientific ]_¢_tcl)ook. "The inlcnsil_,/ of Ihc signal would t)e noted continu<_ttsly and an
attt'ml)t would t)e made to ('Ol'+'<.'l;+tt(_ it with tim ])<)sition of tlw Moon."'" lie conll)ttted
_llll¢'lltlll size Io dct(?t'Illill(! how lllillly _lllt(_llll;l. t'lCIll(!lltS W('I(' nt'<.'(lt'd It) _l('llic;'c' ;t
0,5-dcgrcc beam widlh. Using 270-dcgrcc spacing, Trcxler (letermint'd il would lake
";+tt)otH 150 cltqntmts" t+_ ol)t;dn such ;s t)eatn widlh with ('<HI,%t;+ull ph:|s<,' ;tIld amplilt_dt"
itt,'l-()ss lh(" ilp(!Fllll+( _. Sllt:h _+lll inslrtt]n('nt would bc expensive to build, but worth lilt"
cxpcusc, hc Holed.
t tis labolalt>ry notebook it_dicatcs lhitl Trcxler contintwd his calcttlaliol/s ll+Hot_gh<_ttl
the wct'k of 24 ]tmc 1948. By 29 Jtmt', Trcxlt'r had come to tilt' fi)llowing cotwlusi_n:
From the R(;M /Radio (;outlier Mea_ure_] point r!] view Ihi.t system hold[._] promise at a
commtt_tir'atio_ and radar i_t/ercefi/ drq,ice /i_r tiff_a_t thai ca_H+ol be _tudied at clow, )w_Lw
whe_v nmmal propagatio_z i.s po_L_ibh,, l/ mi_ht be well tr_poittt aut that ma_v radm:t an'
very c/ow /o Ihr theoretical possibility O]+co_ttactb_ the Alom_ (the MEW [Ballistic Missih,
l"a fly limbr_ti_,_ ,S)_stem, BMIi WS;] ]?_r exa mph') att d h_'_tce the p ractir'abilih' 0[ bu ildin_,_ a
._ystem capable Of it_ler_v'p/i_tg /hew, _yttem_ h_' r_Jh,Him_.]rom the Moo_+ is twt lu'_'oad thr
tvalm _4 po,s_ibiliO'. . . . 7'he _trictest security _)wa/d hv maintah_ed as to the eXimtleme _!] tmh
intercept dt'_,ice_ simr the enemy rvmld with litth, d!J]_culty re.ttrict the opera/io_+_ o[ these t+,/s
to a._ tr_ avoid Morro conrad. Ore' immediate appliratirm +![the t:;'ttem wouM he/he drtec
lion a_u/ altalysis ¢_/ the Ru_tiat_ Radar _iL,'_tal,_thai have bee_ mottito_vd at _00 All"
[meL_ahrrlz ] _ear Ala_ka. 'r
Trcxl_.r's ct]_nIs over the Ibl/owiug two ),cars were dirccwd Ioward demtmstrating tl_:tt
such ;t Mt)o_t-imt'rccl)t program was Icchtfic;tlly viablt'.
I]_ l;tlv 1948 ;rod early 1949, NRI+ cot_slrttclt'd ts+s'o la]gc hmg-wire ;mttqtnas dcsigm'd
fin- tilt + high-;tttglc observati<m t)t the Moon at its It,Ilk • Plains field t,u'ilily. '+ The _mtctm;ts
;_,'t,t-t• dt'_,i_n/t'd It) (:,ttrry Otll ol)_.,tq-x.;:tlit)lls ill bands where Soxi_+t tacI;tr signals wcrc kllo_+vll
l<t t'xist. B_,,:\ttgH:.;t 1<.)49, rcgttlarly .,+chcdtth.d _>bscrv;tli_]ls of tilt' M<_on w<.'rt" tm(h'r w;tv.
t)l)t'];tlittg tmd¢'r tht' c_de mm_' 'i]<_t'," wilh Ihc itHcnl of itHcrcepting Sovi_'t r;td;tr sigN,tl_;.
In Jmttt;tv_,, + 19:'5(), lh¢' N:tvv cot+_sttllt'd (;rotq) (];tl)l_titl ])ttnsl<w¢I, tilt' R_v¢;d .+kit-F_r,,t"s t'h'( +-
It'+rail + warl]trc toortli++;tlt+r with Ihe U.S. Nay'< hc hclpc(l NRI+ resc:ucltcvs hon<. their
st';trch wilh it,ll)roved Sovit't t;lrg_'t i);tr;tmt'Icrs.
17+. lames II. 'l'_cxlct. I.;d),,r;m_:x N_,tcb_t,k N<_.N-121. I I Jtme-15 Jtfl_ I!+18. p. 61+ NRI+ _._,_ds.
l"edtq al R_'_+tls (_t,tllt'l+
11;. Ibid., p. I++7>.
17. lbld., pp. 70-71.
I_. l_cxlc_. "':\ (;hro_>l_git al llism_x. +'
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Although inlormation on this early period of the progranl is sketchy, it seems that the
resuhs were sufficiently promising to allow Trexler and his immediate supervisor, t Ioward
Lorenzen, to request approwd frnm NRI:s commanding officer, Captain Frederick Furth,
for extended tests with more powerfnl radars.'" By June 1950, the Chief of Naval
Operations coordinator fox electro,tic countermeasures had been briele'd and had issued
an ofticial nfilitary requirement fi)r Moon-intercept intelligence. The Chief of Naval
Research, Rear Admiral T.A. Solberg, subsequently provided $100,000 for an experimen-
tal progranl, which included money fi,r a new radar.'-" The eftort, now an official Na_ T
intelligence program, was renamed project PAMOR (Passive Moon Relay).
Communication Moon Relay
A site was chosen for the new antenna at Stump Neck, Maryland, on the annex
grounds of the Navy's Indian Head Propellmn Plant. Construction began in late
December 1950 and was completed Isy the fi)llowing Septenll)elY' The design chosen for
the Stump Neck antenna was a parabola having an elliptical opening 220 by 263 feet
(sixty-seven by eighty nleters). Earth-moving cquipnlent scooped a hole out of the ground
and paved it with asphalt; then a galvanized iron grid with three-inch-by-three-inch
(7.5-centimeter-h}-7.5-centimeter) openings was auached to provide a rcflccting surface
good for wavelengths of one meter or illore. A cable-supported hoonl housed the focal
point feed structttre, which could then be steered in celestial coordinates of right ascen-
sion and declination by adjusting tire cable length. "Fire antenna was oriented so as to max-
inlize observations of the "Sino-Soviet Block," although only a lew hours per monlh of
ot)servation time were available5"
The first short-pulse radar contact with the Moon was made on 21 October 1951. The
750-watt transmitter sent ten-microsecond, 198-megahertz pulses.:':' The results surprised
even Trexler. The fidelity of tile received echo proved to be unexpectedly high. It had
I)een assumed that tile echo from a short pulse would have a l:ast rise, hut a short fall.
Theories predicted that ener_, would be returned from the entire illuminated sphere;
however, the majority of the ener_' from the reflected pulse was received during the first
l(t0 microseconds, meaning that half the power in die echo had to come fionl a circle (m
the .Moon only 210 miles (338 kilometers) in diameter, or almost exactly one-tenth tile
diameter of the Mo(m."' Tile (:onse(tucmce was a much more coherent signal than origi-
nally exl/ected. An immediate alicrmath of lhe early test restdts was that Na_,, otticiats
placed a higher priority anti security slalus c,n the project, e; The intelligence pc)tential ot'
passive Moon reflection was greater than originally surmised. A second conseqnencc was
the inattguration of the Colnmtmication Moon Rela')' projecl.
19. Ibid.
2ft. James [I. 'I'rex]cv. I.aboratory Notebook No. N-'tl 1, 12.]tmc-13 ()< tohe_ 1950, p..17. NRL records,
F¢.dt.lal Ret cnds Cornel
21, Tvt'xh'v, %\ (Jtl_mological 1lislor}": I[IIIHIVIIIIHIS, "Unique Aspects": I'rcxicv, "Iamm Radio Echoes";
B.E. -Fmuev aml A.B. _/k)ullt;Hls, "(ZOmllltllliCalioll ._[<)Oll Rclm (( 2MR)," 21 June 1957, declassified NRL Secrel
Report;TrexlcL"Ploposcd [TRS1 Paperlor Ma_ 1955."
"2"2. ,,\n<m)'lnous, "tTniqu(, Aspe(-ts. '+
23. Tvcxh'r, "A Chronological 11istot ',"; Trexlcr, "lJmav Radio Echo('s."
24. J'v¢_tlt'1 and _mmans, "(k)mVlmni¢aliou Moon Relay CMR)," p. 1; l'rcxlcr, "Iamar Radio Echoes."
p. 29(I,
25. rl'l_'xhq, "( 3u_m_d_gic;d l [istor',r. "
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The high fidelity of the reflected transmissions presented Trexler and his coworkers
with an unexpected sl)inofl+ of thei, prt!jecl. The quality of the received signal was poten-
tially good enough to be manipulated for conlmunicalions purposes. As B.E. Troller and
A.B. _._)tttlliltlS, Trexler's coworkers in the (;ounternleasures Branch, reporled later, file
resuhs of [he 1951 trials dem/mstrated 1]lal "the fidelily of this (:ircllil WaS higher lhan sug-
gested" and "implied that tile circuit would be usable in modern communication
sgslelllS. ''e* t_x[)Clitltetlts using Colllintlt)/ts wave, tllo(ltll;lled conlintlous wave, _ttld audio-
fiequency-modul,ltc:d signals tollowed.
Lttnar conlmunicati<ms signal and equil)nlen! testing conlinued over tile next three
Veat's. ()tl 1.5,]une 1954, Trexler Stltlltll;.lt'ized lilt: status of tile work done with Ihe Stttnlp
Neck and earlier NRI+ radio telescopes in a memorandunl to Louis (;el)hard, the NRL
Radio Division's sutlerintendent. "From tilt" ¢'xllerience gained over several years otwork,"
he noted, '+it appears thai the fidelity of tilt" Moon circuit is much better than predicted
resuhing in tilt + possible use of many lypes of circuils such as high-speed teletype, 11acsitn-
lie and voice." The potential uses for such a lelescope included ttlnclions associated with
radar inlercepl, jamming, c<mltntLnicalions, navigation, satellite search, and ionospheric
and atmospheric research. Under "(;onlmunicalions," Trexler proposed using the Moon
as a passive re[lec/(>r t<> "l)roadcasl to half the w<_,l<t at any one lime" at very high fre-
quencies (VItF), as well as t_r two-way con]nnmicalions between the United Stales and
ships, sulmmrines, or large aircratL-': Early work had already advanced in this direction.
I+v tilt: end of 19g>4, Sltnnp Neck was nearing lilt+ end of its usefulness to tile PAM()R
llrojeiit. A much larger atltetltla W;tS needed lo actually collect the weak Soviet tadat- sig-
nals. As noted in his 15.June 1934 n/enlotandunt, Trexler teh that "to utilize many of lhe
possit)ililies of Moon relay an antenna having a 6(t0-[bol [I8:_-meter] diameter would he
,equired at VI IF. For many applicalio,ls, this diameter does not change 111st with liequen-
cv sincc it is tilt" absolute area thai is inlt)ortant in receiving. '':+This mal+ked the I)eginnint.{
of an extensive lobbying anti development effort 1_>t a (R)()-fool radio antenna at ,_tlgitt
(;rove, West Virginia. It also marked lhe elti'clixe separation of PAMOR lrom what J)ec;une
lilt" (kmlnmnication Moon Relay pr<!jecl.
;\n advantage of the com,tntnications I)rOiect was that simple antennas could I)e used
;_tt the recciving, end. This :tdvanlage was particularly enhanced by the use of a 10-kilowatt
klvslron amplitie, covering the uhrahigh frequency (UtlF) band. :'_+With the Stunlp Neck
p:u-ahola scrving as the transnlitter, the receiver used an array of antennas, the basic ele-
nlenl of which was a standard Model SK-2 ta(lat-atllenlla." Early testing included both
teletype :tnd voice transmissitm, wilh Trexler's voice, as nlentioned previously, being tht"
firsl to make tilt" round-tri I) hmar circuit.
After prelintinarv tesls between the Slmnp Neck site and Washington, D.C., the [h-st
lrans¢otHincnta] test was set tot tilt+ week of 20 Novcnll)er 1955. The receivers were estab-
lishe<l at lilt' Nax T Electronics Lal)oralot-', in ,+';an Diego, (;alifornia, and ;.liter orientation
o[ lilt' field equiputent, the (;on/nltmicalit)n NI()<>II Relay circuit t)egan opt'rating at
2li. "Itottc, and Y_mma,r+,,"(i<,mtnunit;ttiot; Mo,+,; Relax ((:MR)," p. I.
27. .]amc:, It,:'xh'I Io NRI. (:t_,¢h'->I()0. *l,Pinotandttm, 13.]tmc 195.I, in .]amt's IL Trcxlct, l+al:,_+iatot',
N<)It'l)_+HkNo. N 7_>(_.I.I April-20 ScF,h'tnbtq 19_,I. p. 91, NRI. ,c_c+I<Is.Federal Rctords (_cntcr. Quc, tcd lt'xl is
horn tacsimilc ill NRI, ]lislotian's tiles.
2_. /hid
29. I.ouis .\. (',cbhald, l'._,oluti+m,/ +"¢H1,NII¢ad/+;Ir.'l."+m,,ir+a,d (,'+,:+lribl+lio,+o/the ."hv;,alI¢+',,+'r+z_t+l.at,,mt,P'_
(Washil;gtm_, DC: NR[.. 1979). p. 115.
'.:k'). lloltct and _nmumn, "'(:ommtmilatimi M_u,n Rcla', ((:MR).'" I>.3.
31. /hid., pp. 7 I0.
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301megahertzon27Novemher.Becauseoftilelowdeclinationof the Moon, initial pcr-
fi>rmance was weak. Further adjnstnmnt of the eqnipment allowed a successfill teletype
message to be sent and received at 11:51 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, on 29 November.
Dr. Robert Morris PaRe, the associate director of research at NRI,, ;is well as one of the
American inventors of radar, signaled Dr. Franz Kurie, the technical director of the Naxa,
Electronics l,aboratory, to "lift up your eyes and behold a new horizon." NRL conducted
further experiments during December 1955 and early January 1956 to understand and to
counter the signal [ading that had been observed during the Novelnber tests. '_
Beginning on 21 January 1956, tim experimental baseline was extended to t lawaii,
where an array of eight SK-2 receivers was set up at Wahiawa, Oahu. Telet)qpe signals were
sent at 300 megahertz fiom a ten-kilowatt transmitter. On 23January, the system received
its U.S. Na_ y christening when Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, sig-
naled a message of congratulations to Admiral Felix B. Stuml), Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet.:':'
The reaction of the l)eparmient of the Nax T lo the experimental systeln "was quick.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research arid 1)evelopment Donald A. Quarles, who wit-
ncssed the: tests, became a strong supporter and provided special Department of l)etk'nse
tttnds to cover development costs. Also, Admiral Burke directed the Bureau of Ships to
develop a demonstration model of a reliable, long-range comnnnlications systeln using
the new technique. By May 1956, a Department of the Na_ T contract had been issued to
ttte Developmental Engineering Corporation of Washington, D.C., for system develop-
ment.:" The costs for total development (including construction) were approximately
.$5.5 million? r' An indication of the popularity of the Comntunication Moon Relay svslell'l
may be timnd in the National A.cademy of Science's Advisory Committee on tSndersea
_'ar[ale, which recommended in Decentber 1956 that future American sut)marines use
Moon-reflection path signaling for ship-to-shore communications. :'_
As the Communication Moon Relay system went into its production phase, the
Comnnuiications Section of the NRI:'s Radar Division, which had inherited the project
f'roln lhe Radio (;ollnternleastlres l_ranch, began emphasizing inlprovenlenls ill receiver
and transmitter design, including move powerful transmitters and transntission at higher
fiequencies. By mid-1957, lunar echo experimenls were being conducted in lh¢: UHF
band at 29() megahertz.
The expcrintental system produced by the Developmental Engineering Corporation
for the Bureau o[ Ships quickly led to the dew'lopment of a filly operational satellite com-
munications system between Washingt(m, I).(,'., and Hawaii. The system, functional It,,,
1959, was inaugurale(l lml)li(ly in.January 1960. '7 As part of the inaugural ceremonies, pit:-
lures of tim aircraft car,ier U.S.S. ! lancock were beamed fiom Honolulu to M,qtshington
via the (_ommtmication Moon Relay system. The transmitted htcsimile featured thousands
oft lancock officers and seanlelt Sl>clling out "Moon Relay" to a worldwide audience.
32. IQ,',Pnluall 3, fit'l]utqlcy ,div_'lsilV OpClations and Ihc tint. ot ¢ itculal plllall izati_m wmt' l_,'(Ollllll¢'lldt'd.
Ibid., p. 1!).
33. Ibid.. p. 16.
31. "tT.S. Naxv (_<mmmnicali4ms Moon Relay ((:MR) SyStCln," 3,'m,al tO:+ear+h I¢,'vi+'w+ (Mmch 1':)60):
17-20.
35. I)cpalltnt,nt of the Navy prt'ss lcleast., 9(_ lanual-,, lgliO, ill NRI. dfl(tllllt!nl file labeled "(;MR--IhlII
1961U' NRI, t¢',¢ _lds, Feclt'HI R¢'_ _:,z,ds ( ;ent¢'n
36. National Academ,, of Scien{es-Nalicmal Rcsemch C¢)un¢il, Advimrv Committee on Undmsea
Wm f_ue, 15*qect ,\'ob_tca, The Impli, ations oJ Advamvd lh'_iff** .n l 'mhv:wa l_,a_/ar, ,, l'7,ml }O'pmt, I'olume l: As_umptiom,
()mdu*ion_, and f¢_'commendatiom (Washington. I)C: National ,:\cadcmv _1 %cieuces, I December 1956), pp. 1(_-19.
37. ( ;t'bhal d, Ev_)l.lio_ ./Naval Radio-Electronic,, pp. 115-16.
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F(gure 7
l+'m _imih' picture, O/the t 1.S.S. I tan_(wk with _hip o/]i_r_ _ a_lrl _rrw _/wllitt,t., out "'.llmm IlrbO'. " 77ris piHu_e u,a_ tra_mlttrd
via the ,lloo_ ]}.m tfemalulu, Ilaw(+ii, to IIOtshi_l,gOm, 1).('., ._ 2S p_mta_ 7 196#. ((;c)urlcs} _! lhc Naxal Rcscmch
[ ,al)l)nalI)lv)
The oomph'ted system used eighly-fotu-lbot-dianwtcr (twent+s-eight-meter-diametcr)
steerable parabolic antennas and lO0-kilowatl tratlsmilters installed at Annapolis,
Maryland, and ()pana, ()ahu, with receivers at Cheltenhanl, Maryland, and Wahiawa,
()ahu. Tim system operated at I_reqttencies around 400 megahertz, it cottld accommodate
up to sixteen teleprinter channels operating at lhe rate ot +sixty words per minute, and it
was capable of processing, lelctvp(, and photographic t,tcsimiles. :+_
During the Fmxt Iwo years, the Comnnmication Moon Relay system expanded to
include ship-to-shore ctmtmtmications. A sixteen-foot (five-nleter) steerable 1)arabolic
anl('illllt and receiving eqttil)ment inslalletl on the lT.S.,',;. Oxfi, d in 1961 permitted <me-
way shore-to-ship hmar sate'lille conmmnicalions for lhe first lithe. _''The addition o1 a one-
kilowatt transmitter t_) the O?([brd in 1<.)62 I)ermitted two-way comtntmications, as the ship
sailed in South i\merican waters. These sttccessfifl trial experiments with the Ir.S.S. Ox[i,d
led to thc establishntent of the Na'+T's worldwide artificial satellite <'mnmtmications svstem
lal<:t it) the dccadt:.
3,% Ibid., pp. I I7-1S.
39, Ibid., pp. 121-22: 1.11. Fchct, U.W. (,vaham, W,E. l,ca,.itl, and M.[, Mus';chnan, '+gah'llitc
( ]lmlmuni< afire+ Rcscat tit--( 'a)mnlunicalti(ms bx lX.lo.m R('la', ((_MR) ," I¢epmt _4 .VRI. lSog+v'ss (xA'ashingt(m. 1)( _:
NRI,, Mas 1962)+ pl ), 36-5;7; ++M.<m lscd to ltansmii Sht)lc-t(++;hip Radio .Messages," Naval I¢,,+,+mb H+_,i,'w+.
l+'elwuat,+ 1!)62, pl >. 21-22.
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Conclusion
Tile Communication Moon Relay system was tile unexpected outgrowth of research
and development in electronics intelligenceian allied but distinct field. The perceived
need by the U.S. Na W and tile American military as a whole to constantly assess Soviet
technical capabilities rationalized and facilitated the diversion of funds and talent to fields
that otherwise might not have been developed at such a comparatively early date. Tile
constructinn of large-scale antenna facilities at Stump Neck, as well as tim provision of
technical support functions, such as the then-cutting-edge computational capabilities of
the NAREC computer, provided the technical and scientific background that made the
Communication Moon Relay system possible. Indeed, it was not only the Connnunication
Moon Relay project that benetited, hut also Na D, radio astronomers who had access to the
facilities during those substantial time periods when the Moon's position (lid not permit
the use of the facilities for intelligence gatbering.
If anything, the history of the Conmnmication Moon Relay project demonstrates the
complex and often bidden history of early space comnnutications. It clearly illustrates,
moreover, that during the Cold D,:ar, even the lnost I)asic research, sttch as radar studies
of the lunar surface, often had a national security component. As the declassilication of
doctunents from this era progresses, the intricate and interwoven history of national secu-
rity needs, science, and technological development should become clearer.
Chapter 3
Moon Relay Experiments
at Jodrell Bank
b)' Jon Agar
The following descrihcs research carried out at ]odrcll Bank <m tile retlcction of radio
waves flom tile Moon. These eXl)miments foHncd part of wider research programs puv-
,'.;llt_(Iat lIlc radio astron<>my establishment itnd had implicaticms tor inilitaty and civil com-
munications. Certain aspects of the experiments can be related [o issues of spectacle and
the public presentation of science thai placcd,Jodrell Bank as one of the most significant
scientific pt<_jccts of postwar Brilish science. Aflt'r the descriptions of the radar research
programs, Ihc|-e is discussion of Ihc initial Yeactions at ,]odrell Bank lo the Echo ballo<m
satellite prRjcct, as well as SOlllt_ of the later hmm houncc experiments at another ilnpof
lant British lahotalory, the Royal Aircrafl Establishment at Farnborottgh.
Radar Astronomy at Jodrell Bank
After Patrick Btackett succcc'dcd William I+. Bcagg its the I+angworth}" Professol o1
Physics at Manchester University in tht" fall of 1937, he immediately switched the research
direction of Ihtr physics department tvom crystallography to his inte|+est, cosmic rays.'
With this redirection, many staff changes occurted, atnong them the al)pointment of a
new assistant lcctltrcn the y<}ttllg l+crnard I+ovcll. l_,arcly ha<l this t-cs,t'al-th gath<'r¢'<l
tll<mtcnluttl x_rl_tmt_ anothtu ¢L2"dtqlt,tilt' otHbrcak of hostilitics with (;el're,lily in 19!_;9, scat-
tc|+cd the physicists into ahogethcr m'w t'nviYonmcnts atnd tesponsilfilitit.s. World War I1
mixed and transformed tilt? tilte(" traditional locales of scientit]c icst'at+ch: the military,
acad¢'mia, and industry. In tilt" radar+ aeronautical, and code-breaking l)rojects, academic
scientists l)ccatne aware of Iht" t?xtt_llt (;,J"availat)h" icsOttlCCs, its well as the possibilities o1
goal-ortented, large-scale research, l .inks we,t: forged I)etween academic scientists and tilt'
governnlcnt, in both the military and civil service. Many physicists, inchtding Lovell from
Mattch+,*sl('t alld Mar'till Ryh' front (_ambridge, entered radar research at tilt"
"[+tqt,c<mn|nluications Rest'arch l+_stahlishmcnl, as it was called by the end of the wa,.
l+ocatcd at Malvcrn, this cstahlishmcnt was in many ways the British atlalogttc of the
Radiation l,al>oralory at tilt" Massachttsctts Institute of Tcchnolog T (MIT). +
1. \.( :. l_,cln;u d t.oxt'll, I'M.& Blark,'l/: A Biog_+qd+i+alM++m.i+tF,tist<d:.l,+hn \Vlight &"N(ms, 1976}, p. 29.
_. A. Caldtq, Th¢'I','oph'_slXhr: Hrtt+m+19"¢9-45 (l+<md<m:{ :;tpth 1969), pp. t57-77; A.I'. R.wc, O_+¢,,_,l+.+
r*/leadoff {(TambridRt+:('.amblidg_' 1'1+ivcrsilv Press, 1'0t_); Ethra_d (;. t_.owt'++./?,_da_l)u}_ tBlist_l: Adam l lilg_'_,
19S7): A.C. P,ct inu d t+ovt.+ll,tCrhoes+4t_'?++'The.gtoP_ +4tf2.S ICadat {lhistol: .\dam Ililgc_. t991 ).
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Figt, re 8
Sir Bernard l.ovel[, dimto_ and founder o[ theJodrell Bank radio astronomy observatm), _ealed at hi_ de_k. Partially, vigible
ir_ the backffrou_ul i_ the observatory_ 250:pmt (_eventy_ix-mete_) telescope, which, with equipment [rom t_e
?bb'.m_municatio_ Ltd., _em,ed to e_tabli_h a hmld-di_tam'e communi_albm_ fi_tk via the Moore ((:oml¢-sy t_l NASA)
The physicists demobilized at the end of World War II were skilled in radar tech I
niques; they were intent on reentering academia, but the}, were also well connected with
the military and government. Committees considering postwar reconstruction and policy
gave high priority to science in the universities. With the Barlow Committee in 1946 insist-
ing on a doubling of "scientific manpower," there was pressure on the universities to
expand their scientific departments.' Blackett, who was one of a number of scientists to be
appointed to important governmenl advisory positions during the war, as well as a mem-
ber of the Barlow Committee, thus returned to his Manchester physics depm-tmenl, and
he was prepared for growth.
Blackctt and Ix)yell recruited radar researchers and secured war surphts equipment
to continue the department's prewar work on cosmic rays, this time hoping to use radar
3. t'hilip (;tllnlntqt, ,'iHenti_t_ in Whitvhall (Man¢hcstcr: Manchester t nivcrsity Press, 1980),
pp. 218-2¢).
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techniques It) delcct and investigale cosmic ray showers. _ The radar group established
itself ;it a university-owned location, a botanical research site named .]odrell Bank and
Iocaled twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers) south of Manchester. Blackell's policy of
deparlmental expansion was to encourage rapid growth in a diversity of projects under
team leaders, rather than channeling all of the department's resour('es inlo cosmic FaVS.
TheJodrell Bank Research Station grew. When the echoes displayed by lhe I':t(|aF sels werc
identified with meteors in 1946, cosmic ray research branched into an expanding meteor
astronomy pFogi-am.
One can discern lwo pha.s_,s ol mt'u'or as_ronom)' al flMrell Bank. First, 17om ] 94/) m
about 1955, meteor research expanded, with the deveh)l)menl of new techniques and the
acquisiti<m of new staff. A radar techniqtu' devised to deduce orbital characteristics--in
particuhu, whether an orbil was closed (elliptical) or open (hyperbolic)--alh_wed radar
astronomy I() COlltine[ll Oll ;t recognized pr<d)lenl already raised, but not resolved, by opti-
(';tl ;tstl-onotlly: the origins of st)oradic meleors..Iodrell g:mk asmmomers argued 111;11 I|lev
had (|emonsll+a.te(t closed orbits [or meteors lhal did not li_rm ])aFt of shov,,r('FS, and they
concluded Ihal ;lll meteors form part of the solar svslctn, During this thst phase, research
supporl came m_stly thFOlig]l Manchesmr University and slildel)l li'llowships mvarded by
the l)(.[)al-tllleltl of Scienlific and Industrial Research (DSIR).
l)uring the st?con(I phase, [iom al)ottt I(}55 to l}le lltle l(.)(i0s, Ineleoi itStl(lllOlllV was
no hmgvr a program of central importance at .lodrell Bank. As Hm 250-fbol (seveniy-six-
meier) radio telescope neared comphrtion, new subiecis and techniques look cenler
stage: research on lhe scinlillalion of radio somces; lhe use of hmg baseline inlerferome-
try lechniqtms; and radar stitdies of the M<_(m, planets, and, afler 1957, satellites. Meleor
Iesearch in Ibis second |)]lase was directed less toward ;tsliont)lltV itll(I nloFe toward i<)llos-
pheric phenomena that mighi alIi'('l missih.s. Research Sllp])Oll ('ililte f]'oilt Ihe [!.S. Air
Fol(e.
Sludics of radar echoes liom flu" Moon emerged from.]odrell Bank's meteor asmm-
omy program. ()hservations of lunar echoes had beeu achieved in 1946 by I,l. (:ol..]ohn
|[. Dc%:ill ;t.i lhe 1..!.S. Al'iltV Signal (]orps's Evans Signal l.aboralorv,, using a coniinuotts-
wave tr;tiisnlittcr, and ltv Zolllitl Bit}' in [[ttllg;ti'y, ttsirlg tin lultistt.t] chenlical eh'ctrolvsis.
receiver.' l)ttring the late 194Os, Frank Kerr, Alex Shain, and (]harles I liggins, Australian
l)|iysicists al the Divisi<m of Radiophysics oF the Comnlonweahh Scientit]c and Industrial
Research Oiganizalitm. also measured lhe slrengl]l of ]tillar echoes+ They corltSrmed
l)eV¢itt's observati<nl <)1' occasional signal fading, but lhev ttilTe,ed in terms of the ('xpla-
nalion. Whih' l)eWitl ascribed rises in signal strenglll 1o SlllOt)lh t)OUil('(' poinls, the
AUSlfaliailS dislitlgllished belWeCll rapid (;tclilig ((';tllSCd llv Mooii ]il)ralioll) aiid slow liid-
illg (fl-(illi Stillle (llhel-, possibly i(tnosi)h('iic, citlise), h
.-\i .]odrell Bank, !d¢illiani Murrily, Silpporied by ;t DSIR sludeni felhlwship, alld J.K.
] [{U'<_l't'itves ])l'gilli their SlildV of hiital el'hl)es in ('Onlle(lilill wilh it ltleleol" I-ese;li-(]l le;llll
h'd by TOili ]_tisei'. |{y 1953, thi'y i('[)orled lhal ","i0,(}00 e(ht)es wei-e phologlaphed ;illil
t. P.M.S, Blat kcll and A.( ;. gel naid l.mcll, "Radi. l'Ltlu>cs mid (;llsrni_. Rat',' Shm_t.is," t'nJ<vcdiu_ _4 th,'
Hm'al _,t. irls r!/l,o.don, svr..\, x_>l. 177 ( I{ll 1 I: I ,<'43-<w,6.Sccaln. A( L Bcrluurl I x_vcll, "The P,la_ kclI-Eckci s]m-
I.-tcll (;ol iCSl)ondciil c .I Wmld %4"ai"lwc, and Ihc ()niginn ,d ]odlcll I_ank.'" .\'.tc_ a.d t_rrmds ,q t/If HqwU _,mnl_
o/I.rmd_m 17 (1993): 119-31.
5. ,\nd.m_.l. I_.Ullil al, 7}>St,r I]tv ('.w'v.: .I I/i_1,o_, rq /_/,'_.rhz.>_ Itadar .t_m,.omy (V'.'ashingloll. l)(',: N\5,,'l
S,I'- 12IS, 1flgl;). pp. 6-12: lames 5,. I h',,, 7t..IC_,.luti.../RadU, A_t_mo. O' (Nm_ "_ilrk: S_ ivn{c tlisml', lhihli_ alioTis.
1977b, pp. 25-2t;.
t;. _lallk K('il, _\I('X Nhaili, alld (Thallcs lligghls. "'Mo_nl t{( liocs and I'cm'lialioli oi I}lc lolUlnllhclc,"
,\a/u#v, 11_3 { 19 t9); 310-13: Fl_llik _('11 alld .\h'x _;h_iill, "Mo(lil Lilll)l's alld "|l;lllSlliissi()ll lhlollgh lhc
hnll_nl)hci c.'" P..,'vdh_:s <,/H. IIU{ 39 ( 19311:2311-2 t7; t h.x, 77_,],Ti,o[uli:m./Iladi. A st_w.o.n, I)p. I I S-I 9; I_uli i( :l.
77,%,,,,t/,, I ',,_,,t/. pp 21-<.'2
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analyzed." Murray and Hargreaves noted that the slow Llding had a dinrnal pattern,
strongly suggesting an ionospheric origin. They concluded, after fi'esh observations of
both tile horizontally and vertically polarized components of lunar echoes, that "the long
period fhding" arose fi'om a slow rotation of the plane of polarization of the radio wave as
it passed through the ionosphere--a phenomenon known as the "Faraday effect. ''7
Soon after the Faraday effect experiments, Murray and Hargreaves took positions
elsewhere, at the Radar Research Station (the renamed Telecommunications Research
Establishment) and the DSIR's Radio Research Slation at Slough. _ lamar echo research at
.]o(trell Bank now became the work of John V. Evans, who arrived as a postgraduale sin-
dent in 1954 and whose supervisor was Ian C. Browne, a colleague of _lbm Kaiser working
on radar e.choes from meteors." Finding the apparatus of Murray mid Hargreaves a "poor
instrument," Evans rebuilt it, increasing the transmitter peak power fiom one to ten kilt)-
waus and improving the receiver sensitivity.'" The aerial, which was used for both trails-
mission and reception, was "an echehm of ten elements arranged one behind the other
along a North-South baseline"; each elemem had a "reflecting screen tihed back at 45°. "''
Evans's postgraduate stipend was fi)r flnee years. The hmar echo research needed fur-
ther financial sut)l_ort to continue, and that SUl)port was to clime t]om the U.S. Air Force.
The route whereby it was secured reveals the crucial assistance of links with Alnerican
astronomers, as well as the implications that the new source of funding had fin
Manchester University and the British military. Lovell's link in the United States was Fred
Whipple, a 1larvard astronomer, a personal fliend, and a colleague in meteor astronomy.
Whipple reassured Lovell that an Adr Force grant did not mean burdensome publishing
"restrictions," and he oftkwed to act as initial "intermedimy" in negotiations. '_
Lovell responded that "important aspects of ()lit- program were ill the process of being
shelved because of financial stringency and consequent hick of research wo,kers." This sii-
ttation described lneleor height determination work, as well as "the hmar echo appara-
ttts, +' I+ovell explained, which was "now ill a state where it can he used to meas/tre the total
eleclron content of the ionosphe,+e .... Here again, the financial situation is such that lnv
man-power on this valuable program is redttced to one Second _.+ar research student." If
extra funds were available from the U.S. Air Force, l+ovell envisaged suhstituting "our pre-
sent fixed aerial with a steerable one in order that we could (1o the measurements at :ill
times of the day and night--not merely at hmar transit. ''_:_
Further negotiations occurred face to face when (;erald Hawkins, a.]o(hell Bank
astronomer who had moved to the Harvard College Observatory, visited Lovell in Octoher
1955. hi a nice example of a gifi exchange cementing scientific networks, t tarwtM got
7. (in Kaiser as a leanl leaden scc David (). Edge and Michael.]. Mulkay, ,4stnmom_, 7"ra_,!fi,m, ed: 7he
I';metgeme o/Radio Agtmnomy iu Britait_ (New "fiwk:John Wih'y & Smls, 1976), p. 31 t ; Also sec William Murray and
J.K. t lalgi'eavcs, "l.unar Radio Echoes and tilt' Faraday Eltk'ct in lhc hm,_spilere," ,\atu_e 173 ( 1{t54): 944-45.
_4. I.C. Browne,John V. Evans,.].K. ttargrcavcs, and William Murray, "Radhl Et hoes froni the Moon."
tll*)(eertint_ o/Hie Phy._i(al ,_;ocie0 l/t:/.I (195(:1) : 901-20. t lalgl-eavt's ]alel iiillved Io lilt" l ligh Altitude ()bscrvalorv (it
lilt_' t'nivt'lSily t)f (]lllol'ado ;it B¢liildcl; bt'iort' rcliiNling I_l I,alil'asier tlniveisill in ll, l'ilain. ["¢lge alld lXlulka);
.411)tmou 0 7)'ar_brmed, p. 414.
9. lan (L Browne and "l'tml Kaiser, "Thc Radio Echo tiom the th'ad ot Mt'u'm Trails," .Journal _!/
Atmotpheri_ and "l'eru'*tlJal I'hysics 4 (1953) : 1--t.
t[I. Bulrica, 7b ,gee the l znteen, p. 23.
I 1. Browne, Evans, Ilargreavcs, and Murray, "Radio Echoes fiom tilt' Moon," p. {109.
12. Fred _.qli|)ple to Bernard Low.It, h'ttm, 18 May 1955,Jodrt'lt Bank Archives A(:('./56/'5.
13. Bt'rnard Lovell to Fred Whipple, lcllcr, 9 Septentl)cr 1955,Jodrell Bank Archives A(:(L/56/5. l,ovcll
also wrole titat he was "ilnprt'sscd with lilt' p,>ssibililit's opened up by lilt' avaihibilitv o[' the sixt}-fbot palaboh)id
iit alncrit a."
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Hawkins, andJodrell Bank received 1 larvard's knmvledgc of Air Force contacls, l :)veil was
told to contact Jiilcs Aalons o1 the Electronics Research Directorate of the Air Force
Carat)ridge Reseatxh (]cFltci- (AFCRC) ill Bt+dfi)rd, Massachusetts." Althottgh Aalolls
tttlllcd down Ilia.' [)ro])osal to supply.lodrc]l Bank with a sixty-loot radio lelescope for lunar
echo work, hc did indicate Air Force intert'sl in funding staff and operating costs |or cer-
tain meteor and ]tlnal ccho rcscalch, l,ovell rcquvslcd S lO,O00 m boost the lunar trans-
mitter fr<m+ tin+ to ninety kilowatts and $5.0()0 to rebuild a steerable radio, telescope to
tc|)J_tcc 111(" Ifansi[ ill'Fay.'"
Whippl,p r<:portcd +hal h,P had ]ic_+.l-d at (:hrist]-a_+ iu I!)53, "'via th<.' g,ap,:vine," +hal _lll
AFCR(; <_l_IH[ had been award<:d t<_Jodrcll Bank. l lc' rcassttred l+ovell that this ,,,,';is good
news. The Air Force was "really quite easy to w<wk vdth,'" so lot+tg as reports wcre in on time,
and otweJodrt'l] Bank had "gotten slmlcd with thcm. +v<m can count on conlinuati<m. ''+"
floweret, Manchester University's bursar, R.A. Rainfi)rd, expressed reservati<ms. "'Iatn
v<.'rv wol'rit'd allottl possil_h" rt(l:,vrcussions, '' particularly al),:)tlt "security," he wrote to
l:,(vll. +'l+'crruission from the Ministry <)[ [)of ChOP,'" h+.' th<m'ght, would b¢" ncccssat-vY
The Ministry _I Sttl)l)Iv, in [act, alrt'adv had cim,+idcrcd the matter. This n+inislrv xva_;
rcsponsil+h" for British rcsearch on long-rat+gc ballistic r<wkcts and their coutH(,rn+e;tsttrt's
and ah+ca<Iv SttF, pOt+t,:+d IIICIcI)I" rvst'arch at.Jodrcll Bank. In a manner tha! seemed typical
<_I his lol)IMng lot SUl}pot+t lor.li_drcll l+,ank proj+.'cts, [,<)yell lhcn tricd It) its,t:' Amcricatl
intcrest to gain fiu-ther hel l) from the Ministry <:,1 Supply. I.ovcll wrote to Sir ()wcn
Wansl:,rou<_h:llmcs, the Ministry of SttF, ply's chief scicntific advisor, lhal the l++(,l(,,i)r ant|
htnar echo programs had bolh "'p<itt'ntial military valut'" and "'vcr'¢ great" ftmdamental
intcrc_,t. Mi:,r,p<ivcr:
(] the e:cperiment_ were not _o sr'verely hamlicapped IO' lark O/mone_, I wouM have no hgL_i-
tallest in PT+]i*_i_tff ap/noache.s ]iom A me_ica, L_'/?H"#1 am _U_" that tJw_v will he .tan,; minm
d!]ficultie.s _'+,,'_ !/the l :_tiver_ity fi'lt ahh' ta L4ve their permission. One ea,_' wa_ out mi£_ht
be/or the Mini_t_ 7 O/supply t. increase it_ wq_/.n't to these pr,£r_wmg, t_
The Ministry o1 SUl)ply indeed c<mscnlcd to the AFCRC grant+ t)ccattse a formal con-
sultativt' pr<+ccdttrc |)('twt'cn the two n+ililary rest+arch 1)<+dies ahcady existed. (:ottlra(ts to
cxpattd the hmar echo research and to cotn|)hqnetlt the Ministry of Supply-supporlt'd
work <m upper atmosphere winds wctc agrccd on.'+ By February 1956, the Engineering
l+aboratories of the Army Signal (:orpsjoined Ihe AF(;R(: in developing the.]odr<:ll Bank
Itmar cchl) al)l_arittvs, pattie+flatly v,,ith respect t<_ "lh,t! pr<d)h'm t)f transallat++ti<. c,:mmm-
lli(ali()n via the Moral.";"
Mcan'whil<:, ]tuta.r echo r<:scarc], conlip.ttcd. In I)eccmlx'r 1<356, Evans used ]+is rel)uih
¢'qttipmcnt Io carry out what hc called the "l)oublc l>uls,. ` Exl:,eriment," thc rcsults of
which, hc sttggeslcd, showed "that the Moon is very lind) "dark,' and lllal the cfl_'ciivc scat-
toting region is at the c¢'tm'r <)t lilt.' visibh" dis[k+ having a radius o[about one-third lhal
15.
16.
17.
18.
A(:(:/56:5.
19.
A( :( ;/5ti/5.
2O.
+\(:(::56/5.
l+,ctn;u d I.ovell m.luh's .\arm+s. h'ttvt, 27 ()t tob<'t 1955..]o,d_vll Bat;k Art hiv,L's A(:(:/5(, 5.
l+,clnmd l.ovcll l,+.]uh's .-\arm,s. Icttm, 21 l)t'cendwr 1955. l-dlcll Bank Aichixvs ACC. 51i/5.
l:icd Whil>i,h' to l+,,mnard I:,;cll. h.ltc_, '.2>!Il)cl vlnl:+et l_)37,..]odtcll P,ank At( hi+,cs ..\(X::56 '5.
R.A. Rainliwd t+, Bt.rnald l:,xcll, If'lit'l, +{0 I),t.t Clll]}+.'l 1953..]odwlI Bank .\ichivcs .\(;(_ 56 7+.
Bcrnal,+l l+.;c]l Io ()v.cn '¢x+ansl)vouu, h:]t,tws, ]t'tlt'l. 12 .]:uunaly ILL'++6. .Jodlcll l+,:mk +\u_Inixt'n
(lop'. _I (<_llll;tt I .\]:{+I (311)-9.17 I<)_ +'lt"+,t'aI_h i)I Mt+(lll t'_ }I<) l)ht'nontt'na,".]_d_cll Bank :\l_ hixt's
Mcmo_andun+. "Mt'It'_w and lunal t'_h<l i)r_g+r:unmc. '' 7 [;t.]+lllalV 1956..],+<Ircll Ba,,k Atchixcs
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of the lunar radius. "L-''Further experilnents the tbllowing March agreed with this reflection
hypothesis. Tile conclusion thai only part and not all of the Moon's disk was a strong
reflector of radio waves had implications tor tile use of the Moon as a passive conlmnni-
calion device.
Already in 1951, teams at the Naval Research Laboratory and the Central Radio
Propagation Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards had used the Moon as an
experimental communications relay. The Naval Research Laboratory transmitted and
received Morse later that year; il Ihen operated a voice relay in 1954 and teleprinter con-
nections between Washington, D.(;., and San Diego in 1955 and between Washington and
Oahu in 1956. '+''-'Evans thought that his resuhs raised the possibility of a higher quality
Moon relay system than expected, because a message would be less troubled by echoes
reflected from lhe edges of the Moon's disk. Suggesting thai he was curiously unaware of
tile American achievements, Evans wrote: "[S]ince the effeclive del)th of tl{e Moon is 1
msec or less it bt.+comes possihle to use 1tie Moon in a conllntlnicatit)n circuit wilh nlodu-
lation frequencies up to -10()0 c/s. This is probably just sufficient fi)r intelligible speech
and could be used for teletype.' ....
Lovell immediately used Evans's success to increase U.S. Air Force financial support.
Because of the "importam repercussions on the consideration of tile vse of the Moon as
a relay slation," he argued, the work was "st) important that a doubling of [the original
support] could easily be justified. '':* Afler resolving whether outside amhorities, such as
the U.S. Air Force, had the right to inspect university accotmts'-';--a central debate in
British higher education in the 1950s>_an extension was granted, along with renewals of
the meteor programs. :7
In the fall of 1957, the.Jodrell Bank's 250-tboI-dianmter, tillly steerable radio wlescope
finally became operational,just in time for the October 1957 launch of the Soviet satellite
Sputnik. /Mter pressure front Ihe consultant engineer tor the inslrulnent, H. Charles
Hushand, 1,ovell agreed to demonstrate tile efficacy of the lronbled radio telescope with
a puhlicized tracking of both the satellite and its carrier rocket. '-'_The radio telescope was
hurriedly filled with a small seventy-live-waU lransmi/tm; horrowed from the Air Ministry, _"'
and radar echoes were recorded, first in a test run on the Moon and then from Sptm{ik
and its rocket a week after their launch.
The tollowing antnmn, John Evans assisted Lovell in making recordings of writes
retlecled off the Moon using the radio telescope. Lovell incorporaled these recordings as
part of his 1958 Reith I,ectures. After the radio broadcast of these talks, J.R. Brinkley, at
21. .].V. Evans, "The Scauering ol Radio Wavvs BV Ihu t_l()()ll," t'..eedi.14_ rJ the I*]i)sical Society B70 ( 1957):
1105-12.
22. Bulrica, 7b ,gee the I !_z_een, pp. 24-25.
2?;. Evans, *q'he Scaltcting of Radio Waves by the Motto," p. 1112.
2,t. Bernard 1.ovell re.Jules A;ttons, lctlcr, 2_R May 1957,.1c_<trcll Bank Archives CS7/:'_5/5.
_5. Jules Aatons Io Bernard Lovcll. Ictlcr, l0 tune 1957,.]odrell Bank Archives (:,";7/35/'5; R.A. Raintbrd
to Bm mud I,mcll. h'ttcv, l g.]mw 1957. Raiutord wrote: "[TI he l !nivcrsity has Ill) obje_ tion to taking (hdlars liom
the (rniwd ,'_tillt's 12)1"vcscatch pvog_ ammos which arc approved by thc Ministvv ol Supply and the [)SIR so long
as thcy (1o nol inchtde lernls which allow the books ol Iht' t;niwrsity to bt' cqmn fiH inspection by Ihc t!niwd
Statt'S ( ;t)V('I'IIIII{_II I."
26. .Ion Agar, "The New Pri_e and Place ot l Iniw'rsity Rcscmt h: .Iodlell Bank in tile Economics of l'ost-
war British Scicncc," t(_rlhcoming.
27. "Memo <m meeting with (]ohmel Trakowski, Captains Bergc and Derrick (t:SAAF Brussels) on
Wcdnesday, 19 March 1958," [9 March 1958,Jodrell Bank Archives CS7/35/5.
28. It. Charh's Ilusband to Be,'nald l._'.'etl, lctwr. 80(tobt*r 1957. Jod.cll Bank A_chives CS7/".:;1/3.
t hlsb:.uld ",Vlolt.: "1 (1o ]"wg otyou ti)l- tilt! sakt! ot ])oth i)tll it.lmlallil)ns tll;tl Sl)lll{. illllllt'diitl('joillt action be takcn."
29. Bernard l,ovcll IoJ.R. I_,rinkley, letlv_; 5 December 19:58,Jt_dxcll Bank Archives (;$7/?,3/4.
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director of Pye Telecommmlicalions I.ld., a Brilish eh_ctronics firm based in C:m)l)ridge,
c(>llt;wled l,<)vell and expressed interest in developing a lunar relay commtmicalions svs-
lem. :+" Pye <fffered.Jodrell Bank the tiee loan of eqttipment. In Pye's view, transatlantic
short-wave radi() links were too "li._w, t|npr(,dictabh, an(l distorted." Molem'er, ;Ihlmugh
the service trod imprm+ed with tit(+ opening of th(" first transatlantic tcleph(me c;tbl("
(TAT-l) in 11_56, sulmlarine cable was no answer to the exponential rise in dc'mand.
"1S]ttbmarine cable will not mlve all the I)r<)blenls, ', Brinkley declared. "The prothuction
and laying of tens of thottsands of miles of sttch cable is a major undertaking, ¢'ostirtg great
slm).s r:,f monc)+' .and taking iq) nmcJJ lJme , . . m;ln,+,• o.f +ht" IrerrJir)rJes .u) bc rt'_whed +ue
inland, wilh no mt)tlerr_ lrtmk routes connet-ting them 1<) the se_tt. The oltlv medium which
offers itself is commtmication via space.":"
Pye inslalled hmar relay lrmlsmitters :mr| rcc<Av('rs at Jodrell Bank +-' and st,ppli(.d
receivers for the cighty-four-t_)()t (Iwenty-eighl-mcter) AFCRC radic, teh+scopc at
S:tg;m|ore tlill, Massachusetts." Tr;msmissions from lhelodrell Bank radio telescope using
a on('-kilowatl Ir:msmitt(!r succce(h'(l in M:tv 1(./5:). As I.()vell wrote later: "Within ;_ short
time clem+ voice (iv(tfits via ill(+ Moon had I)een ('_;nd)lished betw,:(_n.]odrell B;mk and an
American Iclescol)(', :rod it w_s even titan(1 p(>ssil)le to n;msmil recogniz:fl)le musi(. "'_
t |owev('t, Jules Aarons, Herbert Whitney, and ! htgh Peters ()i the AF(',R(i considered th:lt
"[ a]n increase ()f ;q)l)roximatel) 15 dl) gain musl I)(. realized in the ov(,rall sVSlelll I)efore
good intelligil)le vt)ite or mttsi( can I)e r(,ceived. ''_' The exl)erimt'nl was reverse(t in
N()vetnl)er 11159, when Millstone t lill radar ;tl MIT's lJncoh_ I.at)olatory transmitted ;m(t
.Jo(hell l+_ank rt_ct, ivcd. _'' Plans ti)lh)wed Io transmit 1)elv_'t'ell.[odrell [Link _m(t ,.\tls/,-:tli_t and
t)etween Jodrell Bank and New Zealand. _
In .]tme 1960, Brinkh'y told die (;()mmonweahh Press Union that ath'r the .]o(h+ell
t),mlk hmar relay experimenls, he was "lcti in m) (h)nl)l lhzn pra(fi(al (ir(uils vi:t Ih¢' Moon
are tk'asil)le now and will, in the space of a ti'w years, 1)ecomc ec()nomic. '''_ Ahh()ugll lunar
r('lays (<)ttl(| only I)e used at certain times each (la}, tll(" "vast nmnl)('r of tch'l)rinler (+hart-
ntis thai Moon t,ansmissi()tl can rn;tk(' avaihd)le," argued t+,rinkley, would "relieve ('xisting
()verh)aded sh<)rl-wav(_ circnits" as well as have uses in "new fieh[s." l)ye set onl i)hms fi)r ;t
(()mmercial M(>on relay commtmicalion inmh'ing Ihe (tcfensc firm Vickers, using small
lhirl_,'-ti)¢)t (tt'n-mel('r) ([ishcs mad(' 1)y Vick('rs :tnd Ol)('r:ning arotmd 7,000 m('gah(.rl,,. _'_
30. .[.R. Bt inklc', t_, t_,('rnm d L,)',clI, h'mu, 2 l)(.¢(.mbcr 195_,.Jt_(hcll Bank Art hive's (;5,7., ;I;I '4. lh mkh",
had "(list ussi_)n,, v,ith I)r. R)h' :rod I)¢. _,mifl_ ¢)1 It_t' R;t(li(, .\smmom,, I.ab¢_ran)r',, [il; F",c's Io',', n, (::md)_itlw." I (m
th,. (.xl)h)il;ui,_n ,,t m,,,,n tcth._ li(,n." Set. _d,,(, .\.( ;. Ih.t mud l.(,x ell, ()ul t,/II++.Z_,_)lh:./¢M_ell B_mk, I (_'__197o (N,._
xA_tk: [t;upt.I &- R¢)w, 1977,)+ p. 212.
'31. l'alk h_ I.R. l+,linkh '', t(, ('.(mnn¢_ll',xt.ahh l'l(.s', (rlli(lii, +'I'('l:'(<)mnuuli(_ili_)ns _lnd Ih(' I'tcs,,." I:_Junc
1!16(). ,](_(tt,:,ll ILmk A_chi,+cs <_$7 31 .t.
_+;2. .J.R Btinkh'x t[) l+,('ll_md l.m('ll, h'tn'_, _ l)('(,:'mh,.'t l!_SH.]_)(hcll Bank Aithi,,c'+, (_$7 :'&, t. lh<'
II:ttl+_tl/ittCl hnnl_'[lialch :nail;d,h" had <>m' kilo;,.':tlt ,,t I>m,.t't. "_,,;ts hiffhl;, ++lal)h., and wotkc(l "c,ilhm lilt' hand
I()()-_Ol) Ill('_:t]l('[ I/ lilt" it'( t.i,,t.is Wt'F(' ++lnil_si)l,)dm li(,n and high glad_+."
_+_+. ]tth'n .\;It,,its, []('tbt'tt \_'hitliC_., :ttld [lugh I>t'It'I_, "Bistali_ Tt;uls;itlmni< M(+<m R<'IIt+, lilms, .` IIIId;|l
cd tcp(,ll. Iodtt'll l_;lllk ..\i[ hivt's (:$7,'67' l+
5t. 1 +<_',cll, (),t ,/ the /+'++it/+,I:+.212.
33. A:uons, \+x'Itiln('v, _tnld Pt'tcts, "'Bistalil Ti;nlsall;tnti(" M<)_+n R,'lh't'ti<)ns."
3¢;. .l(,hlt IP'+ll)ltl+s()II, '?',i[(l<)li iitl(I I_i'lltD, It'_it(IP;t[ [ I_+:ls_,+_./' _;ll'ullif(' ¢Jtlist't<+;ttil)[tP+," "I;.'( littit;tl (}:+tl;ilP Rt'port
imdcl (¢)nttact .\FI;I ([)52)-I '72. ()( t(_h('l 1!_58-1)c_ <.tnl)(.r I!l(_,ll, ]_,dl,:'ll l+,:mk Ar(hiv('+, (]%7 "?_'._" I.
:_7. I.R. Blinkh',, Io l+,+..tn;ud I.mcll, h'ttcr, 7 Fcl_ru;u+. 1961, ]¢)<lr('ll l+,:mk Archi',.cs (]$7,'.+,1 '1; JR.
l+,_il)k], ',. I,_ (;)itI+m 1). l'i]]'+cil, 21 Ma,. 1!).'>!1.],>dr, q] F,:mk \Jcliivcs (:S7,?,3' t+ ].l.. l';r+',s[';' _,1 _l_t' l)ixi',i,)n <d
R;_dh_l>h}si¢ ,, _41mnpint Y,xdn<',, c(_<)tdin:Itt'd lht' Ansttali;m ('rid (d lhc cxp,'limertt.
3X. l+,tinkh",, '+'l_'h+_,_nnnuni( :tlil)it'., _illd lh(' l't cs,,."
?,9. .].R. l+,tinkh'x t,, l+,c_nai<l l.,)x('il, h'llcl, II; _(+l)I(.ml:,,.l I':C,9. l,><Ircll Bank Ai(hi,.c:., (_7 ::;_+, 4.
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A year later, part of tile c()mmercial opportunity Pye saw was tile manutactme of large
steerable aerials, in conjunction with aircraft manufacturer Hawker Sid(teley?" However,
Pye abandoned the plans, according to Lovell, when "the successful use of the initial low
,wbit satellites, and later of tile stationary orbit satellites removed the commercial incen-
tive tot the Moon COlnmunication link."" The co1111uellts of Pye's managing director,
Brinkle b in October 1961 corroborate this argument. Pye would "hesitate to commit
ourselves to hea,_, expenditure on ftnther research and steerable aerials until [Pye was]
reasonably sure file expenditure would fit into space communication too." And space
communication to Brinkley meant "space satellites. "'_
After Evans's departure fiomJodrell Bank in 1960 to join MIT's Lincoln I.aboratory,"
John Thomson took over the leadership of the lunar and other planetary radar experi-
ments. John E.B. Ponsonby, an huperial College graduate, soon joined him. Under
Thomson, hmar radar stttdies continued through the 1960s and inw_lved, in particular,
the development of hmar aperture synthesis teclmiques to produce laigla-detinilion radar
lnaps of the Moon's surface. This research program declined after the Arecibo radio tele-
scope began operating in November 1963."
The Great Public Spectacle of British Science
By faL the biggest public attraction of 1951 was an exhibition at a specially construct-
ed site on the south bank of the River Thames. This extravaganza was Iht ( Festival of
Britain, a government-planned display of a revival of British cuhure after the postwar years
of austerity. The li_stival's aim was to make "visible a brave New World"--a vision contin-
ued in the proclamations after the death of George VI in 1952 of a New Elizabethan Age,
harking back to the days t)f glory, tmdist)uted British sea power, and tlle beginnings of
empire under Elizabeth I?' At the festival's center was the Dome of Discovers', designed
around a "narrative." Viewers were told a story of "creditable British exploraiion, inven-
tion and industrial capacity. ''"_ As the highlight to the story, there stood a "radio telescope
•.. operated from the Dome of Discovery, with its 'dish' aerial mounted on the top of the
Shot Tower. This was beamed on tilt: Moon and visitors could see on a cathode ray tube
signals being transmitted there and their retlection back about two and a half seconds
later."'; The visiting public, of which there were millit,ns, carried away associations
between radio telescopes and public prestige as early as 1951.
A second instance of the use of the .Mo()n it) (lemonstrate radio lelescol)es can be
tk)tmd in the planned opening ceremony of the 250-fi)ot Jodrell Bank radio telescope. As
it neared completion, Sir Charles Renold, chair of the telescope's Site Committee, wrote
that once the instrument was in suital)le "condition"-_that is, "ell)able of t)eing rotated by
power" and receiving radio signals--then a "dramatic and impressive" 1)ublic display o'f
40. .].R+ Blinklry to Brrnafd Ix)veil, Irttcr, 9 Decemt)cr 1960, Jolh'cll P, ank Archivrs (1h7/31/4.
41. Lovcll, Out oJthe Zenith, p. 212.
42. .J.R. Brinklcy, "Tile Economics of Spate Communicati.ns," 22 September 1961, J(_drl'll Bank
Archivcs CS7/55/2.
43. John Evans, intrfvicw with Andrew Bttlrica, NASA Hl,atlctttarters ' Washington, t)C, 9 Srptt'mltef
1993,JP1. Archives. See also Lovcll, Out of the Zaonith, pp. 194-96.
44. See l,ovcll, Out o]the Z_tith, p. 2(17, fi_r Arecibo's effi't't on lilt' Ventls radar program.
45. Roy Sm)ng, "Prologue," in Mm-y Banham and P,evis [ lillit'r, eds., A 7bnic to the Nation: The Festival rf
B_4tain 1951 (l,ondon: Thamt's & Hudson, 197t;), p. 8.
't6. Misha Black, "Architectltre, Art and Design in Unis, m," in Banham and tlillier, eds., A 7hnit to the
Nation, p. 84.
47. lan ( ;ox, "Three _i_ars a-Growing," in Banham and l lillier, cds., A 7bnic to the Nation, p. 69.
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0_e cffi((:acv of ttw tdescop((' should he pcrl_wln(('d. <_Sir Ben [+o(ksp(('iscr of the I)SIR and
Nil John StopfoM, who was vic(('-chanccllor of Manchest((w Univ¢¢wsity, .judg(('d tidal tlw
Dttke of Edinburgh woukl I)e a suitably syml)olic person to pertk)rm th((" opening ((:((w(.,mo-
nv, _'' l+ovell suggt'sted ;t possibl((' display: "l()/ll pressing the bt).tloiT , , . |Iv, + l((qcs((o])(('
[would] swe(('pover one or more of the r(('mow radio sources in the d(('pthsof tll(('uni-
verst('. The l'CSlt]till_ sigllal couM b((" displayc'd ()n a numl_cr o[' p((m-rec()rding illSll'tlllWIllS,
and thes(c could I)¢" used t<) initial(: a local sol-it's ()f evcnts such it._ tilt' unfurling of flags."-"'
"Evc)l l)(Iter" )h;m a rem(>tc, invisib]((" radii> ',<mrc((', I:>v((ql .,+uggcswd, was a "radar demon-
stritlion" using the visible Mo<)n--a "targ('t likely It) ClCittc all impression.""'
In any ((:,'(mr, Spumik prltvid(xl a d((_in<)nsn+ati()n dlat file teles('op(( +worked--and with-
()i.ll |Ill op((!iting CCFt+lllt)llV. [l()_'t_%r('l ", FiR|ill" ('ch()cs fl-(')Hl lhc .)_.]o()It W('lC S]lOWll itgltin ill
public a) the Reith l+e(lnres. The BB(:'s annual Reith I+ccturcs emb(tdi(('d lh((" principh:s
(t[ ils (chqtlilnt, lit(" c()r|)<)ratit)n's s[(Wll l)atriarch and (l((qen(l(('r <)f ('li)((_ ('flit|||'C, l,oM
R((filh. Fr()m the fitst [cclurc, given by P)((wiran(i Rtlssc[], an invitation was ()|fi.,rc([ (('a(h year
t() all illlthol'itativ((_ pu[lli(: ||gill'((" "to und(_'rlak((' sonle study or original research on a giv(('n
sul)jt'((t and t() give listeners lit(.- |(stills ill a s(('ri((,s of l)r()aclcasts,"": I+ovell was invilt'(|, only
ni()nlhs a[ter Sputnik, to be the Reith hxturcr oi l (.),')8. lie tllade good use of his series o[
lalks, calh'd The Individual and the l+++iverse, to d('fend tlt((" caus((' of hig t((q(('s(:Ol)(,'s.>+ To
I+o_cll il was "a mt)rtil_Jng th()ught that tilt" ];ug(('st [opti(all telcstopc in (;r(eat By|lain
t()dav is consid(('ral)]y snla]l((,r than the I(q((,s(-i)pc whi((:h H((!'rsche] built." H()wev(('r, tilt"
)taft<trial .shame <)f "tile steady decay of Brilish influcn(x' in astrozlolnv" had "b((x'n arrt,st-
cd by remarkable developnwnts in ... radio aslr()nonly." I It("located the cmr((-nt position
o1 tile "great p<)wcrs" (the United Staws and lhc Sovic't Unilm) as st(_mnling |l()lll th('ir
SUl)pOrt ()f pmc s((icnce. According t() Lovcll, "lit((' t(('chnical (t(Mct's which fi)rm Ifit(" basis
(if thc present economic and cuhural _,llCllglh ()|" Ill(." (;FCat Powers can t)((, ll+aCc(t back
within a few g(('ncrations l(t I'tuldanlental scicntifi( hv,'estigalions which were ((arried ()Ill
in the abstract, Sul)ported without th(tught ()t dirt'((( practical t)cnefit. ',.'_
Radio tcl((_s(opes wer((' [)i)rtraycd its a r_)<)t ()[ nati()nal r(('surgcnce, |_.'e(ling ()n tile ((ul-
ttu'al association of instrttmcnt with nation in lit((' Feslival of Britain, To t)ring th((" capa-
[)ilili((:s t)l Ihe instrtlmClll to its list('ning audi(uwc, in the l(('cture named "'Aslrononlv and
th(' Slltlt',+' l:)xcll played tilt" l¢¢xordings ()f voices rcl;iv('d via ill(." N_()Oll.
I'm _m)7 thP echo wrts w) weak, hut thal_ md really imporlanl. After all, oar tratrwnitter
kad :ml_, a tkou._a_dtk o/the pow:,r ,/._r,m, of the t_an_mitOq:_ whhh are hroad:a._lJ?_g _zO'
voice >zow. 77w important point i_ that the voice when wee|red back.[_'om the Moon i._per-
[i,(t(_' inMliq,'ihle and that the tele.sco[m wa,s workin[,_ ou war,elet_Lrtks which roam never he
disturbed hy atmo_phe)4c or iono_pk¢_Jc conditiong. _,ll tke w._ult qf that im_e,_tit,mtion is a
fiv'e ,k"ifi o/the radio a,strmwme_; to al! the commercial a_d milita_ 7 oGmni_.ation_ wh_) will
no doubt uw it in/uture.::'
IK Rent)M, "Radio Tvlcs(<)pc: ()porting flaw,'+ mcm,)wmdum, 6 Dcccmbt'r I95(';,Jod_cH Bank Art hi_cs
CS7 '31:2.
49. P,(') nard l:)_(']] lo It)h)) S)()pl_)d, ]v))('), ,_ I)('(t.mb('r ]954, I_)dr('1] Bank A)('hivcs (_S7 59 5.
50, l))('l tl;+.Id l.()veH to Charh's l lust>anti, l<'ttt'), 13 l)ct <'ml')('r l!)5(L.l<)dr(:l] B;mk Aft'hives (i,";7:?,I,2.
51. Bcrnar<l l,()',cll )o ('.bath's l lu>,l>an(l, lc_t('r, 't.]annary 1957.Jodrcll Bank Archives C_7,'31:3.
52. l)r<'ia(c to l))crnantl Russ('ll. Authn)i 0 nnd ttw lmlivid)ml, BIt)(| Rvith l.c(.'lures 1(.),18 (I.ond()n: (;t'<)t_t'
/\lien & l+nwin, 1(.)t!1).
,")5. P,('xnard 1_()',('11, The [)ulividunl nml the l'niv+,r_., BI),C Rcith l.ccnncs I_.)SS (l+<)nd<)n: ()×ti))d
l.hmc)sitv l>rc>,s, 19"1(.)),
,)').I, l/rid.. Ill ), 6(_<i7.
55. /hid,. p. 69.
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This was no free gift. Instead, it was part of the ongoing campaign by Ix)yell to hold
together the projects atJodrell Bank--in particular, the coh)ssal radio telescope.
In the same summer of 1951, during the Festival of Britain, the DSIR considered a
request ti-om Manchester University for £279,140 tot a giant, steerable radio telescope.
The DSIR agreed to fired the project for at least tbur interlocking reasons. First, it was a
project that satisfied the civil service's twin desiderata of scientific "timeliness and
promise." Second, the project was proposed by scientists who had buih up extensive cred-
it within D,_hitehall during the war by contribttting to research programs, such as radar
(tor example, Lovell), or by acting as scientific advisors (Blackett). Third, as John Krige
has argued in the case of Britain's entry inlo CERN, tile DSIR felt thal it faced competi-
tion and filture challenges to its function, as other departments expanded their own
research programs. Consequently, the DSIR was sympathetic to a prestige projectY; Finally,
radio astronomy was identified with British capability and leadership, and the giant radio
telescope, through its scale and visibilit_q was promoted as an icon of British progress lot
constnnption at home and abroad. Writing about a quality documentary fihn to be flmd-
ed by the British Foreign Office, a DSIR civil servant enthusiastically stated that it had
"already proved of greater public interest than anyother project" he had handled; "it
would bring credit to Britain... it should prove more effective propaganda than tile films
on our social system, housing [or] jnstice." The radio telescope was, he wrote, the "greal
lmhlic spectacle" of British science. '_
However, the spectacle soon slid into debt, and the radio telescope had to he reinter-
preted for different audiences in an eflbrt to secure thnds?* For example, it was "financial
stringency" that made the U.S. Air Force grants for hmar echo work altractNe and that over-
rode the small doubts abm,t freedom to pttblish. '_' The radio telescope came to dominate
work at.Jodrell Bank. For example, meteors were translated as "nature's missiles," when
lx)vell wrote to defense firms seeking contributions to clear the telescope's debtY' While
the promotion of the telescope could prove troul)lesome in attracting "thousands of visi-
tors from all over the cotmtry, ''_ identification with national progress could be mobilized
in the efforts to pay off the debt. The audio spectacle of voices rellected frmn the Moon in
the Reith l+ectnre "Astronomy and the Stale" must be mlderstood within this context.
Working With America
hi parallel with the work supported by the L!.S. ,,'kit" Force discussed above, Jodrell
Bank also was involved in the satellite program of NASA. Besides the scientitic an(l pres-
tige interests, collahoratlon with NASA, mostly involving the use of the big radio telescope
56. John Krigc, "Bvilain and the Eur_qwan Labolatory t'_Oicct: 1951-mid-1952." in Attain Ih'rmann,
John Krige, Uhikt' Mcrsits, and Dominique Pcsm', eds., Ihstr. v r!/ CIiHN (Amsterdam and New 3blk: Nc_Nh-
l lolland Physics l'ul>lishing, 1987-1990), vol. I, pp..t31-74.
:57. |lingslon, "Film _|" the Radio Teh'scope," mcmorandmn, l)cccmher 1_.1.'53,,]odrctl Bank Archivcs
(1S7 +'I 5/I. See also Jot Agal, '+Ncr<'t'ning Science: Spatiality and Auth<wilv al ,]'><h'ell Bank+" in.lot ARm and (]._,'x'.
Smilh, eds., ),laktt_ g S/.,ace/bz Science (lxmthm: Matmillan. t_ltht oming).
58.See Jot Agar, "Making a Meal of dw Big Dish: The ('x)llslruction ol the Jorhell Bank Mink 1 Radio
Telescope as a Stable Edificc, 194(_-57," BritishJmtp*tal/m Ihe lli_lm3: o/S_*ence 27 ( 1994): 3-21.
59. ,:ks the Manchester Univt+rsily's bursar Wl'Ol(? ill 195S: "_lOtlt'y is now '¢{'ly tighl and the only way Io
keep the Sl:ltitlll Roing full?, is to make sure thai ,)u/side 'users + pay theft <ltm shale ot tht' total costs." J.R.
Rainlord to Bt'rnard l.()_cll, I('lttu, 7 Augusl 1958,Jodtell Bank :kHhiv(+s (',$7/33/.t.
F_L P,ernard Loxt'll m l';spley ((;EC)+ |t't|er. '25 Xovt'mht'r 195,_, ,Jodrell Bank Archives CS7" +,/3
[,ikewise, as l+ovcll wrote m <h' Ferranti, th<' Ra¢lit_ l't'h'sc,_pc l'wcamc "really a gigantic radar scanner." Bernard
l.m'ell to de Fevranti, h'll('t, 22 Novemb('I 1955..]_M2vll Bank AI('hivcs (:$7 / { _;
61. l.mlcr+l.o_cll m Mansfichl(Smper. 6Jmw 19,57, Jod_ell Bank ,\-c vvs(ST/.t /3
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to track satellites and |)r(_be,_, broug}lt m¢_('h nee(Ic<l money Io.]o(hel] Bank. One contract
;tl<.me with NASA paid $179,200 to the ta(li(_ _tstron(>my ot)serv'atory. 'u The tt't|lnittu_.'s
involved itl tracking fl]c lwo Echo mylar balloons were similar to lhose used in, and were
c,)nlintlous with, work itl tile Manchester radar program, such as tilt" lunar relay experi-
illetl|s.
The initial response to Echo at .]odrell Bank is revealing. Echo was an _tllt'lnpl to
"establish communications I)ctween lilt, Bell Telet)hone I_at)oralory t_.cililv at ttohndel,
New ]crsey, the Jet Propulsion l_at)oratory [,lt'l+] facility at (;o[dslone, (:alilornia, and the
250-foot dish t_lcility al Jodrell Bank, England.""' M_'ssages would be transmi_u'd and
received tmnl the P,ell Telephone l,at)oratorv and .]PI+, but .Jodrell Bank would only
receive. Ewms visited the Bell Telcl}hone l+aboratory ill October 1959 and discussed the
[)rqie_:t with Bell scientists. Stnnmarizing his visit [i_r [,ovell on his return, lqv,u].s wrote:
"This experiment seems It) l:,e essentially a 'sltml.' There ace no good reasons tier ottr pad-
tic'|pat|on ttnless a voice message weft" to t)t. transmilted, which would give tilt" 'S|llll[' its
maxinnun publicity value.'""
These ",'.;ttllltS," or public displays of scientific spectacle, were highly significant in
holding together the.Jodrell Bank project, so it is nol surprising that the propos_'d Echo
involvemettl xv:ts viewed in this light. Ix_vell's reSl)onse was to "snggesl we (1(> nothing
al>out tl/_' ctnnnmni(ation part of the t)usiness unless we are pressed to (to so by NASA.
Wc have already pronfise(l NASA to help with lilt" preliminary radar tracking."'"
NASA was indeed interested, and l,ovell agrt'ed to ]odrell Bank's |)art|oil)at|on ill lilt'
Echo c,)nln/mlication cxj)erimenl+ so long as the <fl_servatory received ,tssistance from
Space Technology lad>oratories personnel. '+' (]ollal)oration witll NASA garnered for
.Iodrell Bank public and national prestige, as well as lilt" 1)ossil)i[ity of technology translk'r.
The same l)atlevn emerged t)'om involvement in Echo 2, wbell l_ovel] commenled 1o Pye's
Brinkl_Lv, "1 citnll{)[ imagine that much olhcr than Ihc eslal)lishmont ot working rtqations
with the Rttssians will come out of tiffs/'xperimenl, |)tH ]'yen for tha! reason we nit]st o})vi-
ouslv d<> ollr t)t'sl to.join in. '";:
(;<)vernment laboratories ill l+,rimin were" also ti)l]owing the American s:nellite pro-
grams ch_selv. Staff al sites such its the Royal Aitcr;tfl Estalflislnnent ill Farnl)ovottgh, the
(;ener:tl t'osl Of|ice's growing (;oonhilly g,rotmd slati<_n, the" Royal Radar Est,tlflishnlenl
in Malvern, and the Signals Research and l)cvclopnu,nt Establishment all suggested their
owtl salellile programs"" or s<mght It) collabor;tle with the Americans.'"' Tl+e use of lilt'
Moon ti_t militmy ctlmmtmications was carcftdlv examined within the Royal Aircraft
l';stal)lishment,:" along with olh¢+v passive systcms, such as t+]cho and Projecl \Vest Ford, that
l)t'ontised resistance to jmnn_ing and interct'pliol]. 7_Ahhot,gh one initial I-e_+tclit:,n ll) lhe
proposal Io ttsc Moon rclay circltils was that Iltc band witll]_ would be too reslricliv<.' tmless
{i2. NASA (:_mlH(t N,+. N_.Sw-{;8, ct]i'tti_<" dale 14 Apzil 1_t59,.[odrtq[ l+,:mk Art hix¢'s AfX:/'571/2.
li3. "'N:\SA SP.\(IIq(]()NN Pl0jt'{'l Echo S-42 ()I'LKN ,t-60," _ct>ort,.l*_d_,.'ll l:_ank Archivt's (_S3/_)/',t.
(i4. .Ioh. [',,,:ms, "'N<_t,.'s upon mv Visil to I_cll li'lcl:,h_mt' [+t>s.," mem_randmn. ()_t_}l:,cr ,_n N_),.'t'ml_t'_
1!15!1, .]<,dt<'ll llat_k At< hi_<'s (:,";l CL/I.
t_-,. l_,cv mu d l+<_xcll to llflm l+_v;u_s+ inltq _;_1 n_tc. 7_ N_>,,cmbcr 1'97¢.t, ],>drell Bank ..M t hixcs ( :SI/31.
61L I_,cln;ud I,o'+_'11. Oul o/ the /.e_th, p. 2['3. [+o_cll qltotcs hom his I,.'lttq t_ lx'ona, d.latlk'. Spa_c
[i't hntflogx loabor;m>_it,s was a wholly owned su't_sidiary ot Ramo-W<_ldridge (l:ttt'i TRW).
I;7. I_<'_nmd l+o,.cll to I.R. Btinkh'}, lore'r, t Mmch I!tt;3, Jodrcll Bank Aw'hi',cs (_%3' 13/1.
li,_. I:<_+ t+xampl_+, I.W.(;. l);_wson ol d_<' Royal .%ire]all l+]st:tbli_,lmlCl]t suggeslcd "halt s;tlcllitc'" ;_n¢l
"'ll_lshing s;ttcllh_'s '' _.'+Nll'lll's.
t;':L The (;t't;<'l+;tl Post ()llitt. x_:ts N.\S;\'s I+,litish pilittll'r i11 stub pt,,l>,>scd t'xpt'liiw_'nts i_s Rcllls. I'SX.
mtd Rt'i_tlnd. Ihc R_',';tl .\ii_M/ I'_+;tal>lishnlcl_t was anxiotl_, Ihat it shcnfld als_> g;tin t'xpc_it.tlt t' witl_ s:_tcllitc+,.
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suitable fi'equency multiplexing systems were developed, _'-'a "Moon relay service" became
a Foreign Office "requirement" by 19627* and was probably used elsewhere as a secure link.
Conclusion
This paper considers both private and public hmar echo experiments atJodrell Bank.
The private research was supported initially by British civil and military bodies and later by
the U.S. Air Force. The military's interest in the experiments was twot}ald. First, the Faraday
effect measurements iinparted knowledge about the content of the ionosphere through
which rockets and guided niissiles might pass. Second, the Moon could be used as a relay
in a passive communications system. The military preferred passive systems, because they
were understood to be less sitsceptible to januning, interfiwence, and interception.
(]ompanies--in this case, Pve--also were interested in the Jodrell Bank hmar echo
experiments because of their significance fill comnnmications. Pye briefly planned a com-
mercial Moon relay; it seemed to offer competition with transatlantic telephone cal)les, as
well as a new service where demand was high, but collllllttnicafiollS unreliable (Brinkley
stressed Europe-to-Aiiica links). It is also possible, given that Pye and its potential collab-
orators (Vickers and Hawker Siddeley) were defT.rose contractors, thai Pye hoped to find
a market with the military.
To the scientists at.lodrell Batik, the experiments oftk:red an interesting new field arid
the possibility of gaining sltpport usefld in other projects (tor example, new equipnient in
the R)rm of transmitters and telescopes, as well as new stall'). The public htnar echo exper-
iments in these ongoing research programs and in the promotion of radio astronomy in
Britain--and the radio teh;scope in particular--were certainly national spectacle. This
spectacle was usefttl to its sponsors in governnient in presentations of British progress, as
well :is tor the DSIR internally within Whitehall. To scientists such as Lovell, demonstra-
lions of lunar echoes fornled part of the wider campaign to keep the.Jodrelt Bank project
together:
70. lamar echu experimcl/ts were carried roll at the Royal Ail_ rali |:stablishnwnl in ',he early 1960s to
prepare leCIllliqtleS f];}l" passive satellite COllllllllnicaliollS systems.
71. John E. Clegg, "% Note on the Use _1" the Moon and Passive Satellites lot lxmg Distance
(:ommunication," 22 .June 1961, Public Records ()like, AV1A, 13 1292. See also the coninlenl in "Military
(;onllni.ulicatioils--Salelliles/]%_olln," nieelillg illinllteS, 20 October 1960: "[ []1 was t)econling clear that the (;PO
[General Post ()Ilk'el will confine themselves to active satellites in co_)peration with NASA (to ensure adequate
bandwidlh fT)r a civil systenl) hi.It that NASA would continue with both passive and active satellites. Passive satel-
liles have SOllle |)lopl'liies ot [)articil]ar inlportance 1o possible nlililarv CollllMlllli(>atioll_; svstelllS and it was
illlpoilallt fill" Mirlistry ofAviation to study suctl salt'lliles,"
72. (:. Williams, Royal Aircraft Establishment, Radio l)epartnienl, note, l'utllic Records Office, AVIA, 1'3
1292.
73. "Salellile (Miluluulicatim_s Research," meeting miilutes, 12 February 191_2, Puhtie Records ()tfice,
AVIA, 13 1292.
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Chapter 4
Something of Value: Echo and
Beginnings of Satellite
Communications
the
by Donald C. Elder
Tile workt has changed in many ways since 1960, but few areas have undergone as rad-
ical a transtormalitm as tile field of telectmununicatitms. From the virtually instanlaneons
uansmission of television images to the relaying of lelephone messages across vast di>
lances, people have access to capabilities only dreamed of 35 years ago. If the world is
indeed becoming a "global village," the revolution in the field of telecommunications is
in hu'ge measure responsible for !hal development.
Ahhough a ntunber of technological innovations help explain this progress, the sig-
nificant breakthrougll involved the advent of communications satellites. The}' display a
remarkahle degree of technological sophistication today, yet it is instructive to note that
lhev also have undergone a process of evolutiou. Indeed, lilt" thst such device seems
almosl simplistic ill colnl):ll'iSOll 11:, lilt' comnnmicalious satelliles of lodav. Thai salellite,
christcncd Echo, was in facl a _l_t]_ sl)l_t'r_" coaled wilh vaporized almninmn, and it could
relh'ct only signals directed at ii. Slill, lilt" story of Echo l does have gleal significance in
the hislory of todav's leleconnntuticalions rewdution. It proved lilt" viability oflhe concept
of lilt" comulunicalions satellite and allowed inlercsled parlies lo colldtict expe|-i|nents
Ihat presaged the t|ses to which olbers would apl)ly the ensuing generalions of satellites.
The Theoretical Basis
The story of Echo actltall} begins thu-ing lhe days.iust after lilt' end of tilt' World _a.u
II. In October 1945, Artlttar C. Chuke, aheady on his way to beconling one of the preen>
inenl t]gtn'es of science tiction, wrme an a,licle suggesting thai a device placed ill orbit
arountl Ihe Eacth could relay mcssages ti,ulsmilted to il from one point on the planet to
anolher, t [ tis idea Ibund resonance wilh others, who in various forms kept the COllCe[)l t)t
a comnntnieatitms salellite alive dttri|tg the following few years. Indeed, individuals ill a
Illllllb('l C,t'[ !.,_. krOVeFlllllel]l a tr.t'ncies holed ill I-I?pOl'lS lhe v}thle Of Sllch _t Vellllll'e 10 both
lilt' pttblic and p|ivatc sectors of tilt' cottntry. _ l lowever, the poslwar Trtunan adminislr,t-
lion never gave any official back!us toy tilt' devt'hqmlent of conuuunicalions salellilcs,
Ihus keeping lilt' cc.n(epl ill lilt" theorelital leahll.
I. Arthur (L (_larkt', "'Extra-Tc+tcsttial Rvlaxs: (_an Ro_ kct Slali,m'+. (;i','c World-Veldt Radio (_oXt'lagC},"
/l'+,+'/+'*+ IU./d.51 (<)+l+>l>el l!1t5): ?,0.5-[}H.
2. [:.S. Scnalp, "P_fli(', I'lanuing I_l Spate (:lmttllttlli(alil_ll'.." .%HI[/ [_'p+. / I'_elml*,d [m flu" Committ+,' ,,.
p. 3.
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Figure 9
Echo t,_dloon/ull_ i_{]latedJor le_ti_gpmposes. (t;ourtcsy of NASA, photo no. liO-E-6)
This situation began to change in 1952. During that year, John Robinson Pierce, who
was the director of research at the American Telephone attd Telegraph (AT&T) Bell
Telephone I.aboratories, wrote a story tot Astoundi,_g_ Sciem*, l')ction, in which he discussed
the potential benefits of communications satellites. _In 1954, he further refined his think-
ing on the subject in a speech he delivered to the annual meeting of the htstitute of Radio
Engineers. In this address, Pierce examined possible communications satellite configura-
tions and suggested that such a device could either actively repeat or passively retTect sig-
nals transmitted to it. An active repeater would require an internal power source to allow
the retransmission of signals broadcast to it. V_qfile noting that this type _f satellite had
many advantages, Pierce concluded tha! it possessed one highly significant drawback: the
limited lifetime of power sources available at the time would give such a device only a
relatively brief period of usetidness. For that reason, active repeater satellites were imprac-
tical for private industry as an alternative to existing methods of long-distance communi-
cations relays.
ttaving rejected the viability of active repeater satellites because of technological lim-
itations, Pierce turned to Ihe concept of passive reflectors. Such a satellite would have no
need ti)r an internal power source, making it of inol'e immediate utility than an active
repeater. After establishing the superiority of the concept, Pie,ce then examined the
potential conligurati(ms fi)r a passive reflector. ]-te rejected the practicality of both a plane
mirror and a corner retlector for technical reasolls. Instead, Pierce concentrated on the
3. J:]. Coupling, "Don't Wrile: Telegraph," ,4qoumlin£r S<ieme Fiction ,t9 (March 1952): 82-96. John
Robinson Picrcc oltcn used tile pseudonym '11:[. (;°upling," an clc<'lrical engineering term, ti)] his writings in
the tlcld ot s_icncc ti(tion.
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concept {}f;t unili}rndv reflective Sl)here. First, ifsu{h a satellite lO() ti'c! (about thiFtx-{me
reelers) in {lialnet{'r were t}laced in an oFbil 1,O{}{}miles ( 1,600 kilometers) above th{' stu--
|_t(:t' {}f Ill{" Earth, il w{}uld affofd tilt' best ]}{}s_,it}ility 1{}1-'-;ll{-{cssf/lIIv relaying messages. A
sj}hefe ,ill lhill size w{}uld no! require a Sl}Ccial itli_llIllellt ill <}l-bit t{} reIlvt't signals.
Se{ond, its {4/ala{teristics would allow the satellite It} r{,htv lhe widest range of signal fic-
quencies t]{im one point {}n the Earlh Io another. Pierce conch|deal his speeth by sug--
geslhlg aIuminunl f{}iI its a p{}ssibh" n]alerial lot lilt! c{mstructi{m {11lh{' satellite, as l{}ng
as "one {{}lilt[ inilale [the sphere] gently."
Pivr{:e's sp{'cch re{eivt?d a fav{}ral}le response. Encouraged bv hldivi{luals in tilt" au{li-
ence It} publish his presentation, he sul}nlillc{l it m{}ditied version to the .journal ,A"
l}r0puZsi0n, which published his paper ill its issue {}f April I{,}55--an issue whose ti}cus was
on p{}ssibIe outer space venllnes, in this arli{h _, Pierce {'{}FFt"CIIy i}redicted all {}f lilt" {'{}lll-
p{}l:lenls lhat would nlake up lilt" Sll{'{'essful 1}F{}je{'t Echo VUllllll'e f]',,:t"veitI'S ]life1\ bill he
aIs(} n{}led tilt' olle t;icl{}r Ihat prevcnte{[ Ih{' immediale implementation {}t his ilr{}posal:
such a ",,'{,llllll{' w{}llld need inforillalion "t){}m l',{){'kel nlell abotl| {onsllll{:till_ and plac-
ing s,lleIliles'" ill {)rl}il. _ Indeed, at lilt' lim{', n{} g{}vt'lnnl{T_l {}n lilt' Earth had {onunilled
itself t{} huul{hing such a craft. Unlil Ihal situalit}n {ha._ged, tilt" t)r{}sl)ects thr ctmununi-
{ali{}ns salt'llites remained {lira.
The Crucial Breakthrough
Nonetheless, in April 1955, oIlicial I)acking tor a satellite was {loser than PMce could
have imagined. For some time, President I}wighl D. Eisenhower had known thai the intel-
ligence-gathering agencies <}1the United Stales w{mld s{}{m have the ability It} ph{}l{}graph
tilt? Earth with ren|arkable resolution t]-{}m high altitude; his a{b.'isors also i,ff{}rmed him
thal a satellite ha<l exc{qIent potential a.s a plallOrln tor I)asing such an {}]}selv,ilti<}ll svstelll.
Eisenh<}wer un{lefst{}{}{|, how{wel, thal Ilndel" existing practice, any Ilati{}ll could c{}nsider
a satellite passing over its tt:l'l+it{}I'y aS all invasi{m <}f its airspace and Ih{q-et{lre {<}trial legal-
lv sh{}ot tilt" surveillance slttellite down--if it possessed that {al)ability. Unless tile |!hired
States c{}uM somehow convince tilt" nations {}t the w{}rld 1o regard satellhes as having a
diflereni legal still/is than airplanes, tilt- value {}f surveillance satellites would 1}{"severely
limited.
At Ibis critical juncture, tilt: world's scientifi{ conlmunitv had otlined Eisenh{}wer a
possible wav 1{}establish the principle {}f legal satellite overflight. To enhance the gather-
ing {it useft'fl data. during tile International {;et}t)hysMd M-at (I{;Y) 1957-58, these individ-
uals in 1{,154 {ailed {m the g{}vernmenls of lhe world to launch satellites tot {-onducting
scientific {?xl}eriments. Anlerican scientists did not hesitate to propose such a venture t{} the
Eisenhowef administration. Eager Io provide a l}re{t_{tent for tile overtligh! {}f olher
nati{}ns I}v survvillance satellites, Eisenhower approved Ihe hmnching {}t an AmerMul sci-
entifi{ satellite in cotl juncti{m with the I{;Y The official announcement came in,July 1955)
Soon aflcr, the Amt'ri{an {-oor{linal{)rs of the I{ ;Y f{}rn]ed a {{}mnlitle.:' It} sel{'{l cx1}er-
inlcnls to in{lude in the I}avh}ad {}t a venture named Vanguard. {)he 1}r{q}osal IIrcs{'nted
It} this group cam{' from Willimn,l. {}'Sullivan, It., of Ill{" National A{h'is{}rv {',{}nunittee t{}r
Aeronautics (NACA). lie envisioned {2je{ting a small balloon out of lhe tinal stage {}f a
launch vehi{le, inflating it, an{I then observing the effe{;ts ot atm{}sl}heri{ drag {m Ill{"
4. .John Robin,,{m Pi{'rtv, "{}rbiml Radio Rchtvs,'" let t'r,qmlsm, 95 (April 1!135): 77-78, {lU{,tad{m t_,}ttt
1}. 78.
5. F'c}l a lull cxmninati{}n (}t Eis{'nhowel's dc{-ision It} initial{' aul ,-\m{'ri{an salt.lille F,r,}gtam. s,.',PR
{;mRill I lall, "|'he {}ligins {}t[ .S. Spa({' P{}li{v:Eiscnho_%c_,Op{'n Skies, mid FI{.cdom {}1Spa{ c/' C,Ib,t,x It
(l}c{cnll}{'r 1!1931:B-l| 19-2l.
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sphere. O'Sullivan suggested that this balloon could consist of either metallic foil or plas-
tic with a metallic coating. Tile committee considered his proposal and shortly gave its
approval.'_
O'Sullivan and a small staff began work on the balloon project. While developing a
protot_q_e of the 30-inch (75-centimeter) sphere, O'Sullivan began to realize that larger
balloons placed in orhit would offer greater opportunities fi)r experimentation. He there-
titre began work on a balloon 100 feet (about 31 meters) in diameter, and in 1958 a pic-
ture of this larger sphere began to appear in journals and magazines. As late would have
it, John Pierce saw a copy of this picture and immediately realized that a sphere of that
size met precisely the requirements of the passive reflector he had proposed back in 1954.
After securing the backing of AT&T, he contacted Hugh Dryden, the director of NACA,
and suggested the possibility of using the larger version of the balloon for a communica-
tions experiment. D,yden gave his enthusiastic approval; he then asked O'Sullivan tot his
opinion. After deliberating for lwo days, he, too, responded affirmatively. Thus, in April
1958, two separate and distinct ideas tot utilizing a sphere placed into the Earth's ort)it
had become one.
The Technological Component
Certain developments sotm ;tided the likelihood of a successfld commnnications satel-
lite venture. In July 1958, the director of the Jet Propulsion lahoratory (]Pl_), Willimn tt.
Picketing, offered the services of his institution to Pierce for his venture. JPL already had
begun work at the Goldstone Dry l.ake in soutlmrn California on a parabolic antenna
85 t_'et (26 meters) in diameter to track and receive telemetry from the inilitarv's Pioneer
probes. This so-called HA-DEC antenna, so named because its axes were a_-ranged to
measure angles in terms ot local hour angle (HA) and declination (DEC), could receive
messages using the proposed passive reflector sphere.: JpI+ soon constructed a second
85-toot (26-meter) antenna at the (;oldstone location to broadcast signals as well?
Meanwhile, Rudolph Komptimr, an associate of Pit'rce at AT&T who had aided him
in developing the coImnunicalions experiment proposal, tound money in the budget of
that corporation in late 1958 to bttild a large, steerable horn antenna at Hohndel, New
Jersey, fit, receiving messages relayed f'rom outer space." AT&T later arranged for the con-
struction of a transmitting antenna, giving the corporation the same two-wav capability
that .]PL enjoyed. Finall B Pierce and Kompther recognized flntt tim perfection of tht?
maser (an acronym tot microwave aml)lilicalion by stimulated emission of radiation)
would rednce the power levels needed for the successfid transmission of ;tudible radio
waves. The maser was a new lype of solid-state microwave amplit_,ing device vaunted by
one attthor as "the greatest single technological step in radio physics tk)r many years" and
had become available outside the laboratory only earlier in 1958. _'' Front a tecl_n'ical stand-
point, then, as 1958 drew t() a close, Pierce's ballo(m venture seemed very promising."
6. Don Mtu H). "()'Sullivan's Wonderhll [tad Balloon," l'opular Srw)ue 178 (Fcbruary 1961 ): 74-77.
7. Calvin Tomkins, "Woomma llas It'.," ,\_(, }brker 3t.) (21 Scptvml)ev 1963): 8.'>; William R. Ctnliss, .4
lli_tory q/the Deep ,S)m¢e Netwmk, ( ;R- I.'51915 (W;tshingt(m, I )( _: NASA, 1976), pp. I (_- 17, 20-25.
8. (:ovliss, Deep S/uue ,Vetw+uk, pp. 23-27.
9. Tolnkins, "Woom(.v;t Has It!," p. 87.
I0. Ouolafion is _'rom J.V..](ql(,y, 'q'he l'olcntialilics and P_est'nt Status ol Masers and P;uamctric
Aunl)litiers in Radi() Aslronomy." 15,werdinl4_ o/lhe H'[]"+I(g)t ( 1!)(:,',:;): 31, 36, CSl). 30. For th(' invenuion of tim iii;tst'l,
set" l)atfl Form;n. "Inv('nting Ih(' Maser in Post',vat Am(wit;," O_iri_ se,. 2, ',()I. 7 ( 19!12): 105-714.
11. Donald C. EId('r. Out I"),mt llehind the I';iL,ht-Ball: A ttistor_, o/ l¥ol'ect t"<ho, ,&'\S History Series. v()l. 16
(Sam [)it'go: Amcritan Astlonautical Society. 19()5), t)[). 25-26.
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7he Bell Teleph_me l.ah+_rc_tm4,'_ _m,41i#' <_>mmu_icmu,n_ <e_m'_ at (haz,,fiwd tlill m tlolmdel, New p'_:w3", circa 106¢1. Tlu,
sleembD, ho)t_ a_tO'_l _ta u_ed fm- )ec_>ii,i_ i_ :_J the, _4_ht, wh_h, the wxt_.-fluJt _/wet_t_,-meter) t)an_mittittg_ d{_h i_ i_t /he upper h'[t
_t_r#trt; ((]IiUI'Ii's)ill NASA, llli_ic_ ll_l. 227()!_,1 )
Th_>se associat('d wilh Ihl" colnniullicalions s_tl0ilitc" i)l-_ieci soon li)und ll.';_lSOll to
ll_joic¢.- ill lhl_ l)olilic_il I-I'_t]Ill it_; WI']I, NACA hlld ._l|)|)iov('(] l]ll" vl'lilllrl" ]i1 April 19:-)8, bill
thai oi'g_tnizalion (l'_t_,l_(I lo t,xisl oil | ()cl_/t)('r l{i,_ t)ocalise (if _l 1)roc_'s,s of _'v(mls s_'l in
inolion ll_>illli.s I'_lrli_'r. S|)uircfl I)y l]ll" hililich of <_])iillllk, l]lt" ",vorld',s t]r,sl sat/'llilt', l)'¢ llli,
Soviel (_'ilion ill ()ciol)l'r 1957, llrl'sid/qli [is_mhowt'r soughl to d_.'nlonstiale his adlllini,_-
Ir_ilioll',s i_)lillllillil_.'lll I_) lh_! d_.vl'l_)|)lll_,nl of _i vii)ralll Aln_.'li¢iin space l)l<)gl_iill.
Accordingly, thc ])rl'sidcnl advocated the (rl'_ilion of _i civilian space ag_.'llC}; lhi" Nitlioll_d
At'l()ll_llllil:s _llld St)ii¢0 Adlllinisli_lliol) (NASA). As ])itll of the h'gislalion ;illl]l()li/illg
Ni_SA, (]Ollgll'ss tiullloli;t('d lli_." ll('w {igl.,ncy Ill l/I),_orl) NA(_,A. Tile denlis(_ o[ Ihc ori<_il_a]
g()'¢l.llllli/'ill_l] fil;illllJioll of ltll' ('_)lllnlllnil'_lliolls sai_'llile projeci lllOlll_.'lll;lrilv Icl] ihc t<lte
o[' lilt" f)r<!ieci in doul)l, ttowt'v('i; T, Kl'ilh (',]('iinan, llll, t]r,_l _:\_A adnliiliSll_il_)i, sw, v
llit!l-il ill ltll! ('_)il(-i'l)l ;iild coilvincl'd Ihl" F_iSl'll|iowl.r _tdnlinislr,llioii I_l giv*., il _ll]]cilll
iq)l)lovai. ( ',l(,iliiiin ill_tdl" lili,s news ])ui)lic (;ill | (.} Pcl)ru_lly l {t_ll.t,l-'
12, "lli¢liligtl_s Ill tlic llil]_ll_l])l_' _ilclliic ill_ll41;llll. '" tllid;ill'd, I:oldt'i XII, S_ll_.'llil_'s, E_ho--l'r_!icci
Ech<_, N,\S,.\ I Iisl_>l )' ()l]'w_', Wasliingl_m. 1)( ',.
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Aware of the work under way on tile signal transmitting and receiving eqttipment, and
secure in the knowledge that the government stood solidly behind the project, the indi-
viduals interested in the communications satellite project turned their attention in 1959
to the progress being made on the construction of the sphere. O'Sullivan had given the
contract for the sphere to the General Mills Company. At the time, General Mills was a
leader in the field of research balloon manufacturing, and that firm had built a protot_q_e
of the passive reflector sphere by the sulnmer of 1959. General Mills, however, had never
fabricated a balloon of that size before, and O'Sullivan had no facility large enough to
observe the results of inflation procedures under the conditions that would exist at an alti-
tude of 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers). Until NASA could conduct suborbital tests with the
General Mills balloon, he would not know whether the sphere could maintain its integri-
ty in orbit. '_
When NASA finally conducted the first test in October 1959, the results confirmed
O'Sullivan's worst fears: the balloon disintegrated upon inflation, creating a dazzling spec-
tacle of sparkling light in the sky over the eastern coast of the United States. General Mills
in fact had warned O'SuUivan beforehand of a potential problem. The Minnesota com-
pany informed him that it did not believe the substance its technicians had used to bind
the 82 separate panels of the balloon together would allow the sphere to withstand the
tremendous pressure generated by rapid inflation in a near vacuum. The first test dra-
matically validated the concern of General Mills and put the flmwe of the project in
doubt. _'
As it turned out, General Mills already had put into ntotion a plan to rectify the prob-
lem. Before the first suborbital test, the firm had asked a balloon-making rival, the G.T.
Schjeldahl Company of Northfield, Minnesota, for help in creating an effective sealing
procedure. After six weeks of intensive study, G.T. Schjeldahl himself, the compan}?s
founder, developed a satisfactory adhesive, and one of his employees devised a technique
for applying it to the panels of tile disassembled sphere,':' After inconclusive resuhs dur-
ing two subsequent suborbital missions, a sphere built through the combined etfbrts of
(;eneral Mills and the (;.T. Schjeldahl Compauy perfi_rmed flawlessly in a lest flight on
1 April 1960. Now confidenl at)out the quality of the product, NASA otficials began to
plan fi)r a thll-scale mission.
The Dawning of a New Age
NASA scheduled the launch of the giant balloon for May 1960. The rocket left Cape
Camweral successfully, but control jets in the second stage did not function properly.
NASA officials surmised that the Thor-Delta rocket had plunged into the Atlantic Ocean.
Nonetheless, they did not let the failure prevent them fi-om initiating plans to schedule
another launch immediatelyY _ After one additional successthl suborbital launch, NASA
selected August 1960 tor the next attempt.
This mission, after a ntunber of postponelnents, did succeed. The Thor-l)elta
performed flawlessly, lifting the payload on the morning (>t12 August 1960 to the desired
13. DuPont Mag(_zine53 (May_lune 1961): 14.
14. William J. O'Stdlivan,Jr., interview with Edward Mt_t so, 28 ,kugttsl t964, "I tistorical Origins of Ectm
1," William J. O'Sullix'an.lr., tile, NASA History Oftice.
15. Sheldahl (:ompany, Thel'ine Line, special ed., 1985, pp. 4-7, (;, "1\ Scl_jeldahl Papers, Minnetonka,
Minnesota. Alt.er (;.T. Schjcldahl severed his lies with the (;.T. Schjcldahl Company, its directors changed both
the spelling and the name of Ihe firm.
1(5. NASA St:lit'lilt'Ill I() _ll(' PI'I'SS, 13 May 1911(1, l)l_( tllll(.lll_ttioll Eclm Folder, NASA History ()[lice.
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ahitude. The ctjeclion met,:hanisnl ill the final stage sent the tightly tolded collapst,+d
sphere iuto tile near vacttunl of the Earth's orbit; then a com|)ination of chenficals inside
tile balloon unt,lerwent a process of sublimation and released gas that gently inflated the
sphere. The satellite--at that point officially named Echo by NASA--had achievet,l orbit) 7
Tile crews at Hohndel ant,[ (;oldslone learned of the successfid t,leploynlenl of tile
sphert," ill orbit and immediatt,'ly I)rt,'pared for the first communications experiment.
\_,tmn both stations located tilt" satellite in tile sky, the JPl, facility at (;oldstone sent the
first message. "_*(ith reulavkable chu'ity, Bell "lk'lephone l.aboratories personnel heald the
voice of t'vesident Eisenhower, who previously hat,l rt,'corded a short speech for this occa-
sion. _ In this dramatit," tashiem, a new era in the histoYv of ct`mnnunicalions lwgan.
In the days f_)lhowing tht," launt,:h, nlanv t,lifti'rent g,rottl)S conductet,[ exl)eviments using
Echo. JPI, :rod Bell Telephone I,abot;ttorit,'s suct,essfu/lv t,ondut,ted the fhst two-way Itans-
mission using a salellitt,,: alley the (_alifornia team again |)r()at,ttasl the message (if
President Eisenhower, tilt," lh)lmdel ]mrsonnt,'l tl;lllSlliiite(| ;i recording SUl)plied l)v Sellltte
Majority I_eader lyndon B..l,hnson. Tht,' (;ollins Radi_ (]ompany conq)lcted a livt,', two-
way radi_ conversation between its home location in Cet,tar Rapit,ls, Iowa, and a subsidiary
in Rit,hardson, Tt,'xas. This firm also Itu-ned a teletype mat,'hine on b', meaus of a signal
botmcetl off the sphere. The Naxal Research I_al)ovatoYyjoint,'t,t ',villi ihe original partici-
pants to "t,l(ml)le bounct,'" a message [)'t>nt Marvlant,l to New Jersey, then to (:alifovnia.
('.leavl_; Echo hat,l allowed itueresred p:uties Io demonstrate t}_¢" im_enlial t_t,'nt,'ti_s o_ a
COI]IIII tlllitHt i()ns salellile, t"
Whilt,' the lesllhs to that point would have been etlt)tlgh to satist\: :ill cont,ernet,l wilh
Projecl Echo, two lalel experinwnls gave thelll itll evell gl'eit|el" al)l)ret,ialion of whitl :1
cOnlllllUlit,alions satellitc could ol[i,r in the [ulurt.'. First, on 15 AllRIISI 1960, JPl, alld Bell
Telt,'phone l,aborattwit,.s t)rt!jct,t managers ttsed the satellilt,', ant,t tilt'iv II'allSlllittillg all(t
receivin R equipment, in lht,' words _fl ,t Bell lmblit,ily releast,', to engagt,' in a "hislt>Yic {tele-
phonel t,onvevsalion, exchanging pleasantries ant,l t,arrying on small talk.""' Set_m(l, i,I
April 1962, lhe Massachusetts Institule t)J Technoh>gy and the U.S. Air F<wce.joitled in a
stwt,t,'sstul etlorl to relay a live television transmission via Echo. With g_od reason, tht,'n,
bul perhaps wilh cxcessivt' mot,h'sty, I_)_, l'iert,t,' laler would vet;,'v to the salellitt,' as "sotne-
thing of value."
Echo in Retrospect
Even at tilt" time of the sut,cessful relaying o1 television signals, NASA otticials Yt,ali,,cd
thai technological t,levt,'loplllt,qlls had mat,It,' the passive rept,'ater salellilc obsolete, hi(leer,l,
in.luly 1(.)62, NASA humt,hed Telsta,', an active repeater satellitt,', l'e_l)le soon remembered
tilt" original comnlunications satellite more tot its visibility to tht,' naked eyt," at night than
toY the experimctlls individuals ust,'d il to cont,llltt. The nali_nal llews lll,pdia iloted Ihe
dt,qnise _[ l_]ch_) ill Ma_, 1968, as it Ietlll'llt,'d thvoug, h the Earth's atmospllert,', but recog-
razed it_ their t,ovcrage {hal .:,vellls hat/ lo_tg since stviH)et,l it of its televar_cc. -'t
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
()Hire.
Ehh.l. Out I'_.m BdUml t/i_,Ei_4_I-BalI,pp. 99-1 lib
D,_t_hit*k_t¢m.Slat; I I :\u,_u_,! 1960, p. 9: ,\t'_, )bd,' lh'lahl "lnhum', !:_,:\uRust l(:_lil),p. 7.
El&q, pp. 113-116.
Bcll Nm_s Rclc;isc. I."):\ll_llSl I!)()O.Foldct XXII. Salcllitcs l'_th_ 1, N.\5,.\ t listo_ _,t,)lticc
Ns\FL\ N(.v,s Rt'l_.'as(', N(). 75-217, 10 August 197,"), F()ld(.i XXII. Satcllh('s E(h() 1. NAN\ llist()vx
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Still, it is important to rcmmmtmr that a successtul connnunicafions satellite eltort,
however simple in design and execution, was necessary for individuals to plan a more
ambitious generation of devices. The telecommunications industry today may be "file
world's largest economic sect<m" as the Los Angeles Times has proclaimed, btlt few com-
panies would have allocated resources lot a field that had yielded no apparent hope of
success until Attgust 1960/" Viewing tile results yielded by Echo, individuals could envision
more ambitious telecommunications projects for the furore. Echo, then, represents the
prow-rbial single step in a.journey in which the world is still participating today.
"2"2. I_¢_;Dtgreh's 7)me_, 211,Jul) 199.t, p, 11-2.
Chapter 5
Project Echo, Goldstone, and
Holmdel: Satellite Communications
as Viewed From the Ground Station j
by Craig B. Waft
As the geostationary orbit reaches saturation, and as carriers begin to look again at
satellites in medium and low orbits, such as the proposed Iridium system, lhe pioneering
work of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (]PL) and AT&T's Bell Telephone Laboratories
in acquiring and tracking the tirst Echo balloon satellite has taken on new meaning and
importance, Donald Elder has provided an overall descrit)tion of the Echo project, which
includes the design, construction, testing, and launching of the inflatable balloon, as well
as the political impact of the experiment+ _ The tiwus here is on the acqt,isition and posi-
tioning of the ground eqttil)ment necessary to undertake tile experiment; the condtlct o|
preliminary acquisition, tracking, and COlllmtlnicatioll tests prior to [atlllch; the l)erfor -
mance of operations immediately after launch; and the conclusions reached by engineers
of tile two main participant organizations, Bell Telephone l+at)oratories in New Jersey and
,JpI+ in southern CaliR)rnia.'
In an October 1958 internal technical memorandum outlining '% Program of
Research l)irecled Toward Transoceanic Communication t)y Means of Satellites," Bell
Telephone l+aboratories engineers.John Robinson Pierce and Rudolf Kotnpfner suggest-
ed that a worthwhile prelitninary slep would be the establishment of "an experimental
narrow-band communication link.., between two points on the American mainland, tar
enottgh apart to prechtde tile possil)ility of any other signal l)ath. '' The main objectives of
the experiment were to observe ammsl_heric reti-active effects, to stt|dy the influence of
satellite shape, an<l to make signal-to-noise and ban<twidth measttremenls from 100-toot-
diameter spheres latmched into orbit. Pierce and Kompfner believed that the required
1. Most of Ihc research h)r lifts pal)m was (ondu< ted as parl of the author's work tiom 1989 t. 19t._2 as
Deep Spate Net;+,'ovk <ontract histolian at lhcJct l'r,qml'+,iml [+ab.ralo[y (JP[.) in Pa:,iadct;a+ (;A.
2. Scc Donald C. t:lder, %<mwlhin g <ffVahw: l%ho I and tim I+,cginnin_s ot Sat<'llitc (ZOllllnutli( alil+llS,"
chaplcz .t in (his imhlit alion: lit maid ( i. [qdct +, Out l"_.m l_ehind the l'ht.4*t-Ba/l: +l lli+tmw o/t'mfl,+t E)ho, AAS I list_J
Scrit's, V_>I. lli (San Ilicgo: Amvlican Astronautical Society, 1995).
3. "l'hc ov,vrall roh.s play,:'d b?.' ]PI_ and B<'II Teleph,:m<' ].ab<,rat<ni<'s in l'_<+j,._ t I+;_hc +at,:' smnmati.'<',+l
ill _Nallt'r K. Vie I_)1 and R_)l)en'tson Stevens. "The R=_h' ot lhc .lvt Proputsi.n l.ab<+tat{+t _r it + I'n_ict t F_ ho," 1t¢1'+
7)m*_mlio*e_ *m .'_Jm, e l:'/*'clromc* amt 7)@met*, SE']-7 (March 1961 ): 20-28; William ( ;. ,}akes, .l_:, "]'arlJ_ ipa_li+m ot
Bell Ttqcphonc l.al)(watm'i('s in Pt,_jet t lGt h{+ an,:i Expcrinu'ntal Resttlls," 77w Bdl &+lem "l_'chni¢al.]ommd 411 (July
I !)61 ): 975-1028: William C. lakvs,J,;, all([ Walter K. Vk-lor, "Tracking Echo I ;it Bell "l'elt'l)hlmt' l +;d)oratoz its and
the .let Plolmlsion l+aboratoty," in i[.(;, van (It' [[ulsl, (]. (le .lager, and ,\.l". Moore, eds., Space ICe+ea_,h II,
f'ro+wedint,,+ o] the .g,'+m+d IntePnational .S_mte Scieme Symposium, Floren+e, Aprd I0-14 1961 (Amstt'tdam: N_,th-
i tolland Publishing (',otnpan_,, 1!163), pp. 206-14..]PI+ rel)Ott_'d its inw>lvctnent in Prt!jcct E_ho more hilly in a
smi<'s ot progress tcp<,tts al+pcariug in issues trios. (; HiId 37-1 Io 37+61 o| its Ifinumthlv .";pa+e t5%,+++m_ gummm)
.,cries ( o+,.'t._ing the pm iod It om 15 Septcmh,,.r 1959 t_> 15 Novctnl:+,pr ]!)(iO+ as well as in its filial rcpot+l ot't thv l)m -
i(+(I, Robt'l'tS<)tl _tl+t.rt'tl+i atlld V_'allt'r K. Vi(tor+ eds., 7']+e (;oldstom' .v,tatifm Commumcati,m+ amt 7"mckiP+qr L%stem /,,r
15+Wcl l'+',h0, JPI. lt._ hni_al Report No. 32-59 (Pasadena, (;A:.IPI., 1 l)t'cctnbm 1960).
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ground equipment tot tile experinmnl would be two sixty-toot steerable antennas con-
nected to high-power modulators and amplifiers, low-noise receivers, band compressors,
serw)-tracking apparatus, and computer t_tcilities) "[T]o interest some agency that could
launch such a [communications] satellite" and "to convince ourselves and others of tire
value of such a passive satellite experiment," Pierce and Kompfner presented a paper
based on their proposal to tile National Symposium on Extended Range and Space
(_ommunication, held in Washington, D.C., on 6 and 7 October 1958. That paper subse-
qnently was published ill March 1959." Their proposal, of course, was tile genesis of
NASA's Project Echo.
Recruitment of a Partner and Site Selection
Performing tile passive satellite c(mmmnications experiment called fin in tile Pierce-
Kompfiaer proposal required two antenna stations, one on each coast of tim North
American continent. Their proposal did not suggest any specific sites for the two stations.
(;teen their belief that the Bell system would play a leading role in the flmu+e development
of satellite coummnications, however, they tmdoubtedly desired that the east coast station
be located at one of tire Bell Telephone Laboratories facilities, all of wlaich were in New
Jersey.
When tiles: wrote their proposal, Pierce and Kompflmr already had in mind both a
desirable site and an interested partner organization for the required west coast station.
At an Air Ft)rce-sponsored meeting on communications satellites held at Woods Hole,
Massachusetts, on 13-14.]uly 1958, Pierce had discussed the feasibility of using l(t()-foof
diameter (about thirty-one-meter-dianmter) balloons as part of a "passive satellite relay
systeln+" 2+ktllOllg the COlrference attendees was William I 1, Pickering, the director of JPI,
at that time an Army contract facility operated by the California Institute of Technolog T
(Cahech), Following Pierce's talk, Pickering "raised tire question of using the currently
proposed t)alloon experiments for solnc initial work on the possibility of satellite relay sys-
tetns, "++Pickcring was referring to the twelve-foot-dianteter (about four-meter-diameter)
orbiting balloons conceived I)y William ,1. O'Sullivan, ,Jr, an engineer at the Langley
Memorial Aeronautical l+aboratory (under NASA, it became tim I.angley Research
Center) ill ttampton, Virginia--a facility of the National Advisory Committee liar
Aeronautics (NACA)--as a means of measuring air resistance in the Earth's ul)per atmos-
phere. The U.S. Department of Defi-nse's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
had apl)roved that halloon t)roject in lace March 1958 for launches itr late 1958 and in
1959. and,lPL was supplying the ttpper stages for the.ltlno I1 latmch vehicles, r
't. John Rohinson I'im't v and Rudolf Komt)[nt,I; "A l'mgram o[ Rcscarch I)iwclcd Toward Transoceanit
Communicati_ m by Me;ms ot Salctliws," manuscript, 'I'echni_ al Memm'anduln MM-58,-135-24, 22 Selm-ml)er 1958,
p. 20, \bl. KK, Filccase No. 20564, A'I'&T Archives, Warreu, NI. The aulhor is gratcfifl m Slwl&m Hochheiser,
ATScT archivisl, fiw assistance in locating this pal)el" and gv;mting permission to quow from it.
5. .John R_d_insmt Pi<'v_e ;utd Rudoff Komp|ner, "Traus_wcauic Comntunicatiott by Me;tt_s t_t
Satt'llites," Proceedipq,<s o/the H¢I', 47 (March 19591: 372-38(}.
6. William tt. Picketing, "Notes <m Satellite (;onli'rcnce,Jtdy 13-1.t, t958," 22July 1958. doc. no. 15,
miclotilm roll 3!94, JPl_ Archives, Pasadena, (;A.
7. The' launch attempts of d_e twelve-fi_ot-diamcWr balloons were made tm 22 ()clober 1958 and 14
August P359, bm both t'n(h'd in t:,tihtrc. St'e Ehter, Out From Behind the l_ik, hl+Brdl+ pp. 45, 65.
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Pierce, who had known Picketing since the mid-l!)3l)s when they were fellow gradu-
ale sm(h.'nls at (]ahech, quickly mti(vm(2d hi>, li)rmer (lassnuu(," of tile pr()p<)sal that t1(,. had
alrea(,ty made it) NA(:A (,life(tot Hugh l)rvden lo use a 100-fo((l-(,tianl(,'ter version of
O'Stfllivan's balloon fin a passive (-onmnmi(afions slmqlit(e experiment. Pier(.(." recalled
many years later that Pick(,'ling agr(,'e(,l at tilt: Air Force conti+ren(,:e that stt(,h an experi-
ment "wouM be a profitable one" and "offered his et+_c(mragcment and stl])p<)rt. TM The
support that Pickering undoul)tedlv oltere(,l was the use of an (,qghty-five-fi)ot-diamet(,u
(twcnty-six-m(,ger-di'ameter) polar-momut:(,1 antenna that JPl+ had ordered from Blaw
Knox Jn April 1958..]PI, inslalh'd flw so-ts)ll(,d Ph>nccr m)lcnna in July near Golds/one
I)rv l.ake in (;alitornia's Mojave Desert in supF, tnt of two ARPA-approv(,'d Army hmar
probe lmmches (subs(,'quenlly named Pioneers 3 and 4) in late 1958 and early 1959.
Picketing and his colleagues at JPl, unlike their cotHtt(º'rparts at Bell 'liqephone
I,al)oratories, had little interest in the timux' dev(,qOl)ment of conHntmications satellites,
but they t})r(º'saw that mttch of lhe additional gromM-support equipnu'nt that ,]PI, would
need to coIMUCt the passive satellite commtmic:ations experint(,'nts at (;oldsl(me (,:ottld be
apl)lie(,t stfl)se<ltt(,'ntly m the tracking (if, mM (onmmnication wilt(, space probes. By early
1958, .[1'I, aheady was hoping u) devote itself to those activities in the post-Spumik era. In
January 1959, .]IH, l)ropos(,'d to NASA a list of space prol)es that called R)r laun(,'ltes of a
circmnhmar flight in early.July l(`tliO and two flybys.. of Mars in nfid-Octob(,'r 19(il).JPl. par-
ticipation in a NASA-sl/Onsored passive salellite conmnmications ex])(,'rinl(º'nl in particular
might (,'nabh" its engineers to acquire mort,' quickly the tl'atlStllitt(,?r that eventuall) would
be m:eded ti)r issuing commands to ])rol)es to perti)rm mid-course corrections and |i)r
det(,,rmining t)rol)c positions move aCClUatelv.
The usc of the (;oldstone antt'nna in the proposed satellite co(return|cations experi-
ment t)('came nt(Ht" ti'asible dm-ing tilt" lallcr halt of 1958 as a resHh of thv tiHlowing thr(,'e
(,tevelolmu'nls:
• Th(,' tormation on 1 ()cml)er 1(.)58 ot NASA, the new civilian space ag(,'ncy, as well as
th(º' appointmcnt of Dryden, an enthusiastic suH)orter of Pier(,c's proposal who ha(,t
1)lay(,'d an actis(' role in securing ARt_\ approval ol the pto.ie(,l, its NASA's til"st depllty
adttl iii i st Fat() I-
• Fhe transti'r, pvobalfiv with l)rvden's cncouragem(,mt, of the satellite communications
exf)('rimvnl (soon to receive I]'/(' name "F2c])o") in (,arlv ()ctober Irom AR]_,\ t<) NASA
• l'hv transfer in early Dcct'mbcv 1(.)5_ ()t ]l'l, tv(mt the Army to NASA
A( a meedttg on 22 .January 1959, representatives ti-om NASA headqnarters, Bell
Telephon(,' l.aboratories, an(,I,lPl, ttegt)liatcd an agr(,'etnent that (mtline<l the e(luil)nlent
that tire latter two organizations wottld be resp(msibl(,_ ti)t acqtfiring, installing, an(,l [uy,1-
ing prior to the initiM latmch attt'nll)l (dthe E(h() ball<)<m satellite, then len[alivelv s(+hed-
ule([ for Scf)tcnll>er 195(`1. At that rot'cling-, Bell Tcl(,'phone l,al)oratories enginet'rs
ann()ttn(e(l that they plann(,'d to (,'reef, at a sit(.' known as Crawlor(l I lill it( l lohnd(,q, New
.lers('?,, a twetHy-f()()t-b.x-tw(,'nty-li)ot-al)(,'rture (a six-ntet(,'l-l)y-six-nwtel-al)erture) horn-
I'(,'[l('('l()l + 'altt(,'nn;t. l loi-n ,inl<.'ltn;ty; W('lt" kn<(wn till tht'ir ([(,'tn()nstrate(l low-noise prt:,l)erti(.'s."
g. .John R,)bins<m F/cl(c. 7)'u' H+kgPP,+,+k+',+!]'.'s,'+l+q'(.,{+'I'.bm,tunm'+00, (N;tll /"_an_ is((>: :(';an Igam i,,(,)/;'t(",s.
ItIl;SL l>p. II-12.
9. .\ de',ttipti(m ol tiff,, antvmla is giv,.'n I)v A.I),. (;ta','di)ld, I).C. th,gg, and 1..E. ltunt, ".\ ttmn-
R('lh._l_ .X))tt')m;) h:)t .b/>;u <. {;+)mint+t)|+ aJi,>n.'" 77,,.,' lh']/ .%_'._ I;'H._i_z/./,.ll.a/ t() ( 1!}I)1 ): ] 11(15-] ] ] 1). TIlt'
auth()r', llol(,d nhat uhi'., t'+'l:.p ol mm'wna had i)rigm_itcd ;it l),,rll "lHel)h()nt' [.al)c)lah)nit's in thv cad,. 1940,+, "t'hc
antem_ ('ml)h)}vd it+ th(" l'i(h<) ,.'xpt.]in+ctH ]at,.') gained Iittnt. _is lilt' iiiMltlnlt'nl t)sc,:l I:,', A) m) l)t't)zias anld
R()l)(.)t \Vils()n in 19(;.") t() distoxvt th(' _()smi_ mi(t()wavv hack_t'()tHt(l tadi;tti<)t_.
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This particular horn antenna was to receive signals from Goldstone, while a sixty-foot-
diameter (eighteen-meter-diameter) parabolic antenna purchased from the D.S. Kennedy
Company would transmit signals to Goldstone via the Echo balloon. Possibly because o'f
fimding uncertainties in earlyJamlary 1959,JPL indicated that it would both transmit and
receive signals through duplexing, using the existing eighty-five-foot-diameter (twenty-six-
meter) polar-mounted antenna at Goldstone._"JPL project flmding was uncertain because
at that time NASA was operating on fimds transferred from the Department of Defense
and other agencies and was in the midst of formulating its first budget request tbr new
funds fi-om Congress.
After NASA's budgetary situation began to stabilize in the early months of 1959, how-
ever, JPL engineers opted, as did their Bell Telephone Laboratories counterparts, to use
separate antennas for receiving and transmitting. For the second (transmitting) antenna,
they chose an azimuth-elevation (Az-E1), rather than polar, mounting. This choice was not
dictated by Echo requirements. Rather it resulted fi-om a desire by JPL engineers
Robertson Stevens (chief of the Communication Elements Research Section), William
Merrick (in charge of antenna construction), and Walter Victor (chief of the
Communications Systems Research Section) to make a comparative study between the two
t)]aes of mounts, as well as a scale study for larger antennas that the.JPL engineers hoped
to design and construct in the thture for supporting more soptfisticated and more distant
space probes. Early design studies had indicated that an Az-El-mounted large antenna
would cost less and weigh less than a polar-mounted antenna buih to the same specifica-
tions of maximum frequency, wind-loading design, and tracking rates. JPL engineers also
were aware that cotmterweight problems inherent in the polar-mount configuration prob-
ably would make it easier to scale up an Az-El-mounted antenna to a size comparable to
the 210-foot-diameter (sixty-four-meter-diameter) Commonwealth Scientific and
Indttstrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) radio telescope then under construction at
Parkes, Australia.
Unlike the situation at Holmdel, where the two Bell Telephone Laboratories anten-
nas would be in sight of each other, JPL engineers in 1958 had selecled a site at Goldstone
for an anticipated transmitter antenna that would be approximately seven miles from the
Pioneer antenna and separated trom the latter by a range of intervening motmtains. The
site bad been chosen to preclude the possibili_' of the transmitter generating radio inlet-
terence that might prevent the reception of weak radio signals from space probes at the
receiver antenna.
JPL's prior and continuing involvement in space probe communications and tracking
strongly influenced the selection of frequencies for the Echo experiment. JPL and Bell
engineers chose 960.05 megahert_ tot east-to-west transmissions, because theJPL receiver
at (;oldstone was operating at this frequency in support of the Pioneer lunar program. For
the west-to-east transmissions, they selected 2,390 megahertz because "it was the correct
frequency band for future satellite and space-probe experiments. ''_ In fact, the radio fre-
quency used by NASA's Deep Space Network (managed byJPL and comprised initially of
antennas at Goldstone; Woomera, Australia; and Hartebeesthoek near Johannesburg,
South +Mrica) changed fron] 960 to 2,390 megahertz in the mid-1960s.
10. The agreement reached at lhe 22 January 1959 meeting is mlflined in Rutlolt Knmplilex; "A
Proposed Plan tot aJoint JPL-BTI_ Experiment in (:ommunicatinn by Means of a Passive Satellite," 9 February
1959, attached to Rudolf Komplner to I,eonardJal/e (chief of the Communications Satellile Program in NASA"s
Ottice of Advanced Teehnnlogy), 10 February 1959 (copy to Pickering), "Satelliw Tracking 1959" section, micro-
fihn roll 614-93, JPL Archives.
l 1. Victor alld Slevetls,, "The Role otthe.let l'ropttlsion 1,aboratnry," p. 22,
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The twe_ty-_ix-melr_A= 1',1d_t_ a_lh'_m buEl /m I%p'H l'Sho I±_thc./H l'ro/ndsio_ l.al,malm) (]/V.) at (;,hhton_, 1)__ l.ak_
iu the MOlaVelh'srtl, alum! 160 hilmm'lm_/_om thr labm_dmy it_/'a_mb'mz, Cal!/o_Ma.II'1. aL_oused a_ exlattt Itt!#,ttl]_J\
meier tL_-DEC aoh'n tttl. ¢'n'_ted i_tlab' 105,7 to hm k aml te_ri_,ct_'h'tm'h_/iota lhr miltla_ _ l%m'e_ [*_.h¢'_,to tom mu_li_ah
via the l(_h_Jbathmat.((',<mllt's} of NASA)
Designing the Acquisition, Tracking, and
Communications Systems
,-ks noted previously, the principal obieclivc of lh(_je<t Echo was lo demonsuatc tilt"
fbasit)ilitv of hmg-rangc commtmicati<ms using a reflecting sl>hcre as a passive satellite. To
accomplish this objcctivc,,]Pl+ and Bell engineers had to develop systems that could not
only pcriorm [he (ommmdcalions experiment itself, Inn also rapidly acquire [|w fasl-
moving satellite soon after it rose above dw WesltTn horizon and track it during subse-
quen! periods of visibilily. In<h'cd, in the view of,lt'i__ engineers, lhe acquisition and
/racking of Echo wonld bc more chalh'nging than the commtmications aspecl of Ibc
project. ()ncc lhc acquisition an(I tracking prol)lems were solved, according Io JPI,'s
_,]t[lcr Vi(lor and Rot)orison Stevens, "lhc communications problem wouht be no IlI()I'C
dilticuh Ihan a laboratory experiment wid_ comparable signal and noise powers." Nol sur-
prisingly, Ihl._l'C[i)l'C, IIII)SI of IBc II(_W cqttipmcnt procured byJPL tot tl_e project was used
|i)r acquisition and Iracking. _-'By coml);n-is_m, llw acquisition and Iracking of lalcr gcosla-
fionarv satellites were in ccrlain ways less (tmmling, |)c(:attse these essentially remained sla-
donarv in tl_e sky.
At" its (;oldstonc tacility,,lPl, engineers developed fiw the Echo experiment two meth-
ods ot acqtfi,dtion: "slaving" flu' antennas I<_ a prccah'ul',tlcd pointing program using digital
tcchniqncs and local Ol)lical sighting. They also developed lhrce methods of lracking:
12. Ibtd.
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digital slave, optical, and automatic radar. When tile digital-slave method (for both acqui-
sition and tracking) was required, the NASA Minitrack network of stations generated and
transmitted primary tracking data to a general-purpose digital computer at NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center in Beltsville, Maryland. This computer then issued antenna-
pointing commands via telet}_pe to Golds|one. Because of the _'o different types of anten-
nas at Goldstone, JPL engineers developed a digital encoding and computing system that
converted antenna-pointing data from one antenna site and coordinate system to the other.
The principal optical antenna-positioning method used a television camera and lens
subsystem located on the structures of both antennas, akmg with the regular boresight
telescope and boresight camera. The images provided by this system were displayed on a
control console directly in front of the servo operator's position at each antenna site. This
subsystem was not suitable for the initial acquisition of tile satellite, however, because of
its very narrow field of view (about 0.5 degree). Therelore,JPl. engineers provided broad
field-of-view acquisition telescopes at each site.
Because of a blind spot in the coverage of the polar-mounted receiver antenna,
Golds|one personnel used a third optical means to acquire the satellite during its first
orbit. On its first orbital pass, the satellite was expected to approach Goldstone from the
northwest, but the mounting of this antenna (which had been set to track and communi-
cate with space probes having declinations varying front about thirty degrees north to
about thirty degrees south) prevented it from being pointed to the horizon in this direc-
tion. As a result, the antenna would be unable to monitor the satellite for the first eight
minutes of the first pass. However, positional data on the first orhital pass were considered
critical ti}r initial orbit determination, so (;ol{tst{me pers{}nnel used a stand-alone
(]onlraves l}hototheo{tolite t{} provide tinle-tagged Az-EI data dming tile initial part of this
pass. 'File main lintitation of all three optical metht}ds was, {if c{}urse, thai the satellite had
to he visible. Thus, sateIlile observation ha{I to occur at night, in clear weath.et; and when
the Sun ilhnuinated the satellite.
The third method of tracking the satellite developed by.|Pl, engineers was a continu-
ous-wave radar subsystenl. Once either tile digital-slave or one of the optical methods
acquired the satellite, this subsystem tracked the satellite automatically. Contr{}l signals
generated fronl a simultaneous lobing antenna |teed an{t re{eiver positioned the polar-
mounted receiver antenna, to which tile Az-El-motmted transnlitler antenna was slaved via
the coordinate-converter computer and related equipment.
Bell Telephone I,aborato,ies engineers entployed similar tracking methods at their
tiohndel station. The antemlas we|e usually slaved to lhe tracking inlornlation provided
bv tile drive tape ti'om Goddard. Differences between the predicted and true positions
were compensated by ntanual corrections obtained ti-om either optics, radar, or (when a
west-to-east transmission was being made) the strength of the received signal.
Alternatively, the antennas could he slaved to tile positional r{'a{hn, ts of an optical track-
el operated manually to track the satellite.
The optical telescope (h{}rrowed I}y Bell engineers tioln a sttrplus M-33 fire-control
radar system) consisted of a large trailer carrying a periscope-type optical train leading
down t{} convenient operator positions inside the trailer. A ten-kilowatt transmitter (used
flit- both conlmunication and the radar system and pt||{'hased fionl ITT) was installed on
the sixty-foot-dianlcter (eighteCll-nlt:l{'r-dialll{qer) antelllla. The radar signals reflected oil
the satellite were received 1}y a separate eightetql-ti}ot-dianleter (about five-meter-
diameter) antenna l{}cale{I at}out a mile and a half away tiom Crawford Hill so as to
increase the separation between the transnlilte{I signals anti the radar receiver.
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Prelaunch Tests
After the installation of tilt: new cquipnmnt..]Pl, and Bell Telephone l+al)oratories
engineers began a testing program of the equipnivtH and personnel at (;oldstonc and
I-[ohndel prior to the launch of the first Echo balloon. The testing program consisted of
a series of exercises that simulated as nearly as possil)le an actual Echo mission.':; The most
striking of these exercises was a series of seventeen so-called "Moon BounoP" comnuufi-
ciitions experiments that began 23 Novemt)er 1(..)5(.t and continued until 7 Augusl It.It:d).
just live days betore the launch of Echo. These t'xl)eviments involved using the Moon as ;t
passive reflcclor (in the manner of the Echo balloon) between the Hohndel and
(;oldstonc slali(lils. Such tesls wcle useful because the coinhinalion of the Moon's alfilitv
1o reflect t'ilel/.,_: to the receiving antenna (known ;is its radar cross section) and :Is dis-
lance froth rite Earllt provided a transmitter-to-receiver path loss (that is, the ;<llllOtiltl of
radio signal power ]()st between tlt(: tr;tnsniilter and ieceiver) nearly equal to that expect-
e+`l for the Echo satellite."
:\s for acquisilion and tracking pro|)lenls. ]lowevel. the Moon was too easy a largel
comparcd to Echo becaus+`" <)f ils highly predictable orbit, good visibilit B and relativH+
slow nlotion across lhe sky. Theretore, (;oldslone arid I tohndel personnel 1)articipaled in
two t}pes (if lesls will+ a "dark" slttellile in a relatively high-ahilude, stable orbit--namely,
tit+`" TIROS 1 polar-orbiting nteteorological salellite launched 1 Aptil 1960. In one type of
test,JPI+ engineet+s used basic TIROS tracking data generated by tit+.: Minitrack network to
posilion lhe (;oldslone al+ltetlnas; then they leslc<:| the accuracy (+f the ephemeris by
attempting to obtain a ladar echo [rt)nl the satellile. Anolhel lyl)e <)| lt'st involved |+ottnc-
ing continuous-wave radio signals oft +the satellite. The sitlellite's |)(:,lilt- orbit made these
tests more difficult, t)ecause it was visible over the (;oldstone and ttohndel antennas ti_t a
peliod of only a few tninules. As a result, station operators had to rely ()It Minitrack-
generated ()vl)ital data to posilion their atIttqmas. +`
l:+,, Regal din g the i,vt'rall phih>s.l_h _,behind tlivse tests, scc thv sc( licm "_.vstciiiN 'I'l'F+lstill l'vl!ivct 1":<ho"
ill Stc,.cns arid \ i( tot. eds,, TDe (;.blslrm; ,M+le+_+.pp. 4N-.")g;.lakcs, "l'arti{ ipati.n ot B<'I1 'l'clt'phonc l.ab<_ral,wit's.'"
pp. I)80-,N2,
14. I+'_li ilctailt'd dcs{iiptions ot the "Moon t/ountc" tt'sts, s('c "Milon ti.ouncc Experinicnts," iu .11>1_
._;pa+e l'_.<.+rmrs ._,++mmary +V.. 77-1 /'l tDe peli0d 15 .\'.ve+Mwi / U%' to / 5.|:#ruraL'+ / 9:_0, 1 l;ttt)rtlili'+' 19till, pp. ttl-t 1;
"l'l,!ic( t Echo," in .lP[...c;pa+w I'P+Jg.i:tm__,++i++ma_..\'o. 7"72/o_ t#++"pmiod 15 ],_mxai 7 1960 to l'$ Mmvh l?bO, I ApTil
l!)6ll, lip, i t-+iB: "Pr(!it'(t Ei ho," it: IPI+, IPew'r+pH+Su,mi+arr No. 76-2 li*r tile peri.d l I':+,bl++ar+1960 t. / Apiil l+U,#.
_ol. I, pt. 1. 17>,\pill 19(R), pp. I-3; "M.<m-Bouncc l':xpt'rinivlils," itl.]Pl., 5,}+*a<et'mg+rai*++Sizinmarx N.. 77-7p,i ID+'
p+'liod 15 :.laPHr 196U I. l 5 +X1:?, 196fJ, I .]lnl(' 1'91i0, l), :+{);.]akt's, "Pat'iicipation of Bell 'l'clephonc l+al)oiatm it'+,.`.
p. 9,"41+Pll'S's (ll_,t'l;Igt >ill Ihc t'iist puhlici:t'd +'Mi),)n l+lOtill('t '' (l)ililiillllil:;ili()ll lill :{ Aii<f2,ustl':tl_() is ill Mat_in
Miles, +',\ttclnpt Io B(llllill +V(iit+t ' ()tt M(.)li Schcdul<.l'l "l'l>lla',; lwo-%Va,, Phi:lit' Talk S('hcdul('d," Lo_ ,t_tD>._'[,'_
7'ivm_. 3 +L\tl_tlSl I{)11(); +IJPI+_t'ls Fit'_t I +,+)n+_[)islan(c ';'-\Vav Phtlllt' Call Via Moon," I':_r_rte#_a llldepelMeilt, 3 ,\11_11++1
1960; "_<l_lii lscd t<_Rt'lax Philnc (:;ills," l,os +D_geh'_J/Tm'_i; 3 +L\il_liSl 19ii(I; Maiviil Miles. "East aiid %+(t,,il(:<l;isls
(:mixct,,c hi Phonc Call Bounced ()tt Moon," l.+J_,.l_,l,,_ 7'/rues, .I :\il<'dusl lt.iti(l: +:li'l (:all Via Moon ,<";uc_c+,s,"
I><_srM_'lla l_.t+p,,_M+##t, 't ,\ii<_liM I{tll(): l_,ill _iilnilt'l. "NI) t laliliiliil<_ iii l li'q_tic;ll Ph(mc (:all" aiid "_l)ltil'ihili_,
_Vilni_htl,ii in Sl)a< i'" ("i)ail) Rcp+lt t" i ohlint'_), /$Ts,w+<l'_._l,'l I;ltt.<'peml<'nt, :"l and _ :\litZusl 19iiO, all iii /PI +\'<_,_ flq,_.
?l .-\tlL_ll+41 1960. IPl..\l('}ii%t's.
IF_. l:<ll d,.'iailt',:l ilvs_iillti<lii', _ll Ihc:+,t' It'sts. s','t' "l)aik Natcllitc Tlackiil<g l':xlicliuit'nt," hi II'i., "7'"'"
I'm£._al_,_ ."m,mm#__ N.. 37- ;/"_ I/w /u'r,M 15 Ma_H+ I ?,'if) [o 15 ,llrlx l +)rl(; I June l{tli(/, pp. :',S-:;9; "l',,!i<'< t t:._ll_>,'" in
.11'1., LS/Jr_ (' j J J/ ( JlCP' '_ J/_ _ bSl+ _U '_ '_ _ )'_l<Jl 7> +]/_J _ tJl+'l"'_{''t I 5 'Xlm l ?6O)" 1 $/"6 1?('0, 1 August l'9iR), t)t ). t:L- I.",; Rk tia_ d
Vail: ()sll'll+ "(;(_],rlsl<)n+.' I s_'s Nl>v,-sil,t'lil [illYs 1t_ii lt,OUliliilt,_ Signals," Mi_sil,:s r_mt t_H+_'ls, 15 ,\ilRtlsl 191R),titvd
in //'L +\'_'_+,*(,lips, I-_ ;\IIE, tlsl 191;O,.]PI. At_ liivt,s.
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Other tests conducted at (;oldstone addressed the diflicuhv of tracking targets
optically. Some tests involved tracking stars optically t<) check lhe'absohtlc and relative
aligmnent of the two antennas and tO measure the sensitivity of the television cameras
mortared on them. Other tests used a helicopter with an opti_al target light and a 2,388-
megahertz radio beat on to exercise the optical equipment and to train antenna operators
in the acquisition and tracking of visible satellite targets.
Postlaunch Operations
After conducting a series of five suborbital ballistic ("Shotput") tests of the balloon
payload in late 1959 and early 1960, NASA ignored superstition and made its first attempt
to latmch the Echo satellite into orl}il on Friday, 13 May 1960. The day indeed turned out
to be unlucky fin the Echo project. The attitude control .jets on the 'second stage of 1he
Thor-Deha rocket failed to fire during a coast period after the main engine of thai stage
burned out. Incal}al)le of maintaining the proper angle tor orbital insertion, the final
stage ;llt(| payload uhimately phmged into the Atlantic Ocean.
A second launch attempt on 12 August 1960 succeeded in placing Echo 1 into the
desired 1,000-mile-attitude orbit. On the first orbital pass, the phototheodolite at
(;oldstone optically spotted the satellite at 4:31 a.m. (Pacific Daylight Time) as it came
over the n<)rthwest horizon. Three minutes lalel; the receiver amenna began collecting
signals l?om the satellite's radio beacons. The radm acquired the balh)on at 4:37 a.m. and
tracked it automatically over the next 15 minutes until it disappeared below the southeast
h()rizon. In the meantime, beginning at 4:36 a.m., the transmitter antenna began sending
a 2,390-megahertz radio signal toward the satellite.
At ltohndel, the acquisition of the Echo target was more ditfieuh. Station operators
lacked optical visibility, and their efforts were hampered by the use of a radar that was "still
unproven." Bell engineers therefore used a drive tape supplied t)y the (;oddard Space
Flight (:enter prior to the launch. It was I)ast'd on (me of the nominal trajectories and
at!justed approximately Io the actual launch time. Tiffs method allowed the horn alltell-
na to begin receiving (;oldstone's retlected signal at 4:41 a.m. (Pacific Daylight Time).
One minute later, engineers at (;otdstone used the transmitter allltqnla to herin sending
a prerecorded nlessage fronl President Eisenhower, and the ttohndel antenna clearly
received it afler its reflection off the balloon.
Incorrect data points on the drive tape, however, caused the horn antenna to slew
away fiom the actual satellite track during this first pass. Although angular offsets were
quickly implemented to compensate for these erro,s, the reception of the (;oldstone sig-
nal was split into three separate periods lasting from one to three minutes. Bell Project
Echo engineer William Jakes candidly acknowledged that "had the launching not been
virtually perfect, there would have been no reception at all on the tirst pass because of the
severe acquisition problem" at Holmdel.'"
In smnmarizing JPL's participation in project Echo, Stevens and Victor concluded
that acquisition and tracking of the balloon with sufficient accuracy (0.1 degree) to make
comnmnication possible was "the most difficuh task." By far the most reliable method,
they pointed out, was optical acquisition and tracking. :l'he desired accttraev was easily
obtained by this method "as long as Ilhe servo operators] were not fatigued."'Slaving the
IlL For Iht' most detailed description of the Shoqml tesls and the taunt hes of 13 May and 12 August,
see Elder, Out From Behind the EqZhtBall. pp. 68-70, 79-80, 84-85, 88-97, 103-09.
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antennas digitally t}y means of a perforated tt_lelype tape resulted in an avefage difference
between the slave command and the meastued (;oldst{me angles of between (}.1 and
{}.15 degree "as long as the orbital parameters were ul}dale{I daily." Atmospheric drag {}n
the ballt}{}n, which neither remained {;onstant {}v{'f liIlle llor varied in a predictable man-
tier, caused the largest tln{etlainl_' in predicting the {}l|)it. t7
Viclor aBd .lakes n{}t{!{t that (|l{' Ech{} ]}Y{}jecl, lhrt}tlgh a lall_e aIll{)tln| {}f {}rgalliza-
donal coor{tinati{}n, had accomplished the "tmpreced{'nled tk,at {}f simullaneously slaving
II;tFF{}W ])ealll alltenl'las h)cated a {-oiilinent apart to a {-{}nlplllel s{} that a relatively fast-
ill{}ving satellite c{}lfld l}e a{{ttralcly tracked." The)' {-{}nchtdcd, h{}wever, that Ihe t}r{}ce-
{lure "i)robably does not represent the inost {!ff]ciellt rise of a large scale, general ptul}OS{"
colnptlter (}i the personnel involved."'_.]PI/s Slevens and Vicl{}r ads{} feh that lh{" reliabil-
its,, {}f this melhod needed t{} t)e iml)r{}ved before it c{mld be c{msi{lered operati{mally ft'a-
si])le. They tel)erred that iadal-tracking {}f the balloon had been a{{'l.llale to (}.OB {:l{'gl'e{"
f{}r tile leceivill_ al'ltenlla alld a]}ollt 0.1 {|{'_l'Ce t{}1" tile tlanstllittillg antenna at
(;{}l{tstone. h,,
I,o{}king t{} the fttltlre, SlCVel]S and Victor stlggested that "standal+d IeIevision nligllt
be relayed on a ieas{}iiably practi{al basis via passive satellites" if 1,000-f{}{)t-di;IIIleltq ])al-
lo{}ns c{mld be launched instead and if tfallSlllitter power and alllelllla gaill cot|ld lie
b{}{}sle{I. Whil{' flies{? inlpr{}velnents were "lechnically f{'asible," the JPI. engineers warned
Ihat they were n{}l 1]e{essarily "ec{m{}mically feasible or desirat}le"; olher satellite le{b-
ni{lueS _lligh/ I}rove more stlital}le for life transmission {}t wide-band vide{} signals. {)n the
other band, Slevens and Victor judged, l}assive salellites "may be a good solulion for nar-
F{}WeF bandwidt|_ {tata-lvanst]lissi{}n syStClIIS. ''2"
1 7. Stt.vcHs and Vi{t{}_, {'{Is., The (io[d,,hmr ._Ud,,'m, p. F}['}.
18. lakes and Vit_or, "T_ackin_ E<ho I," 1}. _1t.
It.}. 8I{'_,t'ID; ;llId ri{ I{}12 {_{Is., "/'|IF (;olrl_lotw MslPm, p. _'}£').
21}. Vi{'t{}_ and St{.v{'ns, "The Role (d t|l('.]{'l l}roptflsi{m l,;d}{nalof)," I). ',2}8.

Chapter 6
NASA Experimental Communications
Satellites, 1958-1995
by Daniel R. (;l()ver
As the civilian agency exc,cising c(mtr()l over U.S. space activilics, NASA has had a
progranl of tcclm<flogQ' development tbr salcllilc CtHllllltltli(':l|illtlS Sill(.'(." the ;t_(+'tl(.'y t'++'_lP,;
<`,slal)lishcd in 1(,t58. Part o1 this progranl has involved tlying experimental (omnmnicalions
satvllitvs. NASA's ths! communications salcllitc I)v{!iect was Echo. I,atmclwd on 12 Augusl
l(,)(i0, Echo 1 was a passive satellite that |-ctlcctcd radio waxes back to the ground.
Echo slatted out in 1(.)3(; as a Naliona] Advisory (_omnlillcc tof Aeronautics (NA(',A)
experiment to pr<)l)c Ih{' upper r<`'a<`h<`'sof the atmosphere and the c[]ccts on large light-
wcighl SII'tI<,'IIII'CS ill orhil..John Robinson t'icrcc attd Rudol[ Kompfncr of AT&T's Bell
Tvlcphonc 1,al)oralolics had been working on id¢,as for (onlmttllicalions satellilcs, includ-
ing passive syslcms, [_)r SillllC tim<`'. Th<`._ |calized thai the Echo sphere wottld provide an
<`'xccllen! t<`'s! mirror and proposed a communications cxperimvnt. The National
Aca<`l(.'nly ol'Sci(_'nccs sp(:,ns()l<`'d a mr'cling, Itch (m '_>8,Attgltsl I(.)38, lo dclinc lhc l),(!j<`'ct.'
In I(,)38, when NASA was cr<`'a)<`'d and NA{:A dissolved, Ech() became a NASA project.
Tim Echo sawllR(" was a 100-1b<)l-di',un(qt'r (lhirly-on(.'-m('l(.'i-(liamcI<`'r) aluminized-
polyesim balloon I|l;.tl intlatcd after inserli(m inlo orbit. The (;.T. Schjcldahl (;ompany
t)uih flit E<`h() 1 balloon, and (;rtllntllan t)uih Ill(.: disp('nscr, t_)r NASA's l.anglcy Research
(_('ntcr ill I ta,npton, Virginia. Two-way voice links of "g()o(t" quality wcr(: sol up betwet'n
Bell Tclcl)h(mc 1.ab()ralorics in Itolmdcl, Nvw .]crs<`'y, and NASA's J<`'l Prol)ulsion
I,al)()ralor_ t_t(ilil,/ al (_()](|sl()n(', (]alif<)rnia. S()nw Iransmissi()ns t]-om the United Slates
wcrc rc<`ci;c<`'d in England at ,[odrcll Bank.
Echo (|<`'m()ulstratcd sal('llitc Iracking and ,_]()tmd stali(m t('(hnoh)gy that later applied
t() active satellite svst('ms, l,c()nm-d .[alIi', (.lir('(t()r o[ lh(' NASA sawllite c(mmmnicauions
p)-()gram at head(lua,tcrs, wr()tc: +'Ech() lit n()t only [)roved that microwave uansntission
to and from satcllilcs in Sl)aCc was tmdcrst()od a,d ihcr(" would be no surprises b,t il dra-
mali(allv (l(,m()nslral('d lh(.' promise of (:()n+mnmicali()nl s] salellilcs. The success ()f Echo
[1] had )n()rc t() <`[()wilh the m()liv,tli()ns ()f tbllowing c()mmtmi(ali()ris sal('llil(" rcs('ar{h
l]];.lll :tll t' ()t]l<`'t" single CV<`'tll. "'e
Echo 2, managed by NASA's (;oddmd S])acc Fligh! (_<`'nlcr in B<`'ltsvillc, Mat-viand, h'fl
the latmc|x pad ()t+ _,r),lanuary 1(.)1+4. [l had a 1)citer inflalioll syslUtll, xvhi<`'h improvcd the
ball()()n's SlnO<)l]mcss and s])ht'ri(ily. E(h() 2 investigali()ns wt'r¢' (onccrncd less with
c()nltnuni(:tli()ns nn([ tn()rc with tit(.' dynamics of large spa(ccraft. After Ech() _, NASA
al)an(t()nt'd 1),tssivc c()mmtmi(ations svslcms in ti.tv()r of active satellites. The stt])('rior pcr-
f()rlnan{(" ()f lh(' U.S. l)(.'partn+cnt <)f l')cfcns("s SCORE (Signal (_()mtnttnicati()tl by
()rbiting Relay Equil)mtqtl) satcllil(', latmchcd ahll()Sl two v(,ars t)+,'[()l-(" Ech() 1, ah-(,adv had
dcnt()nstralc(I lht' t"ial)ililv ()f th(" a('tivc al)l)r():t('h.
I. l.c(mald.[all_'. (_m_)mt)_i_<_tio,_ i_ .S/*<_ {N('_ "tbtk: I l()lt, Rim'ha)l :m<l _'ill_.l,)ll, 19(:,li). I ). (_7
_. IBM., p. SO.
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Telstar
In tile fitll of 1960, as Echo 1 was achieving its first successes, AT&T began developing
an active communications satellite system called Telstar. Although some observers felt that
AT&T's early interest in communications satellites was part of a defensive maneuver to
protect its commitment to cable technology, the company was investing large qnantities of
its own capital to create and launch its own communications satellite program? Initially,
tile operational system was to consist of fifty to 120 active satellites in orbits approximate-
ly 7,000 miles (about 9,310 kilometers) high. Using the large launch vehicles then in
development, Pierce envisioned that "a dozen or more of these satellites could be placed
in orbit in a single launching." With the satellites in random orbits, Bell Telephone
Laboratories figured that a "system of 40 satellites in polar orbits and 15 in equatorial
orbits would provide service 99.9 per cent [sic] of the time between any lwo points on
earth." As Pierce explained, "AT&T has proposed that the system contain about 25 grolmd
stations so placed as to provide global coverage. '*
The cost of such a system would be high. In 1961, Pierce estimated the expense at
$500 million, but that high price tag was not a detriment from AT&T's standpoint. As a
telecommunications monopoly, AT&T's rates were regulated, and those rates included an
amount that allowed AT&T to recover its costs as well as to make a profit. Thus, the cost
of the proposed Telstar satellite system would be passed on to consumers, just as tile high
costs of undersea cables were, so AT&T found the system attractive.
Bell Telephone Laboratories designed and built the Telstar spacecraft with corporate
fimds. The first Telstars were prototypes intended to prove various concepts behind the
large constellation of orbiting satellites. Moreover, of the six Telstar spacecraft buih, only
two were latmched. NASA's contribntion to the project was limited to launch services, as
well as some tracking and telemetry duties. AT&T reimbursed NASA $6 million for those
services. NASA was able to negotiate such an excellent deal with AT&T, even though
Telstar was not really a NASA project, because NASA held the monopoly for launch set-
vices. Moreover, NASA claimed Telstar as a NASA-supported project and even published
the results of the communications experiments, originally issued as articles in the Bell
Telephone technical journal, as a NASA publication (NASA Special Publication [SP]-32).
In addition, NASA obtained the rights to any patentable inventions arising from the
experiments.
On 10July 1962, a Delta launcher placed the first Telstar spacecraft into orbit. The
tb.ceted 171-pound (about seventy-seven-kilogram) sphere had a diameter of a little more
than thirly-four inches (about one meter). Telstar was the first satellite to use a traveling-
wave-tube amplifier; transistor technology at the time was not capable of the three watts
of power output at the required microwave fiequencies.; Bell Telephone Laboratories also
developed ranch of the technology required for satellite communication, including tran-
sistors, solar cells, and traveling-wave-tube amplifiers. To handle Telstar communications,
AT&T buih ground stations at Andover, Maine; Pleumeur-Bodou, France; and Goonhilly
Downs, Britain. These were similar to, but larger than, the ground station used for project
Echo. The French station used a duplicate of the AT&T Holmdel horn antenna, while the
British antenna was a parabolic dish.
3. Delbert D. Smith, Communicatim_ Vm ._ttellite." A I'i._ion in lCetmspect (P_slou: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976), p. 71.
4. J,_hn Robinson Pier_e, "Commtmicatiou Satellites," Scient!fir American 205 (October 1961): 101.
5. "lkl*tar/, 3 vols. (Washington, D(': NASA SP-32, Goddard Space Flight CenlehJttue 1963). Also pub-
lished as A.C. l)ickieson, et aL, "Telstar I," Bell._tem Technical Journal,t2 (luly 1963). In December 1965, Goddard
issued w)ltune t;:+ttr _fl+NASA S1:'-32, which related (;oddard Telstar experiments. The fottr-v(_ltm_e set of NASA
SP-32 o)tlsequetltly i)l(_vi(les a iist'titl (ompeu(liunl _)['Telstar infi_rmation.
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"l'clstarwas a tFC1ll+`_ndotlStt'(illliCil]stlc('Cs_L +Itl(llIC itll('t'll;4tiotl_lll't'_t('tioll+',';ISsp¢'c-
tacttlar.A U.S, hdortnathm Agency (USIA) poll ,dtowcd that Telstar was bt'ttcr known hl
(',teatBritain than Sptttnik had been in 1957. Ratht'r than +attaching a listless I>attldc.the
Amcficat;s had put into orbit a salcllile +ha! protniscd to tit"Io_c'lhcF the ears all+`+eves of
the world, h_ter+`_slitlglv, the w<_rhl saw Telstar as an tmdcrtaking of the L!.S. government
(the USL'\ pttblicity may have helped). President Kennedy hailed Telstar as "'(tilt Attl¢'ric;tn
¢on.nttnicati<ms satellite" and "lhis outslandin_ svtnbol <ffAnteri(:a's space achievements."
Rcgar+`ling '['clstaf,.lafl_.', head of contnttmi+`_tti<)ns sal+`'llite l)rogt+at+ts at NASA, xvlt+lt'
in 1966: "Alth<)ttgh not tlt+`,first corot+limitations satellite, Telstar is tel+`" l)cst known of all
and is pfolmbly cottsidercd by most obs+`'rvci-s Io ]tax'<' ++shored in the Cla of sat+`qlilc com-
ttttmicaliorls. `'+ Thi_; it+tl)r+`'ssiott rest+hod front the trot+tend<tits pttblic +nil)aCt of th+`' first
tn-ansntission of live television across tlt<" Atlantic (tee'ant l+-om the United Slates to Franc+ +
ltv Tt+lsl:ar I on |0 .Jilt}' 1(.I(+2, tlt+`- very S;tlll(' +`lay il "was lattnche+`l. In addition to ++.'++`'vision
b1<+adcastn. Telstar relayed telcpltom' calls, data transmissi<)ns, and FdCttnr<: lacsitnilcs.
Telstar was +,\rl',Ld+c'l"s tn;l:jor thor(" into satellite cotnmtmicath+t+s. That move lhih'd to
cxtetId ,,\T&:I"s tttonol)Ol+v of tcrrcst,hd (<.nmttnic;ttions into s[:,a(c, hov, revcr, cltan<_in+_
Ich'commtmi+`ations policy froth ottt' ])n+<'sid('ntlial administrath+n to the next, and .t
_-(+Vcl-ntnll<'ltt (]<'sin(' t();tVCI'I it nn<m<_poly of sat<'llit+`" ((+nltnlttnni(;tti<Hts. kt'pl :\'I't_'T's ntottOl+-
olistic asl)iratioltS in check. At thc sam+`" tithe. NASA contracted its COlt;inimical+otis sat<q-
lit<" w<wk to firms other than AI(d.LI ',
When AT&T b+.:gan working <_n Tclslar, tlt+.' lLisenh<_wer admirtistralio, sct'ntcd will-
ing to allow it to extend its ltlOIt<+l)O]_ r inlo SF, aCC. A statement by Pr+`'sidcnt Eisenltox,,'er itt
Dcccntl)er 191"_{), in which It(' presented his a(Iministrati<m's policy on space contmttttica-
lions, stncsscd tit+. + traditional U.S. l)olicy of F, htcirtg tclccommtmicatiorLs in the hart<Is of
[)rivatc c'nttcrF, risc std_jccl to g<e<en-]txttt'tllal liccnsintg and rcgttlation arid thc achicv<.'n)t'nl
of "comntt|tticatiotls lhcilitics second It) none am<+ng, tlt+`" nations <)l the world." The roh'
of NASA was "to take lit+.' lead within tlt<.' +`'xccutivc l+,-anch both to adv.tncc tlt<_' nc+`'d('d
research and dcvelolmwnt and to +`'n(otttab_c ]+rival+` + indttstrv tt+ al)F,l+', its fesottrces toward
tlt+`" t+at-lit'sl pr;wtical)le ttlilizati<)tt of s[)acc technology for (ommcrcial civil cotnmttt+dca -
lion rc,_ltthct+ncnts. TM
The clot+lion of lh'csid<_'nt Kcnnc(ly ttshcrq.'d i. a new p.lic,_ on satellite COlttltttltli(a-
lions that was opctdy antag(tnisti( to m<)n<)i)t+lics, l)arti(tdarl+v to the <..xtcnsion of,+\T_'F'_,
tn<)n<tl)(tIv irt tcrrcslria] (otnntttnications t<+ sl)ac(' ctttntnuBti(ali(+ns, l'residcnt Kennedy
relcas+`'d a l)<dicy M;ttt!lllt'Itt <)It 24.lttly 1961 that l.tvorcd ptivatc owncrshi l) of satellite sys-
tems, but with rt'+g-tllatory and other f+.'atttn-cs ailtt('(l al avttiding a monoltoly."
AT&:T's l)rc<.'ntincnt positi<)n as the hugcst U.S. Ctttttlllt)n C;tI'l'iCl" ;tllt-[ S,OIC illl('ltt;t-
ti<mal lch'l_hottc carrier, together with its willingltcss and abilit,_ to commit large musts of
tnon¢'y to the dcvelopnwnt ntt c<+tttmtulications satellites, convincingly suggested that
cotnntcrcial satellite ttlilizatiott v,;tttl](I vct)' likely l)ccotnc AT&T +utilization. (,on(crn ov+`'r
the p<tssil:,ility of ant XI'&T monopoly in space was one Ire't<. that F,rotnpt,r(l a later rcori-
<..ntati<_n of thc direction that (<_ntnt(,rcializalion s,t.(.mcd to bc folh)wing.'"
(:_. "]'Vl)t'f| lll+ttlttXctipl, P('I('I (:lllllliI+_', "Mis]cadit'_g Ills+on'+': ('.<Yct.rnltit'lll httcnxcnti,'.+ tn lhc
Itv_.chq)tttt'.t oif :c.ntn+:tci;tl (i<_t+tttltHiR aliolt,; Sat('llilc'+,," Rt,l)Olt ,to. 2'i, I+l'++<_t'_lll+ ill S< it'++((' ;ttld I't't ht+oh)b_
I<_I h+It'l mtlio,lal S_'<tllil_, N|ansat huusctls ]Nslittttc _>I l'ct liltolog',. N|a: 1991, p. _9, ,\{SrI._ lh_++.', I ()[]h,.', N.\S:\
] ,('+_is Rt'st'at ([t ( k'tH(+.. ( '.h.xvhmd, ( )1 I.
7. .Jail+'. f#....u.i+++t/+m+ i. >,_m,:', i). 107.
_. tilted in lh_vd It. Musolt. _.d., C...m_6+.ti:ms h'atellit_:_ in t%ffli_.t Orbit (San l:_a._ is+.: (;hal.lh'_.
l!)6_), pp. 17-1_.
l,',m'l<._alR,:',ginl_'t, Nali<.nal \_<}li'+_,s a,.l Rccotds Sc_vit _'. 191H ), [). 5:+i<).
l'h. S..ith, (,Mlllllilllll+¢lll+)H V/+ ,_(I/+'HltF, i>. 71,
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On 31 August 1962, President Kennedy signed the Communications Satellite Act. Tile
government assigned the monopoly of international satellite communications to a new
corporation called (;omsat. AT&T went ahead with Telstar 2, completing its experimental
program. Of the six flightworthy spacecraft built by AT&T with corporate fimds, only two
were launched, but Telstar's puhlicity served AT&T very well. Nonetheless, between the
success of Telstar 1 and the lmmch of Telstar 2 on 7 May 1963, AT&T lost its chance to
COlmol commercial satellite communications.
NASA's role in communications satellites was changing, too. A 1958 agreement
hetween NASA and the Department of Defense gave responsibility tot the development of
active communications satellites to the military, leaving NASA with the development of
passive satellites. In August 1960, however, NASA decided to pursue active satellite
research, but not synchronous satellites. The military already had an active synchronous
satellite, Project Advent, in place. NASA began developing medium-altitude satellite sys-
tems and issued a request for proposals on 4January 1961 lot an experilnental commu-
nications satellite to be known as Relay. Both AT&T and Hughes approached NASA with
their design concepts, hut in May 196t, NASA selected RCA to build the two Relay space-
craft, instead of AT&T or ttughes. Tire (;oddard Space Flight Center oversaw the project.
Project Relay
Ahhough AT&T did not win the contract to build them, the Relay satellites used the
same primary ground stations as those used by Bell Telephone I,aboratories' _I>lstar 1
satellite. These were located in the United States (in Maine, New Jersey, and California)
and overseas (in West Germany, Ital}; Brazil, and Japan). Relay was an experimental satel-
lite program; however, the satellites transmitted television signals hew,'een the United
States and Europe and Japan. The Tokyo 1964 Olympics, however, were passed fiom
Ik)kyo to the United States, and then on to Europe via Relay.
NASA launched Relay 1 on 13 December 1962 into an elliptical orbit with an apogee
of 4,012 nautical miles (ahout sewm kilometers). The orbit took Relay through the Earth's
inner radiation belt, so that the spacecraft could measure the levels of radiation and study
its effects on satellite electronics. Relay taught many lessons in communications spacecraft
design. The idea of flying experimental connnnnications spacecraft is to try new things
and to determine whether they work. Failures are expected and provide the learning
experience necessary tot lechnolog T adwmcement. Relay was no exception.
While in orhit, the power supply for Relay l's primary transponder failed, and the
spacecraft had to switch to its backup transponder, which performed well. Another prob-
lem was spurious commands. The satellite recorded 401 anomalies (errors) during its first
year. Ground stations ohserved anomalies when the satellite was in view, which was during
only 15 percent of its orbit. The main culprit was interference from the wideband subsys-
tem. Consequently; as a corrective measure, Relay 2 carried a filter on the command receiv-
er's transmission line and had improved circuitry to better ditterentiate between noise and
command signals. As a resuh, Relay 2 rect>rded truly sixty-two command anomalies.
Among the other prohlems faced by the tirsl Relay eXl)crimental satellite was the fail-
ure ot the charge controller tbr one of three battery packs after about three months. Yel
another was the long time required for the traveling-wave tube to warm up. Normally, the
tuhe took three minutes to warm up, but the malflmctioning tube could lake as hmg as
sixteen mintttes. This delay reduced the time tire satellite was usahle, as Relay l's orbit
placed it in an}' particular ground station's view for only ahout thirty minutes. Relay 2,
launched 21 .[anuary 1964, had increased radiation resistance plus measures that
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improved reliability. Finally, Relay 1 had a design life of one year, but when ils turnoff
switch failed, it continued to operate for a second vcar.
Syncom
The objective of the Syncom satellite project was to demonstrate synchrt)nous-t)rbit
communications satellite technology. In the cavly 1960s, achieving a s,vnchrtmotls t)rbit
was a challenge. According to I.awrence Lessing, an obsevvev at 1tlt' time (1962):
Nearly et,eo'one al,,_ee.s that fi)r a short-range, e_prrime_tal fi_:_t venture, the medium alti-
tude active repeater satellite, such as Telstar or ttrlas', i,s the be_t bet .... Lockheed... i,s
conJident that hefore the complex problems O[ °[JeratD_14 50 m more _atellite.s at lower alti-
tudes are soh,ed . . . the U.S. will he abl_ to put up a [idl-pmt,ered, simph'_; hi J_-altitucb, .O_s
tern. Olher experls, hmoeve_; say that the _wtrhmnou._ hi_kd_Iallilude _alellite i_ _till some
order r!] magmitude hQmM pre_ent teehnolo.o_."
A synchvonotls t)ll)il is t)nt" in which a salellitc makes one oH)it per day, lhe same peri-
od as Ih¢' Earth's r<)tatit)n arottnd its axis. +.ksa result, the satellit¢' hovcrs over lhc saHlc
atca of Ihe Earlh's suvlace cotllintl()tlslv. The alti|tldc <)f a syn('htt)nous orbit is 22,235
miles (19,322 nautical miles ov 35,784 kilometers). +-'st lowtq altittld('s, satellites orbit the
Earth more dian on(c per day. For example, the Space Shultl¢', at a nominal altittlcl(" of
1_(I miles (290 kiltm|etc'rs), orbits the Eavlh in an horn and a half. The Moon, on the
olhcr hand, at a {tislall¢e ¢)f around 240,000 miles (ll{';I.l'l,v .'_,.()0,000 kilomcters), takes a
mt)nlh It) orl)il lht" Eaflh.
A key advalllage o( a synchronotls satcllit(" is Ihal gltlull¢l sl_l.lions have a lnllch easier
.it)l) of iracking Ihc satellit(" and pc)lining Ill(" transmitting and receiving antennas at it,
t)e(ausc dw satellite is always in view. Wilh sl)act_craR in lower twl)its, tracking stations
must acqtfirc d_c' satellite as it (()mes intt) view at)t)vc t)nt' horiz()n, dwn Ivatk it atross dw
sks as the antenna slews completely to the opp(,sile horizon, where the satellite disal)l)eals
until ils nc,xl pass. For ('onlint_ons coverage, a ground slatit)n might n('(,d Iw() anlt'nnas It)
acquir(" the firsl salellit(', then connect wid_ the next salt'llite passing overhead. In addi-
lion, continuous (()veragc r('qtfires lh(" platt'mtqH of grotm(l slalitms dislril)uted around
the glot)e, so |liar any given salellite is rising over the viewing h()rizon of one ground sta-
tion, while it is sctling in relation to another slalion.
The chief communications advantage of the geosynchronous satellite, however, is its
wide (overage ()f the Farth's surl_ce. At)()ut 42 percen! of the EardCs stu-face is visil)le
tit)m a synchrt)nous orl)il. Three properly placed satellites can provide coverage ti)r the
entire g[ol)e. Ahht)ugh Arthur (:. Clarke published Ihe tivsl idea of a synchronous com-
mlmi(ations satellite in 1945, the first such SS/l_chronolls-ofl)il spacecraft, Svnct)m l, was
not latmched until 14 Fel)ruary 1963. t[owever, when lhc motor fi)r circtflarizing the orbit
firecl, the space(rafl tk'll silenl. To demtmstrat(' attilud(" ('<)ntt+ol ti)r antenna pointing and
station kc('ping, Svtwt)m had twt) sc-i)araw attitttd(" c<mtrol-i('t ])rop('llar|ts: nitrogen and
hydrogen l)evoxide. The most likely cause was a titihuc of the high-l)ressuve nitrogen tank.':
11. I ,aw_('.c(' I.essmg, "I.atmching a (]_mvnu*li( ali[)ns _'_sl('lll ill _p;l( ('," ill The Edil[)lS [_[ Ft)l lull(', t'ds.,
The ,'¢pm_' hzdust_ _: .lmrHra i_ .k't'_lllt_t GiruU l [:.nglcw_d ( :liH:., N[: lh _'wt i( c-1 fall, 1962), pp. 1.10- | 1.
12. Ri(l{a_d M, Be'role; and ,\lbcvI T. ()wct_s. "S'_._(',¢)M SalcllRc I'vt,g_am."l.u_n(d ¢¢ _]m¢_'r*./t mul
I_mkH_lIJ.ly-,.\_Kusl 196-t): 395.
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Syncont 2 addressed these critical prob-
lems fiom the first attempt at making a geo-
syncln'onons communications satellite.
I,aunched {}11 26.]uly 1963, after improve-
mcnts in the nitrogen tank tlesign, Syncom
2 successfully achieved synchronous orbit
and transmitted data, telephone, t_csimile,
anti video signals. Its successor, Syncom B,
launched 19 August 1{.t64, had the addition
of a wideband channel for television and
provided coverage of the 1964 Tokyo
Olyinpics. Syncom 3 was dift_?rent froln its
predecessor in other ways, nolably in its
orbital pattern. A particular type of synchro-
nous orbit is the geostalionary orbit--
namely, a synchronous orl)it around the
eqttalor. {;eoslationary satellites seem to be
stationary over a point on the surface, its dis-
tinguished from an area of the surface.
Syncom 3 had a geostationary orbit, while
Figure 12
7"elevi_ion image tmnsmiltedjmmJapan to the I r_lited ,_tate_
q/the 1964 06,nqm (;anu_ in 7bk)'_ via the lCelay expm
mental commu_6_alirm_ mlellile launched in 1962.
(Comlesy o[ NASA}
the orbit of Syncom 2 wits inclined thirty-three degrees to the equator, so that over a twen-
ty-fimr-hour period, it appeared to move thirty-three degrees north and thirty-three
degrees south in a "figure 8" pattern as observed froln the ground.
In addition to conununications experimenCs, the Syncom satellites contributed to a
determination of the Earth's gravitational tield. They were capable of measuring range at
synchronous altitude to an accuracy {}f less than fifty meters. The high ahitude of their
orbits minimized perturbations arising fiom local topol{>g 7 changes on the Earth's snr|ace.
The Applications Technology Satellite Program
The Syncom sl}acecralL built by Hughes for NASA's {;oddard Space Flight Center,
marked the end of NASA's experimental satellites of the early 1960s. NASA turned both
Svncom satellites over to the Department of Defense in April 1965, and they were turned
off in April 1969. As a continuation of its successful program of experimental commtmi-
cations satellites, NASA inaugurated tlae Applications Teclmology Satellite (ATS) series.
These spacecraft demonstrated c{}mnumications technologies and conducted weather
observations and space research in response to congressional pressure. NASA and Hughes
had hoped to continue the success of the Syncom project with an advanced Syncnm satel-
IRe. Some members of C{mgress, however, teared that NASA was developing technology'
fl}r the benefit of a single private c{}ml)any--namely , Comsat. Therefbre, the advanced
Sync{}m's objectives were I}roadened to include meteorotog T and other experiments, and
the program t)ecame the ATS series.
The five first-generation ATS satellites, buih t)y Hughes for (;oddar{l, tested a range
of new communicali{ms eleclrt}nics in the Earth's orhit, its well as lechn{}logB' for gravity-
gvatlient stal}ilizalion (on ATS-2, ATS-4, and ATe5) and tbr medium-ahim{te orbits
(ATe2) on behalf of the Department of l)efense. All of ttlese tirst-generation ATS sl}ace-
crafl were capable of carrying n]{}re signal traffic than any of their t}redecessors.
The first of these ATS satellites, launched 7 Deceml)er 1966, carried {}tit an impres-
sive array {}f connnunicati{ms experiments and collected weather data. ATS-1 was t|]e first
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satellitetotakeindependentlyuplinkedsignalsandconvertthenlfordownlinkonasin-
glecarrier.Thistechnique,called"frequencydivisionmultipleaccess,"conserw'suplink
spectrumandalsoprovidesefficientpowerutilizationonthedownlink.ATS-Ialsocarried
ablack-and-whiteweathercamera,whichtransmitted the first flfll-disk Earth images fl'om
geosynchronous orbit. The communications hardware flmctioned ti)r another two
decades until 1985, when the spacecraft failed to respond to commands.
The second of these ATS satellites, in addition to colnmunications experiments and
space environment research, was to conduct technological testing of graviD'-gradient sta-
bilization tor the Department of Defense. Launched 3 April 1967 atop an Atlas-Agena D
rocket, ATe2 never achieved circular orbit, because the Agena upper stage malflmc-
tioned. Only a few experiments were able to relurn data. ATS-2 reentered tile atmosphere
on 2 September 1968.
The fi)llowing ATS is the oldest active communications satellite by a wide margin.
Launched in November 1967, it is still in service more than 9g years later. Among its
widest known achievements are the first fllll-disk, color Earth images transmitted from a
satellile. Its imaging capability has served during disaster situations, from the Mexico
earthquake to the Mount St. Helens eruption. ATe3 experiments inchtded VHF and
C-band communications, a color spin-scan camera, an image dissector camera, a mechan-
ically despun antenna, resistojet thrusters, hydrazine propulsion, optical surface
experiments, and the measurement of the electron content of the ionosphere and
magnetosphere. Because of failures in the hydrogen peroxide systems on AT_I, ATe3
was equipped with a hydrazine propulsion system. Its success led to its incorporation on
ATS-4 and ATe5 as the sole propulsion sysle,ll. I_
The NI'_4 and ATS-5 satellites, because of the unsuccessflll ATe2 mission, again
attempted to test technolog)/ for gravity-gradient stabilization ti)r the Department of
l)eli:nse--a key objective of the first generation of the ATS series. (;rarity-gradient slal)i-
lization was chosen to maintain satellite stability, because it uses low levels of onboard
power and propellant. The real goal, however, was to move away from spin-stabilized
spacecraR to three-axis stabilization. Spin stabilization has the adwmtage of simplit_'ing
the method of keeping a spacetraft pointed in a given direction. A spinning spacecraft
resists perturbing torces, similar t<>a D,roscopc or a lop. In space, [brces that slow tile rate
of spin are very small, so that once the spacecrafl is set spinning, it keeps going.
Spin stabilization, however, is inherently inefficient. Only some of the satellite's sola,
cells are illuminated at any one instant. Also, because the radio ener D, from Ihe mmdi-
rcclional antennas ,adiates in all directions, only a fraction of thal ener_, is directed
toward the Earth. Three-axis slal)ilization allows tile solar panels to be always pointed at
the Sun and enables thc use of a directional antenna that not only remains pointed
toward the Earth, hut co,lcentrales the radio energy into a beam, rather than a scattering
pattc'rl,.
tit)w, then, does one achieve three-axis stabilization? (;rarity-gradient slabili,,.ation
uses the EarflCs gravitational tield to keep thc spacecraft aligned in the desircd orienta-
tion. The spacecraft is designed s<+that one end is closer to the Earth than tim other. The
spacecrat) end farther Irom the Earth is in a slightly weaker gravity field than tile end
closer Io the Earth. Although Ibis techniq,m had been used in low orbit t)eti)re the a(lvent
of the ATS program, tile question to bc addressed was whether or not the difli'rence in
g,avit} fields (the gradient) was too wcak Io t)e useful at higher altitudes. That was the
obiectivc of both ATS-4 and ATS-5.
13. Pa,,l I. Mc (;cue}. ".\pplil all,ms "l'ec lillc_l_Ig'_ Salcllilc Pr,*gtaln." .IHa .l_l*¢maIHira 7_ { 197S1: 29!t-'3_5.
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Figure 13
AT_;-7. the lhi_l i_ NA&._Is Appli_alio,_ Tech,olog. ), Satellite (.ITS;) _e_Je_ q] ex[nq'lme,tal ¢ommunication_ _atdht_.
Launched in Nmu.mber 1 _6 7. AT.S' 3 i_ _till in _ervice tod_('v. .4 mong itu mo_t acclaimed _u(te._w_ is the fir_t.]ull_ii._k, color
imaLre oltheEarth tran_mitled]i_om a _alellite. ((]¢)llrlt'y.v _)| NASA. |)hl)l_) no. _'J7-11C-612)
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ATS-4 was launched 1(}August 1968 atop a powerful Atlas-Centaur rocket, t)ut it reen-
tered the atmosphere on 17 ()ctober 1(`)68 t)e(a|tlse tilt' (_entallr Ilp|)eF stare |aih'd to re-
ignite. The ATe5, then, was the final attempt ;it a syll('}lFOIl()[IS gva,city-gradienl spacecraft.
I_auncl'led 12 August 1969 otl _lI1 Atlas-Celllaur t'ot'kel, ATe5 developed pl'ol)lellls ill its
parking orbit and expended large alnt)tlnls of ptopellant to stabilize itself. To try to sal-
','age the mission, NASA injected the satellite into its tinal orbit ahead of schedule.
Although ATS-5 was to be a gravity-gradient stabilized satellite, spin stabilization was
used during orbit insertion (a common practice). The spacecrafl carried a device to
remove the spin after it reached its linal orbit. The device deployed booms to slow the
spin, which is very similar to spinning figme skaters who extend their arms to slow down.
Thtts, ,XF_5 successfttlly achiewd a synchvon<)us orbit, |)tit the spacecraft's spin was iu the
wrong direction fbr this device to work. As at COltSe(lttetlce, the gravity-gradient stabiliza-
tion experiment was useless. The c<mmltmicalions experiments were severely handi-
capped because the antennas were spinning with the spacecraft and could only work as a
lighthouse beacon, father than as at spotlight. Some con|mull|cations experiments were
later carried {lilt ill a pulse mode, and some secondary experiments were conducted as
late as 1977.'* Among those experinlenls were an IA)and aeronautical communications
package, an ion engine, a charge neutralizer, s()lar cell tests, allld lt'seaH'(h ()I|particles,
electric and magnetic fields, all(l solar radio waves.
Applications Technolog T Satellites:
The Next Generation?
The first of tim second generation of the ATS program, known as ATe6, also was the
las! ATS mission. Congress canceled the p,ogran| in 1(.)73 as a budget-cutting measure and
to allow tim commercial communications satellite industry to mlderwrite |Is own vesearcl)
and deveh)pment. In 1974. NASA unsuccesslhlly attempted to reinstate the ATS program.
Thus, the impressive ATS-6 spacecraft, launched 30 May 1974, marked the end of an era
and the beginning of a dry spell ti)f NASA experimelmd communications satellites.
Buih by Fairchild Space aud Electronics Company for (;oddard, the ,,\T_6 spa('ecraft
was tntt(:l:l larger than its pfede(:essors, weighing l,.q'_6 kilograms (compared with 431 kilo-
grams for ATe5) and standing just over eight and a half meters tall and sixteen meters
:across its booms (ATe5 was 1.8 meters tall and 1.4 reelers in diameter). In addition to
being the largest geosynchronous communications satellite launched to {Fate, il was the
first three-axis stabilized comn|uni(ations satellite. ATg(i incorporated lllall_,' significant
design firsts, such as a 9.14-meter l)aral)olic reflector; at digital conll)tlt('l" It)l" attitude (()n-
trol, solid-state high-power radio frequency tlansmittels, at primary Stl-llftttle Made of
graphite (omposite material, heal pipes for primary thermal centre|, mono|)ulse tracking
1()1 attitude control, and a radio frequent", interferomeler for attitude determinati(m anti
('Olltl'()l. t.
Equally significant was the (lemonstration of technology for tva(king and data relay
satellites thai h'd to the Tracking atnd Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) program. In
the TI)RSS, a lracking arid data !clay satellite uses the geosyn(/mmous orbital vantage
point t() look down on h)w-ahitude satellites. Data are relayed f,-{)m the Iow-ahittt(le
14. Ibid., p. 324.
15. Rc,h('ll (). Walt's, ed., A73,-() I'mal I(n_tm',,ring l'e!Jormance I':epoH (\Vashingl(m. DC: NASA Rcscal( h
|'ttbli(aliOll [RP]-1080, 1981).
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satellite to a ground station through the geosynchronous satellite. Without this space relay
capability, NASA needed ground stations all over the globe to collect data from satellites
as they passed overhead. Because a low-altitude satellite orbits the Earth in a matter of a
few hours, it is only in view of a single ground station for typically 20 minutes at a time.
ATS-6 tracked the Nimbus 5 and 6 and the GEOS 3 (Geodynamics Experimental Ocean
Satellite) satellites with a roll-and-pitch accuracy of better than 0.2 degree.
The nine-meter antenna enabled small ground receivers to pick up a good quality sig-
nal. A demonstration in India, in 1975, relayed television signals from a six-gigahertz
uplink throngh the ATS-6 spacecraft and back to Earth at 860 megahertz, directly to three-
meter antennas installed in approximately 2,000 villages. The large deployable antenna
required light pointing by the spacecraft, which is why it used three-axis stahilization.
ATe6 carried out radio-wave propagation studies at ti'eqttencies up to thirty gigaherlz; it
also established L-band (1,:550 to 1,650 megahertz) relay links to aircraft and demonstrat-
ed multiple aircraft tracking.
ATe6 experienced a fitilure of three of its four orbit control ,jets in May 1979. That
iailure led to the decision to power down the spacecraft on 3 August 1979. Snbsequently,
its telemetry system was activated between November 1979 and February 1<.)80 to collect
particle data for correlation with similar data being collected by other satellites.'"
NASA Quits
Alth<mgh the lattnch of the ATS-6 spacecraft in 1974 marked the end of NASA's pro-
gram of experimental communications satellites, the space agency also participated at the
same time in a Canatliatl satellite venture known initially as "Cooperative Applications
Satellite C" and retTamed Hermes. This joint effort inw_lved NASA attd the Canadian
Department of Communications. NASA's Lewis Research (;enter provided the satellite's
high-power communications payload. Canada designed and buih the spacecraft; NASA
tested, launched, attd operated it. Also, the Etnopean Space Agency provided one of the
low-power traveling-wave tubes and other eqttipmentY: 1lermes was launched 17January
1976 and operated tmtil October 1979.
Canada also created a telecommunications policy that the United States would emu-
late, and this would lead to the end of NASA's communications satellite research and
development prt,gram. In late 1969, Canada atl:nonnced that any financially qtmlilied
organization cottld apply tor, and expect to be granted, attthority to operate a domestic
satellite system. As a resuh, in Novemher 1<.)72, that countrs' put into orhi! the world's first
domestic satellite. In addition, the Canadian government :_bandoned sponsored research
in the hof)e of tnotivaling competition in the development of satellite technology. This
Catmdian "Open Skies" p<>licy represented a striking contrast to past U.S. polio+v, TM bttt it
was in tune with the Nixon administratit)n's advocacy of <otnpctiti<)n.
IC,. In 1tl85, the ,YI'S progt am was u ansfi'vlcd flora (;c_dd;u d I_> flw [.twin Rcsc:uth (:cntcv in (:lcvcland
to cons<_littatc NAS..Vs (ottuntmitali_)us progHm. A'IS-3 in still (_pcratit,tml. Michael A. ('.aulcv. "A'l_3:
Cch'l>valing 25 Years _)t Sc, vi<c in Sp;u c," unptd_lishc<l manust ril)t, no date, p. I, ,-\( ;l'S Ih_!jcct ()l]icc, NAN,'\
Lewis Rcscatch( ;t'lltt'l +.
17. I larold R. Raise, +:['hc ('.t+muxuniqatious "l'ct ]mology Satellite Flight Pcvl_t umu_ c," Acta A+t++mautig+t
5 ( 197tg): 343-368.
I_. A.I). Whcch>n, +'\_n K,u mau I.ccTu_c: The Rocky Road to Comttnnfit+nion Satellites," in AL'tA 24th
Aerospace S<4em:_ .lteetin/..:/a_uar_, 6-'), 19,_6, lCeno, Nevada, Paper No. AIAA-,_6-02_:)?,+ Vol. -t (New York: Amc,ican
lnsliltttc ot Acvtumnlics and Astronautits, I!IS6), p. 21.
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Subscqucmly, in.[ammry 1973, budget pressures caused NASA csscnliallv 1o eliminate
ils commurficalions s:ucllilc vcsc;uch and dcvch_pmcnl progv;un, much of which was car-
I'icd OtlI at the (;oddard Spa<c Flight (;cntcv, although flit l,cwis Research (;cll.l('l '_s,.tis
working <m a<h'a,ccs i, traveling-wave tube design and was parti<ipa[ing in the C;tnadiat_
t Icrtncs pro.iccl. (;oddard ha<t bccn rcspollsiblc for most NASA experimental (as wc]l as
<)pcralional) comnJunications s:atc]lilcs, hlchJ<lhlg Ihc ATS series.
McatY_+'hilc, the danger of t_)rcign competition, cspcci;dh' from Japall and Europe,
lo<mlcd larg-c. Thc,]apancsc laun<hcd the firs1 <'omnlcr<ial l_t-band operational satellite,
<alle<l Saklu+a 2a, on 4 Fchrtmr', 1983. Buih by l"ovd (now l+oral) and Milsutfishi, and
latm<hcd on a,lapancsc N2 rocket, Sakura 2a also was.lapan's tirsl commercial commu-
nications satcllilc. It was replaced by Sakura 3a, whi<+h was launched 19 February 1988. hi
lhc 1990s, I.oral also buih dw SupcH)ird and N-Slat salclliles f<n-.]apan, and with.lapanesc
contrttctors led by "Ibshiba, .Iapan's National Spa<c l)cwqopmcnl Agency designed and
buih the ETS 6 (Kiku 6) spacccratl.'"
+\t the same time, [hc Emol_Ca_ls wcrc catching up. The Olympus sa(cllite bcgaH
development in 1979 as l:-Sa_ and was btfih by European aerospace companies, of which
British AcroSl>aCc was tbc ln-imc comractor, i:am_chc<t on 12.J_l;,, 1989 on az_ Arianc 3
rockcl, Olympus was a hugc muhipurposc nalcllitc <|cmonstr;uing till<| promoting new
applicalions in lclcvinion broadcasting, inlcrcily telephone r<)uling, and the use of the
l_t-band for vkh,<_<onfcrcucing and ]_w-rtttc da[a mms[_'r tbr business communication.-"'
F<ncign compclilion provi<tcd NASA a slrong tlrgumcnt l_)1 reinn[aling its commercial
satellite development progr;un. The question wan: wtmt technology' ou:ght Io be dcvcl-
Ol)Cd? Market nludics <on<hl<tcd during the 1970n rcvctdcd the crowding of synchronotln
oYl)ils. The ol)viottn soliHion 1o oxcrcrow<ling was to uric higher flcqtlcn<'y I'_-I)and com-
municalions satcllilcs.
A compelling nvncrgg' cxinls among the uric of I_t-han<l t?cqucncicn, spot beams, and
onboar<l proccsnorn. In general, higher ]rcqucncicn I)roducc smaller ]>cam widlhn wilh a
giV¢'II ttll|Ulllltl, till(| SO il iS ¢'[ISiOF |o It);tl<¢" tlll|lHllliln [}l_.tl pl'otll.Icc sl)ol b('ttlllS _l| _t-]')itl)d
[[cqucn(ics. A npot 1)c;t.n/ <:ovc[-n tt smaller ;uetl, nuch its a lllt_jOl mclropolitan area,
compared Io [ypical beams tow'ring the cnlivc col,ntry. These spot beams improve the
problem t_l rain tl_(lt' al l_-band l>y conccnlraling thc signal strength 1o punch through
cloudn. ()ncc there arc spol beams, it in a natural extension to swilch signals bclwecn var-
ioun nl)Ol covcvagc arcan (nuch an routing one nignal from New York to Chicago and anoth-
er from New Ytnk to Los Angclcn) al)_Jard the spacecraft.
Dcnl)ilc lhc virltml shttldown of lhc NASA communicalionn satellite rcncarch and
dcw'lopmcnt program, NASA synw,,n cngillC(!l'n lllFc, llghoIll the mid-1970s sought ways to
revive dwir ctmcclcd l)rogram. '_,_nk <onlinucd on satclli(cs din( were still operating in
space, tin wcll as <m prqiccls Ihat wcrc [(it) t,u- along to nlop. Both the l,ewis Research
Ccnlcr and the (;<)ddttrH St)ace Flight (:c_Hcr advocalc<t reviving the space commuuica-
lic.ns programs, bill along vcYy diffcrenl lines. (;od<lard championed public ncrvicc salt, l-
lilcs dirc<:llv in compclili<>n wilh in(tunlry. The technolog T dcvch>pmcnl program _tl Lewis
nUl}p<}rtcd U.S. in(htslry, ahht}ugh nt}mc companion saw lhc Ix_wis al}l}roach as subsidizing
c{}mf)ctil<_rs. The Nix{}r_ a{hninisttation's a{Ivo{a{y of {ompctiti{m thus law>red the I,cwis
at)l)V_a<h.
The <tucstior_ otlk'<h'ral timding of c_mmnmicalions satellite tcchnt>log, T' <lcvch_pmcnl
by NASA came I>cRnc lhc Nalional Rcscar<h (:<nm<il, whose ConmfillcC on Salcllitc
19. \nd_c'.,. xA'ils_>n, cd...lay:++';', ",l.,r+,Y l.ti,w,Hr.) 1<_)'; 19<.'4 (SurH'y:.la)m"s. 199:_,). pi ). fili, :k">!l-til).
_11, [I.,id., pp. ?,::;0-::,2.
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(:(mmmnications released a report on the subject in 1977. The committee considered sev-
eral options and recommended fimding a NASA experimental communications satellite
technology flight program and an experinmntal public service communications satellite
system. The committee opposed creating an operational public service system on the
grounds that it was "inappropriate [br NASA. ''e'
In 1978, five years after budget pressures torced NASA to eliminate its commercial
communications satellite research and development program, the space agency reentered
the field.":' The Lewis Research Center, not the Goddard Space Flight ('enter, acted as the
lead center, in light of the program's emphasis on technolo_'. Lewis worked on the next
NASA experimental commtmications satellite and began a $45 million program of
technology development using duplicate contracts, to have the new designs needed for a
radically new spacecraft. NASA involved the five major bnilders of communications satel-
lites--TRW, ttughes, Ford, General Electric, and RCAIhy awarding each a study con-
tract. These contracts ranged in cost from $264,000 (RCA) to $1,213,000 (TRW), and all
were completed in the smnmer of 1981.
Joe Sivo, chief of the communications division at I,ewis, brought U.S. communications
carriers--the users of the technology--into the program to develop a consensus on
advanced technology requirements. Between November 1979 and May 1983, the Carrier
V_k)rking Group, formed by Sivo, met nine times to define flight system reqtfirements and
experiments and to review spacecraft designs as they hecame available ti'om the study con-
tractors. The Carrier Working Group consisted of representatives fi-om American Satellite,
AT&T Long I,ines, Bell Telephone I,aboratories, Comsat, (;TE Satellite, ltughes
(;onnnunications, ITT, RCA, Satellite Business Systems (MCI), Southern Pacific, and
V_k'stern Union.
The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite
The eftorts of the (]arrier Working (;roup and the industry study contracts led direct-
ly to the design and construction of the next NASA experimental commnnications satel-
lite, known as the Advanced Communications Technolog T Satellite (ACTS). Its unique
feature is that it acts as a "switchboard in the sky." The commtmications payload incorpo-
rates steerable, spot-beam antennas and onboard switching that allows signals to be rout-
ed aboard the spacecraft. The Ka-band fiequencies ttsed hy the ACTS (thirty gigahert/for
the uplink and twenty gigahertz for the downlink) were new capabilities for U.S. commu-
nications satellites, but the Japanese already had used them on their own satellite. NASA
makes the satellite available for experiments by industry, universities, and other govern-
ment agencies, as well as t'_w tests of new service applications.
Latmched 12 Septemher 1993, the ACTS has been perhaps the most snccessfid of
NASA's communications satellites. To date, it has operated for two years without failures
and has cemducted more than 100 experiments and tests. Furthermore, several commer-
cial systems have proposed using ACTS technologies. For example, Motorola, which built
the satellite's baseband processor, is incorporating onboard switching in its h'iditnn sys-
tem, while Hughes is working on Spaceway, a Ka-band systcnl with spot heams. Despite
21. Comtniltee on Satellite Communications, Space Applications Board, Asscml)l_ of Engineering,
National Research Cotmcil, I:ederal Rewarch and l)evelop.lent fi_r ._*telhte (;_m..u.i_alion_ (Washington, I)C:
National At adcmy of Sciences, 1977), p. 30.
22. Roberl R. Lovell. "The Sial/is tit N:\..'_A's Communications Program." Pacit"w "l'clc¢ommunications
(]onfmcnce,January 1982, p. 4, pveprint copy SUpl)lied by author.
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these technical and commercial successes, the ACTS had a long and tortuous existence
during tile 1980s, as (;¢mgress and the V,,qdte House debated tilt" phih)sophy of having
NASA develop technology' for tile U.S. connnunicatior_s satellite industry. While tile satel-
lite was still in tile design phase, for exanq)le, the Reagan administration deh'ted tile satel-
lite from its budget, only to have Congt-ess reinstate tile project.
Conclusion
NAS:Vs connnercial communications satellite program has produced many significant
tesllhs OV<.'Fthe past 35 years. Altltough st)tile critics have al'glled that NASA has <_`+'erstat-
ed its contribtttion to satellite comnmnications,-" one can contend t}lal the program has
i-ettll'tled t_tr IllOFe It:, Ill{ +. indttstry than its cost.
()he often o`++crlooked key to tmde|-standing the vahte of NASA's ex[)erinwntal com-
munications satellite program is the cot|cepl of risk in space design. The high cost of
latmching spacecraft, coupled with the curretH impossibility of repairing hardware in svn-
chlollOllS oll:,it, tile;IllS l]l;tl the design of space hardware is driven by the risk of t_tillll'e.
A.s a I'eslllI, s])at'e haldwaFe designs have been very c(:,tlselvative, using old wchnt)logy,
l)ecause of the perceived risk associated with using anything new. l':ven if at new item cam
prodttce greater capability at lower cost, itll increases lhe risk of failtne, it will nol I)e ttsed.
For a new technology' to tly its benetils mttsl t)e overwhehning, thereby 1)rechtding incre-
mental improvemct'Jls in space technoloD'. ,,ks a testth space hardware can lag behind the
state of the art by more than a decade.
A high risk of failure overshadowed the early years of satellite commu,ficatiot_s.
NASA's ]mUlCh record in the eatIv 1960s rellected the state of rocket science ;tit the time--
natnely I-o(+kels tailed qttite ottcu. Also. the space t,nvil<mlnenI wa+s not well known. T]te
period was a critical time for NASA's involvement m the th,veh)pmenl of conmnmications
satellites. Withtmt NASA, [ [ughes's Svncom would never have gotwn off tilt' grotmd, and
t htghes would not I)e tilt: world's largesl commtmications satellite maker toda`+'.
Despite the benefits that NASt\'s ex]}erimetmtl conmmnications satellite progratn has
I)rottght indttstry, i ldttstrv does not look kindly on NASA's developnlent of spacecraft or
technology' that might tmdermine a firm's conl[)etitive advanla_,e. Ill other words, a NASA
sp;tlcet+l';ttt'l lllttst develop new technologT, that all I.LS. contpanh's can list', bttt the space
_tgetlt'7,' Ill[ISt ;tl`+'<}i(I the COllSll-ttclioll of sl)acect-a[l thal ll/igt/I seeltl lo C<)lllpete with ;till'+'
<:ompatly. I Itlghes benefited enorm+msly lr<mt NASA's itlvolvenwnt in tlt,.+, early daws o'f
c<mmmnications satellites. Today, as a resuh, l|ttghes is tilt" largest builder o1 commmcial
COtltlllttllic;.ttions satellites. In the 1993 Space News "Top 50" list of space companies,
Hughes was ranked second.-"
The 1973 cancellati<m of NASA's commt'rcial commtmicatic, ns satellite research and
develolmtetlt program, in retrospect, 1)enefiled the space agency. It totted a conlplete
rethinking of the ]>roRrant. To be reinstated in 1978, NASA had to .justit}' tilt" pr<+granl
t)'otll StTatch and tlailsl_)lnl it frolll a pttblic service detnonstt+ation illto a technoh>g_'
developtnent program. The public service satellite i)rogram looked too muth like com-
pelition to industry even thoug]t tilt" services NASA provided would IlC, I h;ttve t)eell afford-
abh' to public service users.
2:+;. Scc, h,I hlstalne, (:Unltiltc, "Mi.+reading t [istorL" p+*s+im.
2.t. l,auta K. Brmvning, "The l'_q_ 511 Space Companies," ";[m++' ,X','++,+6 2J,-30Julv 995 : s.
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NASA currently is reorganizing its commercial communications program to prepare
fbr the next generation of research and development following the ACTS, although a
need for a followup project is not perceived at the moment. Therefore, NASA plans to
develop long-term technolo_' improvements and work on both spectrum management
and issues of interoperability between satellite systems. NASA has benefited from the
Satellite Industry Task Force, an industry advisory committee chaired by Hughes's
Thomas Brackey. At a presentation of its findings on 12 September 1995, attended by Vice
President AI Gore, the task force expressed support for the ACTS, but it did not call for
NASA undertaking another salellite project.
Chapter 7
From Advent to Milstar: The U.S.
Air Force and the Challenges of
Military Satellite Communications
by David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant
For more than three dvcades, the U,S. Air Fore<`' has led el+[orts to expand satellite
comtnunicatimls capabilities for military use. Front Advent in the early 1960s to Mils(at in
the 19D0s, the :kit Force has provided htun<.h vehich:s, supporling inli+astructure, and m<)sl
of tit<.' communications slm.llites for tit<`" delbnsc conllnllnilx: lit so doing, tit+.: Air Force
has confronted a variety of sometimes related tt'chnical, poiilical. ;and instill|tional chal-
leng<:s. These ti)cuscd initially on long-range slrategic communicati()ns requirements, but
incrcasirtgly ()at tactical needs after the first win-tithe transmission of ,,,()ice and data fr()m
Vietnam l() Washington, D.(L, xia satellit('. Air Force engineers often led their commctcial
<.:ottnterpal+tS its lhey i:,rol+t.d the 1)()undaries of high-risk techlloloL,_ in till efti)rt to
incr¢:as,p payload (apabilities. Unlike i)rovidcrs of (onmter<:ial slttcllitc COnlnnmicati<ms
s<.'rviccs, howtwer, the Air Force has wreslled wilh survivability and unique rcqtfircments
that havc increased military saltqlitc costs, cvcn as commercial cosls have dropped.
As an vxamplc of polilical cltalhmges, "convergence" l)ropone,lls have repeatedly
criticized military sltlcllite cotmnuni¢ations; they argue that merging the cotnmercia] and
ntililarx scct<ws would avoid duplication and slave tax dollars. (:onvcrselv, civilians who
worry id)out divergent civil and military interests and military people concerned with
syslt'lll sect(fair mad assured access du,ing conflicts have staunclilv dcle|td¢'d the need for
separate military satt'llitc cotntntmications capabililies, e,,+..n if they must |:,e supph'ment-
cd by civil lind c<muner<:ia] satellite conmmnications to ]mndh, Iota] volume. In terms <+1
ii1stitttlional challenges, the l)epartntcnt <)f Defense (1)<)D) traditionally has l_tvorc<l
tri-sCl-vicc, <w,ioint lore<`:, military satellite conltntt|ticati{ms tnanagt,nl<:nt fiw the sakc of
(ost-elli'ctivcncss--and I<) rcdt|cc intcrscrvice rivalries. The complicated, fragmentt'd
Italure of nti]itarv satellite communicaliolts tnanagClnmtt has served hist<:,ricallv to r<:nde|
the int('gralion o[ I:,lalmirtg and services ntotc difticuh within the Air Fo|'cc att't,[t I)oD; fttr-
Ih<`'l-Ill_[)l'C, it has retarded the IllOVUlll('lll 01 iililitary satellite CC, Illllttllli('ittit)llS SV'GI('IIIS
from lilt realm <)f rt'seat+c|t and dcvehqmu'nt into the operational arena.
Origins and Early Efforts
World War I1 dora+ms(rated Ill+.' t,sscnlial requircmenl of ch'clrtmically transmilliJIg
military intormati(m over hmg<.'r lang,ps, in greatt'r quantities, and with more reliabililv
and higher s('curily than ever I)eti)rc. A c()nslellati<m of Earlb_)rt)iting sara'lilies, tits( pr<)-
posed by tit(" t+*ritish science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke in ()ctol)er 1945, oftk'red a rex-
oh_tionary way of nmcting tltosc rt'qtfircmcnts. Now a part of earl)' space lore. Clarke+s
concept of gCoSlaliollary c<mnnunications satellites spark,ed s+.'riotts military inter,psi, as
evidenced by t:'rqjecl },L,\NI)'s May 1946 rcl)orl 1,_) Ibt" Arlltv :\Jr F(;,r('t's. litlt'ft 15+dimi*larr
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1)esig_t of an Experimental Wor#l-Cirding Spaceship.' It could not be implemented, however,
until the technology for space launch and satellite construction was more advanced.
For the near term, the military services (primarily the Arm)' and Navy) had to satis_
themselves with using the Moon for space communications experiments. Not until 18
December 1958 did an Air Force Atlas B booster successfully carry the Advanced Research
Projects Agency's SCORE (Signal Communications by Orbiting Relay Eqtfipment) into
low-Earth orbit, from where it delivered President Eisenhower's now-famnus Christmas
message. The Army followed this achievement in October 1960 with the successfifl launch
of its Courier delayed-repeater communications satellite, which operated in the uhrahigh
frequency (UHF) band in a low-ahitude orbit (90 to 450 nautical miles, or 167 to 833 kilo-
meters). Meanwhile, under Project West Ford (later Project Needles), the Air Force con-
tracted with Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo_' (MIT) to
produce 480 million hair-like, copper dipoles, which were launched on 9 May 1963 and
reflected radio signals from an orbit nearly 2,000 nautical miles (about 3,700 kilometers)
above the Earth. _
As the 1960s approached, DoD sought to simultaneously develop a satellite constella-
tion of the sort envisioned by Clarke and create management structures to handle the new
communications capabilities. In 1958, the Advanced Research Projects Agency had direct-
ed the Army and Air Force to plan for an equatorial synchronous (strategic) satellite com-
munications system, with the Air Force responsible for the booster and spacecraft and the
Army in charge of the actual communications elements aboard the satellite, as well as on
the ground. The program initially consisted of three projects. Two of these, named Steer
and Tackle, used medium-ahitude repeater satellites; the third, Decree, called for a syn-
chronous repeater satellite using microwave frequencies. The Pentagon transferred the
management of military satellite communications development efforts from the
Advanced Research Projects Agency to the Army in September 1959; it soon thereafter
combined the three projects into a single program, called Advent.
Once described as a "not quite possible dream," that technologically ambitious under-
taking was soon plagued by high costs, inadeqtmte payload capaciD,, and an excessive satel-
lite-to-booster weight ratio. Those problems caused Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara to cancel Advent on 23 May 1962. Meanwhile, it had become apparent that
neither the Army nor any other single service would have overall responsibility ti)r mili-
tary satellite communications, because in May 1960 the Pentagon combined the strategic
1. For a discussion of comtmmications satellites in the RANt) report, see Douglas Aircrafl Company,
Inc., Preliminary Design 0/" an Experimental World-(Srchng .Spaceship, Report No. SM-11827 (Santa Monica, CA:
Douglas Aircraft Company, Engineering Division, 2 Ma,,' 1946), pp. 14-15. For a prohable connection hetween
Arthm" Clarke's arlicle and the I_\ND report, see l)onald (2 Elder, Out From Behind the Eight-Ball: A ttistorv o/
Project Echo, ,,LA.S tlisun y Series, \i_l. 16 (San Diego: American Astronautical Society, 19951, p. 13.
2. Carl Berger, The Air Force in 5,)m_e, Fiscal Year I961, Vol. St10-_66/142 (Wastm_gton, DC: U.S. Air
Force Historical Division l.iaison Otllce, April 1966), pp. 84-93; Thc Aerospace Corporation, The Aerospace
Corporation: Its Work, 1960-1980 (Los Angeles: Times Mirror Press, 19g0), pp. 47-49; Maj. Robert E. Lee, History
_?[ the De[ense Satellite ()Jmmunications ,%ivstem (1964-19861, A(:SC Report No. 87-1545 (Maxwell AFB, AI.: Air
University Press, 1987), pp. 5-8; Elder, Out From Behind the Eight-Ball, pp. 11-13, 51-56. Projec! West Ford grew
out of a 1958 summer study on secure, hardened, reliable commmfications to overcome problems (such as inad-
equate power generation and limited real-time communication t'rom Iow-Earlh orhits) associated with the earli-
est active communications satellites. Although many critics ['eared that West Ford would produce lmtg-term prob-
lems tot Earth-based astronomers, rnost of the dipoles had reentered the atmosphere by early 1966. North
American Aerospace Defense Command's Space Surveillance (]enter, however, did continue tracking remnants
as late as 1989. l)onaM 1t. Martin, ('ommunicatim_ Satellites, 195,_;-1992 (El Segm_do, CA: Aerospace Corporalion,
1991 ), pp. 8-9; llisto D, oj 31ilitary .Space Operations, ATC Study (;tilde S-V95-A-SPV01-SG (Ix)wry ,M"B, (;0:3301 st
Space Training Squadron, Air Training Command, March 1991), pp. 39-40.
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comnnmications systems of the three services under a Deli_nse (]ommunications System
(DCS) run by the newly created Defense Connnunications Agency (DCA).'
Before authorizing a more realistic military satellite comnmnications project to
replace Advent, McNamara opened discussions with Comsat, the corporation that con-
gressional legislation established in earl}, 1963. McNamara questioned why he should fund
a separate, costly medium-altitude military satellite system if the military could lease links
from Comsat at lesser cost. DaD and Comsat, however, could not agree on costs or the
need for separate military repeaters aboard commercial satellites.'
Furthermore, the addition of military applications to a civilian system designed for
use by other countries created international concerns. On 15 July 1964, after months of"
fl'uitless effort, McNamara ended negotiations and opted for the fidl-scale development
of a dedicated military system, which the Air Force had consistently fawwed to ensure
security and reliability. The defense secretary accepted a proposal that Aerospace
Corporation had been studying tar the Air Force. Although it initially had called for using
an Atlas-Agena Booster combination to launch a constellation of randomly placed, medi-
um-ahitude satellites weighing 100 pounds (tarry-five kilograms) each, the development
of the more powerfld Titan IIIC booster soon resulted in a decision to aim for launching
as many as eight satellites at once into a near-synchronous equatorial configuration. The
Los Angeles-based Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), within the Air Force
Systems Command, was responsible for developing both the spacecraft and its communi-
cations payload; the Army Satellite Comnmnications Agency was designated to manage
the ground segment; and DCA had executive management responsibility for this Initial
Defense Communications Satellite Program (IDCSP).;
The Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program
Originally expected to function as an experimental system, IDCSP rapidly proved its
operational worth and became the first phase in a three-phase evolutionary program to
provide long-terln, survivable commtmications for both strategic and tactical users. The
litst seven IDCSP satellites, relatively simple in design to avoid the problems that had
plagued Comier and prevented Advent from ever getting off the ground, went aloti on
16 June 1966. Operating in superhigh frequency (SHF), weighing about 100 pounds
(forty-live kilograms), and measuring only three feet (one meter) in diameter and nearly
three feet (one meter) in height, these spin-stabilized satellites contained no moveable
3. The Aerospace Corporation, The Aerospace Cmlmration: Itg I!,b_k, pp. 47-49; l.ee, tfi_tory _q[the l._@,aw,
'_'alellite Cammunieation_ 5)'stem, pp. 5-8; f_.ctger, The Air l'?nce in Space, pp. 84-93. V_en it agreed Io termimm" dm
Advent program, DaD received assurances it would have access to NASA's Syncom salellites. On 1 January 1!165,
NASA IJansti.rred Syncom operations to the Penlag_)ll. Over the next two years, the Dol) logged extensive lime
on Svncom 2 and Syncom 3, although use diminished after the IDt'SP satellites became operati<mal. Set' TRW,
Spao" 1,o K 4 (Winter 1964-65): 27-28; Heather E. Hudson, Communication Satellite.+: Their l)evelopment a+M Impact
(New ¥:)i k: Flt'C Pl _.'ss, | _.)9()), p. 19; Martin, (;ommu+d+atim+ Satellites, pp. 12-14.
I. Militarx alld i:Ollltllt'l'ciit[ capabililics would not shatc the Sillllt" satellite illllil tilt' Nilx', (ollllat tl'd
with (JOlll_,it[ ill 1975; for "gal)filler" sctvite, pending lhe ctml|)letion of its Fleet ._alcllilt' Colmmmi(alions
Svstt'm. See Michael E. Kinnley, Ouler 3,'pa_e a_d laner Saru'tltmx: (_avernment, Business, a_ld Satellite (;ammunbatiol_
(New _,brk: Jolm Wiley and Sons, 1,97,_), [)p. 1!)9-2t10; ,-\_lhom' Michael "li'dvschi, Live l'ia Salellite." Tke SIo_)' o/
C03,1SAT amt the TeckaMog) that (3ta_ged Wmbt Comma_d,_titm (Vtalshington. D(;: Acropolis Bo_ks, 19;";9), p. 1511:
Martin, (;ommu*_i_atimt Satelhte_, pp. 104-05, 181_-86.
5. l_,ergvr, Tke Airk'orce in .Spaa', pp. t]-_-Ii8; l'hc ,.\off,space (;orporafion, The Ae_o_pa,e (;ml)matio*_. It_
Ltb_k, pp. 48-52: Ix'e, tfi_tm 3, o/ the 1.}e/e_w Satellite (;ommunicatian_ S_,*tem, pp. 8--10; }louse {[Ollllllitlec olI
(;overnmcn_ ()l)cralions, (;overamem Operation_ m Space (Anal'_ix o/ CiviI-Milita O' Hale_ am/ t_elatim_kip_). 89th
(:ong., 1st scss., .t ]mu" 1965, tt. Rept. ,t45, pp. 78-79.
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parts, no batteries tbr electrical power, and only a basic telemetry capability for monitor-
ing purposes. The configuration of each IDCSP platform provided two-way circuit capac-
ity fi_r either eleven tactical-quality voice circuits or five connnercial-quality circuits capa-
ble of transmitting one million digital or 1,550 teletype data bits per second. The IDCSP
satellite's twenty-four-face polyhedral surface accommodated 8,000 solar cells that provid-
ed sufficient energy to power a single-channel receiver operating near 8,000 megaher_, a
three-watt traveling-wave-tube amplifier transmitting around 7,000 megahertz, and one
twenty-megahertz double-conversion repeater. Designed to operate for three years, the
actual mean time befia'e failure among IDCSP satellites proved to be six years. DCA
declared the system operational and changed its name to the Initial Defense Satellite
Commtmications System (IDSCS) bet_)re the launch of the last group of eight satellites on
13 June 1968?
Figure 14
The Mark IV(X) tlan._portable stat#m lot _atellite communictltion_ degigmed [or tra_mitting aml receiving voice, tele{vpe, and
[ac_imil_, imaL_e_ via NASA _ .h)mmn _atellite, l)u_4t_g the Vietnam t4"ttr, tke milita O, relied on ,S]_ncom J?_r tYmtine adminis-
trative a_d logistical _vmmuni_ation_ between Saigou and ttawaii. ((:_m'tesy _Jt NASA)
6. (;erald T. Canlwell. 7"he Abl'bn_" in _S_ace, l;Acal Year 1964, Vol. $1lO-S-67/52 (Washington, I)(:: U.S.
Air Force [tistorical Division Liaison Office, .]une 1967), pp. 69-76; (;_'rald T. Cantwell, 7"he Air l;orce in A;pace,
I')'_cal Year 1965. Vol. S1tO-S-68/11q6 (Washinglcm, DC: [!.S. All Force Hisltwical Division 15aison Office, April
It,_GS), pp. 42-51: Let', [ti_t<_rx _![ theDe]i'_se .gateUite Com_ml,i_ati_m_ g_'stem, pp. 1(_t3; The A_w_spacc (_rl)_rati_ ,
Tke Ae_vspate (.)npom/iott: lt_ Work. pp, t8-52; Ma_li_, Cmnmucti_ alim_ ,galellite_. t)t ). 95-96.
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Vietnam provided tile first opportunity to use satellite communications fi-om a real-
world theater of operations. U.S. forces had installed IDCSP ground terminals at Saigon
and Nha Trang hy July 1967. Under Project (:ompass Link, IDCSP provided circuits for
the transmission of high-resolution photography between Saigon and Washington, D.C.
As a result of this revolutionary development, analysts could conduct near-real-time bat-
t]efield intelligence from afar. Commercial systellls also supplied satellite circuits to sup-
port area communications requirements. Even he|ore IDCSP service became available,
the military had relied on the NASA-developed Syncom satellite for communications
between Saigon and Hawaii. Later, Comsat leased ten circuits between its Bangkok facili-
ties and ltawaii, while the Southeast Asia Coastal Cable System furnished part of the net-
work for satellite terminal access between Bangkok and Saigon. Satellite usage during the
Vietnam War established the military practice of relying on commercial space systems fi)r
routine administrative and logistical needs while lrttsting more sensitive command-and-
control communications to the dedicated military system5
The Defense Satellite Communications System
_qlile the IDSCS provided good service for nearly ten years and also fhrnished the
basic design for British Skynet and NATO satellites, the first-phase Defense Satellite
(]ommunications System (DSCS) satellites remained limited in terlns of channel capacity,
tlscr access, and coverage. Furthermore, military planners worried about the vtdnerabili-
ty of a command-and-control system that involved a central terminlls connected to a
number of remote terminals. The subsequent I)SCS II design sought to overcome those
deficiencies. TRW Systems received a contract fiom the Air Force Spare Systems Division
(fi)rmerly SAMSO) in March 1969 to develop and produce a qualification model and six
flightworthy satellites to be launched in pairs aboard a Titan III. Plans railed for a con-
stellation of Ibm- active satellites in geosynchronous orbit, supported hy two orbiting
spares. Each satellite measured nine feet (2.7 meters) in diameter, was thirteen feet (four
meters) in height with antennas extended, and weighed 1,300 pounds (590 kilograms).
DSCS II, hecause it was dual-spun tilt stabilit?; represented a "giant step" in technical
development over its smaller, lighter, and less capable predecessor. A flexible, four-chamwl
configuration provided a s_ariety of communicatiotls links for interfacing with _-arious size
terminals. It possessed capacity for 1,300 two-way voice channels or 100 million bits of
digital data per second, and onboard hatteries generated 520 watts of power to comple-
ment the satellite's eight s_lar panels. The five-year design life nearly doubled that of DSCS
I, and the new system's redundancy, multichannel axld muhiple-access features, and
increased capability to <:ommunicate with smaller, more mobile ground stations especially
pleased the Air Force and other users/
7. 13. ('all..]_dm ,J. t.anc, Jl., (,'ommaml amt (,ontml a_M (,'ommltnicalious Slrurtu_es in ,gol¢theast :tsm
(Maxwell AFB, AI.: Air University, 1981 ), pp. 113-1 i. l)ol)'s quest liar inexpensive satellite conlnlunications duv-
in',g the Vietnam Wau gave rise Ill lilt' "'31)cilcuiIs" episodc. Wht'n several carlievs learned in the sllllllllel 1)[ [(,_(;{i
Ihal (:onls;lt inlendt'd 1o lt.asc ?,0 t ilcuits dilt't tlx to Doll, in direct violali(m tit tile F( :( ','s re( oilily iillltnttlb_atcd
"Aulholized Uscls '+decision, they fOi mall;' pwllcstcd, hi Februavv 1967, the F(]C o,rdeled a so-called c otnp<+sitc
latlt' Ill" S7,lO0 pcr halt:circuit, splitting lilt' ira|tic evenly three ways among lYE Rt:A. and "t._,'t-_,lt'l'llt',li,,,I
hllernational. The F( ](] icquired (]omsal to sell lilt' circuits to lilt' ('ill'l'il21"S_ll $._{,8{1[}, Kinslcy, Outer.g].,ao'alut l,'tnel
.'_;'**::/um_, |_p. GO-I;2.
8. FholnaS Kalas, The New lligh (;rr;umt: .'s'tmt.%4,",a_d IGwl,,on'; r_/._i['ar'_A£n_'_,?zl (New Yl_tk: %inl(In and
Schuster, 1983), lip. 73-7fi:.la(_d> Nt'uti'ld, 7"lwAi_l'b_*'e iu .Spin*, 1970-197,1 [Washington, D( ]: ()lilac ,)fAil Fort c
llislmy, Augusl 1976), ill I. 15-19: [,ce, lh_tmy o/ the l)efl'nse .S?m'l[ile (.ommumcatirms ,%:_/em, pp. 1::;-21: '|'hc
Aemspact' t:OlllOralion, lTw ,-te_osprtce Cmporatiolt: Its I,_}M¢, Ill:.. 52-57; Mallill. Commuuiwttitm 5;atellites.
pp. 100-02.
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Tile orbital history of DSCS II satellites in the 1970s, beginning with the launch of the
first pair on 2 November 1971, reveals a somewhat spotty per|ormance record. A Titan
IIIC hooster tMlure accounted for the loss of two of the next six satellites; problems with
stahilization, antenna pointing, and traveling-wave-robe amplifiers plagued the others.
The Air Force responded by contracting with TRW for an additional six satellites of the
original design, and later Ibm more with forty-watt traveling-wave-tuhe mnplifiers in place
of the twenty-wat! amplifiers. Despite another launch failure in March 1978 and contin-
ued high-voltage arcing in the power amplifiers, by the early 1980s, the DSCS II constel-
lation not only fldfilled global, strategic communications requirements through for_'-six
I)S(]S ground terminals, but also linked the Diplomatic Telecommunications System's
fifty-two terminals and the (;round Mobile Forces' thirty-one tactical terminals. Perhaps
the hest example of the satellite's durahility is that DSCS lI B4, launched on 13 December
1973, lasted four times longer than its design life. The Air Force did not turn it off until
13 I)ecemt)er 19937
The Air Force had been designing an improved DSCS III satellite since 1974 to meet
the military's need for increased commtmications capacity, especially, for ntobile terminal
users, and tbr greater survivability. General Electric's DSCS III differed considerat)ly fiom
its phase II l)redecessor. This third-generation satellite was three-axis stabilized, consider-
ably heavier (2,475 pounds, or 1,123 kilograms, in orbit), and rectangular rather than
cylindrical in shape (with dimensions of six by six by ten feet [1.8 by 1.8 by three meters]
and a thirty-eight-tbot [ 11.6 meter] span when the solar arrays were deploye(I). Its 1,000
watts of battery, power practically doubled that of DSCS II, as (lid its ten-yem design life.
Furthermore, DSCS III signaled a ntajor technological adwmce by heing the first opera-
tional satellite to use electronically switched SHF multiple-beam antennas. The sixty-_)ne-
beam uplink antenna produced variable gain patterns fiom Earth coverage, to spot
beams, to patterns with mills in selected directions to cotmter.jamming. The two down-
link antennas used nineteen independently switched beams. A gimbaled dish, two h()rns,
and two UHF antennas completed the array. Flexihh, anlenna contigurations comhined
with six transponders, which ttsed lorry-watt and ten4vatt traveling-wave-tube amplitiers,
oftk'red a wide range of services to lhe growing wideband user community as well as to the
ground-mobile forceY'
The DSCS III satellite also carried a single-channel Air Force satellite UHF transpon-
der with anti-jamming protection fi)r secure voice communications during all levels of
conflict. As with most DoD satellites, DSCS III had hoth an S-hand section fi)r use by the
Air Force Satellite Control Network and an X-band section that provided redundant com-
mand paths and gave Army personnel at eight ground stations worldwide direct control
of the transponders and atttennas. Beginning with the [cmrth satellite, the use of
improved jam resistance, redundancy, and more l)owertid amplifiers enabled DSCS III to
meet lhe ntilitary's growing requirclnents ti)r increased capacity and survivahility. H
9. Karas, The ;_ tfiLdl (;round, pp. 75-76; Ncuteltt, The Air l'brce in S_m_,, pp. 15-19: Ix'e, lti_tory o/the
l)e/enxe Satellite (_ommunicationx ,hl,tstem, pp. 15-28; Th<' Aer<_space Corp_wation, The Aer._pace Cot_Ooration: lt_ Wark,
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Countdm_n, May,/]une 1995, p, 18: IJ. (;en. Winston D. Powers and Andrew M. ltartigan, "The Defense Satellite
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The orbital history of DSCS III did not include the I)oosier problenls that had resuh-
ed in the loss of four DSCS II satellites. On 30 October 1982, a Titan 34D/lnerlial Upper
Stage vehicle launched the first DSCS III salellile. Another two DSCS Ill satelliles went
aloft via the Space Shuttle Atlantis in 1985. The Ckalb'.gwrdisaster and a series ¢ffTitan 341)
failures then shut down launch operations fin two years. Fortunately, the reliability of the
DSCS system--and the exceptionally long lili' span of I)SCS III and later DSCS Ii satel-
lites-allowed the constellation to weather the launch crisis better than most other mili-
tary satellite syslenis. The Air Force finally launched a tourth I)SCS llI satellite via a Titan
34D/Transtage in 1989, after which Atlas II became the preti:rred launch vehicle. Nol
|mill 19July 1993 did the Air F<)rce comph'te a hill, five-satellite I)SCS lit conslellation.
One measure, however, of the confidence thal the Air Force has placed in the jan>
resistant secure ommmnications cal)ability afforded bv DS(;S llI satellites is that since
Decemt)er 1990, they have been the primary tncans for transmitting nfissile warning data
[iom key worldwide sensor sites Io correlation-and-command centers at (;hevenne
Mountain and elsewhere.'-'
The introduction of new heat T, meal|tun, and lighl ground terminals t)eginnmg in the
niid-1970s allowed the military to start phasing {)lit aging equipment tit-st deployed in Ihe
l¢.)t_0s and sttl)sequently modified for nse wilh I)SCS lI. Ahhough DSCS I!I continued the
practice of using terminals tiom the earlier systent, the 1980s brought new lerminals,
inchiding eighl-toot (2.4-n)eter) and twentv-foot (six-meier) anlennas t()1- the ground-
mobile forces. Meanwhile, work continued to convert dw entire s'¢stem from analog to
digital transmission by the end of the decade. The I)SCS Ill smcllile program also bene-
filet| from a munl)er of new Air F<_rcc" acquisition practices. Faced with cost overruns and
schedule slips, Air Force officials resorted m milestone billing, attd they convinced
('::regress to ap})love the practice of muhivear procurement instead of annual buys. _'
A Fragmented Management System
The tact that I)S(L',; renmined a Penlagoi>n|anaged system, with l)(_A, the Army, and
the Air Force all playing roles in its day-lo-day operation, indicated a much broader insli-
tutional problem. Based on I)oD Directive 5105.44 of 90ciol)er 1.973 and.loitH Chief,s <ff
Staff Memorandtun of Policy 178 of 17 March 1975, managenlent of hill|tars satellite coin-
mira|cations systems remained fragmented among the exit Force, Nav_;. Army, and DCA.
From the 1980s on, tile U.S. niililary wrestled with that unwieldy situation in an effort to
CilStlI'_U tllOFe (7OSt-('f_]Ci(qlt a('(|[lisitioll and more eff>ctive eml)loyment of resources
lhrough all levels of conflict. The strong tendency, however, since the earliest davs of lnil-
itary satellite c(mmumi(alions remained for each service to want its owti system. That had
been lempered F,artially dttring the 1970s bv fiscal cutbacks and congressional pressure,
W|liC|l had caused ;ill S}:S{elliS {o _)ecotile lllOFC "C¢)llllliotl riser" (lespit¢" their lioiliellt'la-
tlll'e. While technology helped achieve a higher degree of efficiency within an expanding
12. Ix'e, tli_trn)' oi tk_ l)e/e._¢, _;atdlite (,'mnm..irali.t_s g'_'stem, pp. 29-32; M;utin, ()mtmt¢mtation .gab'llitcs.
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(',<l]ol'itdll Spl ill_>,, (]().
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_iih lilt' tllltllU ill l)_l(],l_, sl?t" ;llililtlt'_ _,nl.llih' (::_lttniitttir:tlifms Ol,'/,'rJlluitil_ l. 3,:1_,¢lJfllitmx ,¢1D.llar,, Rt'I)I>II il<l
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user conmnmity (that is, the cost per capability dropped), tile increasing sophist|cat|tin ot
military satellite conlmullications still led to dralnatic price increases per satellite and
required automated tracking, telemetry, and commanding instead of the old, manual
methods. _
While the creation of the Air Force Space Command in September 1982 signaled the
Air Force's commitment to centralizing its space operations, the establishment of the U.S.
Space Command three years later clearly ofti_red an opportunity to vest managerial
responsibility tiw all military satellite communications in one organizational chain. The
translation of opportunity into reality, however, proved next to impossible. Despite various
initiatives, the 1980s brought no detinitive answers to the questions of whether the exist-
ing military satellite communications management structure should be altered and, more-
over, whether the existing acquisition alignment--that is, UHF for the Nax T, SHF for DCA,
and extremely high frequency (EHF) for the Air Force--should remain binding.'"
The fitssing, fimaing, and thmbling over military satellite communications architec-
tural arrangements and their implications continued into late 1990, with the assistant
secretary of defense for comnlaild, control, comnnmications, and intelligence finally
directing I)CA to fake the lead in deveh)ping a suitable archite.cture. That task included
considering the role of smaller and cheaper satellites, the potential fi)r the increased use
of commercial satellites, the achievement of U.S. and allied interoperability, and the pos-
sibility of cooperative eff¢)rts to reduce developnmntal and operational costs. Altn(_st
simultaneot]sly, efti)rts to develop a new nlemoranduni of +policy for military satellite com-
munications management bogged down, after the Air Force Space (_ommand complained
that the new version failed to l)lace 1)SCS executive management within the chain of com-
mand of the U.S. Space Command's conmiander in chief: it left that responsibility in the
hands of the Defense Inti)rmation Systems Agency (the successor to DCA). Systematic
1,t. l)oD 1)iret tire 51()5. t't, t} October 1973, established tit(' Military Satellite Comnnmications Svstelns
Organization within I)CA, provided li)r c(mrdination of all service and agency ef]brts, and defined further the
military r(mmmnications satellite roles of theJoinl Chief's of Stall" and assistanl secretary <)t'del_,mse fk)r tel('(om-
lllUl;ticatilItlS (later Cllilllged t(I assiStallt secr('tavy of defi'nse It)l [ ¢)lnlllall(f, COlltrol, ('olntllttllicatiollS, alld intel-
ligence), '['he first revision of Joint (;hie[k of Staff Memorandum ofPolicy 178, l May 1(.}78. spelled out DCA's,
and each service's, executive nlanagt'menl responsibilities for military sat,.qlite systems+ h contained criteria 1or
sl)e( it}'ing system intetol>erability and compalil)ility. A second revisi(m of MelllOralt(hlnl c)l Policy 178, dated 4
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efforts to restructure fractionalized military satellite communications management, with
the goal of centralizing all responsibilities under tile U.S. Space Command and its
component commands, failed. Entering the last decade of tbe twentieth centnry, the
requirements process for military satellite communications seemed bankrupt; attempts at
architectural definition bordered on the absurd; and system responsibilities reniained
split among the Air Force, Na_ 3. Army, and Delkmse Infi)rmation Systems Agency?"
The Persian Gnlf War experience of 1990-1991 made it apparent that the United
States and its allies needed a fully integrated communications package for future crises. It
could ill afford again to wait until after a crisis arose to assemble such a package.
Moreover, an optimum communications network had to emphasize tactical rather than
strategic requirements, the need for commercial satellite augmentation, and the impor-
tance of a responsive latmch capabilityY 7 In the early 1990s, Air Force planners faced that
reality, even as they focused on drastically restructuring the tronbled Milstar (Military,
Strategic, Tactical and Relay) program to trim costs and save it from cancellation.
Milstar
Milstar had emerged in the late 1970s fiom an Air Force proposal for a strategic satel-
lite system to be called STRATSAT--a fimr-satellite constellation designed solely to sup-
port nuclear ti)rces. It would avoid potential anti-satellite threats by orbiting at a so-called
supersynchronous altitude of abont 110,000 miles, and it wolfld operate in the EHF range
to provide more band width for spread-speclrum, anti:jam techniques. Considered too
ambitious f(_r so limited a mission, STRATSAT gave way to Milstar in 1981.
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Figure 15
The Mil_tar (Military, St_tte!...i_;]hetical and l_ela)) p_zg,._am_'eeived "tttghest Nali_mal /5"t_a4(,,'"statu_ it* 198_, but tt
umterwem dela),_,rede_i£_s,and costovt,rr_t_ thai a_gered a budk,et-eutti_A,(_m_gre_s.('o_eque_t(_, the ]b_t Milstar satel-
lite entered orbit in 1994, _'vet_ vear_afie_ its pr_qectedlaumh. (( _¢mrlesy of the Air F_wce Space (_ommand, Hislory
Olfice)
Air Force planners, viewing Milstar as c:apable of both strategic and tactical opera-
tions, proceeded to add numerous requirements to meet more types of missions.
President Reagan's assignment of "highest national priority" status to Mils/re" in 1983
allowed the program to proceed with few fimding restrictions. Similar to the Atlas inter-
continental ballistic missile program in the 1950s, the development of the necessary
"cutting edge" technology for Milstar and procurement, which included fielding the
infrastructure tot ils operational support, proceeded concurrently. In the case of Milstai;
untormnately, those so-called "concurrency procedures" resuhed in delays, redesigns, and
cost overruns that drew the ire of an increasingly budget-conscious Congress. '_
Initially designed to provide low-dam-rate EHF conmnmication, the eight-satellile
Milsmr c<mslcllalion offered cross-link capabilities and extensive hardening against radia-
tion. The Et tF range hacl the advantage of allowing tot the use of anlennas as small as six
18. (;overnment Accounting ()llice ((;AO), I)M) A_quidtio*_. (;ase Study o/ the AHI.ST;4R 5_ttellite
Communieati_ms .S_tem, Repot; No. N.S|AD 86.-t55-15 (Washinglon, 13(;: (;A(), '31 July 198,6): (;A(), Militar)
Satellite ('ommut_i(atiolls: Mil_tar Proloam l_sues and (;_**t-Savi*tgOpportunities, Repot! No. NSIAD-92-121
(Washington, I)(;: (;AO, 26.]unt' P._)2); Roger (;. C;uillvmclte, "Baltlcstar America: Milsmr Sun viw's A War Wilh
Congress," (;m_atdraon,N_vcmbcr-Dt'ccmber 1994, p. 22.
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inches (about fifteen centimeters) in diameter, which suited highly mobile special opera-
tions tortes. Titan IV boosters would send tour of the satellites into various polm orbits
and the other Ibm- into gcosynchrotl<)us orbits, Because the primary objective was surviv-
abilit}, not high [)eftOflllatl(e, the Milslar <lesion did not inch!de high data iates; e+t(h
satellite was to sevve no more than fifteen users sinntltaneottslv. As a resuh, it would sup-
|)lcment rather that1 replace existing satellites such as I)S(:S and Fleet Satellite
(_OtlllllUlli('3tioIIS. +''
Milstar's original strategic orientati<nl seemed ;machronistic following the end of the
Cold Way. Operation I)esert Storm durirLff the f'evsian (',ulf War reinforced interest in pro-
moting Milstar's tactical capabilities, and the pl<_gram utlderwent significant downsizing
1)ased on congressional demands :rod Pentagon reviews. By early 1994, Milstm" inclttded
six rather than eight satellites, without the vast arrow of s'urvivM)ilitv |i._atttrcs and with
ti:+wer ground control stations. The first Hock el two satellites, designated Milstar I,
let;lirled the limited-use low-data-rate ca[)al)ilily, but sul)s,rquent MilslaF satellites were to
be equil)ped with a mediun+l-data-rate package to sttpl>ort tactical l_+t-ces. ()n 7 Fel)ruarv
I(I.1.14, sel'('tl \cats alter its projected launch, the fiFSt Milstm satellite went into orbit. Tlw
Air Force anticipated the l;umch <ff the first Milstm+ II satellite in 1999, with transition to
a cheaper, lighter, advanced EttF Milstar IIl s_ttellitc t)y _()06. By the mid-1990s, despite its
eli,.clive use in t t;fitian o[)erati<nts, il was still not known whether Mils!at had the ability
to l)t+ovide sm+vivable, .janvresistant, gl<d)al comnuuficalions to meet the needs of the
national command authorities, battlefield comn_anders, and oF, evational forces through
all levels of conflict.-"'
Planning and Organizing for the Future
The escalating costs of dedicated mililavv satellite (ommunications such as Mils!at,
combined with the inability of the United States during the Persian (;ttlf War to laun<h
_tdditiomtl military conlmllllications satellites on demand, highlighted the need for using
('ivil and commercial salellites and lautl¢l+t'rs in both pe,tcctime :tnd etllelgenc)' situations.
l low to use commerci:d systems without jCOl+ardizing congr('ssi<m;d support fl>r mililarv
satellite conmumications i)rograrns remained a maj<n challenge. Moreover, the need fin-
an eflk'ctive integration of military ;rod conmwrcial networks presented yel another chal-
leng, e. The military s<ntght to save mont'y by finding alternatives to leasing individttal cot+t-
mtmications satellite circuits, which is its historic policy. Ahh<:,ugh DoD could not readily
identit\' its lotal current usage of commercial conmnufications satellites, the consolidation
of needs :rod proclnenwnt el+greater overall capacity seemed w<nthwhile. The creation <d
a privatt + military-managed network of connnevcial comnnmications satellite assets had its
pvopo,wnts, t)ui the idea tolmdcred because the gOVCl'nllltqlt could not opel_tle in
notlgoxerntnetH radio ti+equency bands. An(_lher ahernalive involved a "c(_nmwrciallv
equivalent" military satellite system that would use military radio tiequerwies and existing
terminals. Such saicllites wotdd cost less and hart(lie more traffic than satellites buih to
military specifications. They would ottbv tk'atures comnunfly f<_und abc, ard militarx
19. Imncs "W. R;twl('s. '+Mils!at S<m_s t_t'yolld Butl_t't ;rod Schedtdc (;o:tls," lh'/i'n',,; Eh,+l++mic+ 21 (Fch_ u:u",
ltJ_9): ti1_-725 (.uillelllelte. "l+;tltlt'slat Alllt'li_':l," I I. 19: I):l'+. "rl'l:ltlMklrlll_llioII OI + Nalion;d Set!!tit,, SI):/tc
l+rogtarns in the I+ost-(kdd W;tr Era," l);qlt'l read ;ll |Sth (_otL'd, rcss ol lilt' lnlcl nati,+n;d .\ntrot+aufital Fedct ation.
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[)p. 3-1: "S;II( o111s Su( (('s _,S1¢)1 )," ._']),'ltt' :_,larJerl+ | (1!)91): 11-17,.
76 (_RE,XTIN(; S_.".;'fEM,'-;: UNffl._l) _TA'I'ES AND (_AN,Xl)A .
satellites ([or example, steerahle spot-beam antennas anti secure telemetry and payload
control links) but would lack the special survivability features of military models/_
By February 1994, when the Government Accounting Office (GAOl reported on the
military's use of comtntmications satellites, it was clear that the institutional barriers to
efficient, cffective military exph)itation of commercial communications satellite capabili-
ties remained. GAO recommended "cstahlishing firm policy and procedures for
Department of I)efense components to coordinate their needs tor tbese services through
a central organization. "_2 A partial response came later in 1994 with the Pentagon's
"Commercial Satellite Communications Initiative," in which the Defense Informalion
Systems Agency set forth cost-saving concepts based on transponder leasing. DoD subse-
quently drafted a "Military Satellite Communications Master Plan," recommending that
commercial satellites be nsed extensively by the turn of the century for low-security ntis-
sions. Questions abotlt the necessity of satellite survival)ility remained, however, and all
increasingly vocal group of advocates touted the advantages of fiber optic cables over satel-
lite tecbnolo_, for meeting flmue military communications needs. Others argued that
the real point of discussion was the applitahitity of satellite and cable technolog 7 in
particular situations. Despite lingering legislative restrictions on the milita,y's use of com-
mercial systems, the Pentagon relied on commercial carriers to handle most "general
purpose" satellite traffic, which mnounted to more than 80 percent of all DoD satellite
communications requirements. That reliance undoubtedly would increase, because the
military could not afford specially designed satellites to handle the five-fold growth in
requirements expected between 19{)5 attd 2010. It still seemed appropriate to rollle criti-
cal command-and-control traffic, amounting to less than 2(1 percent of the total military
traffic, over dedicated military communications satellites.':'
It was apparenl I)y the mid-1990s that rapidly advancing communications technolog3,,
made readily available at relatively low cost by the commercial sector, offered tim inilitarv
an attractive ahernative to increasingly expensive military satellite communications svs-
telns. The greatest roadblocks lay ill traditional, service_n-iented attitndes and the linger-
ing notion that only military satellite communications could be relied on lo be available
21. IA. C()I. (_harh's F. Stirling. +'COmlnefcial (]Omlmlni(ati(m Satcllile Apptic;ttion fluting National
C2isis ."vlana.gt'inenl," blarch 1985, Air Forcc Space (]ommand, tlislory ()fl'icc Archives; (;,,st(), Mihlar_ .'_atdhle
Communications: Potential/or Greater l,_e O/ Comtm, m'a/ ,Satellite Capabihlie_, (;At) Rvpm! No. DNSLkl)-92-39
(Washington, 1)( :: (;,,st(), '2"2 May 1902). For bat kground, see (:.S. l:)t'ens, l)(;.,st, "( ;cm(Vl)l I)(:S (:ommetcial
Satellite (;tmmmnications St,,st¢,!ln," 5 .]tlllt + 1981; IIQ AF(_C/Elqq) to tlQ tTSAF/X()KCP, el rd., "DCS
(:ommcrcial Satcllilc C<mmmnicati.ns (COMSAT('+()M) Pmgl;tnl t:pdalt'," h'ltt'r, IO March 1983, with two+
altachtnt'nls; (kmmmfti;tl Salt+llitv Sutvlvabilitv Task Fort'c, ResolH('c Enhancements Working Group,
"( ;<mlmevcial Sittcllite (_ommunhations Survivalfility Rcp_)lt," 20 May 1983; Donald C. [,atham. Deputy Under
,%et+ft.tal.¢ t->[ l)elbnse li>, (_ommand, C<mtr<d. (itmmmni(ations, and Inlclligence, Io (2hairman, NSI)l)-97
Steering ('-VOUl++, "Initial Report of flit' Mana<gcr, National C<mmnmicati(ms S'¢stC/ll (NCS), on (:ommcltial
Satellite CommunitalioltS Survivability," memorandum, 21 May 19V;4. with attathmcnt; ,";I'ACEC,MI)/KRQS,
"t's(' of( ;t)llllllCl'('i:tl Salt'llitt's during National Crisis." staff StlllllllallV S]l('CI, _ NoVCIII|)CY 198.1, Air Forte Space
Command, t listovs ()fti_ c ,Xlchi',es. ["ol a spt'cilh cxamph' ot how ineltk'_ ti'+c .nanagcmt'nt h'd to Ihc intqlicicnt
IISC (If ('()l]llllCItial (Olllllllllli('alliOllS Salt'llilt'S. SVt' "Spat(, {_()llllnilll(FS (_OllllllCI'('ilt[ Satellite t_(lllllllllllit'illiOllS
l+rogram, " t+.F,. Air l:()i(c Audit A e,enCX Report, 2 Novcnfl)t.t I!183, +,kit l:orcc F,l);tte (_otnmand+ l listory Oflkc
Archives,
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with (:<mll)lete certainty during (Tises. (,iven this situation, Air Force leaders considered
Ihe lilne ripe 1o leassell their service's claitn to military space leadership--a role also sug-
gested by a nunlt)er of respected civilian analysts. As Philip (;old, director of detk'nse and
aerospace studies at the Seallle-l)ased Discovery lnstitule and a leclurer at Georgetown
15niversitv, sunnnarized the situation: "Ells'clive space control demands a revolution on
the ground, a revolution in thinking, in procedures, and in relationships." I h' wrole thal
the Air Force, with 90 petcenl of all U.S. military space assets, should be charged wilh
structttring and managing lhe overall military space program to meet tile operational
reqttircments o1 tile other services, tilt" unified co,nmands, and DoD in general. In addi-
lion, (;old recommended that the enlile relationship among military, civil, and commer-
cial space activities had to reflect that tile era of massive technological military-to-civilian
spinot]_; had passed; technological atlxalltt's ill the commercial arena (namel), the shift to
smaller, cheaper boosters and salellites) signaled the emergence of the civilianqo-militarv
"spin-on" era. Despite such en<)l'lll<)tlS obstach's as "'govel'lllllent;tl ovet--legtllillion, t]om
excessive secrecy to sltrrealistic itCCOllllling," the "[)<_lldel+otlS culture o[" weapons develo|)-
tnenl,'" and con_-erns al)oul security, {;old asserted lhat it was time Io inlegrale I]le mili-
litl'V and comtnel+cial space eflbrts. ;+
The Air Fo,-ce did take the initiative on centralizing military space requirements, of
which satellile c<lltlnluliit:ati<)lls was :.t part, t)y focusing on systems acquisition. Arguing
that multiple a<,qttisititm agencies had led to expensive, less el+fective capabilities, the Air
Force in mid-l{)94 pt<q)osed to the ()ttice ot +tilt' Secl'et:lYy (If Det>nse, its well as to tilt'
olher serviccs, that it be designated executive agent for all space acquisition. "Flit' result-
ing ttl)lOar h'fl no doubt that interserxice rivah-v over space roles and tnissi<ms continued
tO haulll the military space l)logratll. +-ksMajor <[;eneral R<+bert S. Dickman, then director
ot space programs in the ()[t]ce <_[ the Assistant NecretaYv of the Air Force tot Acquisition,
t+onmlenlt'd, '+I don't lhitik anyone anticipated Ill<.' depth of [eelings--,minn>sity may he a
more descriplive term--that was evident in tilt' service andj<_inl staff<d).jections. "+:'
:MlhouRh tilt+ Air Force initiative withered under life, it helped crystallize efforts to
provide new and efli'ctive organizati<mal changes. By the Silllllllel" _)[" 1995, DoD had cre-
ated a delmtV under +secretary o[delk'nse lot sl)ace, eslal)lished a Ioint Space Management
Board to co<_tdin,tte activitics between the ]'enlag<m and the (_enlval Intelligence Agency,
and designaled ;t l)ol) space ,trchitect. The last became responsil+le for ensltring COml)at-
ibilitv ;and stnoolh <q)el-alions ,UllOng lht' dift_.qent mililat+v and c<mnnercial s'¢stems+
:\llht')tlgh tTlled I)v an Air Force otticer, Mil+or (;enet;tl Dit'knlan, the p</sition of space
althitect remained within lilt' l)oD'sjoint SllUt'ltue.-"'
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FOlt +<'s.'' I t _,cplcIIIlICl 1¶t9,t, pl I. I<%"1-199: Dr. itdln [- Mt I,utas, "Spa,:c ]+olic'+," tlttliCl I)lC',cntt'd ;it Ih<.' _+Xlllt)l>-
siuin "l'hc tt%AF ill ,_,l:,_l(_': 11115 i_+ ih'," Tw_'llt',-Hl+q { ;,t.lilUrX," <-'1+27 S<'l)lt'inbci I¶P:ts. \%ashitit_lon. D(;. i ). 1,"4,
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Conclusion
It is still too soon to assess the impact of the latest changes in the military space orga-
nization. Man}, questions about the titture of military satellite communications remain
unanswered. Will Milstar provide effective strategic and tactical commtmications capabil-
ity? To what extent, and in what way, shtmld the Air Force rely on commercial augmenta-
tion? Is a national, combined civil and military network feasible? Or, following the
commercial sector's example, should the Air Force consider a constellation of many small,
cheap satellites distributed widely in low-Earth orbit to solve the problems of both its grow-
ing communications needs and the increasing overcrowding of the geosynchronons orbit?
Moreover; how can an}, satellite communications system, whether military, civil, or com-
mercial, be successful over time without responsive launch capability?
For more than a generation, the fragmented nature of the space community has led
to higher system costs, inefficient resource utilization, and the inability to achieve a cleat
operational (as opposed to research and development) focus for n_ilitary activities in
space. The new Pentagon organization represents a major effort to overcome these glar-
ing deficiencies and, simultaneousl,,, to accommodate the rapidly changing reqtfirements
of the 1990s. For the Air Force, the challenge is to work effectively within this joint struc-
ture it) preserve its capabilities and to provide the best possible space support to the
warrior, no matter what the color of the uniform. If successfifl, the Air Force not only will
preserve its leadership role in space, but it will contribute to ensuring a satellite comnm-
nications architectnre that meets the military challenges of the twenty-first century.
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Chapter 8
Thirty Years of Space
Communications Research and
Development at Lincoln Laboratory'
by William W. Ward and Franklin W. Floyd
Today, we take tor granted the availability ofglolml high-capacity conununications cir-
cuits. Satellites and cables bring us information and ellleltainnleill froln almost anywhere.
It was not always l|ais way. In file mid-1950s, for example, transatlantic communications
relied on several wletype cables, a few dozen voice chamlels via cables equipped wifll vac-
Imm-mbe repeaters, high-liequency radio (roughly lhree to thirly megahertz), and tile
physical transport of messages by plane or ship. The rest of the world was not even thai
well equipped.
The high-fiequency medium always has challenged communications engineers.
Under favorable conditions, it provides global point-to-point communications by using
relatively small, low-power |tans|hilling and receiving equil)nmnl. However, nawral phe-
nom('na often inlerti're with high-tiequency links, and during war ("cold" or "lint"), they
become targets lot jamming. Nevertheless, high frequency was the only game in lown in
the 1950s. As a result, conmmnications for the command and control of U.S, stralegic
totces worldwide weie lacking.
The goal of the Sl)aCe coilltntlnicalions program of IJncoln I_aboratorv at tilt*
Massat'husells Institute ofTe('hnolog_, (MIT) was and remains the developnleni of reliable,
alfT)rdable sVMelIIS Of nlililarv c()lllllllllli(;tliollS. The pl'ogralll'S initial otwciive simply was
it) Iliake ]oi-ig-l-allge lllilital'y ('()lnlllllllicaliOllS l'Olltilleiy available--firsl for large, fixed ter-
nlinals and liwn ti)r ,'.;lllall, lllol)ile olles. After Ill;it objeciive was reached, tilt" enlpiiasis
shified ioward illakillg coiiiiiiUlli(alions s'¢slenls capalr)h, of ti.lnClioning, (lespile the iliosl
deleiniined eftorls by an advelsarv io inierfei_e with ihenl byjanuning or by ph) sical allack.
Project West Ford
The inunediale inlpetus tor 1Ancoln I,aborators's first work in space conlnninicalions
canle fiolli the HARDK\(]K serit_s of high-ahiludc llilClCai icsls carried otil in the Pacilic
()(can ll('all" ]o|lnslon Islalld ill August 1{)58. The firsl detonation deslroyed l]le ionos-
pht'l'c ovcI- a vast __tI-C;l;ll'Olllld the lest site and illterrupled illitny higii-frequency radio
(Ollliiltliii(alioils links, I)t'lailSe high-frequency radio sigilals travel I)y retieciing ott ihc
1. Th(' unal)ridgcd _crsion of lilis l)apcr originally appeared its Williain W. _,Vald and Franklin W,
Pll)'_d. "l'hirtv xt{'al s ()|Rt'_,t-;ilch alld l)(,vtqOplllCill in _lla(c (;Oliilnllnirali(lllS al I,ill('oln ].a|)olalorv," 7De l,imol.
l.(IDOl'tllOl']:./OItlllH[ _(1) (19_19): 3-34. Tile ;llll]l()lS ;ll'(' indt'l)lvd Io lll;lliv pc()plc insidc ;lild outside I iil(ohl
l.al)olalol "¢ Ibl lilt'it ;issislan(c in lilt' plcparaliotl of Ihis IIiM()I x o| kin(ohl [,al)ol alOl_,'s spat(" ('()lllllllllli('itli()ll _,
plO_lalll alld tllt' I)l()lld It) ha'el, had die opporiuniiy 1o ctlroniclc their _l((olliplishlllCills. The ;llllhlilS cspcci;ll-
I) m kiloWlCdg(' iIR' [.ill(()lil I ;lt)(nah)l_. IJ|)lar',--alld lhc Arcllivcs I)cllaIInlclll in ilarli( ul;u ,
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lower surface of the ionosphere. In particular, the loss of high-frequency radio halted
conunercial transpacific air transport. The military implications of a high-ti-equency radio
communications failure at a critical time were obvious.
Walter Morrow, at I+incoln Laboratory, and t larold Meyer, then with TRW, considered
the prohlem of high-frequency radio communications failures during the Army's Project
Barnstable Summer Study in 1958. They suggested that if natural phenomena, such as
solar storms, or thermonuclear detonations disabled the ionosphere as a radio reflector,
tlmn an orbiting artificial rellector could replace the ionosphere. Just prior to this, both
tl_e Soviet Union and the United States had demonstrated tile ability to place satellites ill
orl)it, s() the idea seemed feasihle.
Morrow and Meyer proposed creating an artiticial ionosphere consisting of a pair of
bchs (one circular polar and one circular equatorial) of resonant scatterers in orbit a few
thousand kilometers above the Earth's surI]tce. The scatterers in each belt would be con-
ducting lengths of wire that would resonate at the system's operating wavelength and
therefore reflect radio signals--the smaller tile wires, the shtlrter the wavelength, and the
easier their distribution flonl an orbiting dispenser. If the wires were too small, designing
adeqtlate transmitters an(t receivers would become excessively ditlicult.
Subsequently, Lincoln l.aboratory proposed an experiment In demonstrate transcon-
tinental communications by sending thll-duplex (thal is, simultaneously in both direc-
tions) mmsmissions t)etween terminals in Camp Parks, Caliti)rnia, and Wesfford,
Massachusetts. The orbiting wires would act as half wave dipoles and resonate at about
eight gigahertz; comnmnications would be transmitted at 7,750 and 8,350 megahertz.
Each scatterer would he a 0.7-inch (ahout 1.8-CelHimcter) length of #53 AW(, copper wire
(0.0007 inch, or about 0.0018 centiineters, in (liameter). The experiment required thai
about 480 million of Ulese lorry-microgram dipoles (nineteen kih)grams of copper total)
be distributed into circtdar polar orhits at an altitude of abtml 3,600 kiltmwters. The aver-
age separation between (til)olcs woul(1 be roughly 0.3 kilometer.
Recognizing tirol a proposal to l)lace wlsl nmnhers of anything in orhit woul(I be con-
troversial, I+incoln Lahoratory designed the proposed experiment, Project West Ford, to
ensure that the experimental hch would not endure. The pressure of incident solar radi-
ation on tile orl)iting (lip,,les w(ml(l change their orbits, so that the perigee of each revo-
lution woul(t move swadily downward. Bctore long, the orbits woul(l start to (lip into the
dun upper atmosphere, and atmospheric resistance woul(t sh)w the dipoles enougll thal
they would tMI to the gronn(l. Thus the beh would he removed from orbit within a tk'w
years after l_nltlch.-'
l.incoln l+ahoratory unveiled Project West For(t in 1960 in virtttally complete (telail,
even though tile planned experiment was originally secret. It was i)arti(vlarly important
It, alia) the con(erlls of o[)tical and radio astronomers anti other scientists who perceived
the experimental belt as potentially harmfltl, causing interference with scientiti(" observa-
tions an(t auguring worse exl)eriments to come. _ The experiment originally hore the
name Pmjecl Needles, and renaming it Project West Ford (lid little to still tll(, clamor ti+om
both si(tes of the hon (;m-lain.' Uhimawly, reason ])revailed, an(I l)residential approval was
given for Project West For(1 laun(:lws, although limite(l to the bare minimmn.
2. For backglotmd ,m the F,r,,gram, st',+' "l'r_jcct Wrst F<n(I" in (#m+pe_Mium .] Commu.ication a_+d
Hnuulrast ,'_atellite+, 1()5,_ tiJ IqNO (New Y(Jrk: [nstilulc i)[ Hc(lri_ and t'_h+t'lrlJnit' l'_tlgillCCls (II';EE), 19811, l)p.
299-302; l)<mald I|. Martin, "Veest Ford," in (.7,mmunicaliou Satellite_ 1959-1988 (El Scgun(h>, (]:\: Acrosl)a(c
(;,,rl)<,lali,m, 1988), pp. 8-9.
?;. "['+l¢!]cct West Ford Issue." l'm..,,di,+_:s ,It/: I1(1+;1'+52 ( 19fi4): ,l.lg-liOlk
t. Prtr l+,r, kmalm, I(+r+-llx+lerl+_a.d th+' l)'+hm+]Jhobe+ (B, mMcr, C(): (;olcm Pr,++'-,s.1973h pp. 91-92.
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On 21 October 1961, tile first expmiment was launched, piggybacked on another pay-
load, into circular polar orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base, but it was unsuccessful;
the dipoles ta.iled to deploy. Then, on 8 May 1963, a second launch with an improved dis-
pensing arrangement achieved a substantial degree of success. Tim beh formed and
closed over a period of about fi>rty dws. Its estimated density was five dipoles pc, cubic
kilometer. The effectiveness of the scatterers p,oved greater in the earl), stages of belt for-
marion, when the <tipoles were less spread out, and permitted comnmnication data rates
of up to 20,000 lilts per second. As the months and ),ears passed, the belt became less
effective for scatter communications--tcstim{my that it was indeed cleaning itself out of
orbit. By early 1966, the removal process was essentially complete)
Project West Ford was an undeniable success, but it had little impact in terlns of oper-
ational employment. Communication via passive satellites, such as the West Ford dipoles,
required users to make large investments in complex terminals and provided only limited
capaI)ilities. The success of active c<>mmunicatitms satellites, beginning witb AT&T's
Telstar 1 in 1962, swept the field. Now and then, though, the vulnerability of convention-
al satellite communications to radio-frequency interference, whether intentional or not,
is brought forcibly to everyone's attention. Furthermore, most satellites in orbit are flag-
lie and thus vulnerable to physical attack. Thercfi)re, Lincoln l.aboratorv has focused its
work in active-satellite space communications on the development of robust systems that
function reliably in the face of formidable levels of interference, tfowevcl, the lesson of
Project West Ford--that point-to-point scal|er communications at limited ttala rales {'all
be extremely survivable--should not be forgotten.
Space Communications at Superhigh Frequency
Folh)wing Project West Ford, IAncoln l+aboratory embarked on a program to improve
the design of active satellites. In most cases, the downlink signal (from a satellite to a sur-
face terminal) is tim "weak link" in satellite communications. An uplink can be strength-
ened by increasing the power of a sm'thce lransllliller. 111 Colllrasl, a satellite downlink
Hi{Is{ be strengthened by accomplishing a more tlifficult task: the maximization of the
eft>ctive isotopically radiated power per unit mass in orbit. To address this downlink prot}-
lem, I_incoln I.al)oratory set out to develop bigl>efficiency spacecraft transmitters in the
downlink frequency band. hnproved antennas offered an additional benefit. If the space-
craft attitude-control system linked to a high-gain spacecraft antenna could positiOll the
antenna within the required beam-pointing range, both downlinks and uplinks would
benetit. A series of l.incoln Experimental Satellites (LES) launched between 1{.t65 and
197B addressed these and other spacecraf*-related technological questions,
High-efticiency systems of modulation and demodulation, together with recent
advances in encoding and decoding signals for detection and correctitm of errors.
1)romisett significant advantages for communications terminals. Also needed were inter-
t_.'rence-resistant, muhiple-access signaling techniques that permitted the simultaileous
use of a satellite by tens or hundreds of users, some of them mobile, without involving
elab{nate systems for synchrt}nizati{m and {:entralized control. These and other terminal-
rclatc{l 1}roblems were a{ldresse(t by a series of I.incoln Experimental Terminals (I_ET)
that W{qll hand in hand with the IJ(S.
5. h_in I. ShalmO, "last ,_ldw _,_,'¢.slt,_nd I)il_¢,h,s," _,_t_,,r,15t (19661: I It5.
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Figure 16
1,incoh* Lahm_ltm_v la u*_hed lJ','3; 1 in 196 5. Compelling the _elettum r_[ the _atellite'_ /requem_, tm_M wa_ the availability,. _!/
_perhi£.h-/}v.quen_, techmdoL_, d_v,eloped fi)) h_qec/ IVe_t Fowl taA_, htumm a_ lS.]e,'t _\),edh._) an a/tempi t_ e_tabli_h l'am-
prmg mihtary communicatio_s_ vm . harm _j ,nb_tip_g dtp#h'_. ((_ourt(,s 7, ,)I 15ncoln l.al)orators, photo no. ('P202-7(i)
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l.im<)h) l.al)oratory's space commtmi(adons program atter Project Wesl Ig,-d began in
19B3 will) a ohmfor to build and dcmonsli,atc mililary space commumicalioi,)s systems." The
inilial progrii,m ol)iecfivc was Io Mfild, laulwh, lind ticld it, I.ES and a I,EF that woi,,ld work
Iogcthrr as a syslcm and drmonslrat{, pri_clical mililary satcllilc comi,uuHfications. Thr avail-
abililv of Pr<!jecl W('sl Ford's adva)lcrd si,zzlWrhigh,-ti{'qli,ri,)cy (SHF) Icclmology (al srvrH 1o
righl gigahcrtz) conlribulcd to fit{" drcision Io drsigl) LES-1 and LET-1 |br lhk:tl ])_)l)d. The
Del)azz-lmci,_{ of D('l_,'i,ise's {:oi,)ci,i,i,Tcnl [)i,o(Izr('m{'zz)I o[" a sci,'ics of ,St IF salcl]ilcs at)d termi-
nals, {olml)cl)cing wilh the hnilial I)rf(,nsr (2tram)mica)ions Salellilr Program (II}(:SP), _
|,)wan) I/)a_ /{'sso)zs/eai,ncd from I.E_I rand I.E'I:I w<)uld find an ad(liIi(}zz)al ai)p/icafioi,L
1.E_I, l;ui,i,)(h{.d fi-(}m {;al}C Canav{'ral ()n l l Frl)ruary 1965, a{{oi,nl}lishc(I ()nlv a ti_'w
of its ob, j{'(tiv('s. ,-\ppai,'{'i,)tl_ _bc(ii,i,i,s{" of mi,swirii,i,g <)f Ihr (}rdnatw{" (ir(i,zzitr_', lhc sl)tclli/{.
ncv{'nn Icfl {ii,-{ular orb|! and {:cased li,al]Snlilling iin 11.}(_7. I.E.%2, l]]c IWil] of I.ES-1, _ t;u{'d
i)zi,l(]) ]}{,111'i,; J| ii,(:|licvcd iI.s t)Iamwd thi,al {)i,bil ()I1 (_ 1_,|_))' 11.}(}.5.TIlt' Ol}('ralioH with
1.ET-I" wan stt({{'ssful and {oi,mn{'i,w('d lhr m()ri,fing afl{w lauunch.
Th{. )i,{:xl st{"I} izz)Lincoln I,ab<}zzalo)y',s l}i,()gram it,i,si}ac{" comr)Hnficali<}n.,_ was I() park
a salt'|lit{" in gcosyi,)(:luoi,]oi,i,s orbit. I,ES-4 wits I)i,i,ilt 1(} lidfill )hat miss|o)]. Th{' salt,flit{, was
at) ()i,ngi,owIh, ()f IJ'2S-I azz)d -2, l)i,ll i1 ,r(?ii,II,i,r('(l I)i,<))(' s<)l_li, {{Ills and a larg{'r array of Si,zz!n
ml(l Emlh st.|,)sots.'" I.ES-4 {iui,icd ml inslri,i,m{'nt tot mci)sluninff, Sl}alial and I{'Hli}()xxa] vari-
ali(}zi,.,_(}f lh(- rn{'i,g_' Sl}CClzzzzi,mof lrapp{'d {'/{'(Iroi,)s e)){:ountri,'ed in oFbi]. This ii,)MI'I,I,I,)I,CI,)I
w;_s a{l(t{'d 1() i}r()vi(h • int()i,i,]|_tti(}i,/ t)()l]i, t()l s{:icnlif]c intvi,-c.st and 1o aid i]){" (l{'sigi,l of
|]I,IH){" .spa({'{i,atL
A Tium Ili{: b()oslei, was to ('ii,i,Ty LES-4 and ils (Oral)ant(}|,), 1.ES-3 (d{.scrib{'d in lh{'
ilCXl ._,{'(|i(}lI), Io _.Alt{';II'--g{'oS):tlc|lFollol.l,(,; ,_i,]li|ti,d{" ii,II(I deposit thc))) ill ('ii,'clll_i,l', lit'it,i,2
r(tu, aloi,-ial ()i,-bils. Unfol'ttli,li)l{'ly, 1|11' |}OI,)SI{'I"|ail{'(l t{) thnish itsj{)b, le;)','il)g, lh{'s{? sal{.llitvs
stra))(h'(l it,) i];){'ir I)ansfcr eHipsrs. This disal}l}oizz)_))i,r)]), h{>wcv{'); had ils |}rig|)! sid{'.
I,E_4"s I,ct)eatc{t tFii}s t)ctwc{.nn) i){wig{-{_ (11,15 kil()mcl('rs) i)J)(I apogee (33,7(}0 ki]om(_.l{q-s)
gave i1 n)m]y opportzzzzz)itics Io m{'ii,szi,re I]){" ri_(IiaIi{m (..))viFoi,llllPllI ()v('i, bl W]{I{" I,'_ti,)g{" ()t
idlil)l(l{!s. _ Also, its (:oi,lli,IlUli,liciHi()i,ls ,_.",M{'II,I,s{,{,i,ll{,d to l}{, workhlg its w{.ll as it (ould I,i,1)(Ici,-
the ]i,a)){lMi,p of ])cing izz)lh{' wi,(}tzzg or])il, l/]ti))litt('ly, as wit}) the W{'st Foi,d {lipol{'.s, 111c
l}i,{'ssm{ ' (}f solar radiation (au, s{'d the p{'rig{'{' ()f I.ES-4's oi,'bil t() {tcscri,){l into lhc uq}t){'i,
aIzni),sp}i,{')e, ai,)d il burm'd u[).
l,i,i,i,oh) l.al)()ral(}i,2v's a(('on|[}lishm{.i,)ls in St tF space {'oxxmnuni{ations Ol}Cned up a
pii,ll ()] lh{ ) {']('{lF()iii,_-i,gI){-[]c 81){'CIFzzll)) lh;i,l I,-(')ii,;i,ills |)('_lviIy I,i,sud t()d;i,)', lit fa(l, su('(eedi))g
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F,l)in-St;d)ili/('(I N{'a)-S','t'wh) onou'., Sal{'llit{'.'" ll'J".l'. "l?a._mti,,._ ,m :tnt_'_.a_ and l')opa_ation AP-I 7 (l!)(;!)): t?,5-12,
I I. ,\I;))) (;. S_m]h._. a))d/(.:.) I.. Rx:u). Cha,_.wd P,.I,iH_, l_.dia/i,m 12"m,i_..mr_t in .";_.dm,m,._ (hhit. I.in('oh_
l.ah());_t(,)v T{'( Imi{al R,.'l)O)I I I_>) {l.('x(n_gt())L MA: I.iu_(()h) I.,d)()ual()).,. I:') Mav 19(i_), 11]I(2 #AI)-(i772,_ I.
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generations of SHF satellites now form the space segment of the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DS(',S).
Space Communications at Ultrahigh Frequency
Although LES-1, -2, and -4 showed tile capabilities of SHF ibr reliable communica-
tions between fairly massive terminals, these technologies were not immediately available
to small tactical units, such as vehicles, ships, aircraft, and specialized ground troops, all
of which needed direct, dependahle communications. Only a large command-post air-
plane or a sizable ship could be equipped with an SHF terminal capable of working with
the DSCS satellites in orbit or those planned for the immediate future.
Moreover, because high levels of SHF radio power could not be generated in the satel-
lites, the downlink continued to limit system performance. Each terminal's antenna aper-
ture had to be large enough to capture the downlink signal, and the price paid for a large
antenna aperture was a nmTow antenna beam that had to be pointed directly toward the
satellite. Small tactical units, especially those in motion, could not accommodate such an
antellna systelll.
Communications links at much lower frequencies in the military UHF (ultrahigh-
frequency) hand (225 to 400 megahertz) solved the downlink problem. Solid-state circuits
could generate substantial amounts of UttF power in a satellite. '_ A relatively uncompli-
caled low-gain terminal antenna could provide a broad heam, thereby simplifying the task
of pointing an antenna in the direction of the satellite, as well as a sizable aperture. Such
antei/nas were particularly appealing for aircraftY + UHF terminals also promised to be
comparatively simple and inexpensive, and they could be produced in large numbers.
The feasihility of satellite communications at longer wavelengths was demonstrated at
\TIF by Hughes Aircraft Company on 8 May 1964. The company used teletype-rate si D
haling (60 words per minute) through the Syncom 2 satellite from one ground terminal
to another nearby. _' On 27 January 1965, teletype-rate satellite communication to and
from an airplane in tlighl was demonstrated by using the Syncom 3 satellite, operating in
the same mode its Syn(:Otll _, and a ground terminal at Camp Parks, California. '_ NASA's
AT_I satellite, htt, nched in l)ecemher 1966, also participated in experiments of Otis sort.
In 1965, the Departmen! of Defense established Tri-Service Program 5{11 (Tactical
Satellite (_ommunications) to enable the Army, Na W, an(t Air Force to evaluate the [)olen-
tial usefuhless of satellite communications in the military UI tF t)and. IAncoln l.aborat()ry
was chosen to provide the satellites essential to the lest program. LE_5 was to I)e buih and
launched as soon as possible; LES-6 would incorporate improvements on LES-5 and wot|ld
be latmched a year later. The three military services would procure test terminals that
would work with I+ES-5 and -6 and would re'range tbr their installation in ships and aircraft.
12. l)avid M. Nni(l<'t, "A l'hcorctical Analysis an<l Experimental Conlirmation ot the ()ptimally Loaded
aim Ovt'r-Drivvn RF Power Amplilivr," llq'J+; Tran+aclioP+s ou 1,2h,cl**m Devices El)-14 (191i7): 851-57: Alvise Braga-
Ilia and David M. Sni<h'v. "Tr;msmint'd-I',m'cr Maxilnizalion in Communicati<m Sau41ilcs,".Jmunal +_/Spac+'crafi
and Ilmhet_ 6 ( lt.tBg): 173-77.
12]. (:.\. [Jndbclg, "A Shallow-Cavity [Jill: Crossed-Slol mlllUllll;i," 11:7¢E I}ansaHirm_ on Antennas and
Prupagalhm AP-I 7 ( 1(,tt591: 558-(i3.
14. I,A. (hccnbaum and R.A. 1),oucher, "VIIF Teletype l)cmoiNrations," ]lughcs Aircrali Co., Re1.
22311.3/[52 (23Jmm 196,t), NASA-(_R-57.(18(.) (conltaclor's report).
15. Allen l...]()Imson, "Two I Iund_ed 31-;u's o1Airl)ot m, (:ommunications," Aen,_pace llisto6an 31 ( 1984):
185-!13: Vltt"Ai_,)a/t Satellite lCda)'--Final I¢,,,pmt o[l"hffht I'e_t, Rel)ml N¢). 181-1016-958 (l_ahimot(.: l_,cndix Radio
Division, Al)ril 19(i51.
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I,in{:oln Lal}oratory carried out two |}r<)grams to measure the characteristics of the
UHF environment. In the tirst program, receiving equipment was instalh, d in aircraft and
flown over representative cities and varied terrains, and the ambient radio noise was
measttred. I'; In Ihe second program, ])rOl}agation phenomena between satellites and air-
borne terminals were examined. For this second program, I+E_3 was buih in haste, using
lechnoh}g_' ti{}m I+ES-1,-2, and -4, and was launthed along wifll I+E_4 on 21 l}eccmbt'r
1965.
LES-3 _:was essentially an orbiting signal generator, emitting a signal near 233 mega-
hertz. [_ {;ivcn the degree of smoothness {1t the planel's surface relative t{} file one-nl{'lt'r
waveh!ngth of 300 megahertz (the midtlh" of th{" military UItF I}an(I), much of its surtacc
is nlirrorlik{'. As a rt'sull, ch.{+trtmla.gn{'li{' waves could 1}c 1}ropagatt'd I}(.tw{'cn lilt' sal{'llil{'
and Ih{" airl}ornc terminal 1}v mot{? than one l}alh. By knowing lilt' likely t}aramt'lers {}t
tile signal delays, the {'{}n]muni{:ali{ms svsl{'m {h'sign{'rs w{'re ;till{" t{} {{mstru{t ino{tulalion
and {h.nl{}{hdati{m circuhs thai w{}uld not b{" {{}nl6und{'d Iiv muhit}ath-|}r{}t)agali{}n
{'ff{'cls.
As m{'ntionc{l, l){}osl{_r i}r{}l}Iems lral)ped I.ES-3 and I+ES-4 in trans[{q- ellil)sCs, inst{'a{I
{)t c{]uat{}rial nca>gcosynchr{mous {}rt}ils. The a{tual orl/il of I_E_3 did f}{'rmit th{" galh-
{rring of muhii)ath-pr(}pagali<m data over a wi{h" varit'ty of terrains, and it gay{" lilt" lJnitoln
1.al}{}lal{}rv If'st [c;itllit ;it lC;:lS{}ll |{} t]y I{) cxolic d{.slinations l{} r{'{'t'iv{' I+ES-3 signals r{'tl{'cl-
{'{I l/v r{:l)r{:s{'ntaliv{" typt's ()I terrain. As with I,ES-4, I,ES-3 uhimat{'ly rc{'nl{'rt'd lh{" allllOs-
l)hct2{ • and (lisintcgratcd. [+ES-5, laun('hcd {m 1 .]uly 1{.)67, and I+ES-6, humt'hcd (m 26
S(?l}u:mt}{.r 1{.}68, shared ;it sir<rag tanlily r{.s{ulll)lan{'{'.'" To sum ut}, sat('llit{' conununica-
lions in lhc mililarv UIIF tland worked well. Th{" ui-s{'rvi{{' lermin;ds al)oa,-d aircraft an(I
ships and in [h{' field communi(at{'d readily Ihrough the orbiting I.ES-5.-"'
I_ES-6 and Ill{! [ Iugh{'s-btfilt U I tF/SfIF T\{ 2S£F' (laun{h{'d 9 Fcl}vumy 196{.)) p]ac{'d
sul}slantial {ommuni{ali{WIs r{:S{}ln-{{'s in gt.{}slati<)nar.v ortlit, and Ih{" l){'parlvntull of
I}etens{" I}r{>{'ur{'d large quantities {)f [!I tF l{'rminals. B{.{ausc m{}r{" than two salcllitt's
w{'r{' n{'{'dt'd for worldwi(lc covcrag{', a s{.vi{'s {}f s;m'llitcs, inch,di,lg {,al)filler
16. { ;{'(,ug{' Pltnt_,sios. "EIc{ Ir{mm_tlcti{ N{}int' Envhtmnncnl iH flu" 21t0 M11z t{) tOt) M1 lz Band {m B{}ard
,\il {l all,'" I}_.rt'r:tiRg:_ .[ IJt_' IEEI'] 51 ( 1!966}: 2017-1 !}: ( ;c,}ngc Ph}u_.sios, "{ lib N<}is{' and Its l'2tli'{t UlUm Aitb<}rnc
AnlCnlm N{}is{' T{'i1q>ct attl_{'s at I'l ll-\'" llq'.'L +l)a._arli..s o. ,-t.-+'?JV.':ue aml l,+h,H.,.ir M'_t+'m_ \ES-I (I 9{:,8): I I-'}I:
(;{.{}rRc t'h}ussic+s+ .\'.i+. ?;,m/w_atmr_ .] .ti_bo_+: AIIh:llPPas fll [711', [.Hl{'{+hl l.ab<}tat{,tx h.{hnhal N{>lc 19(:,6-3!1
{Lt.xinRt{m. MA: IAm oltl l+ah{}lat{_l ',, 6 l}{'({'in}}{'l 1966}. I)11(2 #,,\1}-(_-t-t8_!}.
17. Shcl man, Ma{l.{'lhm, I_{q rim, aim Wal(h<m. "IAncohl Expcrimt'nml S;m'llitt' Ihogt aln (IA(S-I, -2. -3.
-t12 "I,ES 3" m C.mpe.dium .! (+.mmu.iueli.. a.d Ib.ad_a_t ._;atellit,_s, pp. 179-81.
IS. K{'nm'th I...l{,rdan, B. "Mcastucm{'nl {,I b.hlhipalh Ettbcls in a Salcllitc'.\iHratl t_ttF I,mk."
I'm.'edi.g_ rg th_ I1'.1"/1¢.'53 ( 1967 ): 1 I 17- I S
19. Willimn V',:. B.'at{I ;ul(l Bult 1'2. Ni{ h{ds. I.im.I. I:'vl,v_im,'.lal ,gat,.llit_' 5 (I,l'2S 3) 7}r_.vm.d+'_ I'crfl. ma.,,
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EXl>Ct m+{.ntal Nalt'llilt's 3 and {i," i11 Nathmfi{'I E, t"cldman and (ihalh's M. K{'lb,, cds.. l'_+J¢.,_+'++i*+ A+tr+,.auli¢+ a.d
.D'_o.a.ti,_, \_}1, 26, (£omm,,ir_mm_ gatdlitc_ p. th, N;,,'.lic_: )n'_t_'m_ {(_;unl}tidR{'. M,\: MII t'r{'ss. 1971}.
t)i ). 375-!}S; "1.1'2S-3" and "1.1CS-6" m (.',m_pendi_*m O  (:ommu.i_ati.. a.d B._ad_rt_l 5al,'llit+_, pI }. 187-93: William 1.
Bla{k, Iha(lto+d lh}wlannd, and l+2(t_;tt{l A. \:lablik, "'kn I(h,{ll_}lmtgn{'li{ :\ttiludc-{:{}nlt{}l Nxnt{.iH 1{}1 ;I
SVlttln{nt<nls Sal{,llilc." /.n*Pta! o/.'Vsa.,++a/l ++_+rl/¢+./,'el+ 1; t 19{;9}: 7!}.-}-9_: Milton 1.. Rt,nt.t+thal. \lark 1'2 l}{.xanc.
;rod lh'_ mud 1:. l=tlhtRv, "'V111 +` .\lllt'llllil S_.slt'lllS t{)1 Si}m-Stal}ili:{,d Satt.llit{,s," ILI£1. I}a**_a+lio,_ o. t.lv,,a_ a_+d
I'_,q_aR*_*i+,, .\P-17 (1{.16!}): +tt'.';-51.
2<). It,:,h+ I+. l.ch,:++,, Kcnlu'th I.. ]otd;ut, .]L. ;rod Paul R. I)t<}uilh{'t, ]_., "Sat,.'llitc (:_>mlmmi{afi{}iP. _{}
M_}l}ih' I'lattb_ ms." ]'m++,+'dHP_:_ ./Ihr IEH, 7}!) {1 !17]): 12+!}-7>!}.
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(MAR1SAT)f +'FEFSAT (U.S. Mr Force satellite commtmications), _:+and LEASATy 4 were
launched. A new series, UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites, is now under development. Use
of the UHF spectrum for military satellite communications is by no means limited to the
Pentagon. The Soviet Union has announced a series of Volna ("Wave") satellites that
incorporate UHF uplinks and downlinks, _ and the United Kingdom has included UHF
provisions in its series of Skynet 4 satellites, the first of which was launched on
10 December 19882 '_Ahhough it is very difficult to defend a communications satellite with
a UHF uplink against a determined jamming attack, the relative simplicity and compara-
tive cheapness of UHF military satellite communications terminals make this part of the
spectrum highly attractive, and it is likely to remain in use for a hmg time.
Multiple-Beam Antennas
LES-I, -2, and -4 showed that the SHF hand could provide reliable communications
within certain limitations. The antenna systems on these satellites were small in terms of
wavelength, and their beams were inllch larger than Earth coverage (which is about 18
degrees from synchronous ahitude). The next level of sophistication in SHF space com-
munications was a satellite antenna system with a mechanically pointable, less-than-Earth-
coverage bealn. This adwmcement was achieved through the governmental procurement
of conmmnications satellites, such as the second generation of the DSCS satellites (the
TRW DSCS II series).:'7 Lincoln Lahoratory undertook the task of developing and demon-
strating, in orbit, an antenna system that could allow satellite operators to aim the mms-
mitting (downlink) power to receivers and simultaneously reduce the receiving (uplink)
sensitivity in directions that might include sources ofjamnting or other interference.
Such an antenna system can be bttilt in two ways. In the phased-array approach, many
separate transmit and/or receive modules (each of which has a beam width much larger
than Earth coverage) are controlled individually in amplitude and phase, so that the sum
of their signals--a resuh of constructive and destructive interference--approximates the
desired transmitting or receiving antenna pattern covering the Earth. In the multiple-
heam-antenna approach, many separate antenna ti+eds form a dense set of narrow pencil
beams covering the Earth. The signals from this collection ofheams are at!justed in antpli-
tude and phase ("weighted") and combined to approximate the desired antenna pattern.
Each approach has its merits and shortcomings, and the appropriate choice depends on
the application.
Lincoln Laboratory began a program to demonstrate, in orhit, a nineteen-heam (mul-
tiple-beam) antemaa tot reception at SHE An Earth-coverage horn was to he used for the
transmission. Tim thirty-inch-diameter (seventy-six-centimeter-diameter) aperture of the
receiving antenna yielded a noininal three-degree resolution throughout the cone sub-
tended hy the Earth tiom geosynchronous-satellite altitude. The ground control terminal
22. "MARIS.AT" in Comp,,ndium olCommunication and Broadcast Satellites. pp. 51-53; Martin, "_Ak'st Ford,"
p. S,t.
23, "FI?I'SATC()M" in Compendium ¢_]Communication and Broadra_t Satellites. pp. 15t)-61; Martin, "West
Ford," pp. 87-90.
24. "I+EASAT" in Compendium o[ Communication and Btvadca._l Satellites, pp. [71-73; Marlin, "Wes! Ford,"
pp. 93-95.
25. "Volmt 1 through 7 Series" in Compendium ¢![ Communication and Btvachast Satellites, p]3. g7-Sq; Martin,
"West Ford," pp. 104-O5.
26. "Skvnel-4" in Mariiu, "West Ford," F" 95.
27. "DS(]_II" in C, mpeudium r![ Communication and Broadcast Satellites, pp. 1.51-53; Mm+liu, "Wesl Ford."
pp. 80-82.
[_EY(INI) TIlE I()N()S.I'ttERF _+7
was to calcttlatt" the weights for the individual beams to approximate tile desired antenna
pattern and tt) translni[ the weights to tht" satellite hs teh'command.
The mtthiple-heam antenna, which was kept lacing the Earth by the altilude ctmtrol
system, dominated the configuration of I+E_7. Solar cell arrays followed the Sun it)
collect energ,3/;is I+ES-7 revolved in orbit. Work got under way to cteveh)p tile satellite hits,
which consisted of structure and hottsekeeping systems, power, propulsion, auitude con-
trol, thinreal conlr()l, telemetry, and telecommand, in parallel with the developmenl of
file muhil)le-heanl antenna and associated c<mlnmnications systems. -'_
By early 1970, it became apparent thai I.E_7 was ahead of its time. Becaltse there was
not etlougi_ Pentagon suppt)rt tot the mission, Ihe funding required for the satellile's
development, humch, and evahlation in orbil was not available. Wilh considerable regrel,
Ifincoln l+al)oratory put aside the I+ES-7 tlighl program, hut il developed tile critical mul-
tiple-he;m-antenna techntflog-y "on tile bench" and at an antenna ttrsl lallge.-'<' Ill time, tilt"
muhil)le-t)eam-anlenna concept was applied to the third generation of the DSCS satellites.
Each General Eleclric-huih DSCS Ilk carries lhree muhiple-1)eam antennas: two nineteen-
heam S! IF itl1'lellll:tS (()1 transmission and one sixty-one-be;hi SHF antenna for reception.
Space Communications at Extremely High Frequency
l+incoln I.al)maloty developed and buih lot the Department t)t Defense a pair of
ext)crimental <-ommunicatitms satelliles, I,ES-8 and -9, designed to operate in coplanar,
inclined, circular, get)synchronous orbits an<t to ctmlmtmicate with each other via inter-
satellite links (cross-links), as well as wilt<` fixed and mol)ilc terminals. _'' U1)links, down-
links, and intersatcllite links at extremely high frequency (EL IF) augmented tile nlilitary
UHF hand. The EHF hand held <.i,111 tile promise of almndant hand width It) acctmlmt)-
([_t[<. _ III_III+V Sillltlh;llle()llS llseFs ;lid sprt'ad-spectltm<` svslems of m()dtl]ati()n and detllOdtl-
lati<m for anti-jamming commtmications links. For reasons of convenience, ol_eIathlg fre-
quencies in the Ka-hand (thirty-six t() thirty-eight gig;hertz) were selected.
lntersatellite links in tile range of [ifty-t]ve to sixty-five gigaherlz w<)uld have hecn
desirable, hecause the absorl)fion by oxygen molecules would auenuate signals passing
through the atmosphere, ttowever, it st)on became apl)arent thai the technology of 1971,
tm which I.E_8 and -9 had to be hasvtt, would not support such ;it<` enterprise. Very liltle
test equilmlenl was commercially avail;hie for frequcnt:ies ;hove forty gig;hertz.
Thereiore, auention focused tm tilt+ develt>lmlent of Ihe needed comp<ments and stthsys-
teins at tile I_l-t)and. 'L
One of the slrengths of I+inct>hl I+aht>ratt>ry's space comnnmications program is that
it encompasses Ihc development of hoth k, rminals and satellites under one roof. The
transmissi<m and reception tor satellite lines t)rovitling stthslantial anti-janmling capabili-
ty, such as those links through I.ES-8 and -9, are complex when compared to links thai rely
2S. '1 +l'_S T" in Compemtium o/(.ommu*+i_atirm aml Broadtail .'QllellHes, pp. 195-97; Mat tin, "West lq _ld.'" p, 17.
29. :\ndrc R l)i<m and [,con J. Ri_ ardi, %\ \+;uial)h'-(_oxcragt' Satellite Al'_tt'nna Svstctn," lho:e,+,di_+e,', r+/lh+'
1l_1"2( 59 ( 1971 ) : 2r,2-fi2.
30. Frederick W. Sarh's, .If., l.eonard W. Bmvlcs. I+.P. Farnsworfll, and l'hili I) Waldron, "The l,il..In
Expcrimetmd 5,all'lilies I.E_8 and I+ES-9." 1EEE l".h't It<talcs and Aerospatc Svslt'nls (_onvctlti<m (EAS(:()N),
Arlington, Va., 1977. l"a_+on-77 Rrc0rd. p. 21-1A, IEEE no. 77Ctt12r_F_-9; "I.ES 8 and <Y' in Compendium o/
(_omntunic_+lion and B_+,ad_a_l .'salellib_, pp. 199-206; Martin, "West Fot(l." pp. '31-.q_+L
31. F..lohn Sohnan, Carl D, Bctghmd, Rithard W. (:hick, and Brian .l- (3ill<m, +'The K ,";,,stcms ot the
l+incoln Experimental Salt'llites I.E,S-8 and 1.ES.-!t," AIAA Pat)el 78-562. A ('olleHirm o/"l'echniral Pal*e_: AL_A 7th
(;omm+o+ications .'_atelble S++tem_ (Joufi._en¢r, San lJieg., ('ali/'rnia, Al*ril 24-27, 197?+' (New York: A1AA, 197S), p.
20_--15. lhis paper (.t+¢,thls a bil)li<+graphv ot olhrt l>almrs <m K-band It'chnoh+gx t;:_r I.EF,-S and -9. It also
;pill.areal in ]ou r.al ,j ._,)+mu'c.zfi aml I¢o¢1¢r1_ I (; ( I !t79) : 181-86.
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on unprotected transponders, such as tile links through tile earlier LES. It would be very
difficuh if the space and terrestrial segments of a modern nlilitary satellite comnlunica-
tions system were developed separately and their first operating encounter took place
after launch. Lincoln Laboratory conducted extensive end-to-end testing of communica-
tions lines befi-)re launch, including the terminals that Lincohl Laboratory developed and
those developed by the Air Force and the Na W. The generally smooth course of testing in
orbit owed much to the prelaunch testing at Lincoln Laboratory?'-'
The LES-8 and -9 intersatellite links successfully addressed the key technical problenls
that confront the implementation of satellite-to-satellite communications? :' LES-8 and -9
were launched together on 14 March 1978 aboard a Titan IIIC booster. Their launch was
tailored to suit the companion Naval Research Laboratory Solrad IIa and Solrad IIb satel-
lites and to facilitate the evaluation of specialized gyroscopes designed by the Charles
Stark Draper Laboratory that LES-8 and -9 carried as flight experiments? _LES-8 and -9 are
powered by radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and have no solar cells or bat-
teries. The design of the RTGs had to assure their physical integrity in the event of a
launch failure, so that the potential environmental hazard would be acceptable. During
compatibility tests and preparations for launch, Lincoln Laboratory had to develop spe-
cial procedures and pay scrupulous attention to health factors to ensure that workers
would not be overexposed to particle radiation? _' The RTGs were well worth the eftbrt.
The compatibility of these rugged power sources with complex signal-processing circuitry
has been well established. These RTGs are similar to the ones that power the Voyager
spacecraft, which have been exploring the outer planets and bewmd since 1977.
LE_8 and -9 represent the high-water mark to date of Lincoln Laboratory's program
in space communications. In addition to their complex communications system, these
satellites have systems and subsystems for housekeeping fimctions, including attitude con-
trol, _'' onboard (secondary) propulsion, _7 telemetry, _ and telecommand. Lincoln
32. I,.J. Collins, LR. Jones, l)avid R. McEhoy, David A. Siegel, William W. Ward, and David K. Willirn,
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p. 471-78.
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l,aboratory continues to be responsiblt_ [or the upkeep of ItEm8 and -9. The I,im'oln
Experimental Satellite Operations (]cnt¢'r operates and maintains these satellites+ and il
will continue to serve them as hmg as they remain useful.:"' The tcchnoh)gies of onl)oard
signal ])rocvssing and of EHF transmission and reception, successfully demonsmtlcd in
the 13'7,_8 and -9.|oint Test Program, have 1teen incorporated in subsequent military sawl-
lile communications procuremenls. Thor single-channel transponders on the DSCS 1II
satcllilcs and the Milstar communications system itself (see below) have tlowed directly
from 1+1'_S--8and -9.
Switchboards in the Sky
Following the launch of LES-8 and -9 in 1976, l+incoln l,aboratorv addressed the prol)-
lem of providing affi>rdable anti-jamming communications to many small mobile users.
LI+'_H and -9 and their asso('iatcd terminals (lClllOllSllalc(| that I+71IF and El IF conmmni-
cations systems could bc cross-t)andcd in signal-processing satelliles and SCl+VCtilt" needs
of a li,nitcd nlml|)er <)[ small, mol)ih" tertniYlals, h was tem[)litlg to try to +.'xtt'nd l'he
al)l)r<)ach to meet tile Ile(:'(ts ()f a. large numl)er of ttSOl'"i, bt+catlS( ` Ill+`"relative simplicity and
¢'h+`'a]lnt'ss +`)f U! IF let'lnillals mad+`" thai part ()f the s])cCtl'tlln attractive. [Ttlt(+l'lllllatclv, Iht"
inilitarv [ !I IF band (22B to 400 megahertz) does not have enough available l+),md width to
pt-ovidc the ,equir¢'d levels of anti-jammitlg i)roteclion, and Ihc application of adaptive
hulling, an anti-_jamming technique, was not enough to overcome this handicap.'"
Therclore, under IAncoln I,aboratory's new al)pr<mch, all anti-jamming space comnnmi-
cations links w+`'t'c assigned to the EHF band.
The argumctHs fi>r and againsl EItF are well known.*' The list (:,f lit+`' EIfF bands can
overt<row the lrt+qucncy congestion that aft;,..cls both civilian and military systtqns at lower
ticquencies. | h_wcver, the major advanlagc to military users is that El IF also supl+lies tit+`"
baud widlhs wcessary I<_ iml-flcnwnt rol)ust .jam-l)roof s,X'SlelllS l+)as+`.don spread-spcctu-um
t+`whumlogies. By using advanced spread-Sl)eClrUtn ;.ttlld other lechniqu+`'s, including cxwn-
sivc onb<mrd signal processing, a salcl]il+` + o[ lllodt!sl size +`'atllStqVO large llllllll)+`q's ()|" small
m<d)ilc us<:rs sitntthant'ously with highly .}atlll-l'csislalll ('Olllllllll|i(+ali(lllS chamwls. The
probability that covert transmissions t+tom tcrntinals wishing to rcnnain unnoticed will be
intercepted is also reduced at EItF. On the n(.galivc sid{', the ef[t'cls of rain atlcnltation
on El IF links require thai tile minimtnn elevation angle of the satellite rclalivc t<+ the lcr-
minal Inltsl b<.' significantly highcu- than for lower fre(Ittcncy syslenls.
In <onsuhati<m willq its sp<msors, l,incoln l,aboratorv conceived a "strawman +' EHF
sVSleln all(I buih a l(:sl-])c(t satellil<_' with terminal har(lwar(" that served as the fi)cus tor lhc
in-house t('chn()l()g T deveh)pmt'nlt l)t[)gram. The gr()undw<)rk for Ibis El 1F system con(Cl)t
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was laid during the successful development and demonstration of the Ka-band compo-
nents, subsystems, and systems in LES-8 and -9. The essential features of the strawman
EHF system were demonstrated on the bench at Lincoln Laboratory in 1980 and 1981 in
the combined operation of the test-bed satellite with its test-bed terminal.
Subsequently, the EHF system concept and the associated technologies in develop-
ment at Lincoln Laboratory served as a point of departure for thinking about EHF systems
within the Department of Defense military satellite communications community,. In
December 1981, tile Pentagon decided to go ahead with a new enterprise, Milstar (the
Military Strategic Tactical and Relay satellite), which incorporated many technical fea-
tures of Lincoln Laboratory's strawman EHF system in its own system and in its Common
Transmission Format.
Lincoln Laboratory was asked to support Milstar development by building two Air
Force communications satellite (FLTSAT) EHF Packages (FEPs). The communications
capabilities of" an FEE when installed on TRW's Air Force UHF/SHF communications
satellite, are a subset of those of a fill Milstar satellite payload. 4'_The first FEP was inte-
grated with FLTSAT-7, which was launched on 4 December 1986; tbe second was launched
in 1989 as part of FLTSAT-8. The electronics and antenna assemblies of" each FEP were
buih by Lincoln Laboratory under very tight power (305 watts) and mass (111 kilograms)
constraints, so that they would be compatible with the existing Air Force satellite design.
The FEP also has thcilitated the early operational test and evaluation of the Milstar
EHF/SHF terminals heing developed by the Army, Na W, and Air Force. The complexity
of an FEP communications system is fhr greater than that of the LES-8 or -9 satellites, even
though the FEP has fewer parts. Integrated circuits in the early 1980s, when the FEP
design choices were made, were more sophisticated than when LE_8 and -9 were
designed in the early 1970s.
The major innovation in the FEP was a computer-based resource controller that estab-
lishes data channels operating at different data rates, via different antenna beams and
other means, to support the communications needs of individual users. The onboard
access controller receives requests lot user service from each user terminal's computer.
The controller in turn sets up the requested services and informs the user terminals' com-
puters of its actions via a downlink order wire. Once a channel has been set up, the FEP
converts uplink message formats to downlink message formats and retransmits user data
via either or both of the FEP's two antenna beams. Although tile computer-to-computer
dialogs between the FEP and the user terminals are complex, the required interactions
between human and machine are user friendly and can be performed easily by terminal
operators? :_
The experience gained in operating the Lincoln Experimental Satellite Operations
Center for the control of I,ES-8 and -9 in orbit was directly applicable to tile task of con-
trolling an FEP in orbit. The greater sophistication of tile FEP (compared to the LE_8 or
-9) has resulted in a much lower workload in the FEP Operations Center than in the
Lincoln Experimental Satellite Operations Center, where any change in the configuration
of the satellite's communications system requires human intervention. The resource con-
troller in the orbiting FEP carries out most of its comln|ter-to-computer transactions with
users and would-be users without supervisory intervention. Two FEP Operations Centers
42. David R. McElroy, "The FEP Communications System," AIAA Paper 88-0824, A Collectioz_ of Technical
Paprr._: AL4A 12th International Communication._ Satellite _),stems (;onferen_e, Arlinuma , VA, 13-17 March 1988 (New
York: AIA.A, 1988), p. 395.
43. Marilyn D. Semprucci, "The First Switchboard in the Sky: An Autonomous Satellite-Based
Access/Resource (]onnoller, +' l+imoln l+abmatory]ournal I (1988): 5-18.
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have been built. One is installed permanently at Lincoln l.aboratory; the other, trans-
portable but by no means mobile, has been installed at a Nax 7 facili_' in Maine. (The Nax T
is the operational manager of the FEP Communications System.)
During the FEP program, Lincoln Laboratory concentrated on the challenging tech-
nologies required for the FEE taking advantage of the satellite-bus technologies already
developed and proven in space by TRW's series ()fAir Force satellites. It has been gratify-
ing that the FEP aboard FLTSAT-7 arrived safely in orbit and has worked well since launch.
While the success of the FEP program speaks well for Lincoln Laboratory's approach to
implementation and quality assurance in building reliable spacecraft, some of the success
of Lincoln Laboratory's program in space communications has to be attributed to plain
luck. Consider the case of the FEP carried by FLTSAT-7.
Mthough FLTSAT-6 carried no FEE FLTSAT-7 and -8 each carried one. The sponsor
decided to.juggle the launch schedule and interchange FLTSAT-7 and -6 to get an EHF
package into orbit as early as possible. As a result, FLTSAT-7 was launched on 4 December
1986, and FLTSAT-6 followed on 26 March 1987 during a storm. Lightning struck the
Atlas/Centaur booster, After the rocket engine noise ceased, and a series of muffled
explosions occurred aloft, one of the authors of this chapter, who was at Cape Canaveral
at the time, said to himself: "There but for the grace of God and the United States Na W
went the first FEE"
Advanced EHF/SHF Terminals
In another Milstat-related activity, Lincoln l+aboratory designed and buih the Single-
(_hannel Objective Tactical Terminal (SCOTT), which was the advanced model of the
Army's Milstar EHF/SHF terminal. In 1983, Army personnel successfully tested this ter-
minal, mounted in a tracked military vehicle, against a satellite simulator in the field. The
Army's production version of SCOTT has many of llle features that were first demon-
stratcd in Lincoln Laboratory's development model.
As an outgrowth of the SCOTT work, Lincoln Laboratory conducted a feasibility study
in 1983 that resulted in a conceptual design for a human-portable, Milstar-compatible
EHF/S|IF terminal. The development of the Single-Channel Advanced Milstar Portable
(SCAMP) terminal was completed shortly after the launch of the first FEE and it has oper-
ated successfully" with the FEP. There alv nntnerotls diverse needs tot- limited-capability"
terminals of this class, which offer most of the advantages of Milstar communications wilh-
out the full range of options.
Optical Space Communications
The success of optical communications for some terrestrial applications is undeni-
able. l.aser and fiber optic technologies have brought about cables that seriously compete
with communications satellites, l lowever, optical space communicalions has been the
"wave of the ftuure" for many years. The advent of the laser, with its promise of coherent
radiation across the transmitting apertures and correspondingly fine, high-gain antenna
beams, has led to very encoreaging link-pertormance calculations. To the hes! of ll_e
authors' knowledge, howeven no one has yet demonstraled a nontrivial optical intersalel-
lite link in space.
IAncoln I.at)oratory once considered putting optical intersatellite links on I.ES-8 and
-9, in addition 1o the millimeler-wave links. The optical feature was dropped fiom the
satellite's confignration in late 1{)71 when it became clear that the current stale of the art
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in solid-state laser-diode technolo_+ was inadequate ibr a llight experin+enl and that the
project's resources could not support an optical link. Progress in available comptments,
coupled with new insights in system design, has since made it attractive to resume work in
this area, often called "IASERCOM."
I+incohl Laboratory is now deveh+ping a technolo_, base for high-data-rate intersatel-
life links that could be realized with small-aperture, lightweight, low-power optoelectron-
ic pa{kages. The al}pv<}ach taken uses solid-state laser diodes and silicon-diode detectors
operating in a heterodyne mode. +' M<}{lulaled cotHintlt)t£s-wave transmission and
heterodyne detectiota will be combivled in the syslem design to 1)rovide col+tmlttnicalit)l_s
significantly sttperior to the more commonly used systems based on pttlscd transmission
and direct eneth_+ detection (cott+monly known as the pholot+-I)ttcket approach).
Ahhough l+incoha Laboratory began to prepare in 1985 for a demonstration of het-
erodyne L__SER(;()M technoh}g+,, in {_rl++il,progcam constraitlts have rttled it out for the
present. Lincoln Laboratory is now bttilding an engineering model of a complete hetero-
dyne L,_SERCOM system, which will address all critical technol{>gical areas and issues.
When the world is ready for [+-kSERCOM, the technology' will be available.
44, Vinc_.nt W.,++';. (',hart, "Space (]oherent Opfic+d (_Onll++lltlli('_lli_)il ,_ystcnls: All Intr<+dHction,"]ournalo[
l+i+_htw¢+_>r T+'Hznolt+g,_' t_l'-,'Y+ (lt,)_7): 6'._,?,-?,7; Vi_lctq'tl W.S. ('|l;;;'_, "[lltt'ls;++tt'llilt + Optical |{t'ttq'ot_lylW
{i<_n+n+utficati{,ns Sy+.tt'ms," l+im'oln l,aborr¢to,3.]m+r_'ml I (l.t)b+8): 16_:I-b;6.
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Future Developments in Space Communications
The nexl goal for reliable military satellile conununications systems is the extension
to tfigh-data-rate applicalions ()1 the l'Obtlsl, j;.tlll-resislanl technoh)gies t_)r h)w-(lala-t-ale
applications that FEP has demonsuated. Considering the large band widths that will be
required, these new systenls will most likely be implemented at EItF, at least for lhe
uplinks and downlinks. The ett;.'(ts of bad wcalhel, even ch)uds, on optical links between
satellites and ground ternfinals scent certain io tule (>ttl IxkSERCOM for applications in
which consistent link availat)ility is imporlant, floweret, optical links between satellites
and airborne plattorms flying above the weather nlay nleet specific military needs. The
technolog%_ of radio intersalellitc links has been ainl)ly demonstrated in orbit by I,E_8 and
-9 and by NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System.'-' It is only a matter of time--
and of continued SUl)port--until IASER(X)M inlersatellite links are similarly demonstrated.
hltersatellite link technologies have not yel tound civilian application. The Intelsat 6
series of conlnnmications satellites, the first of which was humched in late 1_.)91, was
designed well after the LES-8 and -9 intersatellite li,lks had been denmnslrated in orbit.
t lowevcr, it was not totmd economically.instifiable to include intersatellite links in the
hllelsat (_ salcllilcs, nor have such links appeared in sttccessive generations of these birds.
Nevertheless, lhe time tilt civilian intersatellite links will come.
Conclusion
In tile more than ._+_<)years since the launch of Sputnik, the field of space comnnuli-
cations has reached a high level of nlatm+ity. The mission tailures that occasionally
|)esmirch the record of each spacetaring nation cannot obscure tilt+ numerous remark-
able--and useful--achievements that have taken place. Notable among them are tile con-
tril)utions of space conlmunicati<ms, both economically and in ternls of increased inter-
national stability. The field of space conmnmications allows national leaders to stay in
touch with one another, and it gives them more control over their military resources, thus
reducing the possibility of accidental war. The field has changed lilt + ways in which soci-
eties fltnction itn([ inleracl, alld it pronfises to (Io tar more. To quote tile science fiction
writer Arthur C. Clarke (who first suggested tile geostationary communicati<ms satellite):
"What we are building now is the nervous system of mankind, which will link together the
whole hunlan race, lor better or worse, in a unity which no earlier age could have imag-
ined."_,,
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Chapter 9
Billion Dollar Technology: A Short
Historical Overview of the Origins of
Communications Satellite
Technology, 1945-1965
by David.]. Whalen
hi lhc fouc decadcs shlcc lilt" ]auuc]_ of Sputnik, conlnnufic;lthms salcllite.s rt'main Ihe
otflv IruJv commcrcial space lecJmolog),, l+ess Iban cighl years at)er .Spulnik, a rcvenuc-
producing satcllile, Earl', Bird. emt'rgcd. Thus far m file l(.t(.)0s, the averagc nmnl)cr of
C()llllll|llli(';lli()llS satellites |_lllll(ht!d anntlallv has bet'll Iwt'llly. ill all a,¢cl-a{_(" ¢osl o[ ll/()l+U
than $50 million ton 1he satellite and :ulolh(,r S50 nlillion (or more) ion the launt+h vchi-
('It:. The average spcnl ammally on comnnmicalions satellites is m excess ot S2 1)i]lion.
In the tktcc of lifts ovecwhehning commcvci;d success, most anah'sls of lhc early devcl-
(:,l)nlt:l/1 of conmnulicali<ms s:ucllilcx hart: c<mcenl|-ated on politics and policy sludics,
a.hnosl cxchtding lilt' tcchntflogical and cc<momic ot+igins t)t lllis illdtlslrv. Thcsc analysts
lend lo discuss tilt' passage of the (;tmmnnlic:-tthnls Satellite Act of 1969 and lilt' ups and
downs of lilt' NASA c(ml]nunicalitms s:ltcllilc prog,anl, wifll litth' reference to tt'chnoh)g, T
O1" t't'tlllt)lllit'S. AS a COnSCCtUCnCC ot Ibis Clnllhasis Oil political sludit,s, conventional wis-
donl asst'rls IIlal the gc, vt'l-lllllt'lll devel<qx'd (ommunitations satellile l{'chnolog-y bt'taust"
illdllstl')' Was mlwilling or mlal)le Io th(:e lilt" high cosls and high risks associalt'd wilh (mn-
nnmicalions satellite rest'arch and tlexclolmlcnl. This conventional wisdom asst,m('s thal
in(iuslry w()ultI n()t develop ncw (()mmunitali()|ls satellite lc(:hn(>h)b,,3* l)et'ausc it was too
risky, lhe|(" was a lack ()f thrills, and industry would nol be at)le to apllvoprialc lilt" be,writs.'
Whih' st)me communications satellite tt'thno]ogy flows fv()m one manufaclurcr to
a,olh('r, routl) is t)r(actt(,d b) pal<'nts, and ('yen more is t_ro_c(lt'd 1)v lilt: tlitticuhy of
learning ncw lecb.|!.()logT_. Tc(hnt)logy transfi'r, even when facilitated I)y co()peralion, is
ofl('n dilticuh. Many early gc()synchr,m(n]s satellites ttsed techniques pi(mct',-cd I)}
t htghes on Svnconl in 1963. lhc 1 lughcs-Williams patent was lhe subject of liligati(m tot
vetos, I:,ul il liV()vcd to t)e quite valual)h' it) [lughes. Eventually, tnost ()thcr manufattt|rers
anti lhc (!.S. governnwnl had Io llay rovahics to |{ughcs. Pcrhal)S more i|npt>rtanl,
I lught's has dominate(l the nmnutacmr(" of (onnntuli(:ations satellites since the tivsl
,Synt<_n:l in 1963. The risk of t()llll)(qit()lS al)propl'ialillg technolo',.,_' is greatly ()Vt:l:.,lale(I.
(',al)ilal has rarely I)cen thc n+ost iml)t)rtant issut" whim invest()rs looked at ¢'onlmuni-
('all(ms salellil('s; access It> lilt' lllal'kcl has t)C('ll f_ll" lll()t+C iltll)<)rlatll. "['(qe('Otlltlllll/iCali()ns
Ills Ill'ell a nn,hillillion-d<)llar l)usint+s, ,, tor tnosl of this Celltttl+y. :YI'&T, in ])artit'lll;tl-. (ct--
tainly had lilt+: financial resout-ccs to invest in connntmicalions salelliles.
I. Scc. 10t cxantph:, Mm¢ia S. Smiflt, "(;i,,ilian Space Appli(afiot]s: Tht' lh i',atization l+,auleg_mmd,'" in
Radt()ld l+,7+ctb, It., cd., ),pa_, +I'.li+', lbr+.r+irle.,d (P,,ml(h,t, (:(): Westview, 1!18!)), l)p. 105 16; 1 .inda R. (h)hcn and
Rogyt (;, Noll, +"1hi' Appli_ ati(ms :l'e( hn,)h_gy Yiattt,llit(. P+,)Rt am," in IAn(la R. (:ohcn and R()Rm (;. Nc)ll, v(ls+, I'h.
l'+,+li,oloq_ 1'o_1¢I_._.'1 (Washiugt,,n, D(:: l+,lo<>kings Inslimti(m, 1991 ), pp. 149-77.
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In 1933, John R. Pie,'ce ()f AT&T conlpared the estimated cost of satellite communi-
cations with the cost of the first transatlantic telephone cahle (TAT1) then being laid
between the United Slates and Europe. The cahle would provide approximately thirty-six
voice circuits at a cost of art)und $35 million. Pierce then asked his readers: "X&'ould a
channel 30 times as wide [as TA'I:I ], which would accommodate 1080 [30x36] phone con-
vcrsations or one television signal, be worth 30x33 million dollars: that is, a billion dol-
lars?": AT&T was in a position to fired a billion-dollar project. In 1959, with net sales otover
$7 billion, AT&T was in a heifer position to fund communi(:ations satellite research and
deveh)pment than NASA, whose entire hudget was only a few hundred million dollars.
In late 1964, after the successiktl launch of Syncom 3 and prior to the lmmch <)f Early
Bird, NASA Administrator James E. Webb asked his staff: "lIow did we get so much com-
nnmications satellite technoh)_, f()r so little money?":' His question has never heen
adequately answered, lle(atlse most analysts have COllCelltraled Oli political, rather than
t(,chnoh)gical, issues. This chapter addresses the history of the dcveh)pment ()f that tech-
nolog) and, in Ill(" process, attempts to answer Webh's question.
Postwar Technolog T and Resources
The roots of nearly all <)f the technologies associated with communicatioIls satellites
extend hack to World War II. Ahhough billions were spent on tilt" Manhattan Project,
radar research and dew.'lopment, and lhe development of the B-29, the pr<)gram that nlost
stimulated a longing to exploit space was the relatively inexpensive German V2 rocket,
The V2 made it cleat" that tockets were practical and, with a little m<)re development,
c¢)uld |)lace a satellite in orbit.
Although Hermann Ot)erth in 1923 and George O. Smith in 1(.142 had speculated
abottl geosynchronous on in Smith's case, Earth-Ventts relay conmnmicati(/ns satellites,
the acknowledged "father'--or, in his own words, "godtather"--of communications satel-
lites was Arthur C. Clarke, a Royal Air Force officer at the time who hoped to revitali_e the
British Interplanetary Society after the war. Clarke was tile first, in his October 1945
Wireless _+,_Jrld article, to develop rather fttlly the concept of a geosynchronous satellite.
Three of these satellites, each fixed over a specific longitude (m lhe equator; would pro-
vide complete glohal coverage. Clarke envisioned their use for television programming,
and he assumed that the satellite wottld he occupied by humans to (hange the vactn)tn
tubes on a regular basis.'
The +_.+yvless 14,+Md article did not receive wide publicity. (3arke's real contribution to
satellite c<)mmunications was to continue pressing for a geosynchronous systenl in other
puhlications. His hook The Exploralion o/Space" inchtded a system of three geosynchronous
satellites, and many readers viewed il as a bhteprint for the entire space program." At the
same time as the pttblication <)f (;larke's Wire&_s WorM article, moreover, U.S. Na D'
researclwrs began developing launch vehicles and satellites,: and, t_filing to lind higher
2. John R. Pict{c+ "()rhital Radi() Relays,"fl't I)r_gmM_m 25 (April 1955): 153-57.
3. Paraphrase of W('l)l)'s commcnls at lh(' 22 S+,'plemb('v lG)(!,4 l)rogram R('view. rvli+rt('d I,) in W.A.
Rat:tills to Al)A/Shaph'y, I0 l)eceml)cr 1965, 'l'h(')ml)SOn papers, NASA 1[istory ()lfice, \Vashinglon, I)( :,
4. Avthu) C. (Jarke, "F.xlra-Terrcstt ial R('la'.,s: (:an Rocket Slalioils (;iv(' W,:)tId-Widt. Radio (_ovt'raR('?,"
$t'i_eb:+s W+++kl51 (O('t<)l)er I.(.1451:305-08.
5. AtthtH C. Clarke. The l';xploratio?_ +J/,S/m+_'(New _)Ik: flat p,,.) &" R()',v, 19_12).
(}. For ('Xaln[)Ic, 101lll('l NASA Asso(iate A(hninisliat()) l](:,mct E. Ncw(.ll (tt'dit('d Clark(" as th<' +.'ham-
l)i(m of c<)mmunications salellile apl)lications. I h>mer E. Newell, B,70_M the Atmo_phr_e: Fa)l_' );ar_ of Spat; .%'cieme
(Washingto)L I)C: NASA SI)-4211, l(.)gl)), i). 106.
7. 1|atroy }|all. I".ar{+'Iti_to U a?+d BaHeg+mund on Ea?lh Satellite+, it'port n(). 405:1 lit:dr (Washiugt<)n. DC:
()tli('(" ()f Na+al R¢'sear{:h, 29 Now'mbcv 1(.1571.
levelsupporl,Ih<.',,'_q:,pr<)achcdIll<.'ArmyAirForceswithat:,r<)l)()s_llfor;ljointprogr,un+
Ulfimat('13; die _k _" _ _ I _ T '_ki '" F__''_"_' _ _V__ :_S Um''illillg ;iS die NaVV m fired lh<.' I)rqiccl.
Despite this I_.tilure, on<." positive mll<.otnc was ;ill ind<.'p<.'nd<.'llt study of the feasih, ilitv
<)f E;tNh S_lt_-lli1_.s by Pl_>jcct I.C\ND (th(m ;i l:,m-t _>1 the l)mlg]:lS Air<,-;ltt (:orl:,or_uion and
t_<)t v¢,t _ln iudcp_,ndt,tm n<mprofit rc.',+t':u<.h and dcvchqml<.'t+_t mganizsuiml_ on b<.'half of
tilt" Army Air Forc<."+. _ ('.<mlplcled _)t/ 12 M:tv 1!1.t6, tilt' RAND l'('})Ol't ohst'rv<.'d, mnong
olhcr poitm,, theft a ssttcllit<.r launch x','<_tll(l has'<." a dr,mlatic <.'fle<l oti world opilaion .rod
I]'lstt lh<.: salcllite migllt h;tvc m_t;tl)l(' tlS<." sts Sl commtmic,llions rclslx. '_ hi sl)itc of _t curlail-
m<.'nt <d ttfilitarx res<.'arch and dcv<.'lopnl<.'nl <.'xpenditur<.'s tmdcr th<.' TI-Hlllkln admirfistra-
lion, StlbS<._qucnl IL+kNI) stttdi<.'s <)f _<.'_)synchron<ms communicali()ns s,ltcllil<..s _tnd tilt.
polilical mid psy<hological :_Sl)<'Cls <fl" humch v<.'hiclcs sq_pt'_w,_'d in I(.I,t9 and 1(._5(1, r<.'spec-
tiv<.qxY" l'hesc RAND studi<.'s emph',_si/cd tllstt whichcvt+r nation t]rst Immch<.'d ;i satcllitc
,+',_)ttld s<_)r<.' :t trc[nt'tldot_s l)_+;vch()h+gicsd "<ict+_rv ;rod th;tt tilt' ssltcllitc (+)itld bc tt_;cd I()r
l<'(()rnl,tissm+cc, Ill tilt" v,,m-<Is of hist()rian VX_slltt'r ;\. Mcl)_)1,gsill, tilt" 197)0 RANt) rcl)oVt
"+llO/-c th;u+ stay <>lhc1_ d_+st'r'ccs t+> bc c_>/lsidt'rcd lilt' 1)i/lh Ct,llit'lc;tl<' ++f ,.\lncl+irilll S|:,+t(t"
I_olicv. '''' ()<or thc tblhwdng yc;us. RANI), tilt' Air F(wcc, North Anl<.'rici|n +.\vistti(m, ittl(l
olh<.'r dcti'nsc cmnp'anics worked on tcc<mtl_lissancc, rather Ill;in <m <)ttl<.'l siltcllil<.' ;q)t)li-
('ktli()lIF++ 111M<.'std, Ct)ltl111111iiC'Slti()11_ +-,ktl('llitt'_,, W<.'I( + Io _)<' 1)()1"11 I'I"(HII CiViliStll <'O111111<.'1"Ci;tl
I<.'l('('()ltl I111111it'klt i()liS (|('vt'iO])lll('lll S.
Ft)lh)wing W_)rhl '++V;u" 11, lclcl)ll(mt" us;(" un(h'rw<.'llt st (ham,ttic ill(r(':.lS('.
(_OIIlllltllli<'Slti()ll +', ill gClltq'_ll gt't'W sit III()I'U thstli lhr<.'t' lilll0S tilt' gl-()_,s nktli()n;tl pl'<)([ll('|
((;NI)) r;ttc ()1 growth. A ]arg<.' C(mll)OilCllt _)| th_H growth v;s/s in both domt'slic ;itld inter-
xlslti<m;d h)ug-distanc<.+ traffic, l l<)v;<'vt'r, I_.+',,viUllprt)vctncnts ll_Id b<.-cn rnatlc sin<.<.' thc lay
itlg <d th<.' last tl;ins_itlmltic t<.'l<.'gr:iph (sll)I<.' it+ 192_. Rst(liott'l<.,graph',_ ,Ind r_tdiotclel)htm.v,
whil<.' raF, idly _>v('rt,lking lllICI('l'X+v';It('l c_ll:,Ic telegraphy, sttfl_.'rcd from It<list' thsll was inher-
<.'lit ill tilt" w<hl_+)h_g T. Th<.' first II';tllSklll;.lliti(" t<.'h'l)h<m<.' c:lbl<.' (']',L\'IL]) '++',';iS11<)I laid Iltllil
19._6. TAT-I was tnaitlly an AT&T vt'ntuv<" in c(+llsd:,Orslti(m with such fi_r<.qgn partners as
tilt' British Post ()fficc s,nd (:;Ul;Id;l'S ()v('t+scas T<.,lccomnlunic;ttions (:Olp<)rati<m.
hldicstlivc _1 th<." cM)l<.% succcss v,;ls thc imt_lcdi:ltC inchtsi<m of t-sldio c<>mp;ulit+s (R(:A,
ITT, _lnd Wcsl<.'rn Ulaion) in tilt' TAT+-I ;trrml_t'nlctlts. 'l'll<+y recognized th<.' supcri<_ritv t)l
the tit's,, tt,ch,loh)gy and wantcd l<> t;tkc pml in it.+.++.,xF,h)it:ttiml. N<.'xt cmnc TAI-_ in 19._9,
<)Wtl<.'d l>v ATScT, tilt + Fr<.'nch IMst;d m_d Tclcctmmttmic;itiotls .\dtni]fi_,tr;iti<m (1)ir<.'<tion
(It's T('lt"c(mlnnnlic;tli(>)IS ._ot_s-Marincs), ;Iti(l the l)<.'tttsche ['_un(It'sl)<)st, al+_d TAT-3,
owned 1)v AT&q and the British Post ()frier +, in l_.)l')_+*.+ul+chitid tilt" l_ying ()1 th<.+se tt+smsat -
hlnlic <';tl)It's w_Is a drmn:Itic growth in interllalionsil tClel)ll<me (lkdfic (hl'mlgll()ttt tilt +posl-
war F,cri+>(l, gCllcnilly ;It the l;+ltt' <_f 20 [)('lC<.']It l)<.'l" .v(',ll" (Figttre 18).
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Figure 18
lnternatirnlal telepkone calls 1940-1970 . (Source: tfi_lotfcal Statistic,_ _?[ the _'mted Stateg)
Ahhough RCA developed much of the radio and television technolo_', AT&T, specif
ically its Bell Telephone Laboratories, made many hreakthroughs in basic electronic
devices, the most famous of which was the transistor. AT&T also was deeply inw)lved in
developing the maser and the traveling-wave tube. The maser is a low-noise amplifier, an
important component of ground stations receiving weak satellite signals; the traveling-
wave tube is a high-gain linear amplifier used in satellite transmitters. While masers origi-
nated at Columbia University, Bell Telephone Laboratories worked hard at adapting the
lechnolog T to underwater telephone cables. Bell also developed tl_e traveling-wave tube
tor use in microwave relay stations. Furthermore, AT&T performed extensive research
and development work tbr the U.S. government, including nuclear weapons research
(San(tia), missile studies (Safeguard), and Apollo program support (BellComnl). While
other companies also had research and development laboratories, AT&T stood at the top
in terms of the caliber of the resea,ch and development peril)treed, as well as the com-
pany's willingness to invest vast sums.
Similar to AT&T, most of the firms that later became invoh'ed in satellite communi-
cations had been around for some lime. General Electric was the oldest, having been
formed by the merger of Thompson-Houston an(t Edison (;eneral Electric in 1892. AT&T
was tormed in 1895. Botb ITT, created to manage a variety of telephone and telegraph
companies initially in I_atin America, and RCA, organized to pool radio patents, were
formed in 1920. (;TE was a telephone COml)etitor of AT&T. Hughes, which started in the
1930s as a "hoht)y-shop" for Howard t lughes, grew dramatically in the postwar period. All
of these companies were major electronics manufacturers, and all, except Hughes and
General Electric, had significant stakes as communications system operators.
These firms generally were quite large. In 1959, all of these companies combined
spent more than NASA. AT&T and General Electric alone accounted for more than 2 per-
cent of the GNE The following are the 1959 U.S. GNP, federal outlays, the budgets of
NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD), and the net sales of the eight largest
American companies (industry tigures are net sales):
BEY()NIt "ItlE ION<)SI'ltERE (.)_.)
U.S. (;NP $4&3.7 billion
Federal outlays $92.1 billion
DoD $44.6 billion
NASA $0.3 billion
AT&T $7.4 billi<)/i
General Electric $4.3 billi<m
RCA ,$1.4 billion
I,ockheed $1.3 billion
ITT $[).7 billion
Bendix $0.7 billion
(;TE $0.4 billion
Western Union international $0.3 billion
(Source: lli_to6cal ,_'taU_liei o//he I )6led Stcete_)
AT&T d(tlninat('d the telccoinmuzficati(ms industr}'; c(msequcz_tly, any improvement
ill tclcc(lllllll/Init'atiolls te(+hnolog_ ' ultimately wits Io the advantafi, c of AT&T. By 1957, when
Sputnik began orbiting the Earlh, all the u'chlmlogies necessary fi)r salellile comnmnica-
titres had been invented. All lhal remained was to demonstrate these technologies and to
c<mlplue the diffi'rt'nl ilmovations Ilia! had becll discllsscd in the lechl_ica] litt'rlililre.
Sputnik: The Catalyst
The tncdia panic restthing front the "surprise" latmch of Sputnik I on 40cl<lbel +1<.)57
did not evidence itself immediately in pttl)lic policy, but it soon began to ]tare an effect. A
tlurry of military rocket development ensued. The ti)llowing lllOtlt]l, both the Thor and
Jupiter rockets wet(' ordered into pr<)duction, and bv the end of the }'car, tnorc than it
halt:dozen Thors had bccn fired. Thor wtmld l)econtc the workhorse of the Sl)aCe pro-
gram. Then, on 31Jantlary 1958, the United Slates launched its first slttcllilc, Exph)rcr 1,
ti)lh)wcd (m 17 March by Villlgtlltl-d |. All together, the United Sllttt's, had seven suctt,sslul
launches in 1958; the Soviet Union had (rely ont'. _:'Am('rican missile icchn()lob, _' n<)w was
available to launch c<)mmunicalions experiments.
Meanwhile,John R. Pierce and Rudolf Kotnpfncr of AT&T, indcF.cnd,pttt invent<ws of
tit<.+ travcling-waw' tube, sltw an Opl)(Wttmity lot AT&T to launch all experimental COtll-
mttrficalions slm+llitc. Sometime in early 1958, Pierce and Kompfncr slix+,'it picture of the
shiny 100-ti)ot (dmLv-one-tnctcr) sphere that William J. O'Sullivan of the National
Advisory Commiltcc for Aeronautics (NAt:A) I.anglcy Resear(h Center had proposcd for
lautich t<l undt'rtakc atnmst)h¢'ric rcscm-ch, h rcmin(ltM Pierce of the 1(t0-[bot (dtirlv-onc-
meter) comnmnications retlcctor hc had envisioned orbiting around Earth in 1954. That
Stlltlltlt'l', while Picrcc and Komptiicr wm-e allt!ndillg all Air Force-sponsored mcvting on
contnnulicillions ;it _+Voods |[olc, Masslichtts/'llS, Pierce met William H. Picketing, director
o[ thc.lt't Prol)ulsion I+al)oratorv ([P[,), :tnd the three engineers discttsscd the possibility
of using a sphere such its O'Sullivan's tor cOlnlnttnitati<ms cxpt-rinlcnts. Pickcring vohm-
tct'rt'd Ihc stq)[)ort of JP[,. To support Ihcir plan, Kotnpiilcr and Picrct' t)rcscnt¢'d a pat)or
itt (;corgc Washington Univcrsitv in Washingi<m, D.(L, <m 6-7 October 1958. _`
13, I)alt'd cxents, tmlcss slwcitit all', tOl+li',{it{'d, are lioln I louse (;onnnitlcc <m SlmlC and ,\Stlmiauti_ x,
A ChtotmDJ_,)" +!/ Mi_ilr rigid A_tr.na.ti¢ I"vt.tzls [ 1915-1960], 87fit (long., I st st',.,,., Iq61. 11R-67. and subsequent
dlltlltal N,\S:_l t>ublit ati(uls.
II John R. Picrl'e, ""['l+tilS<ilt'aillil (]OlliltlilllildliiHi bv Mi'AIIS i11 Nalt.ililt's," I'ro..+.di._(s O/ l],+' IIU¢ t7
(Mill( h 1{159): _{79-81); ]lilill R. I'iel<c, TD, ]JvL_IPtHD/trs ¢JlSatdlltr' (;ommuPlitatioils (Sitil I.'liitll is(o: .l_illl I"litltl isil)
Plt'ss. 19(;S), lip. 9-1 <-'.
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The Pcmag<>n had its own space progran_. In [act, heft>re tile advent of NASA, DoD
had l)eeu the primary space agency an<l remained dominant fin some time fltereaftcr.
DoD's inilial responsibility for space activities was with the A'`lvanccd Research Projects
Ag-cncy (ARF'A). In tile period between the announccmem of the intention to f<>,m NASA
in early 195g au<l file actual fin'marion of the space agency in lau' 1959, ARPA was respon-
sible toy managing all U.S. sF,ace programs and later for apportioning responsilfility [or
those programs among the three armed services and the newly formed NASA.
In November 1958, representatives <_f NASA, ARPA, and the Bureau of Ihe Budget
met with the p,csident's science advis<w to <liscuss satellite communications. They agreed
that +\RPA wouM con<'entrate oil active salellites, while NASA would develop passive satel-
lites, t` N-\SA aheady was co|lltllitted to launching balloons t(> study tirol>spheric d'`,usit),
and it was the only agency interested in I)ic,'ce's plan to 1)ounce signals ot+f ])alh)ons in
orbit.
At lhe same tim(:, Hughes wits in<:hing into the field of contl:uunicalions salelliles. In
1959, when the Air Force canceled the F-108 h)ng-range interceptor in resp<mse t() the
can<:ellation of the Soviet advanced intercontinental bomber program, the l lughes
Aircraft Company lost its F-108 COll[l'acls and laid off 20 percent of its employees. Frank
Carver, lnanager of the F-I (18 fire-control system design group, saw the layoff coming and
asked llarokt A. Rosen, an electrical engineering Ph.D. tiom Catitbrnia lnstilute of
Technolo D, (Caltech), L'_to explore potential markets for the skills of the Adwm<ed
Dewq<>pment Laboratory personnel. Later in 1959, Donald 11. Williams, a ! [a,vard physics
major,.joiued Roseu, and ,over the following months, the}, worked on the design of a light-
weigh! geosynchronous communicatious satellite.':
(:ongrcssional hearings held 3 and 4 March 1959 on "satellites fi>r world commu,fi<a-
fi<m '''_ illusu'ated file disparate lines along which military, civilian, and commercial satel-
lite communications were developing. Of the six organizations making presentations, four
of them, NASA, ARPA, AT&T, and ITT, were actively engaged in communications satellite
research. AT&T and ITT even expected to make a profit in this endeav<)r, John Pierce, in
making 01e AT&T presentation, mentioned that about two dozen professionals and vari-
ous technicians were working <m satellite communications at AT&T, a half-dozen of whom
were full time. Ahhough Pierce did not mention the deveh)pmen! of the transistor by Bell
Ik'lephone Lahoratories or his own inveution of the travcling-wave tube (both necessary
to satellite communications), Ihc message was obviotts: AT&T cottld do the job and
ah-eady had started.'"
Following Pierce was R.E [ taviland of (;eneral Electric. Haviland, based on his expe-
rience with the earl}, Na'_ T space effort ( 1945-1947) was General Electric's in-house "satel-
lit,-: expert." tie described two possil)le communications satellites. Otle, tbl lhc fttture, was
a huge manned television broadcasl space station wilh living qua,'lers and enormous
antennas a la Clarke and costing un<tcr $2 billion. The second was a h'ss ainl)itious pro-
ject intende(t fin the presenl. Sixteen satellites, each with four lransmilters and oil)able of
15. T. Kcilh (;h'nnan IoJamcs H. Douglas, 18 Augusl 19{:,0, NASA 1 listory Otficc.
16. William l'it kcring,,lohn ['icrcc, aud 1 [aroh[ Rosen all had ch>t Ioratcs in clcctri¢al engineering hom
Cahct [L
17. Ilarol<l A. Rosen, 'lt;u_dd Rosen m_ Sau'ltiu' Tcchn<dogy Thou and Now," Um Satelliteg (luly 1993):
40-,t3; (;M-Httghcs Elccmmics. "llistor} and A_coml)lishmcnls o[ the Hughes Aircraft Company." undalcd, p.
12, [lughcs Air, rah (;t)ml)any Archivcs, F,I ScRundo, ('=",.; Edgar W. Morse, "Preliminary llistory ot lhQjccI
S_.'N(;()M," 1 September 1964, pp. "_2-34, [ tisuuy Notes 1tl IN-I,t. NASA ttismr,, Olfice.
I& lhmsc Committee on S,ti,pllCC and Astzonautics, Satdlite+/or L+brbt Comnmni,+aio., glit]l COlI,_., 1st
scss+, 1959, (86) I I 173!_-3, passim.
19. Ibid., pp. 35-46.
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2t){) simulhu)eous t('lely|)(_ messages, would provMc global coverag('. Th(' cos! (:,f lh(" vd)oh"
system was t)('lw('en $100 and $150 million to establish and i)('rhaps $50 milli(m annually
to opcral('. (;,.q)e,a[ Ele(lric d)us s(,(,m(.d ])r(.i)m-(.(I 1() enter th(. field of ('()mmtmications
satt'llit('s, l()o.e"
Th(' next [)resent('r was t[cnri (;. Busigni(,s, l)rcsid('nl of 1TT Laboratories. t 1(" dis-
cussed ongoing r('s¢'arch in sal:elliu' communications ar ITT, whi(h rec(mdv had I)c('n con-
((mtrating ()n lw('nlv-t()(|r-hour satellit(' s,,'stcn]s. ITT (-(mid han(lh" 1lie n('cessarv satellite
and ground station (()mmuni('ati(ms har(lv,'a,(', ;rod it hadjoin('d wilh (]urlis-Wlighlt and
A('r_._j('t tbr assista]_c(' _,,,'illl the salellilc vchich- itscll. As wilh :\T&-T and (;('m'ral Elc(lri(,
ITT was intcr('sted in comnmnications sal('llites, ])Ul it se('m('(t to I:,e looking fi)r a partner,
('spe(ially one with a knowlc(lg(_ ()t satellil('s.:'
The main message of th(" (ongr('ssio,ml h('arings was that sal<_'llitt, cornmuni('ali()ns
were I)cing lakcn s,(:l-i()t|sl_,'. ARPA, at leasl ill lh(" opinion of the XF&T (,ngineers, was too
ambitious--and perhaps insuf/icienllv kn(_wh'(Igcabh'. :VI'&'L .]PI. and NASA I.angl( T
were pr()((_cding with a simple passive CXl)Cri,n('nt (Pmje(l Echo), which, if su(ccsstul,
would I('ad to more (ompltrx satellilcs. AT&T clearly saw itself as lh( r ]ea(ter in passive sat('l-
lile programs. Tbc mosl im/)_)rlanl gr(mnd tacilili('s would be lhosc of Bell Teh'l)h,)n("
I,al)()ral()rics in New.lersey and.IPl, m (;alitornia. NASA would btul(1 and launch the I)al-
l()(m. NI&'I" lrcalcd .IPI, as a kn<)wl('dgcat)h" jttni<w l)m-lner, but it ('()nsidert,d the rt'st of
NASA altnosl in(()ntptqtmt, l'h('ir w<)rst comments wcr(" r('scrve(l ti)r ARI:'A enginct'rs and
managt'rs, lh()ugh, wh()m they saw as tmr('alisti(ally gralldiose in Ih('ir al)proatlw"
Hughes and AT&T Push Forward
Meanwhile, industry t)uslwd forward their (ommunication,_ sat('llilv phms. Rosen and
Williams, join(!d 1)} Tom I ludspclh, were busy a! ! tugh,:'s Aircraft Company. By the sum-
mer ()f 1959, they had designed, at h'ast (()ncct)tually, a lighlw('ight communications satel-
lit(', all([ |h('V WC[(" I'('a(lV [O make l)r('s('nla0(ms to upper Illall_tg('lllcIl|. -'_ Ro.'..;Cll'S s:twlliu"
l)r[q)()sal du'n und('rw(m! evaluali(m in an in-hous(, r('view. The sm(ty re('ommend('d tirol
Itughes seriously consider a commercial v('nmre in sawllil(' communications. Even
llmug]] (c'rlain as|)(!cls _)t lille! pl*O|)O_,_l] W(q'(' ()V(q']V optilnislic, commlmicalions sal(,l]itt,s
(()u]d generat(, l)restig(' R)r Ihc c()ml>any. The ,naj()r ()bstacl(' would I)(" (omm(qcia]: find-
ing enough tr,dti( to make Ill(" sysl('nl 1)r_ditabl(,. The rcvimv rcc()mnlcn(Icd, ll'mr<'tbr(', a
thorough study of Ihe t)usincss asl)ccls ()t sat('[lit(" (()mmunications an(t lalks with (;(m('ral
Tclet)hone, flu' hu'gcsl Bell ('()ml)clilor.:'
Th(' t lughcs Aircraft Company Task Force (m (iomm('r(ial Sau'lliu' (;ommmficali(m-'"
m('t [br lhe firsl tim(" a f('w weeks lalc," on 12 Octob(.r 1959. The group de1('rmincd dial
the most crili(al aspect of satellite c[mmmni(ati(ms was n()l the technology, I)lll the (om-
mcr(ial prospects. Th(' AF&T monopoly w(mld bc difficult, bm no1 ncccss,u'ily imp(>ssibh,.
t() cir(utwvctn. A sal('llitc's vahu' n('cd n()t t)(. d('tcrmine(l n(,ccssarilv 1)v its ability t() (m'rv
21L IBM., i)p. t7-51;.
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telel}h{me traffic; that value ('ould (:ome flom prestige, a claim (m a section of tile sta-
tionary orbit, a wide bandwidth service (such as television), or military cotnmunications.
Many questions were left to be answered, however. V_q]at about competiti{m fl-om AT&T
and RCA? Should government support be sought? :'_
The recommendations of the Hughes task torce strongly endorsed tim Rosen satellite
prol}osal. Hughes had a cost advantage that derived, according to the task force, from the
"Hughes brand of system engineering." NASA, RCA, Space Electronics, and the Army had
proposed solving the problenis {}f geosynchronous satellites with large complex space-
{Tall, while Hughes alone (successfully) had attempted to design a chea t} lightweight
spacecraft. The task force rec{munended starting immediately to capture the prestige of
having the first satellite in {}rhit, fun{ling the development {>f the Iraveling-wave tube
sel}aralely as a c{}mmercial product, and exph}ring cooperation with (;eneral Telephone. e:
Following a briefing a week later on 26 October 1959 by Dr. A.\Q Haeff of the task
torce, I,A.. "Pal" Hyland, I hlghes {;eneral Manager, suggested delerniining whether new
technologies developed for satellite communications could be patented and coordinating
et]orts with NASA as other firms had done on At{relic Energy {2}remission projects. On
th{}se projects, the g{}vernmenl tinanced the {levelopment {}ta type o, {:lass of react{)r btlt
allowed iildtlstrv to devel{}p it c{mnnercially and t{} retain conntlercial rights over the
i}atenls that it generaled. Hyland also urged that dialogue with l}otential partners n{}I tie
engaged until after both these issues were resolved. Finally, he decided, the development
of the !raveling-wave tube shoul{l proceed {}nly if its vahle were coniparable !o other
research l}ro.ie{:ts. :_
(}n 5 Noveml}er 1959, D{mal{l Williams {if Hughes traveled t{} NASA headquarters for
a meeting with l lomer .1. S!ewart, wh{} headed a small planning grou 1} under NASA
A{hninistrat{ir T. Keith {;lennan. Ahh{iugh most thighes senior executives were not Ioo
upset at tile thought of NASA taking over their l}atent rights, {Villialns, the ii_tventor of the
orbit and ahitude control system, pretaced his discussions with a statement that Hughes
did not wal]l to lose their l}roprietary rights by talking to NASA. Stewart assured hinl !hat
this w{/uld not happen. Williams elnphasized the Hughes interest in proceeding with their
salelliie program as a commercial venture. Stewart saw the Hughes-thnded commercial
conlmunicalions satellite program as being in line with the traditional U.S. policy of let-
ling the private sector run telec{}mmunicati{}ns, but, Stewart warned with some t}re -
science, a t;Icti{}n in {]{ingress would of)pose privalely owne{l comnlercial connninlications
satellites.-"
As with Hughes, AT&T was f}roceeding wi!h its own c{}mmluiications satellite pro-
gram. During most of 1{.}59, AT&T concentrated on building antennas, transniitters, and
receivers f{}r the Echo program. By Novembm, successful Moon-b{}unce experiments had
been c{mducted belween AT&T's Bell Teleph{}ne l.aboralories facilities at Crawford Hill,
New .]ersey, and .]PL's {;{}l{lst{}ne t;tcilities)" AT&T au{l several of the other coral}antes
_6. S.(;. l,ulz t{I A.V. I la{'l], "E{on{}nli{ Asl}{'cis of Sat{'llil{' {]{}innnnli{ alion," 13 {}ci{ll}{.i l':),r}{,}, I tugh{'s
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interested in smellitc comnnmic,ltions (nozably ITT, bm also I lughes) viewed dw gr<mnd
facilities as the most impofla.nl coml){mcq'H of a communicalions ,_mellitc svslcm. In gen-
eral, from this early pmiod m the prcsenl, more mom,v has h,t'en sport! oft ,qrotmd stations
than <m the commtmica, tions satellites thcmse]v,ps. The prcvah,nce of the Bell Telephone
I,aboramrics technolog 7 in ils own sySIClllS suggestt'd Io AT&T's rvsearchcrs that the coln-
party had a technological advantage mx'r <t/her companies.:"
In ad(lidon to work oft passive satcllit(',;, such as Echo, NI'8,:T wns n(_t ncg-h'(+ting ,wily('
satellite design. By August 1959. Ix'roy (:. Tillots(m, a s('nior engiuccr at Bell Telei)h()ll('
I.at)(mmJri,Ps, had described at salellitu &'sign (luitc similar 1()qk'lstar in a ,ncmo,an(lum,
and anodmr Bell mem_randum des(ribc(I a satellite ll';tV('lillg-D,':t\'t _ tut)t', l_v Ihe e]ld of
lgY.), studies of spacecraft power systems (such as sMm cells, Ni-(:d ba.ttt'rics, and l)(:-l)(:
C()I1VUI'I('FS), S,ll'tL('IIII'CS. S,]);,I('(' onvil-()lllll(ql|, th('l'lll_I] control, and allitlld(' c<_ntl-ol also had
bct'n complclcd. Perhaps more itnp<_rtatH was a ,qrowing COmlltilm<+'nl l_ the dcveloptl_t'nt
_>t+acli,,'t" salcllilcs. In Ihe word:., of Pi,prcc: "'lY+ Ihe cnd oF 1959 tmr lhoughls wcr,p dirccled
toward ;t simph', lov¢-allitudt' atlive salcllitc as Ihc next sl<.,p. "_
NASA Joins the Game
l+,v the end of 1959, the x'ari_nts commet-ci,d cotnmttnicati<ms satcllilc proOf+ares wcrc
tnovillb_ along. [ htghcs had dcsigncd thc basic S_rll¢+_ >1_1 S:tlcllitc, and it was considering,
developing lh;tl satellite in pal+tntwshil ) with NASA. +` AT&T and NASA wt'rc tinishing
prcparations for Echo, and the firm was procccding wilh an 3.(live salcllitc design. N:\SA,
the' fledgling sl)acc agency, slill had n_ commuuicafions satellite p_dicy dvspitc its 1)arlici -
pali+m in the Echo pr<>gram.
Aside trom Ech<+, the first rctcrcncc iu the diarics o[ NAN:\ Adntinistrator -I. Kcith
(;lentl,m to {ommutHcalions slttcllil_,s is an entry {htled 27.[ttly 1960, itt which hc refers to
a meeting with (;e<Hrgc t>_. Kistiak<twsky, thv 1)rcsidcnt's science advisor +, to talk a|)ottt com-
mttnicad<ms satcllites. The two wcvv comcrncd thal F, tthlic policy had not ])t't+tl devcl<q)vd
in this art'a, yet the +'l),-cssttrcs gcnetatcd by AT&T and h,v tim military its well as hv other
in(htslri,tl SUpl)licrs arc lmilding u I) quite ,t []rc.""
The ll('Xl day, (;lennan assigned Rol:,crl (;. Nttnn, .11., N:XS;\'s Assislatlt (;t,tlCt;ll
(',ounscl, the task of preparing an <mllinc of a position paper to Ix' dclivcrcd at a cabinet
mccting in which NAS:\ w_mld request tcspmlsibility tilt preparing administratim+ policy
<m comnnmicalions satellites. A wcck later, Ntmn and.John A. Johnson. NASA's (;choral
(Mtmsel, met with (;lerman to discuss what was now called "the c<mmnmicalions satcllitc
prol:,lt'm." The tollowing days' diar\ cntrics were iillcd with l-et'erences to communicatior_s
+;att'llilcs, including an 1 l .,\ltgltsl mcclb_g ,+'¢illt an :YI'&F (]clcgati<)l_ lha! had bccn CXl)loJr-
lug the 1)<)ssibility _tt a,jtfint c_mununicalions Salcllitc program witll partners in l:_ritain,
France, arid West (;crm;mv. In thc space of a Few days, NASA, at leant as evidenced by
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(;lennan's diary entries, had gone fi'{mt a position of ahnost no interest in communica-
l,itms satellites to one {}f very high interest--even "owning the 1)rol)lem. '':''
NASA had {Dtl{:el/lrated oil passive satellites, as specified ill the" 1{359 agleellteltl with
DoD, and had assmned that the Pcntag{m w{mld be resp{msil]le for active satellites. Thai
policy was about to change. After consulting with Budget Director Maurice H. Stans and
Deputy Secretary of l)efense.|ames 11. Douglas, Jr., Glennan devel{}ped a new agreement
with l}oD that allowed NASA I,{}t}r{}cce{I with an active {:ommunical,ions satellite pr<}gram.
Discussions with (;eneral CounselJohnJohns<m made it clear 1o Glennan lha1111a11v ol,her
policy prol)lems had to be solved its well.
AT&T temahted tile leading firm with it {'{mtmunicati{ms satellite pr{}gratn, although
on 19 August 1959, (;e{}tge Mete]If of {;eneral Electric, contractor f{)r tit{" military com-
munications satellite Advent, {onmnmicated to {;lennan his firm's iltl,etest ill deveh}ping
a c{}mntercial launch and data-acquisition service, including a Pacific Ocean laltnch site.*'
AT&T, it] {'{)llllasl, ;,++';iswilling to put its own m{}ney into satellite c<}nnnut]+ications. ()n 15
Sepletttl)er 1<..}."}{.}, (;et}l'ge Best alld William Baker {>t"AT&T met with (;lennan to provide
more background {}11AT&T's interesl ill conmnn]icati<}ns satellites. They inlormed hint
]hal, XI'&T was i}repaved to sl}end $3<) million lot three satellite tlights--m{}re if they had
any success. This was the first proposal {;lennan had received ft-ont in(hlslt+y in which {{}m-
|}any, rather than g{}vernmetH, funds were to be (<}ntmitl,ed.
Ahn{}st at week late]; on 21 Septentb¢w, as {;lennan dis('ttssed his up{:{mting trip i.o Bell
Telephone Lal){tratorics for an Echo delnonstration, his lawyers and detmty argued that
his preselt(:e would give the al}pearance of NASA SUl}port fi)r £I'&T. {;lellllan was u{}t
anmsed, tte wrote in his diary: "AT&T is going to be in tit<+' business and if we are going
t{} take leadershi I} it] g+etling this program off l,he grotln(I, it seenls I,{} me that we have I(}
take a positive rather than a negative viewpoint in itlaltels of this kind." (;lennan allelld-
ed l,he (tenmnstrati{}n l,he next day. A picture of {;lenmut an(l l,he six Federal
Counntmications (2mmdssion (FCC) c{munissioners it] atl,endance 'was l,ransntil,l,e{I I)v |at-
simile to the Naval Research l+al){tratory, then returned t{> Bell in Itohndel, NewJerse),
via the Echo balh}{m. {;lennan was impresse{1. 'r
N{metheless, the deveh}pntent of adminislral,i{}n policy {}n c{mununicati<}ns saMlites
did not move torward during lhe tinal days of l,he Eisenh<}wer a(hninistration. Noventber
came and went with n{} sign of the cal}inet pat)er {;lennan had prop{}sed tea<ling sin{-e
.luly and had promised for the 11 N{>vemtter 1{.}6{}cabinet meeting. (;lennan seems to have
1}eel1_ surprised that I 1 N(}veml}er was a h{}li{tav. {;enerals D,qIton B. I}et+sol]+s (Eisenh{>wer's
chief {}t slaff) and An(h+ewJ. {;<}odpaster (While t t<)use staf[ secI'etHFy) chided {;lennan,
telling hint that the prcsidenl, wanted I,o menti{m c{}innmnications satellites in his Stalte ()f
the Unhm message. On 7 Deccnl])el + 195{.}, (;lennan, Nunn, an{lJ{}hnson met with reple-
sent]tires {}t AT&T in their Manhattan oft]ces. {;lennan suggested thal, AT&T might I)e
t}etter off by mittunizing its role in satellite conmmni(al,i{ms to avoid m{mopoly prol]lems.
The provision of gr{mnd stations for the upcoming satellite i)r{}grant at no cos! to the _,()v-
eFnntenl would be a good sialI, lie suggested.
The lleXl day al a NASA meeting <}11the sut}jecl, At}e Silverswin, NASA's dire{'t{}r of
space flight programs, t}b.je{'ted Str(}l]gly I'{} the t}resen('e <}f 1)rivate c{>m])anies in the com-
munications satellite business. {;lennan was amazed. Anol,her meel,h]g x++'ithAT&T, this time
in Washingt{m, included the {tel,ails of their l}rogram. The eft}grant impressed {;lennan,
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but he was beginning to beliew" that the Washinglon establishnmnt was too anti-business to
lolerate an AT&T monopoly of satellite communications. After giving Eisenhower a copy
of the communications salellile briefing t)apcr on 19 Decenlbel: (;lennan presented Ihe
paper Io the whole cabinet on 20 l)ecember 1959. Eisenhower released the details of the
paper at Ill(' end of lhe month as his communications satellite policy, h emphasized the
traditional privale nature of the U.S. telecommunications industry. :_
()n 93 December 1959, as rnost rnemb(ws of the Eisenhower administration were pack-
ing their hags, and while Keith (;lennan was taking his (:hrislmas holiday, Robert Nunn
and John Johnson met wilh Auorney (;eneral William f'. Rogers to discuss NASA's future
relationship with AT&T. Nunn, file special assislalll fof communications satellile policy.
was not a political appointee; he and (;eneral Counsel.lohnson continued al NASA under
lhe Kennedy presidency. They outlined key elemenls of fulurc NASA policy. Nunn
believed thal "AT&T [was] reaiislically Ihe only compa ly capable of doing the job." (:)n
the other hand, the monopoly power of AT&T and ils altempl lo "'l:)reernpl" lhe role of
communications satelli0e t:,uildcr and operator "would ill ell'eel selecl AT&T as the "cho-
sen inslrulnent' of the United States." Rogers argued that the governnlent must not act to
put AT&T in a preemptive position, nor must it appear to do so. Moreover, Rogers
advised, "the Executive Branch probably sh<>ul<t obtain at least the acquiescence of
(;ongress." Nunn and Johnson showed Rogers the (;lennan p<)siti<m paper, which the
White House had released. Although he ha<l no overall problem wilh Ihe paper, Rogers
ot_jecled to lwo senlences lhat specified "private enlerprise" and rej(-cled governmenl
operation of a communicalions salellile svslcm. The sentences remained in the slatemenl. "'
The Kennedy Administration Takes Control
Betore his election, John F. Kennedy's attitudes loward lhe space program are not
clear, bln his lransilio)l lean) developed so)n(: s_ron g fi,elings aboul file space program i])
gelleral and aboul satellite ((mmmnicalions in particular..lerome B. Wiesner, assigned the
lask of examining lhe U.S. sl)a(e program and advising lh( r presid(q)l, was crili(al of l}le
spa(:e pr()grmn. In parliculm, he believed that developing a satellite communications sys-
tem was b('y(:,nd Ill(" invesl)))enl capabilities of indHslry.'" Wiesnen lhoug]), bad pro, posed
a.joinl U.S.-U.S.S.R. comrnuni( ati,.ms salellile program in 1959) / Lying beneath Wiesner's
evaluali_))) of c(:,mn)unicalions satelliles was a strong belief lhal this new lechn(:,log T
should nol become an AT&T monop(:,ly. The Kennedy administration was prepared l<)
c,vermrn tim Eisent)(:,wer view I:hal privale illduslry was the ]ogical (:andidate to deve]()p
commercial salellite communications. They were n,:)t alone inside Washinglon.
Despile II)e positive ten)per of lalks b(-lwe('n N,.kSA alld AT&T, NASA civil servanls made
il clear lhat they were againsl AT&T involvement in salellile communications. :Ls (;lennan
w)ole in his diary: "[Leonard] Jatti: and Silverslein seem[ed] de/ermined lhal anylhing
sh<)rl of having someon(" oth,tT than AT&T win lhe COml)etilion will be tantamount Io fol-
lowing a 'chosen ilislrllllieY)l' policy '')e (,lennan had don(" his besl, ])Ill he left behind civil
servanls who seemed strongly 1)iased against privale industry, or ;11leasl against AT&T.
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That bias pemneated NASA policy on satellite ground stations. Both AT&T and ITT
had offered to provide stations for active communications satellite experiments at no cost
to the government. NASA accepted AT&T's offer tot gronnd stations in the United States,
but the space agency felt that the State Department, rather than AT&T, should make
arrangements for foreign stations. Although AT&T already had cleared tim way, NASA
reached formal agreements with Britain (14 February 19{51) and France (16 February
1961) to participate in the testing of Relay, a medium-ahitude repeaten and Rebound, a
low-altitude balloon retlecton
Part of defining satellite communications policy invoh,ed determining the separate
responsibilities of NASA and the FCC. Those agencies defined their respective roles in a
memorandum of understanding signed 27 February 1961. The FCC remained responsi-
ble for spectrum allocation, while NASA looked after technolo_' and policy.':' I toweven
the question of puhlic vmsus private ownership remained to be answered. On 27 Febrttarv
1961, new NASA Administrator lames E. Webb met briefly with Robert Nunn and asked
lot a briefing on communications satellite developments. The following day, Nunn oblig-
ed. He emphasized that NASA had a policy formation role and suggested that Wel)b read
both the United Research report thw_ring government ownership of communications
satellites mad the Glennan cabinet paper favoring private ownership.
The question of public versus priwite satellite ownership also entered the dratlting of
NASA's budget. In March 19t")1, NASA was preparing its fiscal year 1963 budget estimates.
The budget rested on several assumplions--nanmly, no funding lot operational systems
(only demonstrations would re<Teive support), ground support, or passive satellite devel-
optnelm +' The NASA tiscal year 1962 budget proposed I)v the outgoing Eisenhower
administration included $34.6 million tk)r communications satellite develol)ment. Some
controversy lingered as to how much industry should reimbnrse NASA for co,nmunica-
tions satellite development. In December 1{)60, Glennan had asked Budget Director
Maurice Stans to include the $10 million industry contribution in the NASA budget, so
that the government would not be dependent on industry. Slans refused. Then, dnring a
14January 1961 press conference on/he NASA budget, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh
L. Dryden was asked why in¢lustr_, given their obvious interest, was paying only $10 million.
l)ryden gave an tmcommitted response. The toltowing month. Webb, NASA Associate
Administrator Robert C. Seamans,.]r., and Senator Robert S. Kerr (D-OK) discussed the
$10 million. Kerr and Webb agreed that the figure should appear in the supplenwntal trod-
gel, alld the ,,_ll) million finally showed up in the March amendment to the bll(tgel. _:'
Meanwhile, AT&T was losing ground at NASA headquarters. In April, AT&T
President Fred Kappel and NASA Administrator.James Webb exchanged a curions series
of letters. In a letter of 5 April 1960, Raq_pel complained that D,k'l)b had stated publicly
thai "NASA [had] yet to receive a firm proposal fiOltl any fOlllpany" t.o liIrln a comrnuni-
cations satellite development partnershi I) with NASA. Kappel recapped AT&T's commu-
nications with NASA over the pas! year and pointed out that, in its Relay pr<)l)osal, AT&T
t3. NASA, ..le_o*tault¢al a_id ;tslm_lauli¢al l:'vetils o/ 19:_10, Vashington, l)(;: I].S. (;_Jvt',nzncnl Ihinlin,g
()[licc. 19(121, pp..l-8; Minulvs: .\dministlato1's Sial] Mc'eling, 18 Jamuax',, 26Jamuu.y, and 2 Fcbluauv 19lil,
NASA I lis|orv Otlit c.
44. :{,l>e Silvmslcm to Assislanl l)ircclors, el al., "Fiscal _d';u 1963 Plcliminary P,uclg_'l Estimates; addi-
tional int_lmali_m t_mccfninR," 1 Ma,'ch 1961; A..Sihczslein tc_ It. (;_t'll, "l)csignalions tot Missicms and
l'avloads." I March 1961, NASA I [ismrv ()lticc.
'15. Robmt (:, S_'am;ms, NASA l'xil hm',vicw, St'amahs Folder, NASA Ilistorv ()ttice, pp. 1"_,, 25-26:
tlugh L. t)lvdcn, Prcss (;{)nf/-iCllCC Irans_ ript, l't .]anna] y l'91il. NASA I fislory ()fti<e, p. 21 :.]ames E. \Vcbb l_)
The lilt('( mr, Bulvau ,)l the I_u<tgcL 13 M;mh 19{;I, NASA []islc_, x ()l[](c: Robert 1.. R_)sh,)lh ,ttl ._l:tmirz:str:tlive
/li_lot)' r!l,k'A.'_,t, 195,'¢ 1965' (Washingu,n. l)(: 1:.,";. (;oVt'l'nmcnl l'l-inm_g ()flit c, 1!t66), p. 19.5.
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had w_hmtccrcd to share costs, cvcn to contract privately, for rockets and launch tat|li-
lies. "__A_'bt) rcl)lh'd in a rather unfriendly lone: "I am Io1(| Ihat yollr |oIler of Dccelnl)cr
14th was (le]ivcrcd I)y a number of your associates [.lames Fisk and George Bcs/], Ihal an
extended conference ensued, and d]al i! was lllaflc clear Ihal NASA woil]d nol DCFIlli|
your company, or any other, Io pre-empl lhc l)rogram of lilt" United Slates in this area."':
ill COll[l'ilsl, (;hqlIlatli'S I'CSpol/st" Io tile 14 l)ccmnl)cr mceling was thai AT&T had pro-
posed "a ralher good pl'OgI';.llll. ',+> The })altl(" lines v:crc being drawn, and AT&T was on
lhc wrong side.
Drawing the Battle Lines
()n 12 April 1961, Russian Mi_jor Yuri A. (;agarin achicw'd die thsl manned orbiud
flighl. A few days laler, Ill(' (|lib|Ill Bav ()f Pigs dcllaclc ran |Is ill-falcd course. Among lh0
many I_7.S. reactions lo lhesc events was an urge Io do something spcctacular ill spacc
|/('t()l-(" lh(" Soviet Union. Some suggested |hal s|)i|('(" VGU-, Ill(" l'Ca]lll of Ill0 military, not
NASA, Ihc civilian space agency. _'' On 20 ,\pril 1961, Presidenl Kennedy asked' Vice
lhcsidenl I.vndon B. Johnson, ill his roh' as chairlnan of lit(" Space (:ouncil, Io roe(m>
mend a program for Ihc l_Tnilcd Sutlcs t()l)eal Ihc Soy|c! l_nion in space.Johnson replied
Ihal Ihc Unii('d Slales could prol)ably win a r:wc to Ill{" Moon.
As ttl_' United Sla.t('s cmba,kcd on l[liS lil(c I(I lht' _1OOli, lhc F(',(] became embroih'd
ill colnnutnicalions satellite policy. ()n 19.]anuary 1961, Ill{" r(,gulatory agency authorized
AT&T lo launch an exp(!rimelHal ((imnnlni(ali()ns sal('llile svsl(qn, hs ()Ill}: prc\ious sig-
nifi(an! ('()mmtmi('alions salelli|(" a(ti(m had b('en lo reop('n (h)cke! 11966 (known ;is
"al)ov(' 8!)()," bc(ausc it lcla|c(l l() lhc general allocalion of fr('qu(mcies al)ovc 890 ]m'g,l-
hertz) in May l.t)(_(l (and modified in Dec¢'mber 196(i as ¢hwkcl 13522. Io address _mlv fre-
quencies for' sate|lilt c(mmn,nicafions), which soughl views (m du' frequencies rcquircd
l'()l S])a('_," (-Ollllllllni(alions, Ill l'('S])OliS(' Ill whil[ S('('lll(!(l [() l)(" it |fish If) decision in Ill("
salcllilc communications ,ucna, lh(' F(:(: opcm'd dockc! 141)24 in March 1961 m solicil
opinions on lhe "adminislrafivc and reg-ulalory probh:ms" associalcd wilh commercial
salcllil(' {'Olllllltlllif'aliollS SVSl('llIS.
The rcsl)onscs to F(;( : dock('ls I 1866, 13522, illl(l 14024 tigtucd in the icslimony Riven
bctore lit(" ! |OtlSC (]ollllllil|('(" ClIl Nci('n(c till(1 :\Sllon_lllli('s during hearings on comlnuni-
cations salellilcs held 8-11) May 1!161. Tlmsc hcarings again dt-II/OllSllalcd lh0 willinglwss
of privalc induslr\' co invt's! and build in the field of salcllilc communicalions, but lhc
rclalionship I)('tw_'t'n gOV('l'lllll('n| till(| induslry had ycl to be defined. In his opening
i('nlarks, Comlnillcc chair Over|on Brooks (1)-l_&) so| lhc lone: "The proper rclalionship
1)('lw('('l/ (_OV('l'lllll('lll till(1 ]ll(tltlSll'y lllLISl l)C defined . . . Ill(" 111()s1 desirabh' business
ill-I'alllg(.'lll('lllS should t)c dclcrmincd ill the earliesl possible time.'"'
The response of (;choral Elcclric |o F( _(; dockc| 14024 mirrored |hal firm's cagcrm'ss
lo.join thc (omlnttnicati<ms salellilc ticld. The company proposed tha! the acrospact" and
comnu,nicalions indl|s|ri('s.iointly raise $250 million to ])u| the (;encral Elcctri( medium-
t6. Ftcd R. KaplwlU_Jamcs E. Wvbh, 5 \ptil 1961._c_1_ in,]_dm M l.ogsclcm, gvn cd..,4al. I'x/d,.4.g
If; g_.t,'.,m,.: _,,b,_h.d Do,...'.t_ i. t1: lli_tm_ _q d: I.'_ (iv|! S/_m,' I'm:_'_.m. U,lu.: III. ,S]m_ .Ip/di_.ti.._
I",'CIshingl_m. I)( :: N,\.";,\. t_,llhtoming).
17. .]amvs E. Wcbb Io Iqvd R. Kal)l)cl, ,,.a,AI n il 1961, in l:_gsdon, l']x[d.rm,¢ the I t_1¢_)7,,_, _}_l_*]_s 111: 's/m,,
_/,,/,qi_:tlUm_,t01_11{ olniI_ g.
IS. (;I,..nnan, The' Birth ./ .M l,",. _,,p. 29t).
t9. This nUR,RC_,liol_ _'_cn came horn _ithin NAN\. Scc l)_,n ()sllandm I,, lh: _,_'aln;ll_n. "Rc.llc(ti_ms on
the ,\lm'liC an Posm_c in 'gpa_{'," 21 :klnil 1961, N,XS,\ }lisl_n_ ()lti_c.
."){I. }lolls(' (:l',llllllillt',:' (_II S( i('ll_. ,,' alld ;\Sll_lllallli(s, (:.mmu.ie.lio*ts &dclhhs, l_:_l l. 87th (:ong.. lsl
st',,,,.. 1961, (87) IIIS!)S I-:\, p. 1.
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ahitude equatorial system of ten satellites in place using the Atlas-Agent launch vehicle.
Another $250 million would be needed to build the ground system. (;eneral Electric
pointed out that the connnunications industry had sufficient expertise to build the
ground stations, and the aerospace industry had the expertise to huild the satellites.
General Electric was ready to invest $25 to $._0 million of its own money in satellite com-
munications; government support, but not government flmding, would be required. As
did ITT, General Electric called attention to the need for foreign participation and the
apparent capability of the United States to support only one commercial comnlttnications
satellite system. Moreover, as had all the other presenters except AT&T, (;enela] Electric
emphasized the importance of avoiding a monopoly.
I,ockheed's response to docket 14024 was a proposal fin" the creation of a new orga-
nization, q>lesat, to operate a global system of geosynchronous commlmications satellites,
two over the Atlantic Ocean and two over the Pacific Ocean. Communications carriers,
other companies, and the general public would own Telesat. Telesat would not have any
foreign owners, but foreign organizations would have their own ground stations and
Inight receive an undivided ownership interest in the satellites, but not in Telesat itself.
Lockheed foresaw that government subsidy would be advisable during Telesat's early years
to reap the prestige benefits of inaugurating a global communications satellite system;
moreover, the $200-$315 million system would not be self-supporting until sometime in
the mid- to late 1970s.
Meanwhile, NASA attempted to sort out satellite communications policy and the
fulfilhnent of Kennedy's wish to see the United States beat the Soviet Union in space. On
12 May 1961, shortly after the premature closing of the ttouse hearings, NASA Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans presented NASA Administrator James _,_l)b and Deputy
Adnfinistrator t lugh Dryden with a stnn,nary of the accelerated NASA program propose_t
in response to the president's desire to beat the Soviets. h included communications satel-
lites, as well as a manned hmar landing and meteorology projects." Memoranda between
Seamans and NASA counsel Robert Nunn raised the question of why NASA should devel-
op an operational comnmnications satellite system. As Nunn pointed out, "the conmmni-
cations industry continues to atfirm its own clear intent and obvions ability to achieve the
same ohjective. '''_
In any case, NASA was proceeding with its own experimental communications
satellite program and, in carrying it out, relied on the expertise of private industry. On
18 May 1961, NASA awarded RCA the contract to build Relay, a mediuln-ahitude repeater
satellite. Ironically, RCA had stated publicly its preference for a twenty-four-hour satellite.
Although NASA did not announce the standings, the ranking apparently was ( 1 ) RCA, (2)
ttughes, (3) Philco, and (4) AT&T. Some NASA participants in the evaluation process
expressed surprise; they had expected the AT&T proposal to be better, if not the best. The
deciding 1actor was apparently the RCA ten-watt traveling-wave tube. AT&]" was not entire-
ly out of the game, however.
The relationship between government (NASA) arid industry still had not been set
forth when President Kennedy made his speech of 25 May 1961 that challenged the
nation to land an American on the Moon before the end of the decade. That speech
included satellite communications as a NASA goal. ':_On 15June 1961, Kennedy directed
51. Robert Sca_.lllalL'-; to JailleS Webb and ttugh l)ryden, "Status of planning till an accelerated NASA
program," 12 May 1961, NASA | listory Of tit c.
52. Robert Ntmn, "Memorandum fin the Associate Administrator," 16 May 1961, Nulm Papers. NASA
1 listory ()trice.
53. NASA News Rclcast' 61-112, "Stal{'lncllt by,James E. Webb, Administrator," and NASA News Release
61-115, "Budget Briefing," 25 May 1961; Minutes, Administralor's Stall Mt'eting, Thursday, 25 May 1961. NASA
History Oltlct..
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tile Space (:oun+,il to study conmmnications salellilc policy. Thc F(:(: was delaying ils
decision <m gov<<'rnmcut-hldustry.joinl v¢'nlt,r+,'s until lit+,' fit+st wt.,ck of July+ aftra the Spa+`+`"
('antncil mtttdy. I)iscussious t)+,'tv,x.+,,n NASA and AT&T mrcr patent policy reachcd a con-
+,lttsion that |)leas+,'d th+,. FC(: comnlissiottcr ;tnd lit+,+ ,tssistant atl(itncv g,+,'n+,'ral. This F,oli-
cy not only gay<, the govcrmn+,In royalty-fv+,,t , us<, of A'I'&"] llatcnts, but also lic+,'nsing
rights." NASA ,.\dministrator !A_+Itb had a cl+,'ar vision <ff the al)proptiatc sph+,'r+,'s ol
responsibility of NASA and the F(:C, wilh whi+,h NASA had a ttt+,'mtnandtun t)f ttttdcr-
standing. Tit+," F(:(; was "to take p,opcr action on the probh,,nt of organizinR the r+,.s<mrccs
of privat+,' iltdttsllV in S,tlClt ;t itl;.tnllCi- ;.Is Io IttCcI _<)V+,'l'ltltl('lttal I'C(]tlil-t'tlt+,'lltS+ atll([ ('Olt[()t'llt
to public policy, '+while NASA had "the,job <)f d+,'vchlping the spa+`+`' l+,'+,hn<_l<)t.,_'which any
privatc organiz:tlion authorized by thc I:( :(;will l)e ablc t<+ ttlilizc to pr<>vidt + comnntmca-
lion st'rvic('s lo l])+,' pul)lic.'""
Tim I lottsc +,ommuni+,ati<)ns sat+,qlite h+,'arings, SUSlmndcd ill May all tit<.' request ot
NASA, r+,'sum+,'d <m 13July 1!)61. Tttc F,urp<)sc of th+,! hcarinRs, ill Ih+,' wot'ds ot c<)mntittct"
('tlail" ()VCl't<)lt Bl'()oks, ".,vlts, ;tlll()n_- others, "t<) d+,'t('rmhl+,+ the t'X1Clll that privat+," industry
should pauti+,illatc in lh+,. SF,a+,e cotnlntmi+,ati<m itv_Rt;utl." The tcstintoltv of _v++k'l:,l:,is illus-
traiN+`" oi his altilUd+,' towa,d industry involv+,'nlt'ltl ill C<)lllllltlltiC_tli<)ItS s;tl+,'IIit+,'S. V+,qlcn
qu+,'stioncd about tlm financial conlrilmti<ms o1 pl-iv,ttc industvv, Wcl)l) rcsptmd+,'d lhat
"lhcrc art' certain things no pl-ivatc in(htslt-v can und+,'rlak+,' Oll it:,; own al this particular
stagy o.+lhc _amc.'""' This is a slrang-t' comnlt'nt. ,\s wv ]|arc set'n, AT&T was willing t<) fund
c<munttnicati<ms satellite rescar+,h and dcvclol)mCnl Itx itself, and (;.envl+al El+,'Ctl-ic and
[+<)ckhc+,'d had l_)l+m+,'d 'ijoint-v+,:ntur+,' (OlpOvati<ms" to d+,'vel<+I) atnd Ol)erat+," a cotnnmrcial
Ct)l'nlnunic;tli<)lls satlcll+l+c sysi+,'ln.
Wtq)It scctns to have l)c+,'n c<mlmittcd It) ])rival+`' own+,,rship of thc satellite communi-
c;|ti(lllS £yX|+Cltl, ].u+,q_.'rably by a joint v+,'nltn+,' of intm-natitmal conttntulicali<ms carri+,,rs as
I)r_)posed by lit+.' F(',(:. Wel)l) ,tlso st+tins to halve ]_+,'('n contmittcd It) NASA +,'onll'()l o1' sp;at'e
poliQ and spat+,' tcchnol<)<<y issues, l Its stand on olft'ring htun+,h scvviccs to htdttstrv, fttv-
th('lmOvt', sccnled to have shill+,'d, lu May 191;I, h+,' was willing It) launch an AT&T salcl-
lilt', bttl hc had not b+,'en willing lit+,' month l)clor+,' wht'n his acrimtmious c_)rresp+,mden+,+,'
wilh l_tppcl look l)lacc,
Wcbl) told Frc<l I_tpl)Cl of :\T8cT tlm( NA,";A v¢<)tthl sell him laun+,'h st'rvices. ,qh<)rl]'+'
llmr+,ml'tcr, NASA ann<)unt+,'d the award of lit+,' Relay conlract to R(_A; thcn on 97 .]uly
1961, NASA and AT&T entered into agt'+,+cln('nts l_)r the ix.imlmlsable launch of T(,Istar.
()n 11 Attgusl 1961, NASA siRncd it solc-sourcc contract with t hlghes to build Syncom, its
til's,l gt+osytl+,'hronotts sat+,qlil+c.":
By the ('rid of 1961. Iv,'o F,assiv+,: t:xl)criments (NASA/AT&T's Echo Italh)on and I'lol)'s
Pr<!icct Wcst Ford), two ntcdium-altitud+,' activc +,'XF,+,'t+inwnts (N.-\SA/R(_A's Relay and
.-\T&T's lclslar), atntl Iw<l Rco:+,yncln_)nous expcvim+,'nts Dol)/(;ent'ral El+,'ctric's Advent
and NAS,,\/llttght's's Syn+,om) w+,q-+,'under way. All le+,hnological options wet+, + in phty.
(;choral Willianl M. lluun+,'s, lht'n c<>nnn;uld<.'r of the Arnly Adv+,'nt M;.tnag+,'nl+,'Itl Agcncv.
tcstificd bcl_>vc (;ongt+ess <hal th+,' nlilit;uv Advcnl sal+,'llite syst+,ml could handl+," all trallic
needs ;tnd w<)tthl I)c ready in 1965. Weltlt and l)v. IGdward C. Welsh, F.xccutiv+,' I)ir+`'ctov of
the Sl)aCC (:<mncil, bolh tcstilicd at th+,' sam<" hcat+ing that only one svst+,'in would bc viabh'.
W+,'lfl> statt'd that "you simply cann<_t Slal+l two or thrcc totnlnunicati<m salcllitc
5-I. Mimttc,;, ,\dministralor"+ Stall Mt'<'lin_ l'httlsdax. 22Jttnt' 19GI, N,,\F,:\ lli'+,tot x ()lille.
7).'1. l[()ttSt' (_<)llllllill('C {)11 ,"_( iCII(C itllf] .'\Slll)tl;tllli(s, (,'ODItlllllti(flliOtlS _:ll_'[lit:_. I_rlt! [, ,'RTth (_()11_., l",t
st,s_., 19ill, (ST) ]1189S-1-.\, p. 16,t.
7_G. Ihld, I:'. II;I.
:-)7. In ;t 19(;<) _ 1+nxt'Ixati(_n wilh +gt';tlnans. (;Ictln;_n [lad stlg_csl¢,d iunt stuh a "stflc-,,out _ e" l)iC+( llr_'nl_'nt
ol lhc l lughcs s'_stciii alt+.'l tilt' poli_ had l>cvn wo_ kvd out. S('illl+_iis NASA ]'_x.h Intcrvi<,w. p. ?,_.
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systems .... Theretore, the Govermnent policy has been to say we will create the condi-
tions under which one system will be established."""
The situation called for some policy direction tiom the VChite House. That policy was
shaped 1)y Edward Welsh, tormer legislative assislant to Senator Stuart Symington and,
since 1951, a memt)er of the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Commit lee who had
helped drat]c the Space Act of 1958. Welsh's experience made him somewllal a political
partisan and a strong advocate of "trtlst-lmsting." Soon after his appointment bv Kennedy
to Ihe Space Council, Welsh suggested that the comnmnications satellite p_;licy was _1
natural ti)r the Space (]otlnci]. hi the next year, he de(ticated more stall time to this isstte
|1|;I.I1 ally other. Welsh influenced Kennedy's 25 May 1961 speech that committed the
United Slates to building a global communications satellite system.
Kennedy wanted the system to be global, be sensitive to the lleeds of the developing
world, and serve the public interest. In response to a request flom the president to pre-
pare a policy recommendation aimed at accelerating the creation of an operational com-
mtmications satellite, '_,kqsh drafted a statement tavoring private ownership and control
and cir<:ulated it among slat'f HleHlbel+s t_-om DoD, NASA, the Slate I)el)arlment , the
Atomic Energy, Commission, the FCC, the Justice Department, the Office of Civil Defense
Management, the Bureau of the Budget, and the ()ffice of the Science Advisor. Even
before the paper was ptfl)lished, Welsh publicly stated that the Space (;ouncil did not t_v¢or
government operation of the satellite system. :+
After Welsh presented the paper at the Space Council meeling of 5 July 1961,
President Kennedy released the paper on 24July. The paper proposed placing r_'sponsi-
I)ility tiw the communications satellite system in private hands. It assigned government the
roles of regulation, negotiation with tiweign countries and organizations, research and
deveh)lmWnt, and latmch services. Subsequently, several liberal members of( _ongress sell|
Kcnnedv a lem, r suggesting that lhe government aw)id any decision that might result in a
satellite communications monopoly. '_'
hi November 1961, President Kemle¢ly asked the Space (;ounci] to prepare a plan for
implementing the program outlined in the 24.July 1961 statement. }_,_lsh decided that
implementation wotfld require legislation, so in September, he hired Dr. Charles S.
Sheldon from the (_ongressiona] Research Service as a technical expert. Sheldon, the son
of an engineer, had a Ph.D. in economics tiom Itarvard. He and Welsh were the primary
writers of the proposed legislation. Welsh tkqt, its C,lennan had before him, thai a polio it
vactmm on communications satellites existed. Welsh also was concerned that, if the pro-
posed system were to I)e privately owned and <_t)erale(I, it ]ntlst 1)e c<)mpetitive, not a
mOnOl)<dy. The final version of the i)hm went to the White House on 30 November 1961.
Comsat
At this point, Congress began to play a role in shaping communications satellite poli-
cy. The thmse had studied the issue as early as 1959, when its Committee on Science and
Astronautics held hearings <m "Satellites tot WorM (:ommunications.'"" In early 1962,
58. ltottsc Committcc on S<icncc and Aslrot]autits. (k,,m,,ira/irm_ ,gatellites, Part 2, 87th Cong., 1st
scss., t961, (87) 111898-I-B, p. 77,!t.
59. Ilal Taylor, "Council Favors l'rivalc Ownership," Mi_ih'_ a,d Hockel_ 9 I'_.lub,. 1!161 ): 11, '10+
60. l.cttcL l htl+)cvt ] htmlflucy , Estc,, Kcli+m'v,,'v, Wavn.t +Mors,.., el at., t<_ Kcmwdv, 2+1Augusl 19C, I, +cpIint-
cd ill SCII;IIc (;l+lllttliltt't' Oll Foreign Rclmi<ms, (,'(J++ljtlltll'lil'all[)ll s ,5alellite AH ++/ 1962, 87th C_>ng., 2<1 scss., 1!t(+2,
(87) S153GI-L pp. 51-54.
61. ]hmsc (2ommitlcc on ,"it icm c and ASIIlllllLIIlit's, .h'rzl+'lli¢+_ [o_ |I;,hl ()mtmu,i+atioP+s, 86th C_mg., lnt
scss., 1959, (86) t11733-3.
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thrc(' comnumicalions satellite hills were introduced into Ihe S('natt+: lilt" Kerr bill (S.
2650, introduced 11 January 1(.)62): th¢' adminislration hill (S. 2814, 27January 1i)62):
and the Kcfauvcr bill (S. 289(I, 26 Fehruarv 1(,)62). ''-'
Thv Kerr bill, which resembled the F(:(; position, tavorcd ownership hy a consortium
of cxisling comnnuticlttions carrit'rs. Tilt' hill would mandale the crcation <)t a new col-
poralion capitali/cd at $500 million. Share's, al $100,()00 each, would be sold in mininnmt
lols o[ live to U.S. c¢)nmlon carrivrs authori:cd by lh(' F(:(;. The Kerr bill would prohihit
,YI'&T fiom going its own way, hut would do littl(' to nfinimize AT&T's dontination of
internati(mal Iclcphony, its the firm prohabl?,' would huy a plurality, if not a mi_jority, of the
shares. S¢'nator Rohcrl Kerr also was a cosp¢msor of the administralion bill, so it is unclear
how conllniltt'd hc was to his own bill. Dclbert D. Smilh, a lawvm" who studied these ,:,"+'ellis,
has ,suggcsl¢,d |ha! Kerr might have b¢'cn Irving I+) make _bc Administration bill look like
lhe middh, ground hetwc('n carrier ownership (his hill) and govcrnmvnt mvnership (the
Kclhuvcr t)ill) 2 _
Th(' Kcl+auver bill, inspired l+)) thal ,_CllatOl" Eslcs K('lmlvcr's distrust of industry's--
especially AT&T's--m<m<>l)olislic tendencies, called for a conmumications satellite system
m,,nt+d and opvrat¢'d hy tlt(+ g<)vernm+.'nt. Kcl+alnm sltpp<)rted his prop<)sal with thrtw main
al'gtllttcnts. First, private ownership would m:olve into a m<mOl)oly. S(+('Olt(|, the initial sys-
tem w<nlld o1 neccssilv consisl of Iow-ahiludc satellites [nf('ri<w Io ge()s+vnchronous ,+atel-
]ties: im'estnlcnI in this initial inliwior system would delay lilt" ('r('ati(Hl ol il Stll)('l+i()Y g('<_.-
SVll('hl'(lllOtlSl sVst('It/. Third, because slttellites wt'r¢' dtwel<)p¢'d at go'¢t+Uttllt(+nI ('x1)(qls,(', lilt"
bt'nctits shoul(t attrue to th(" 1)tthlic, m)t 1<) prot]t-making privale corp<Hatic, ns.
The adnmlistration f)i[[ steered a m/ddh, tout-so lwtw('('n th¢ + Keihuvt'r and Kvrr hi|Is.
11 as, sttlllt'{I thal private ownership maximized ctficicntv. As did Ill{" Kerr bill+ thc
Administralion hill called It)t the tormation <>f a new c<wporalim], hul <lilt" with a broad
ownership |)ast'. Nol only international calricrs, hut other corp<walions and ])rivale citi-
,,.cns could purchase sharcs. The administration bill also placed limits on Ill+.' ntnnlmr of
shares any single cntily could own. Foreign organi_,ati<ms could m,,n shares, too, as well its
gtotnld slaliOllS. ';+
Dcspit( +K{'l_tuvcr's algUmt, nts, it is ot)vious in hindsighl that the bill did not delay g('o-
Syll('hl'oll<)tlS s'¢st('tns; [+_al'lv Bird, (:omsat's first salcllite, lattnched in March 1965, had a
gc()syn(-hr()n(>tts <whil. h is also ()bvi()llS lh.tl lit(" (+()sis o1 satellite (level()l:,n+,('nt w('re I:,<)ln¢.
1)x b.th g<)vm-nnwnt alld industry. AT&T l)aid f()r Ih(' developnwnt ()t Telstar and rcim-
t)urscd NASA tbr tilt" launch s('rvi(cs, tlughcs paid tilt" d(,vt'lopmcnt costs of tht'
pr{)t()tlighI Sxn(_)m satc]lile, alth<)ugh NASA tmdcrwrote the construction of thc a(tual
tJig})I m<)d('ls. ()nlv Relay was ['ntire]v a govcrnm('nt-fmtded saI(']lil(!, })ill tit(" rt'markal)lv
shorl limt, hcl;v(,cn ('()ltil'a('t award and laun(h suggests thai R(iA had ht'('n spending its
()D,'n lll()n('v It)l" P';()lltt" time. ()nlv lattn(h vchich's wt!re c<mq)lct('ly timdt'd l)y lilt' go'v('rn-
m('nt, and, gi'+cn XI&l"s willingness t() [)ay lot latm(hcs, this did not have t<) h(" the cast'.
+I'ht: inlr<)du(ti<m <)f lhes(" titre(' bills ill the Serial(' made il dear ihal AT&T's inv,psl-
m('nI in satt'llitc nlanut,t(turing was v<aslc(l. Tht' <)l)t'raling svstctn was 1o I)e either Sl)On-
st)re(1 ()r (qtlir('ly Ol)('ralt'tl by thc g()vcrntncnt, with no l)htct' [i)t +AT&T slm'llilcs. AT&T,
though, |lad Sl)t'nt m<wc m()nev (m ground stall(tits lhall ()It satellites, t)c(attsc tile lat+g( `
ntml])m +of satt'llitcs in low orl)ii pr()p<_scd for A-I&T's Telstar svstmn li/v<w('d tilt' building
I_2. Dclht.Tt 1). Smith. (;+m_m._6_.tiot+ _,m _,_m'llit+':I Vt_i_m in lb'tm_p_'*l (B_)st(m: AYA'. %!itlt,)lt. 197(_), pp.
93-103.
63. Ibid.. [). 10.t.
()-t. S('ILII(' (iolntll[11_.t. (}11Fmcig, n Rulali_ms. (.'e_m_*ll+_i_vltigm_,'+*_t_'llit+'.bt (g 1062. STIh (I()IIR., 2d st'.,....
19(i2, (H7) S157,%1, I)1). 1',+,-21.
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of simple satellites and complex ground stati<ms. The horn-and-maser AT&T ground sta-
lion design, however, lost out Io cheaper designs using parabolic dish autennas and para-
metric amplifiers. Telslar would not bring home any profits, and AT&T could not fall back
on.just pride in its performance. Problems discovered in tesling caused AT&T to request
a launch delay.":' AT&T's pride was taking a lot ()f hits.
AT&T also suffered from file restrictions placed on it as a prerequisite for [)articipat-
ing in tile communications satellite program. NASA had rights, including licensing rights,
to all AT&T communications satellite inventions after May 1961. NASA, not AT&T, would
undertake all negotiations with foreign goverlllllcIll telec¢'mmmnicalions adminism_lions.
NASA would coordinate all tests and all pul)licily. AT&T lound none of these reslrictions
acceptable, I)111 the firm was more interested it) t)uilding satellites and ground stati<ms
than in debating terms.
As AT&T's star fell. Hughes's rose. Thai firm had redesigncd the Svnc<m) satellite t(>
accommodate its launch <m a Thor-I)eha from (:ape Canaveral. In the +FWOCeSs, Svncom
grew from thirty to sixty pounds. The added weight permitted the addition of new (tesign
features. Syncom was a joint program of NASA and DoD. Ahhough the Syncoln cOtllllnl-
nicalions capability was often disparaged as "only one voice-channel," it had one advan-
lage over Relay and Telstar: the Syncom transponder could be used conlinuouslv, not jusl
when the batteries were tully charged. The lightweight, low-power Hughes traveling-wave
lube was a key part of its success. "_ Harold Rosen of ttughes and Leonard.]afti_ of NASA
began discussions concerning potential improvements Io Svncom, and in February 1962,
ttughes presented its plans to NASA for the Syncom Mark il. ';+The ttughes Syncom held
great pro)hist. II could be sold to the congressionally approved satellite system operating
organization, (:onlsal, the [.!.S. military, toreign customers, and perhaps NASA, too. "_
Ii) tile t_.weoff between medium-ahitude and geosvnchrtmous satellites, the suc<esst_.fl
laun(h of AT&T's Telslar on 10Jitly 1q62 demonstrated that medium-ahitude communi-
cations satellites _r_]'(' eminently practical. However, this did nothing to improve AT&T's
chances of t)pe]aling such a syslcill, |or by then it was clear thai Congress, out of t_.,ar of
creating a monopoly, would not allow AT&T Io do so.
Following the introduction ot the three communications salellile bills in the Senate,
Congressman ()ten [ tarris introduced H.R. 11040, which was identical to the Kerr bill, in
the House on 9 April 1962. Tile bill passed the ltouse 354 to 9 on 3 May. '_"Meanwhile, tile
Senate (:ollllllille(. ()11 Aeronautical and Space Sciences reporled t_avol:ablv on Kerr's bill
on 2 April 19{i2. > The Senate Commerce (:ommittce then reported favorai)ly c,n the Kerr
bill, and it was brough! befbre the full Senale on 14Jtme 1962.
The illOVelllCll{ [o_val'(I private operation by a ('olls4,wlillllt of COlllllluni('alions CalTiers
seemed to 1)e galhering n|<mmnlum, ahhough Senat<)r Ke|auver and his allies attacked the
bill for several days. ()n 21 June 1962, the bill was withdrawn It) allow other business to be
completed. When [he )lebale or). the [)ill rcsttme</a month later <m 26July, a difterent eli-
maw prevailed. ()n 10.]uly 1962, AT&T had succeeded in lavnching tilt" first Telstar satellite.
65. Dickicscm, "TIq,S'IAR," pp. 85-130.
66. IBM., pp. 157-91.
liT. I)cstz ib('d in th(' bro(hurt' oil lughcs Air( rail (:ompam tilh'd :s')'.VCOM. NASA 1 listol v ()t'li_ ('.
liB. AnOllVnlous ((:.(;. Mulphy?). "Pulic,. Sli||ciiiclll t0F Exphfitation of lIAr: Itlughcs Air(raft
Coral)any I (;<m)munit atiotls Salcllilcs," tir(a caulv 1962, I lughes AiHl'atl (:4)lllpilllV Al'(hiv{.s; [)it kics_m, "TEl.-
ST\R," pp. 85-127, 129-55. Ironically, Ihc Telslm uplink (1i,?1911 megaherlz) and downlink (t.170 in('g;tht'rlz)
tie<lUem'ies weft" tllo:.;c land microwave h't'quent it's thai AT&T earlier had argued, in the "AI)ovc 890" dt'cisi_m.
wollld })C tlllsttitaHc t01" salc]lilC ('Olllllltllli/'ali(>llS.
(i_). "| ]otlsc V<flt's ',;;,_t-lo4t ,\l)lm)val ol ,";pat c (:ommuni( ations I:il m," Wa_hi_lfflo_t Post, 4 ,May lC.Ri2, 1), :\l,
70. S<'lla/c (:olnmillcc (m Fott'iRn Rclati<ms, (:ommu_#catiotl_ Satellitt, :let o/ 1962, g7lh Ctmg., 2d st'ss..
1962, (N7) $1539-,1, Da_im.
[_1- "_ )Xl) 11 I1,1 [< )N()SI'I I I.MI,I [ | ,'_
After receiving the approval of tim Foreign Relations C<)nmfiltcc on 10 Attgus! 1962,
the Kerr bill came beti_rc the full Senaw, where h imm<.diauqy became lhc sul_jcc_ (again)
of a filibuster by Senators Esles Kefauvcr (D-TN), Albert (;ore (I)-TN), Wayne Morse
(I)-()R), Russell I+ong (D-Ix\), Ralpll _]lrt)or<mgh (I)-TX), Mam'ine Nent)erg_w (D-NY),
Ernest (;rttening (I)-AK), and Patti Douglas (D-II_). In an cfforl to end llw l]libttsler, the
Senate passed a historic cloture lnOlioll on 14 AttgtlSl 1962 by a vote of sixty-three to twcn-
IV-Stwcn. The Senate passed the amcndcd I louse bill by a vote of sixty-six to eleven till
17 August; fen days later, the House passed 1he amt'n(h+d bill. Presidenl Ketmedy signed
it into law as the (_omnmnications Satellite :\el on 31 August 1962. :_
Figure 19
15eside_lt Ix)_ti_+..d_ pla)ed a k, 3 a_ld lasti_g role i?l _haping the dtT,elo/mu, m o] _alellite rommumratio_ls, lli* admim_tratton
blocked ttw ext,'_+sio_r o/AT&7"'_ mom_po(_ o/terre_trml trh,_,mmur_icatiw+s ir_lo _paa'. I_ hi_ ]amou_ 25 May I _h')l _/.'e,h.
which d+,dared the l )_itt'rt 5,?.:es would [._M a htlma_l _l the .lh_o_ I_ the end o[ the decade, Kemwd'¢ a:_o +ommito'd the
I rmo'd States to hltildbl¢ a k4ohal tr_mmuni_at/o_ _atellite q_lem, lh,piHrd above: ()P_ ?1 A uKu gt 1962. the 15esident W.,_ted
i_lto htw thr ('ommuvicatio_ls ._iab,llitr A_I, whi+h _alled ]m Lmve_ _tme_+t creatiw+ o/a prn,a/e _mpmatiom the ()ommt+mu_lio_t_
.gatellite (;mpmatim_ (Cmn_ati. ((_mn tt's', o[ NASA)
Tlw (:ommunications Satellite Act mandated lbal the government create a private
corporation, the (_<mmmnicati<)n,s Salcllite (;orporalion, now commonly known as
Comsat. ()n 4 October 1962, President Kennedy lliUlicd the thirteen iqlembclS (called
71. Thc politit a[ actions leading t_> thc l)aS,;agt + t_I lht. (;imlmtmicalic, ns Satcllite Act of 1962 haxe been
stttdicd in gtcal d_'lail it+ books, +nlitlcs, and disscrtati<ms. Mu_h o[ thc dcbatc is dctaih'd in the varh,us imh +-
listwd heating,;, The dt'stliplitm ahoy,.' is _ompilcd t_<nn xariotts sour<t's, especially Smith, '+(_i',ilian Spacc
Apl)licati.ns"; .l_mathm_ F. (;Mlowa_, The P.litic+ aml Techmdokv_ o[ ,';atellit+ + CrJmmumration* ([,cxington, MA:
Ix.xin_t,m l_,<>_)ks. 1972); Mi(hacl I+;. Kinslc}, Outer ",,];a+;, am/l_m'_ Y,,:mtr+ms (New "ti)] k: l<,hn Wilt'} & .%{)ns. 1971_).
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Incorporators) of the temporary Comsat board of directors: six Imwers, three financiers,
one labor representative, and one engineer. Beardsley Graham, tile engineer, had worked
at the Stanford Research Institute and Lockheed, where he had been active in satellite
comnmnications studies carried out in parmership with GTE and RCA. The conclusion of
the Lockheed studies was that the main issues were business, regulatory, and internation-
al relations, not technical. Graham also was convinced that geosynchronous systems would
be in place in the near future, r-'
The first task of Comsat was to incorporate, which it did in the District of Cohmabia
on 1 February 1963. Its second task was to issue stock, perhaps worth as much as $500 mil-
lion. ::_ The stock would have to be sold betore an}, election of the board of directors.
Before any stock was sold, however, Comsat obtained FCC authorization to borrow up to
$5 million from banks, including Continental Illinois, of which David Kennedy, an
Incorporator, was an officer.
Meanwhile, the board of directors was undergoing some key changes in personnel.
During January 1963, Chairman Philip Graham resigned. The following month, the cor-
poration annomaced that Leo D. Welch of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) had been
named chairman and that Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk had been
named president of Comsat. Welch's background was in international finance; Charyk's
background was technical and included significant experience in reconnaissance satellites. TM
In addition to the standard problems associated with gettiqg a company off the
ground, Comsat had three major concerns: (1) satisfying Congress; (2) maintaining good
relations with the Europeans; and (3) deciding on what the eventual operational system
would look like. Congress was unhappy with the high salaries paid to Welch and Charyk
($125,000 and $80,000 per year, respectively), their luxurious offices in a Washington
mansion (Tregaron), and the general uncertainty involved in the enterprise2 _' The
Europeans were not certain whether they wanted to be part of any American system. In
December 1962, the Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations tormed a committee to study the issue of joining an American-led global
communications system. While recognizing that the maiority of international telecom-
munications traffic originated or terminated in the United States, the Europeans were
anxious to gain maximum control and make equipment sales, r'' Deciding on Comsat's
operational system--geosynchronous versus medimn-ahitude--was a more complicated
problem.
72. Beardsley (;raham, '+Salcllite Commtmication," h+te*++atiop+al S+ieme and Terh*mh_gy 13 ([anuar}
1963): 69-7,t.
73. .]a(k Raymml<l, "l'rcsid('ut Names Satellite Boatd," ,\½0 }bz/¢ 77rues, 50ctol)¢w 1962, p. I.
74. "Salcllitc Job is Resigned by (;raham," l.ta_hi,g,con Evenin K Star, 26 January 1963, p. Ag; "Sat¢qlilc
Firm Sel¢'cls Top Otti('crs, Hires at Stuck Sale in at Year," 14,a//Street Journal, 28 February 1963, p. 32; ,Jtssocialed
Press, "Welch, (31aryk Picked m Ilead Satellite Firm," l'Va_hing'to*_ Post, I March 1963, p, A3.
75. .lohn W. Finney, "Spare Radio Plan (healing l)oubts," _'_½v }brk "l'ime._, 24 April 1963, p, 2,
76. Cecil l_,rmvnlow, "U.S.-Europc ('omsal Agrt'cmem Prcdicwd," Aviatimt '¢Vee,k & ,'Space Technolofo; 78
{22 April 1963): 74-75.
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Geosynchronous or Medium-Altitude Orbit?
The choice of a Comsat syslenl was becoming ever more urgenl. In.July 1(.)63. the FCC
made public ils concern thai (_omsat "no longer has definite plans for an early issue of
slo{k." The apl_oinled (]OlllS;lI })(lal'd D,r;tY, ill lhe position of making decisions aholll tile
|'tlllll'C o[" Iht! COlllpany. whic]l should have been made by tile sharellolders. (_Olllsatl respond-
ed I)v Sllggeslillg Ihal decisions had to be made abOtll tile svstelll {Ollfiglllalioll betk_re issu-
ing Slock. Unlil a basic program was oullined, il was unch'ar how much equity capilal should
bc acquired, and it was UllCeltaill how to calt'gorize risks, which was a legal requirement. =
SUl)p_lrl tor a geosynchronous CtmlSal _q)vraling system had been growing f_r some
time. hi September and ()ctol}er 1(.)62, lilt" Applit'alions Subconlnlitlee of the [louse
(]ommillec on Science and Astronaulics had held hearings on "(:Onlmercial
(;ommunicalions Salelliles" lot lhe tmrt)osv, in the words of Congressman Ken Hechh'r
(l)-V_r), of deft'trebling "thc most et]7_.cliw., and least expensive syswm for COnlmercial
d{'v{'hqmient'>'--sptx'ifically, whciher lhe system should be in geosynchroHous or
mediumIahittlde orbil. Represeutalives oil lughes, NASA, AT&I\ |he .ttice of the direc-
ior _)t 1)ef('nse Research and Enginee]illg (I() whicll ARE,X reporled), tilt' Slalc
Dt'parlment, and lhe U.S. Informati()n Agency gave teslim(my; by tar Iile Iong{.sl 1)rest'n -
fall(ms w{q-c those by tlughes and NASA.
Making I}lc case tot a geosvnchronous sySlelll Wel'e Fred Adler, I |ughes Space SySlClllS
Division Manager, and (;or{Ion M/lrphy, ,_VllCOm Program Manag, er. 11 seems thai Mtlrplly
startled Ill{: COllllllitlee lllellll}elS whell he slated Ih;tI ill addition to Ill{" NASA contract R/t-
three Swlcom sat{'lliles, a NASA slltdy {+OllIl;t(+l t{:.l advanced satellh{'s also s.++as hi place.
FItlthel'lll<we, Mlu'l_hy declared, "we expect Ih;it Ill{' later- ('t/IllF;tCI will lead to an inilial
opcralional communication satellite dcmollstralitm in Ill{: first half of 1964. We call the
advance{t satellite Svncom Mark 11."
Murplly oullincd lilt: work ctmducted al I lughcs from 1_.159 lo 1(.t61 on salellile design
and lcsling, all wilh company timds. As a resl.lll, } Iughes eouht laullch ils tirsl SvHtOZll. only
17 ttlonlhs aflel signing a ¢ontta¢l. This was less than R(',A's 1_.} inonlhs; tl+Om cOnllaCI
slallll l) lo launch Relay, but tin>re than AT&T's 1,t mt>nlhs from {OtllGtCI starlttp to launch
Telslar. t hlwt'ver, Murphy fold the ('t>llllllill,p¢ + lhat Ih|ghcs needed a NA.'-;A C<mlmitmt'tl!
bv March 1963 to tmild tlighl vehicles, as well as a NASA colllllliIlllcIll Dl build grot,nd sta-
tiOllS. The Tt'lslar. Relay, ;.llld Svll('oln ,_lOtllld stations were all owned bx olhels. ]_iHlphy's
Ill;litll" ;ll'glllllelll [()1" ;I. geosynchronotls svslem was thai il could be inslalled so,met than a
medium-ahilude system be(aust' tmvet- satellites would have [o be humched, and the sin>
plicit) of lilt' ground stations allowed lhelll I{I 1){" installed lnuch inole quickly. 7''
A{'lllatl salcliitt' laun{h expt'ritqlcc, howevcr, st'treed to favor the medium-altitude
s;ttellites, such as ['('lslm and Rclav. ['hc Telslar and Rt'lav satelliles had been launched rel-
alivtq¢ stl#{es.stlll]'¢, bill S)'llcolll tililt>¢] atit'l ils il!jtxthm illlO RCI,S)'IICIIJOIIOII_,; url>il. _'' Mt,sl
77. R,,I,_'ll (:. r['l)ltl. "E( :.( :. .'_UCS lh'la_ m Spat,." Sm_k," Ne;'t, }brl_ Times, 27]ul ) 1_.167,.p. 3: '%m'llitc
(;oip., Plodded t)x F(;{ ;, Max lcll Nhllc 'lhis Weck ,Xboul Plans tm Sl_,ck Sale.'" W.II 3,'¢..Hflno_lal, 29 ]ulx 191i3.
p. 7.
78. [ _h,llsc { ;_mHnim'c _ti 5;, icm c and :\stronauti{s, (;o,,,'H:_o_lal (}...._..a¢io_ A;'*Idht,'*,sTi)l ( ;_:ltlR . _rl
scss., 1!16_. (87} 111,_!18-t, p. I
79. IBM., pp. 1-1.
80. "S. Ahilan ( )l_scl xal_v) S]),>ls Missin_ Sxm ore." I_hq,._t,.; I'._. I Malch l_.)fi3, p. \g: "'lh'_vhqmicnl
,_1 the Rcla_ (:_mmnlnitalions Satellite," I;,_l,.rai_ia 17 {lune 1!16_): 758-5_.1: .';idllm Xlt'l/Rl'l and Robcll 11.
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Ih'l._, I I>_r,K_ezm{'_'VAnhillgloll, 1)(;: I'.S, (;(>xclntncnt Pliming ()tlhc. 1965}. pp. 1:£{,-!)1};R,,II_,II I'.. _'l,'alllt'll.
"'_,xn(_m/ l }'l'l)Rl_.'ss Rcl)_nl N,_. t," I ).lal, h 1963. NAN\ tlisiosx ()lti(c.
116 (]REATINt; S_TI(MS; tJNITED STATE,_ AND (]ANAI)A
analysts teh that geosynchronous satellites held the. most prondse. S),ncom subsequently
showed that geosynchronous orbit was attainable, but the salellite's light weight con-
strained the communications payload to a single telephone circuit, which was significant-
ly less than the wideband capabilities of Relay and Telstar.
Support for a geosynch,onous system also hegan to appear in the literature. For
example, in September 1963, Siegfried Reiger and Joseph Charyk of Comsat published
articles in the journal of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics that out-
lined the system's technical choices. In summarizing the problem of orbit selection,
Reiger admitted that most engineers agreed that a medium-ahitude system could be made
operational sooner than a geostalionary system, "[blur there also appears to be general
agreement that in the hmg run the [geo-]stationarDsatellite concept offers the greatest
promise and growth potential." Reiger made the point thai insufficient geostationary
satellite experience existed to evaluate the prohlems associated with this orhit2'
Meanwhile, NASA continued to underwrite Hughes's Syncom experimental geosyn-
chronnus satellite program. Within a year of receiving a sole-source contract ti'om NASA
to huild three Syncom satellites, Hughes Aircraft Company engineers began studies of an
Advanced Syncom, a geosynchronous satellite whose payload would suplmrt thousands of
voice circuits rather than the "single voice circuit" of its predecessor Syncoms. The travel-
trig-wave tubes would be more l)owerfnl; the antenna would direct most of its energy
toward the Earth's sttrface; an(t the satellite transponders would allow more that+- one
ground station to use the same transponder at the slune time."'-'
NASA's thnding of Syncom did not go unnoticed, however. Congressional objections
to the spending of taxpayer dollars for the benefit of a private corporation, Comsat, made
NASA's joh particularly difficult. In an effort to allow tnore time fi_r Syncom 2 to prove
itself, and to persuade Congress of the benetits of Advanced Syncom, NASA extended the
llughes study contract another two months in .June 19637' The successtul launch of
Syncom on 26 July 1963 made it clear that geosynchronous sawllites were practical.
(;omplex grotmd station problems were solved will+- apparent ease; the on-hoard jets suc-
cessftflly corrected the sluellite's drift and positioned it over the Atlantic Ocean, ready to
carry trattic."'
Hughes was extremely active in attempting to find additional markets tot Syncom.
One idea, resurrected ti-om a suggestion made by Hughes's Donald D. Williams it+_1959,
before Harold Rosen convinced him communications was a better application, was to use
Syncotn as a navigational systemD More immediate was the tmsuccessfnl attempt 1o per-
suade DoD thal the Hughes geosynchronous satellite system performed better that+- its
medinm-altitude competitor. _'; More productive were t Iughes's discussions with Robert R.
(;ilruth, Apollo Program Manager and Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, It)
_;1. Siegtiied H. Reiger, "Comnwrcial Satellite Systems," Astnmauti(_ and Aero.space l+2nginee_inl._ 1
(September 1963) : 2(+--30;.]oseph V, (]haryk, "Comtnutdcations Satellite (kwporatitm: Ol+jectives and Problem%"
A_tronautic* and AermpaceEngineelqng 1 (Sel)lember 1963): 45-47.
82. Paul E. NorselL "S'_NCOM," Aslronautic_ andAeroipaceEnKinee*qn g I (Seplember 1963): 76--78; NASA
Press Release, "Teehnieal Background Brieling Project S_(X)M," 29January 1963, NASA Itismry Office.
83, R. Darcey to It. (;oetl, 14June 1963, quoted in Weitzel, "The Origins ot ATS," NASA ttHN-83, 1968
(unpul)lished), p. 50, NASA I listory O[fi_e.
84. R.W. (]oh' to l).l). Williams, "Summary of Orl)ital l)ala liw Syncom 2 (A-26)," 18 August 1963,
ttughes Aircrat't t;omt)any Archives.
85. I,+M. Field to I+.A. Hyland, "Possil)h. use of Syncom as a Navigational System--Microwave Ix_ran," 9
August 1963, }tughes AirtTati Company Archives.
86. (].(;. Murphy to L.A. Hyland, "Synchron_ms Ahitude Communicatitm Satellile System," 16
September 1963, ttughes Aircratl {:ompany Archives.
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use S.vncom tot commtmications links among Project Apollo's widespread tracking sta-
tions. *vAIlempts to find additional markets accelerated in tile wake of lhe II(+'ws that NASA
would not pursue the Advanced Syncom flight p,'ogram. As NASA Administrator.lames
Web1) thought, Congress would not allow NASA t<_ fired hardware development because
of the perception thai NASA was subsidizing (;omsat?*
The Early Bird Hatched
Meanwhile, Comsat still was trying It) ch()<)se the base satellite system orbit. Among
the announcements tile firm made at the end of 1963 was a request tor proposals tot a
satellite design, either medium-altitude orl)il or geosynchronous orbit, which would con-
st|rule (_omsat's |)asic systcln. No decision on the basic system would I)e made until after
the designs had been evaluated."
The choice of conllntlnications satellite system orbit was not easy. AT&T and the mil-
itary wcrv convinced that medium-ahitude satellites were best, while many others believed
that high-ahilude, geosynchron_ms satellites were pret>rable. NASA seemed to be leaning
toward bolh geosytl+`hronous and medhml-ahitttde satellites. For examl)le, in April 1962,
Milton SIollel, director of NASA's Office of Applications, slate(i lhitl "wllell all the tech-
nology is in hand, it will be the synchronotts-ort)it satellites which will be the most attrac-
tive to us. ''+ I h)wevel', ill September 1962, lx,(mardJafti', director of Ill+." comnnmicati<ms
group under Stoller, suggested that a medit|n_-altitttde system similar to Telstar would be
best."' Thetl, <m 25 Februar+' 1(,)t13, NASA antmtincod ils intention lo c<m<entn_te +m geo-
stationary salellites. M1 of dwse opinions and decisions complicaled (Mmsat's task of
selecting a satellite operating systetn.
The (++(:,lllSal request tbr proposals re<vived Ibm responses in early Fcbvttarv 1{)64.
()ne desiRtt gtOUl) consisted <)f AT&T teamed with R(:A, xvhih' another ]lad TRW teamed
with 1T'['. I tughes and Philco individually submilt+.'d the olher two t)ropos;.tls."-' Neither the
Phiho, Ihe AT&'I'-R(;A, nor the TRW-iTT proposal was tot a ge<+syncht+<m_ms system.
I htghes had the only geosytwhr(mous s;ttellilc i)rOl)osal. +'_
.Many +`,Xl)+`'rlsassumed lhal Ihe inili;tl c<mm+{'rcial sx'sl+.'m would be placed in a nu'di-
ttm-ah imde orbit. In l)ecenflwr 1963, l lught's prt_p<_scd a <'onmter(ial vcrsi<m of Svncotn..
which wouht Ix'vead_ lot laumh in early I_.)65and whM! couhl serve I:,olilexF,erimental
and oF,erationafn,eeds.Wilhout commilting to a g+`.osvnchronous orbit fbr the basic svs-
ten+. whose characteristics w,:q+e to be ,:h'ternfinvd later. (:,0n+sat accepted the l-lughes pro-
posal and Immch¢'d an "eatIv bi,,:l'" prior Io lnakitlg a final decision <)n svsten| type. This
"+`'atIv bird" would consist of "'a svnchr<m<+us satellite orbited on an ('xperilllenla]-
87. I.A. l[:l;md to Rtd),,q I (;ih uth, 21 ()(t<d',tq 1963, Ilughvs Ait(lalt (:<milton", ..\t_ hi,.<,'s.
8S. R.E. _++l';tll<'ll I<) r. (_-+llbill+lli. ]{) _l'[)t{'lll))('l" I{)1)_+: ;tl)(] R. ( ;all billJlli I1) IL (_,l>('tl, _| ._('lJtuIllb¢'l I_)(). '+,,
both qttolt'd in X%itz<'l, +'Th,r ()tigins <d A'I S." F,F +. 37+-?_{L
8!1. (;<>msat Pit's,, Rt'h'a,,<', "(Mmmcr_ial (kmm+uni<athm'., £alt'llitc |:.ngim'crit+L_ Dc_,ign lh,q_osals
Rcqut'st{'d -t lndustr',; (i<,tp_+tation Rvgard'+ Mm't' .Xs P',l:!j_+t Sit'l>.'" 22 1)_'c rml)t'r lgli?,. NAS\ I ]i,,Ic+r'_ ()ttic t'.
!10. "NAS.,Vs (_omSat Ftmding to (;limb." ,XIA_ih,_ ..d tCr_h_'l_ I<) (2 .\l)ril 1962}; 17.
91. "N\N,\ st.c+, IEI.STAR:I'}pc %ttclliu' as lt.t+s_ t01 Wo_hbWidc Sxstcm.'" .l_,iati,m _.l:.,eh Co: Xp.,,
lk_h..f.L,_ 77 (_t SCl>tcmhm 1962): t<).
92. I tu'n c ',',_'_,;' ,,v',cn al pt obh'm,, as_,_wi;m'd ',,,iuh _1_,:',,_,' t,:'am,,. Phih o ;rod TRW had tcamvd on mvdium-
ahilu(h' t_mmnnii(ati<ms salcllitcs, I11 ++as an ;t_lxis_'_ I<) l)oI) _>tt mcdium-adtitudc _()tnnnnfit all(ms nalcllilc+,. It
+_;ls quite possiidc Ill;it nl('(litlul-ahitli<lc (I)lnllluni< ath,n +, salcllil_+s would tw ( ;tn<('lt'_l. illld (',()Itl_,itl xx(ltlld i)i(_-
:idc th(' (;tj);tbilit} _,.'quilt'd b_ tilt' lllili(;u x:
93. "(;ommunicaliol+s %_(cllitt' (:(lip. (;t'ts Bids t<_) l')<'signil_g _,xstcln [:r<)in Nix (;<m_1)anics." IIhll WP*+'t
/_mz..[. 12 h.btualx I!)+;,I. i x 1; (;c_il lh_)_nhm. "lntclt_ati.nal (:_m_sat ,\gvnc', (;(msid_'r_'d." AHalmn l'+}','l; Ca-
,_/1(/t', +' r/i_{/PHO/_71 _{] ( 17 Frl)t uat'+ 19(_I): 3 I,
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Figure 20
I.'_tzt(_'Bird, _h.wn he_r, u,a_ ('om,wll'_ /ir_t _atellile, Laum hed i. Alan h 1¢J65 into a geo_ym hnmou_ .tbit, I,.'a_l_' Bird (k.mvn
:dso (is lntelsclt 1) s u:.7.,,'sted the :mnme, ial ]mte,lml o[ _o,tm_m_fim_s _atellites. ((;_url¢'sy _ff NASA. pt',¢_ n_. 66-|t-1511)
operational basis in 1965, widl a bandwidth and power which can provide a capability tbr
lclcvision or, alternatively, tot thcsimile, data, or lclcgraphic message lrattic or ti)r up to
240 two-way telephone channels. ''_
Comsat considered Early Bird, as the sawltite crone 1o lie called, as both experimen-
tal and conm|ercial, but not the tinal system choice. Comsal proposed 1o make the
sawllile awtilable for commercial use after conducling l¢'sts with il. Part of the Early Bird
rationale was die success of SyllcOln (launched 26July 1963) and []lc rcsuhing desire Io
cxperimenl with a similar slttcllile operating ill so-called commercial [requencies (al four
and six gigahertz).
Betore Emly Bird collslrtl(liolt could begin, however, Comsat needed F('_C apl)roval.
The FCC was nol comiortablc with Comsal's intent to use Ihc AT&T Andover ground sta-
tion. It preferred Ilia| (;OlltSa| OWH and operate its own gmtmd stations. '_ On 4 March
1964, Comsat rcqucswd permission from the FCC to launch Early Bird in early 1965 into
geostationary orbi| over the Atlantic Ocean. The eighty-five-pomad (38.6-kik)gram) satel-
lite was to provide 240 voice circuits or one television channel. AT&T planned to lease
94. (iomsal lhcss Re|case. "Comlncrcia[ (:mnmunicalions Salcllilc Engineering Design Proposals."
95. JohnJ. Kclh'her to l.ccmard ]alli', Mcmolandum, "F(X] Action on Early Bird," 2,t January 1964, ]atti'
papcls, NASA 1 [islol y Ol]'icc.
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100 circuits <m Early Bird to handle peak teh.phone loads and for cable replacenwnt. Ill
April, tlIc" F(;(; al)proved the launch of Early Bird.'"'
Bciorc file launch of its Early Bird samllile, (]t)lllS;,tt received a strong vole of confi-
dence from the business world. The first five milli(m shares of Comsal stock (at $20 each)
were sold exclusively to communications common carriers. By the 23 March 1964 dead-
line, more than 200 carriers had notified the F(;(: of their illl(.'res! in purchasing Comsal
shares, and by 26 May 1964 (the ottkial dcadlinc for bidding on shares), AT&T had
offered to purchase $85 million of lilt $100 million worth o1 shares reserved fin commu-
nications carriers. Because t]tc stock was ovmsubscribcd, XI'&T was pcrmiued to buy slock
worlh (rely $,')7.9 million, or 2(,) percenl ol all shares. ITT bmlght stock worth S21 million
(11 pcrccnl); (;TE look $7 million (-t pcrccn|); and R(;A got $5 million (3 percenl).
Other carriers bought the remaining 5 percent. The Comsal charter stipulated that fltc
communications carriers el('cl six ntt,ltl])UlS ()[ I|1(! board ()f dire(t()rs and tlla! each ItoM-
er ()f 8 percent of total shares earn('d a dir('cl<)r's seat. Consequenily, AT&T ha(l at leasl
three seals guarantc('d, and ITT had at least tw() seats. '+
The second set ()f five million shares wc|-e sold 1() the ])ttbli(, with tim FCC responsi-
l)le lot al)l)orti()ning sah's. When these shart's w(we ()l'fi'r('d on 2 .lime l.q(iJ,, the publi("
snapl)cd them Ul). (;on]sat stock was very popular--s<) p()pular lhat the size of purchases
was limilcd and, as a resuh, (k)msal stock <)wru.'rshi[) was disl)t-rsed. Th(" av('rage pul)li(
shar(dl<)Idet + ht'Id <rely r_v(mty-s('v,:'n sh,t,vs. ()f th(" 130,000 shar('h()Mers, about 120,000
held less than 100 shares. ,.ks a r(,suh, ther(" was upward pr('ssurc on thc stock pri('(' (fl+()m
S20 t() S48 pet +share 1)y mid-Augtlst 1964). ''_
Entangling Alliances
,,ks (:()msat F.r('F.ar(:(l its eXF.,wintcntal Early Bird [)rogr;utl and mld,mto<)k a search f()r
the final sat¢'llit(" system design, qu(,stions rt'gm-dit]g the its(" <)f lh(' c<)mnwr(i.tl s',stcm 1)v
th(" military and lor('ign organizati<ms h,t(l to bc res<)Ived. ,-'ksearly as l (.)60, w('ll l)elorc tit(_'
passage <)f tlt(" (k)mmttnicati<)tls Sat('l]ite Act, intcrnaii<)nal ,UTa|tgcm('nts starlcd when
,.\T&'I' sttggt'stcd IIw p<)ssit)ility ()f a satellite ln()gram t() its fi>r('ign ('able l)arlnc,s. B()th
.-\T&T and NASA contintt('d those discussi()ns thr()ttgh()ut l(,)6l and 1(.)62. Whil(' tht"
(]()mmunicati(ms Satellite Act ()f 1(.)62 was under c()nsi(h'r,|tion by (k)ngrcss, th(_'
Eur<)pcans <h.'lil)('rated th(,'ir options.
96. "Ocean San.]liic I)?, 1965 is ,"-,oug, ht>'" ,\'vw }b)k 77m.,:',, 5 March I(.)61, p. ,I; "(;,)msat Fih's with FCC."
Mi',',ilv_ and l¢od+.,,/s II (!l Mai( h 191+)4): 8; "('.onmmnit;tti<)ns Salcllitc Firm Ncg<)liatcs S[)ac('ciah (]<)ntua+.l with
I lugh('s Ail( i+ttt," l_,}tll _ln'el/,mtnal. 17 March 1!)6t. p 6: "l:( :( ; ( ;i_('s ( :<)reNal ( ',o-Ah('ad," Mi+siI,:+ aPM IPtactwt_ I 1
(2() \[)til 1!)61): Ill,
97. .]()hi) P. MackcnAc. "200 (;alliels I:ih' fin (:()rosa1 Sh;u('_." l_hdU>_,qo_r /)o_1> 2t M;uch 1961. i ). I:
",";alcllite (:orp. t_, Maikel 5,l(>('k at $20 a Shar(,.'" l_hll _)tn.et/uutmd, 7 Ma'¢ 196.1, p. 32; Philil).[. Kht,,s, "( ;(,msat
I.'irm Files $200-Milli(m Fund Phul,'" ,ll,mti+m 1lT,d+ _ ))pa++' l_+hnolo_.,_ 80 (11 l%'la_ 19(7.t): 25-2(i; R,)hcil ] h)t],
"Scllhig Sharcs m st)a( (,,' .tviatiml il;<'d,' _ Spa¢c 7},+kmd+)t,'l Sli (11 May 19(;,t): 17; J()hn 1), Ma( I%iizit.. "lndusti',
,%iiap,, I rI) Its l lalt ()t( ;()lllS_ll SI()( k," II'_++l+iP+<_t+_*lI)lJ+t, _8 Match 196t. t). 7; '%alcllhc (]()t l). Picks (i (7andidatc,, h)l
Nt'x+ l))()aid. '' ,\)'w }Tnk 77mr+, 9Jul) 1964, p. 43( L "(]OlllSai Slo(-k Wid(.I,, l)isiril)ut(.d," ,]pelf;' D{li_,, 14 :\tlb_llSl 1961,
i). 777; ,N. ()liver (ii)Odlil;ill. "l!_,(I,l)Ol) ()Will'is l+istt'(l iu lnilial R('l)oil (:.1 (]OillSal,'" {l'a_hi)#yton I)o_t, It +\til_llSl
l(.t('),t, i ). I)7;J()hn W, Fillllt"_, +'(]¢)msat "[]tk('s ()11 Piival(' Role As [ h)hh'rs _lag(' First Me('ting," ,\Yw }Tnh 77Jmts, 18
_('plellil)lT 196t, p. ,IF); _)ll/allli(' MOlll_oli)('ly, "( ]()illsal I))oaid :\Wails _t'i)alt' Nod." .'lli_iD,_ and 17oc,('_'t_ 15 (<)8
_(.'pl(qlll){+l 19(;,I): 5,.t.
()8. ;\]('x;ilidt'l R. ] |all)lilt'l, ",',h)( k I)l (]()lilSal Sll()'>vs ;i I_)i_ (;aili/" ,\';'_z' )7,'PD /Tme_. 20 Atl<_lIM 1961, i ). :{7:
"'(](>iil,,al ',t_)('k Widcl; l)i_,ltihut('d," _.pmr/)aTA, 14 :\tl_ii,_l 19(ii, p. 227; S. ()livvr (',()odiIlali, "13OJ')(iO ()wiil.rs
l,isted in Initial Rel)Oll ()1( ]OlllSat," LITt_hi#+_'ltm l>o_(, ]). [)6.
120 (;REAlIN(; S_NTEMS: UNITE1) STATES AND C,\NAI)A
They decided that they could maximize their benefits fl'om the U.S. satellite progranl
hy negotiating as a bloc. In I)ecenlber 1962, the European Ctmference of Postal and
Telecommunications Adnlinistrations began formal studies to estahlish a basis for discus-
sions with the United States. After a series of formal and informal discussions anlong
members of the European (:onference on Satellite Communications, the Europeans
agreed that a consorliunl, rather than the series of bilateral agreements preferred by the
U.S. State Department, was the best approach, with Comsat serving as the consortium
nlanager. During meetings held in Washington, 21-25 July 1964, agreements were
reached that created the International Teleconmnmications Satellite Organization
(known as Intelsat), theret)y estahlishing a flamew()rk for tile international use of com-
munications satellites2"
While Intelsat turnished a framework tot international satellite communications, the
question of ntilitary use remained tmanswered. The partial ownership and operation of
lntelsa! by foreign agencies determined that Intelsat could not provide comnnmications
services tot the U.S. nlilitary. Therefore, at a press conference on 15 July 1964, Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara annotmced that I)oD would build its own satellite com-
munications system. Both Leo Welch and Joseph (:haryk of (;omsat attempted, ill letters
to McNamara, to "keep the door open" tbr the nlilitary, but Comsat, at least ti)r the
mo,nent, was not committed it) the meditm]-ahitttde ctHilllllnlicatitlns satellites preferred
hy the Pentagon. _°''
On 25 January 1963, (;tmlsat--nol (_ongressIreopened ttie issue of providing com-
mnnications satellite services to the military. (;otnsat proposed launching twenty-four
Hughes satellites, similar to Early Bird. eight at a time. (;omsat blanled the Pentagon for
tile previous del)acle, an([ they wanted to try again. Philco, the winner of Ill(! 1963 Doll
satellite contract ((mll)etili(m, had not t)een able lo proceed tor more t]lan a year because
(if (;omsat's ettbrts, l)hilco was annoyed that the whole process had started over again.
('.onlsat proposed a sole-source contract with t hlghes, leaving Philco out. Philco ilrotesl -
ed to the FCC on the I)asis that the Communications Satellite Act required conlpetitive
bidding. Eventually, l)hilco t)ttih the Pentagon's comnntnications satellites, but (;omsat's
l)olitical moves delayed launch fi-onl 1964 to 11.t66. '<
As Conlsat carried out this attempt to cal)lure military customers, thtghes was begin-
ning to gain momentum in tilt." competition to be the primary provider of conmmnica-
ti<ms satellites. Tile year 1964 had I)egun with a contract for two geosynchronous satellites
(model HS-303, the Eat-ly Bird) for Comsat. hi March, NASA had awarded ttughes a con-
tracl for five Applications Technolog T Satellites, and in August, Sync<ml 3 was launched
into geostationary orl)it. Sync<ml 3 relaye(l television images ti<)m the 1964 Tokyo
Olympic (lames to the United States via the Naxa' ground station at Point Mug[t,
(:alifornia, and a new ground station at Kashima, northeast of +Tokyo. Ahhough the trans-
mission was not up to "commercial quality," no ()lie really noticed. Many wondered then
and later if" space was the right place to spend human resour('es, and many critics could
not (tiscrinfinate t)etween the t)ractical and the prestigious. '''='
99. Ilousl" Committee Oll (;ov(?l'llln('llt ()pmati(ms, Militaly ()peralions Sttl)(ommitlee, Satdlite
(:.mmupdcation._: Militar3'-(:il,ilI¢rd*<_a*ld l¢dation_hip_, ViSthCong., 2d scss., 1961, (88) 112086-]-A, pp. 89-96.
100. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 51-57,. 105-124.
101. Comsat Press Rel('ase, 25,January 1965, NASA Itistory Otlice; "Comsat's Defense Bid Challenged by
Phitco," The [W.shilll._ron]l:'ve_d_¢ ,_'ta_;2 Fel)ruary 1965, p. 3; "FC(: Bars Coulsal Pail." Ali_sile_a_arlHrwhetsI(i (8
t+'(*l)tlial'y 1965) : 9; "(;CllllSat t<lSeek Bids (m Doll (;otns;tl," £_mrvDaily, 17 F('bruary 1965, pp. 2.'19-4(); [+atIV
Weekl(' B '+(;omsat Btiws to F(;(_, lnvilcs (;eneral," Washiwctrm IJ+_+l,17 Fet)luary 1965, p. (:6.
102. Anthony Mi(hal'l Tedcschi, Live via SateUite(Washington, 1)(i: A(ropcdis Books, 1989), p. 31; "Leveled
on (_olnsat Olyml)i( C(Jveragc, ,+£ymre l)ai& 14 Septl'ml)er 11.}1_,t,p. 237; "5 'l_'l:hnoh>gical Satellites will be
l)evt'hlpt'd by [ hl<ght's," .\'i-n,)bl]+7)lne*,4 Malt'h I tJ64, i). 7; "1{ught's (;<'IsKI'N Par'l," Mi*+ib'+aml I¢or'kds14 (t.tM;uvh
1!161):S; A.S..l('rVCUlSto I I.AJ Rosen, "SxlU()m Pulfii_ itT<"21 Septemll¢.l 191i4,I tught.s Airt laft (iompany Art hivt's.
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Comsat was "bullish" on [lughcs, trot it still was not oh'at ',vhelher Ih(' basic (:omsat
syswln would 1)c gcosynchronous. Svncom had bccn successful, and orbital and attitude
control scorned to bc much simpler than originally IhOl.]ght. th)wevt'r, tclcpllon(" compa-
nies (._cm'rally) experimented only with the mt'ditml-allitud(' ']'elstav and Relay satellites
I)(,causc Svncom used military, not commvrcial, ti'cqucncics. (]o]llsa! st()ck, selling for
almost lhree limes the initial oftering price, was (,onslanlly moving; no on(' knew what was
going to happt'n in the" end. Early Bird was eagerly ,mlicip,m'd.
Early Bird Flies
U.S. and Eurol)Can demand lot Early Bird circuits was building. AT&T wanu'd t() use
100 of the satcllitc's 241) circuits, while (',atmda, Britain, Framcc, and West (;crmanv also
"_vcr(' allxious to ])arli(ipal(!. t''' NASA was VVSl)onsiblc ti)r the launch, but cxo<'l)t fi)r basic
Ira(king s(,rvic(,s, du" s|)acc agency had no rCSl)onsil)ilitics after placing the spacc(ratt in
orl)il. (:Olt]Sitl personnel l)CV[orlncd all the orl)ital and conlrol functions. Thus, as pvc-
scrilmd |)v the' (:ommtmitalio]ls Salcllitc Act, NASA provided launch sorrier's, but (]ot]lsltl
was in ('h,ugc. '''_
Early Bird was launched (m 6 April 1965. The spacctrall was ahnt)st ith'nfical to
Sv]It'o]I] _), t)]ll il ]lSt'd commercial (six and Ibm-/igahcrtz) ralhv.- than military (ciRht ;rod
two gigahmlz) ti-t,qucncics for uplink aud downlink commtmications. Similar to Svncom
._, Early Bird's orbit was gcosiationary, not .it]st g¢,oS_/l]thl()llOllS--l]til| is, its orbit 'was in
the pl,mt' of 'dw cqtutlov, not inclincd to it.'""'I'hc cighi>-fiVC-l)(mnd (38.6-kih)gvam) l'_;]rlv
t>,ivd was a more sophisticated Sl);tcccrltt! thnn the original Iwcnly-fivc-pound
(11.3-kilogram) "commercial communications sal('llit¢'" that Ilarold Rosen, Donald
Williams, ;rod ['om I ludspclh had cnvisi<m¢'d in 11)."_(.1,1)ul it clcml} ()rigin;]lcd in the mod-
ili('(l oh'sign they 11;1(1dcvch)pccl in l(.)(;(). ' ....
F(>vmal E;uiv Bird c(mmnmications CXl)Crim('nts llcg,m on l0 April 1965; c()mmcr(,ial
scrvi(e l)(.'gan on 1 .June. Early l:t,ird's 240 v()icc-chann(.'l <,qla<ily ahn()st equah'd the
317-(Imnncl (,tl),t<ily ()l itl] ¢'xisting :\tlanlic wh'pl]<m(' (al)l('s--and it cost much lt'ss'. The cc()-
n<)mics <)f Early Bird wen" astoundit]g. Th(" most ul)-t<)-dat(." tm(h'rwater l¢,h,])hon(" cal)lc (,u--
ric([ ti.'wt'r (']tittllt(']_.; itl]d cost a.l)()ttt 1C11 titn('s its nit]oh th(' sal(,'l]it(', l'];tl'lv l))h'd ilttd its lat]l](h
vehicle cost (:()msat ar()tmd ..<57million, a small fiacti<)n ()1 ils $2()0 milli<m Cal)italizati()n.
l)cspitc tht' (hqnand fi)] EatIv Bird t('h'l)honc (hann(.'ls, an artich" in l'.S. +\'+'7_,+&
llbrld Ib,/mr{ (,mph,]siz('(t transatlanli( t('lcvisi()n as th(' m()st "'visibh'" Caltability ()t thc nt'w
sat('llil¢'. '< Th(' linking or Em-oll(, and .-\mt'ri(a it] it ,_h)l)al tote'vision cxtravagan]a <m
2 May 1965 l)('vhal)S ik'(t dnlt image ()I lhc sau'llit('. P,ciorc tht" launch of Earlx Bird,
Ih()ilgll, | [ll,2,ht's had iinl/()tln(t+d l}lltl Ill(' |('chltt)]o_-y 1() })ui](I it It']('visi()n })l-Oad(asl sal¢'l-
lit(' was availat)lc, t Lut>ld R<)scn ()f ! htgh('s suggcstcd 111:/I Arthur (:. (:lark("s 1(.).t.'+(h('am
()1 a lt'h'visi()n tlroa(t(ast from spa((- could I)c in,(tic a vcaliv, with Ihc N.\,(';+'\ ,\p])lic,tlions
T('chn()h)u,-y Satvllit(' program.
103. Rol)m) (:+ (](>_,X('ll. "(:()iiiiii¢+i(i_i] Rvla', Nat('llitc ha', Dalc h)i Npzin_." (;Im_tiat_ 5,+{era(, .'_IrmiOJ_. 15
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I tlllll¢ h ( ;I)III,,AI',; l']ai b. l/iltl," '_iJme I)rlT&, '->,"4l)t'(vinl)<'i 1!)l;4. l)+ <2(i(.).
lilt. ",V:[+ Wvl)(q, Ml'ill()ralidillii Ibr thc R+.,ioid, "_illniil;ll; <)t t[,_,-30:1, Farl,, llild (;<llllil/illiil,ilioil',
5;aicllilc Piol2,ialii," IF_ ]ailuai'}, I(.t(_+. N.,\S:\ lli',h)i', ()lticc.
Ilk'). N,\S<\ Mission ()l)<'r;tti()ns R_.'l)()ils, N3,SA l]istol'_ ()tlh¢'.
Ill(). (:()insat I)l(,ss R(,Icasv, "Eall,, l+)ir(l ]:a(I Sli(,vi 111: l']:itl', l))iid, '' i10 Mat<h Itl(_'), N.\F;,\ 5+lis,,i_)ii
()lil,lati()liS R,.,l)()liS, N \F,+\ tlisi(>l; ()tfi(v.
11)7. ":'is (;()lllS;it (;('ts l)()wll l() t).ttSill/'S<,, ,' { ,\¢7t'_ _; fiTs#/e/ I{c/mH. 12 ,\pill 19(i_'). 1), 7.
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On 13 May 1965, ABC television filed with the FCC for permission to launch a televi-
sion relay satellite--the first domestic connnunications satellite. Comsat responded, how-
ever, that Congress had granted it a monopoly on satellite communications, but it would
be glad to provide a relay service for ABC. The potential market for a satellite television
relay was huge. Estimates of AT&T revenues for relaying television on terrestrial circuits
was about $50 million per year. Nonetheless, telephone traffic was to dominate Comsat
and Intelsat satellites for ntany years. Even st), it was clear that television, not telephony,
captured the public's attention and began to give rise to the notion of the "global village."'"_
Meanwhile, the scramble for Early Bird telephone circuits was under way. In Jtme
1965, AT&T filed with the FCC for permission to lease 100 voice channels fiom Comsat.
AT&T was still negotiating witll Eurol)ean telecommunications administrations, but it
expected to have thirty-six links with Britain, twelve with West Germany, ten with France,
and more with other countries. RCA filed tor thirty circuits, ITT wanted fi)rty-one, and
_Ak_stern Union International sought tifiy-five. In all, Comsat had requests for 226 out of
Early Bird's 240 circuits.
Commercial service officially was not to start tmtil 27Jnne 1965, but the FCC granted
emergency permission to begin commercial service after the failure of one of the transat-
lantic cables days earlier. The FCC then allocated voice circtfits to A.T&T (seventy-five cir-
cuits), 1TT (ten), Western Union International (ten), RCA (ten), and Canada (six). AT&T
managed to lind partners fi)r sixty of its circuits, hut only one other circuit was in opera-
lion: an RCA circuit to Germany. European stations were not yet capable of handling the
full traffic load, so the allocation of all circuits was held in abeyance. A long article in the
Wall Street Journal bemoaned the slowness of the Europeans.'" The Europeans were
making it clear that international telecomnnmications required two equal partners. They
were not going to tolerate a global satellite conmmnications system dominated by the
United States. I"'
European developments aside, Comsat was about to acquire a major domestic cus-
tomer. Negotiations with NASA would provide Project Apollo with high-quail% wideband,
global communications systems linking NASA's tracking stations in real time with the
t hmston Mission Control Center. This led to Comsat filing an application with the FCC
on 30 September 1965 to build and launch tour geosynchronous communications satel-
lites to provide NASA those services. Comsat proposed to buy those tbur satellites tiom
ttnghes at a total cost of $11.7 million, while NASA assmned a total liability (monies the
agency would pay if it did not use the system) of $10.5 nfillion |i)r Ihe entire network. At
1118. Barry Miller, "tlughes l'r_l,,,ses TV Broadcasl Satellite," Aviatim_ Week & Spree 7"e(h*mh_:__ 8,2 (I
Fel)ruary 1!1651: 75-77; I Ioward Simon, '"Ii+,,t of Early Bird's "IX' 1lcightens Ol:,tintism," ++h+hinKlon Po_l, S April
1965, p. A2; "Emly Bi_d Satellile Relays a TV Signal in a Stuprise +li'st," WallStreet]ourTtal, 8 April 1965, p. 2; "Era ly
Bird Orbit is Nearly Pcrtiwl," ,VeTt, tbrk "lime+, 10 April 1965, p. 1 I; Suzanne Montgomery, "Early Bird Operation
May be Speeded," Mi.+sile+ and Rocket_ 16 (12 April 19fir,): 12; Val Adams, "2 Continents See (+;lobal "Ia, r Today."
New tbrk 71rues, 2 May 1965, p. 35;.lack Gould, "Comsat to Assay ABC Sau'llitc," Ne'w I'brk Time.s, 15 May 196r_,
p. 63.
109. Jerry E. Bishop, 'q,agging Early Bird," _1_111Stred]ournal, 2 August 1965, pp. l, 14.
110. "First Formal Bid m bc Comsal Cusumwr Filed by AT&T \Vidl FCC," Wall Street Journal. 3June 1965.
p. 4; "RCA Follows AT&T in Asking to Become Cuslomer of Comsat," 147dl StreetJour_tal, 4June 1965, p. 6; Larry
Weckley, "Early Bird l.in(' l)emand Grows," WashinKtml Pint, 8June 1965, p. l)8; "Comsal (;els (;o-Ahead to Put
Early Bird Into Commercial Use," $1,7"d/StreetJour_ml, 21 .Jmm 1965, p. 3; "Early Bird Given I.easing G_)-Ahead."
New t;'nk 71m_, 24Jmw 1965, p. 57.
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a time when only one-fourth of the Early Bird capacity was being used, Conlsat had
acquired a major new custonler.'"
On the last (lay t)f 1965, Comsat released its first quarterly report, which listed rev-
enues of $966,000 from Early Bird operations. Given that these revenues were gathered
during the first half of the life of an investment in excess of $7 million, those figures were
quite disappointing. On the other hand, Early Bird was primarily an experiment, and it
had been an extremely successlill experiment. Comsat still had almost $188 million in
cash out of its initial $200 million capitalization, and it had contracted to provide Atlantic
and Pacific Ocean service to support the Apollo program. *'_
A Choice Is Made
Still, no decision on the basic Comsat system had been made. Comsat had pushed for-
ward with Early Bird (Intelsat I), an experimental operational system, and lntelsat It, the
special-purpose system launched to provide NASA communications services. When
Comsat granted the Earl}, Bird geosynchronous contract to Hughes, the communications
company also awarded two study contracts for medium-altitude-orbit satellites to two
teanls, NI_&TRCA and TRW-ITC "Fhe asstmlption beneath those study contracts was that
a medium-altitude experimental systeln might Ii)llow Early Bird some time in 1966.
t Iowever, events were unfolding t()o swiftly ti)r that kind of experimentation; thrthermore,
cxl)erls generally assumed that "Ikqstar and Relay had prt)ven the nlcdium-ahilude case. h
was titnc 1¢)choose.
(;omsat had ;). variety ()f system designs from which to choose. ! lughes, the builder of
Early Bird and Intelsat Ii, as well as Comsat's partner in the venlure to supply military
conmnnficati()ns satellite services, proposed an "advanced Early Bird," the geosynchro-
nous t!,%304. AT&T and RCA, the builders (/Telstar and Relay, proposed a system of eigh-
teen satellites i)) random polar orbits. These two firms held o)le-third of Comsat's shares,
and AT&T was tilt" dominant tclecommunicati()ns company. TRW and ITT proposed a
controlled, or "phased," system of twelve satellites in similar orbils. In May 1965, Comsat's
.]()seph (;haryk antlotul(:cd that lit(.' COVl)Ovati()n was n() [()nger consi(lerirlg the "random"
apl)r()ach.L_'
Then, on 17 August 1965, (_omsat, on l)ehall of the Interim Communications Satellite
Committee, issned a request for proposals fi)r an "advanced satellite" (Intelsat Ill), the basic
satellite system design. The request for proposals stipulated that the satellite should be suit-
able R)r use in either a geosynchronous orbit or in a phased syslem at altitudes between
(L00I) and 12,000 miles (9,656 and 19,312 kilometers), ahhongh preferably applicable to
both ()rbital types. The veques! fi)r prt)posals further specified a capacity of 1,000 two-way
11 I. (:omsat I))cns Rt'lcas(', "(lores:it Files Al)plitation f_w F(',(', Atlth()vi.'ation Iov Propos('d Sat('llites t_)t
Ap()[l() St'Ixi(('," 3(_ 5;(.'ptt'mi)('v l'_)(;,'-): R()I:.('rl (_, ,g(..aln:uls, .[I., I() Ill..lOSel)h V. (ihal ",k, lett('r, 2Y_ November 196:'):
R()bt'rl (;. St'am:ms, Jr., t<) lb. J()st'|)h V. (;harxk. h'tl<q, ?,() l)('ct'mbci 19('13, all it) NAN:\ l list<|r,, ()lfic('. :Ms<) see
"(:())))sat ,";('('ks l() i'ht 5 .I Siq)cv lq;uh. F;it'ds," Ne., }brk 7)m,'s, 2(1 (h t.bcl 1965, p. I I: '*(_()msal l"ilcs Apollo Sawllitc
(:()lltl'iR(,'" ,k,],)t*t¢IJrld_. _l ()(loI)('l I!)()._), p. _(z)_; "First (]Ollllll('lt.i;l.1 Sat('llitc lobc l)laced (),.'t'i Pacifi('," ,\)_v );.k
Ti.u's, .t N<)_cmbv) 1!)(;5, p. _N( ;; "4 Sat('llit(" Svs(em Ordt't('d by C<mlsat,'" 3,_'w }?.k 7"irrupt. 25 November 19fi.5, p. 3,
112. (k)msat Plcss Rch'as(', "(',()msat (;ivt's l lighlights ()[ (]orl)t)rati()n's |)rogFcss in an lnt('rim R('l)orl t()
Y)l_;))t'hohlt'rs," 31 I)v('embt'r 1!165, N,:_SA I |islo)v ()ffic('.
113. "(;()lnsat Snldies," Aviatbm VG'ek & ,'#dace 7krh_lolo_,)80 (6 Aplil 1!)(:,4t: 19; "Th(' Big F()nv in ('.()ms:_t
( hmll)('titi<m," '_pr.¢' l.)ailL _) Ap)il 196_'), p. 2L)?,; "l'_ml_ Bird F()lh)w-(')n." Aviatio. |_;,_,t,. & .%_mc¢,Techn.lo_ _2 ( l !)
AI)_ i1 1(.1651: 28: I >,1(" 1)ctmiston, "( :,)msat Satt'llit(' Dccision t tints ()_ Eavli('v Pv()lits." W<gshin_kqrm EveMng Sial; I I
M:_', 1965, p. "7` ).
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Figure 21
I'hr Inlelsal t" seri_<s o/,_'eosym'h_nlou_ commum_alitm_ wHell#es illustral_!s ltw J2"rrrH ,g_*nvlll J_t _atrllile sic/' Ihal had bee_
a_hir_,ed sime the firq Inh'l_ul, I(ar/_' Bird, Irmmhrd i)_ 1965 (l')_'un' 2#i. [Is Krr_ttet _i_e (amt u,eight) _.nprtted /o its pn,-
de._s_m:_ _u¢_r_t_ the/a_L,r_ _ u mbr._ aml va_4,'ty o /u mtim_ it, ould p,'_fl.m--a_.t had I. p,'_]mm--as th: n u tuber o/g,'o-
stall.navy dot_/u'g.an to  ill up, (f ;mulesv of NASA. photo no. 85-1 I-t02)
voice circuits, a five-year lifetime, a weight of approximately 240 pounds (109 kilograms),
two repeaters, a directional antenna, and multiph¢ access capability. RCA, TRW, and
i lughes submitted hids. On 16 Decemher 1965, Comsat aBnotulced that it was negotiath_g
with TRW for at least six lntelsat lll satellites at it cost of approximately $20 nlillion. TRW
had oflk'red a design capable of operating at both medium and geosynchronous altitudes.
(;omsat still had not decided which orbit to use? t_
(In 29 1)eccml)er 1965, again on behalf of hitelsal, (;onlsat issued a new request ti)r
proposals lor design studies for its tourfl>gencration satellites (lntclsat IV). These would
have a capacity of 6,(100voice circuits (or Ion TV chanl]els) and a five-year lifetime, and
they would weigh less than 2,300 pounds ( 1,043 kilograms). These satellites would lw .¢er,-
.synchronous. Comsat had tinally chosen a system!":'
Arthur (;. (;larke could |)e proud, but so could John R. Pierce, t larold A. Rosen,
l)onald D. Williams, Tom Hudspeth, Sid Melzger, Siegfiied Rciger, I.eonardJaffe, and fiR:
hundreds of other engineers who had helped to make commercial satellite cmumunica-
lions a reality. Political forces nlay have determined the tklllll of tile final syslenl, and
econon]ic Iorces had provided much {}f' the impetus, but none of these [orccs would havc
produced the global comnnmicalions satellite s)'stcm without the cI'fOFtS of the engineers
and technicians who envisioned, developed, demonstrated, and deployed the "billion
dollar tech nolog_'."
I l't. (:oms;tt I>ress Reh'as_', "(:omsal Asks Manufacturers to Sulmfil proposals on Advanted Salellilc fin.
(;Iob;d ( :omnnmi(ations," l 7 August 1965, NASA t ]istm'y ()trice; "Early Bird Follow-(In," Aviation |t},ek _-¢ _lm_e
7_'*hnolo{. O' 83 (23 All,lISt t _.1{}_")): 27; l,mrv We¢.kh.v, "( ;olllsat Negotiates With TRW on l.arg, e Salcllile {'A)llll'il('t,"
V(a',hi;ll.,r/m'l I'o*t, t7 l)¢'cember 1965, p. (]8; "(;olllsal is Negolialing fin New Satrlliles With 'IRW; Uscvs' Charges
Ma,, lie (hH," Wtdl.%l_,e/'//ourrtal. 17 l)etcn]bcv 1965, p. 24.
115. John N.blc Wiltozd, "( :omsat Seeking Bigger Salellile," New }brk lTme_, 30 [)t'ctqllt){.r 1!165. p. 21;
"(]t)lnsal Asks !.)t'signs |til Big, Nt",_' %alctlile," t_Ti_/ii**:_l,m Evrni}_g Stm; 30 l)ett'nlt)er 1965, p. At3.
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Conclusion
All ()f Ill(' lechnologies Ibr communications salcllitcs had exislcd in some t_rm sincv
at lcasl Ihe end of World War I! when Arlhm (;. Clarke wrote his ltqrdr<s., HbIM a,-dclc.
Most, (,Sl)c(ially lit(" ('lectr(itfi(+s te(hnol()gics, wcr¢' rclalivt'b, llt;{ttll't' b+V |(.)55 whcll.l()ltn R.
l)ier<( • wr<)lt' his atiltl(, fol./H Ib++)/)+,l+io,_. Miss, It,s, l]lt' critical enabling tc(]}]l{)log_; arriv('d
,):)1. lit |hC _A'OI-t|N ()l" I)iCl'CC: "Thc nc(csS_ily spurs Io ('<)tl('l'ClCon slagc on 4 ()cl()t)er ]( ""
;.{('li()ll tOll ('()llllll{ltli('Hli()llS SaIc]IiIcs] CitlttC with lit(' succ(:sst_tl Jatll{Chil{g ()['.%}){llltik I hv
lhe t:SSR."'"'
Equally iltlp()r|a]l|, lilt" inlcrna|ional |el('(omnnmicali(ms market was booming in |he
lair' l(.)50s and could pr()vidc sutlicicn| rc'c('nu(.'s |() und(.rwritc a "ltilli(m dollar tt'('hnolo-
RT." .\T&T was r<'adv Ill tin:nee at global SVSICIil ()Ill ()l" 'iS own funds. (;('n(',al Elc(tvic and
[.()(khet'd, p,ol)altly in pursuil ()[ satelli|{' sail's, wcrc anxious I() fi)rm a c(ms(),tium 1o
share lit(." risk. I lughes, (;TE, and ITT w('rc anxious It) disc()vev a way around XF&T's dora-
man{ [)ositi(m iu {hc t(.'l(!C()lnntulliCalil)ns lt{arkcl.
M('anwhih', lhc U.S. g(lvcrnmcnt s(.cm('d |o havc many minds during tim Eismlhowcr
adminis|raliott. Vfhih" lht' pr(-sidcnl himst'lf seemed lo} _:_%T(' I )_'('] _ wholly in favor {)t" pri-
vail' (AT&T) (t("¢ch)plnt'n| and owncl'ship ()f _1 gl(}ltal salclli|(' comnmnicalions svsl('lll.
()|hc,'s wilhin lilt, adnlinislrali()n and (',vii scrvi((, wcr(, [('ss cnlhusias|ic. St)m(" [}.'i| Iha[
AT&T was mon_)p(}listic: ()|h(ws ttelicved |ltal salelliic communic;tti(ms wlis sonlclhing g()v-
evnmcnt should d(). "I'hc Kennedy administrali()n was less C()llllltilt('d lo private ()wm'rship
and m()rt' el)remitted Ill the potential i),cs|i_c ()f a ,_o',ermnenl-sl)Onsor('d program. The
Bay of Pigs and the tligh| ot(;agavin in |it(" spring of l(.)(_l finally tihcd govcrnmen| away
t'l'()lil i)rivatc d('v<'lol)nlcn| ()f ('()llllltlltli('_{li()llS salellil('s, |hcrel)y ,_tlltl'aUllct'itt_ [hiH ;\'I'_2T
w()uld n()| bc able It) (tontiuatc satellite c(mmumi('ations.
1)riot |() |hc LrOV('rtllllCtll lltkc{)vct" ()f COllllltttltiC_l|i()tlS salelliic dcvelo])nl('nl itl l(J61,
pl'iVa((" it/(iuslr'.,' hild ittl(lcliakcn ('xltqTsivt" dcv('l()plllClll tlSitl_ 'is (')wn flllldS. ] htgh('s had
built and tested a Syncom pr<)l<)tyl)c. AT&T had buill large ant('nnas lbr the Echo i)ro -
g,-alll, had (l('sign('d Telstar. and had I)uih a ft'w pr()|()tyl)c Tclstal + (ottll)tmcttts. It +olhct-
(onlpani(*s w('r(' ,to| sp('nding |he millions ()f dollars inv('sl('d by [ htght's and XI'&T, Ihc'_.
,l()n('lhcl('ss w('rc [)urst,ing (ommunicalions sal('llilc and g]_mn(I st:lion |(.(hnology wilh
[hi'Jr own I'CSOllt'CC:';,.
In spilt' ()f llw P('nlagon's lack of dirccl involv('mcm in (-omm('rcial c()mmuni(alions
salcllilc dt'vt'lo[)Int'nl, the militarv markcl allowed commercial manufacturers It) dcvch)lt
lhc c×pcrlise |ha| would have allowed llmm lo (ompe|e wilh AT&T in th(' early days and
whh ] ]tigtlcs lalt'r Otl. (;cnt_ial Elc('tri( l)ast,d its atlctllpl I<) Clltet" the ('Otlltll(q'('i_l] ('<)tll-
municali(ms sa|(+llilc t)usincss in |hc early 19(;0s ()n its c'xpericnce wilh tit(" mililavV's
Advcul program, l)cspi|e dlis early w(}tk, (;choral Eh'c|ric did no| launch a ('(mmmnica-
|i(ms sa|('llilc mltil 1(.)78. The.[apatt('se Broadcast Sit_t'lli|e buil_ by (;tmera] Elct_ric was
similar 1() A(h('ul in many ways. albci| at Ira move sophisticated versi(m. (;t'ncral Elcclric
lalcr ])uih the I)S(_S Ill series for I)oi), and at(m prochasing R(_A, the company all(_wcd
R(_A's Asl,'o 1)ivisi(m t() con|imtc 1)uilding (()nmmni('alions salelliles, while (;(mcral
Elccl,iCs Spa(c l)ivisi(m concentrated (m mili|arv lug.t1 Earlh-ohserving mavkcts. R(:A.
af_cv bcing ()ill ol the ma,k('t from lilt" lasl Rt'lav (1964) undl |h(" launch of Sireore F-1
(197"3), was very successful in Ill(" U.S. dontt,slic sal('lli|(' market.
i). 9.
126 (',REATIN[; S't,N'I'I, IMS: UNITED STATES AND (]ANAI)A
TRW (through its subsidiary Space Technology Laboratories) entered the connnuni-
cations satellite arena as the systems engineers for the Pentagon's Advent and NASA's
Relay programs. In 1965, the company won the Intelsat IIl series contract. Hughes was
tm,ored in that coml)etition, but that firm rcfilsed to design a satellite capahle of fimc-
tioning in either a gcosynchr()nons or a medium-altitude orbit. "FR_,V built additional satel-
lites for DoD and NASA, but it was never strong in the commercial inarket. Lockheed, for
its part, lobbied for a place toy aerospace companies within tile organizational structure
that became Conlsat. Later, the company attempted to enter the domestic communica-
tions satellite market as an operator with CMI, Satellite Corporation (later Satellite
Business Systems), but not until late 1995 did Lockheed begin building comnnmications
satellites (tbr tile Iridium tow-Earth orbit system).
The most successfitl manufacturer of communications satellites has been the Hughes
Aircraft Company. From earl), 1959, when the Syncom design began to come together, to
1961, when NASA gave Hughes a sole-source contract for Syncom development, Hughes
devised various designs and strategies to enter the conmnmications satellite husiness as
manufacturer, operator, or some combination of the two. One strateg W involved alhlwing
NASA to fired satellite development much as the Aton|ic Ener_, Commission had fimded
the (levetolm|ent of nuclear p()wer plants. Ahhough only one of many strategies, top man-
agement supported it, and it is a fair representation of what look place.
NASA considered the Hughes design fauhy, but the agency chose it as the next most
promising program when the Kennedy administration made available increase(l c()mmu-
nications satellite research and development tkmding in mid-1961. Problems with the mil-
itary Advent program, which had been in trouble ti'om the start, contributed to tile joint
NASA-DoD decision to proceed with Syncom. Development work on Syncom then led to
tile commissioning of the Advanced Syncom study program and, somewhat latin, to the
Intermediate Syncom study program. Advanced Synconl metamorphosed int() NASA's
Applications Technology Satellite program, while the Intermediate Syncom became the
NASA-sponsored lntelsat 1I series. Between 1963 and 1968, Hughes launched thirteen
communications satellites sponsored directly (Syncoms 1 through 3 and Applications
Technnlo_' Satellites 1 tln-ough 5) or indirectly (Early Bird and fi)m flights of the Intelsat
II) by NASA.
If the governmentInamely, Congress an(l NASA--had not intervened, an AT&T-
dominated medium-ahittlde system would almost certainly have been lannched in the
mid-1960s. The Hughes design eventually would have flown, but when, and with what suc-
cess, is problematic. Governnlent intervention had two main effects. First, the success of
the Syncom series, and the NASA commitnmnl to the geosynchronous orhit, made geo-
synchronous the logical choice to, a comnmrcial system. Second, the demonstration of
the Hughes geosynchronous system gave Hughes an advantage over all of its potential
competitors. This advantage grew as NASA persuaded Comsat to launch a version of
Syncom using commercial frequencies (Early Bird) and offered to be an ancho, tenant
for the Intelsat It series. The NASA Applicati(ms Technology Satellite kept Hughes at tile
top of its technical t'orm, ''_ while lntelsat flew the TRW-buih Intelsat III series.
Government intervention had very little effect on tile development of new technolo-
Dr, however. Much of the electronics was developed originally at AT&T's Bell Telephone
Laboratories and improved later by other coral)antes using internal research and devel-
opment fimds, tlughes (teveloped Ill(! basic "sl)innev" and "g)Tostat" technologies using
117. l( slmuld I)e iminled out Ihat timn'e Hughes systems depended on Ihe "<q_/r()slaI" principle devel I
oped at Hughes t)y Anlh[my h)lillo and dcnmnstral('d (m the Army TACSAT.
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its own funds. "Three-axis" lechnology derived not fiom NASA's sixth Applications
T(Pchnoh)gy Sat(lilt( +, but t+;lthlq ` fr<inl lilt" T('Icvision Infrared ()F, erati,_)n;d Satellite and
l)cft+nse Meteorological Satellite Pvogr;un by R( L+\ and int('rn;tl sludi¢'s carried ottl l>v Ford
and oil+ions, l.ater govcrnm('nl programs, notably tilt + Applications Tcchnolol.,_' Satt'llitc.
had hlrgc eltk+cts on tilt + application of gcosynchr<)n<ltts tcchnoh>gy. Some of these appli-
(;(lions l|avt" n("¢('r qtlitc math' it into f)raclicc (siuch as at'ronautical comnltmications and
tracking), while <)thcrs (geosynchronous weather satellites, t<_r inslanc(') have 1)('conic
tfl)iqttitous.
Tht'r(' is a place fi>r ff,OVCl'illllClll iilv</tv¢'nicnt in c_ltlllll('rci+<tl Icchllologics, |)ill tiivl|/
;(lid con'¢cnlioil_i] wi_;doiil ilili_;l 1)c t'yiuiiilicd c_ii+Cflllly l/t'|_)lt" i_l.'-;.p_lycr lll(lilox' is co(lint(l-
It'd It> Ill(' _lc]lic'¢ClilClil of iill|)rot)_ll)lc g<lals. Th(' g(iVClllillClil li/_ll-kcI has I)ct'n _t P41iOll_-Cl
t_)l+CC Ih_tll dilcCt spotlstirship of lCSC_lich and dt'vt'lol)intqll, and it has t)CCli stiongcl thilll
govCillllicnt-Iillldt'd "dt'lilOliSll+_tli<liis" in lht' dt"ct'l<lpincnl <if conlillci-ti_tl tt'chnt>h)gics.

PART II:
Creating the Global,
Regional, and National Systems
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Chapter 10
Launching the European
Telecommunications Satellite Program
by Arturo Russo
This chapter is t)ased (m research performed as part of lilt" histo,v project of the
Eur<)pean Space Agency (ESA) in collaboration wilhJohll Krigc and 1.()renza Sebcsta. For
this history project, the attthor conducted a special study of the launching of tile telecom-
munications satellite program of the European Space Research ()rganization (ESRO), a
muhinational space organization created in Europe in the early 1960s, whose activities
ESA look over in 11175. The following is a discussion of the results of that stud}; which can
be fimnd in detail in two ESA llistory Study Reports?
The United States dominated the history of satellite communications ttp to the end
ot the 1970s. Europe was a latecomer. Although the first plans tot a .joint European
commtmications satellite program were elaborated in 1965, many years t)assed helore the
program was implemented and a Et, ropean satellite finally was launched. Only at the ell¢[
of 1971, in fact, did the ESRO memher states approve a program aimed at developing an
experimental satellite, and not until 1978 did thal satellite, named the Orbiting Test
Satellite (OTS), leave the launch pad. ESA approved tim second phase of tile telecom-
munications program in Fehruary 1978, with the aim of (leveloping an operational
satellite, named the European Comnmnicatinn Satellite (ECS). The first ECS was placed
in orbit in 1983; three others followed in 1984, 1987, and 1988, respectively, thus
completirlg the ECS system.
By the rime the first ECS satellite began operating, however, six Intelsat V satellites
already were orbiting over the Earth's oceans. Also, domestic communications satellites
had been under development by private companies in the United States for ten years, and
some 18 U.S. satellites were in orbit. Meanwhile, Inlelsat itselt was providing domestic
services in more than 20 countries; (;anada aheady had launched seven Anik satellites;
Japan, India, and Indonesia also had acquired independent space communications
capability; and in Europe, two Franco-( ;erman Symphonie satellites were apl)roaching the
end of their orhital life after several years of good t)erforntance. While not all these space-
crati were as complex and up to date as the ECS, the European system was certainly too
late to play a major role in the competitive market of space communications.
The Big Picture
Why did it take such a long time to develop a Emopean communications satellite pro-
gram? To answer this question, one nmst first consider two main asl)eC_S. The first is file
institutional framework in which lilt' program was to he developed. Two multinational
space (wganizations existed in Europe during lilt" l(,,)()Os and early 19711s: (me was devoted
1. A1lur_ Russo. The l(,'t*l) l)/.7,eh:/)ms,_*! t)[ the 7)'h'¢ommu_ii*a/io_ .S,vldlite l'rogv_*m i_ IiSRO ¢10¢_5-1#711,
ESA tlSR4_ (Noordwijk: ESA, May 1993): Armlt_ Russo, I'_SH()'_ "l_,le¢ommt_fication_ Ptoffr_zm arm the ()17_ t'l_lr, I
{ ] 97D-] 9741, E_+\ I ISR- 13 ( Nootdw!ik: ES, A, I"cbt mu) 199t). Fol Iln' history ot EY;RI ) and El.l)(), sccJt,}m K_igc
atIId AI till'l) RII'.;_,o, I(ltropt' ill .gptlr¢. l 0:,¢_1_177. ESA SP-1172 (No.rdw{ik: ESA, Set}tcmhcr 199t).
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to scientific research (ESRO), and a second, called the European Launcher Development
Organization (EI,DO), whose original mission was to build a rocket called Europa,
became dew)ted to launching hea_ 3, satellites into near-Earth orbits. The eventual involve-
ment of ESRO and ELDO in the new field of geostationary communications satellites
implied a change in their charter and operational program. This change was not easy,
owing Io their different missions, sn-uctures, and memberships. Only six European cotm-
tries, plus Australia, were members of ELDO, whose programs were defined essentially at
flw governmental level. Each member state was responsible fi_r a specific task vis-a-vis the
final goal of buikling lhe three-stage Europa vehicle and associated facilities, and each had
a diff_erent level of financial and technical commitment. ESRO, on tim other hand, con-
sisted of ten member states, each of which contributed financially in proportion to their
gross national i)roduct, and the European space science community defined iks programs.
Figure 22
Apprrn_ed in 1971, but no! lautu'hed until 197B, the European Space Ageno' ) expoime_tal salellite, _mmed the Orbititt g Test
Satellite (OTS!, shown here, served as the [im.ru_tw_ o/the s]mce ct,ffe_u_'_ sl4bseque_lt cmnntuni_ _lti_m_ _(ttellites, l_t.nt,u ft_ lhe
Eu ropea n (;ore m u nU'atio n Satellite (ECS). (( h mz tcsy _t NASA)
ESRO member states were not equally interested in communications satellites; some
of them were firmly against the organization's involvement in space applications. ELDO,
for its part, was hampered by severe technical, financial, and managerial problems that
restthed in a dramatic series of test launch failures of the Europa rocket. As a conse-
quence, strong disagreements existed among ELDO member states about the viability of
a European launcher for geostationary satellites. A collaborative European effort in
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sat('llile commtulicati<)ns could only be devclol)(,d within the framcw<)rk of _t <'onH)vc-
h(')l.siv(- spa('(" policy in which national (xotl+)mic itttcr('sts and poli6cal goals cottld b(" sat-
i+lied. The development of such a policy rcquirt'd m_tny y('aFs of lal)orh)us ne_otiati()ns.
Th(" second r(+as(>n why it took s(> much lJ)n(" lo develop a Eurol)('an commtn)ications
salellitc program was the question of users, l)tuing the l(.)60s and l(.)70s, all European
countries provided l('l<.+C()tllnlllllit:+tliOllS St'I'Vi¢'{'_; thYotlgh state-owned operators. Thesv
st_ttc tt'lec()mmtmit:tlions administr+tti(>ns had tht" aHl]lol-ity to) ;tel +tts t]I(" monop<)ly
providers of all services considered at that time :ts suitable [or a F:tuopcan satellite svs-
tent--namely, international telephony, Iclt'x and (]:tta transmissit)tl, and internalional
telt'visi()n dislvibtnior_ within the Eurovision nctw<)vk.
The st:tit" tch'commttnicati<)ns adtnhlistrations, while interested in sttpporting
re.st'arch and dt'vclol)tncnt studit,s of c<)mtntttlic;tti()tls satellit(,s, were h+tYdly ()plimistic
al)otll lhe econ<)mic prosp(.xlS ()F a Etut)pcan sys|ctn. According (() their ('stima(es, in tirol,
the large investments retltfircd tot proctuing and latmching satcllilcs, as well as t_)r bt,ild-
it)g lh(" l_t:cessal+y ground statio/)s, would 1)c g/-(:'itll)' il1 t'xcess of the sitvi/)gs achieved by
transferring traffic from the terrestrial ('al)le network to it satellite svsti'm. Over lhe short
;tvt'r;_c distances between Etlropcan centers, and wilhottt th(- pv()blems pos('d by large
()ct'al'is (:,r vast tmdeveloped regions, it m:t(Ic no sense to put sophisticated tt+anspoYldt'rs
as high as ?)(LO00 kilometers in th(" sky and to bttihl htt_c _tlllt'nn_is <-)n the gr<)und.
Two Package Deals
This, then, w+ts the backgrotmd tt) the humching of s;tlellite tcle(:onmumications in
EIIFOpC. Stal'lillg t]l( + pl'O_l'_U11 t'('qtlil't'd tt l+('dcJ/lliliOll (1["the respe('tivc roh's of ESRO and
El+DO within the tr;uncwork oI Eur<)pcan space p()licv. ESRO was the obvious candittal(.'
t<) develop comtnttnicati()tls s_tlellitcs, l);tscd on ils cxp('ri('nc(' gained in the field of sci-
entitle rcs(,arch. Indeed, FSRO's cxc(:utive and l(,¢hnical staff ('nthtlsiasti(ally h)oked t<)r-
ward to working on sate[lilt c<)mmtttli¢ali()tts. A b_thtn¢c(I program <d bolh st'icntit]c and
applicatiotts satt.llites implied, in l_)+ct, a m()tt" ('ll](i('tlt t_s(" o| capital rt'sOtlrCt's, a m<)v(.'
c([ttitablc ([istt'ibttlk)tl o+" iH(htstt'i;tl (ontta(is atnottg tnc_Itl}(,r st;tt(+s, atl(l itucrcsting.jobs
for r(.+(:rttiling the l)+.'sl cngin(x'rs. Fld)(), R)r its p;.ut, w<)tth-I l)(" called on to develop al)pro-
priat(" ]atmt'h vei)icl('s.
Following the succ('ssfifl launch and ()l)('ration <)f Emly Bird (Inlelsat I), Comsat's first
salcllitc, in .M:tr¢h I(.)65, EI.DO ntt'ml)cr statt's agrc¢'d in.July 1¢.)6(+ to fund a program t()
make the EtH-opa rocket capal)]e ()f launching small satellites inl() geostati()nary orbit.
l,ttl(.'t" th+tl yt'ar, ESRO was charged wilh studyhtg an experimental satellite f<)r telephony
and telcvision services in Europe and the Mcditt'rrant'an. At the s_lnte tim¢L the Ettropc;m
Sl):t(t" (:onf(wcncc ('a.n_(" into 1)ehtg ;ts a polhic;tl forum fi)r discussing :t COml)rehensiv("
space policy for Et_rope. At its sctond mc('th_g,, held in Rome in.lunt" I¢.)67, the confer-
t'tl('t" s(.'l lip tt special ct)mmitt('c l() (.'lat)()t;H(, a I()ng-lvllll prt)gram that included scicnlif-
i( t+cst'at+ch, applications, and latmchcrs.
The ttansiti<)t_ from the study |)hast" I() actual development, however, t,t+ct)tmtt'r('d
tl)rce main dil/]ctHti('s. First, imp+>rlatH (qtu))t'_)Is ()f l])e Eu)opea)_ space scit'n(:e com))m-
nily cxpr(.'ss('d concern abottt tht. t'v('t_tttal ('xtension <)f ESRO into app]icati<)ns satc]lit('s.
_l;tIly s('i(.'ntisls R:ared t]lat ._:c()ilOllli( Jill(| comnl(.'rcial illI('l('sIs rapidly would eclipse sci-
cnti|_(+ ot)i('clives and that polilical taclovs would dictate program priorilics, ralhvr lh_wt
the n('t'd to investigate scientifically interesting l)hcnomena l)('yond the _tmospher('.
The second dil_ficttlty derived fr<)tn th(" diverging visioYts of the ESRO tncml)er stalvs
;l.])()ul thc pio_+pt'(|_ of salvllitc ('()llllllllll]C;.LliOlIS ill I_tnx)I)e. Fo]" some, notal)Iv Frat'_(.c ;uld
(;crtn_tny, th('rc was n() d()ul)t that EtH'(>l)C sh()uld tu+_de_lak( • a vigorous effort in this I]t'l(l,
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to reduce the perceived technoh)gical gap with the United States in this strategically
important industrial sector. France went so tar as to suggest that ESRO should concentrate
on applications, leaving science to national space programs or muhinational projects.
Other ESRO member states held tile opposite view. The British government, for example,
tollowing the advice of the powertifl British Post Office, that country's state teleconnnu-
nications administration, opposed any direct involvement in the space segment of satellite
communications. They believed, in tact, that very few possibilities existed for autonomous
European action in this field, because of both the strength of the American presence and
the tioreseeable small commercial demand tbr the kinds of satellites Europe could 1)uild
and operate. For Britain, as well as for some of the smaller member states such as
Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, ESRO was doing well in science, and space
research had to remain its main mission.
The third ditficul D, to the transition from the Sllldy phase to actual development of a
European communications satellite system was tire question of a launcher--namely,
whether Europe shotdd develop its own, more powerful launch vehicles or should rely on
American rockets. Britain and France led the opposite camps. The British stressed the
high cost and poor performance of the p,'oposed ELDO launchers compared to
American missiles; the French argued that Europe could not sustain a credible space pop
icy without the availahility of its own launchers.
The ambiguity of the U.S. position regarding the provision of their launche,s timled
the controversy. NASA, in ['act, had always been available to provide launch t'acilities tot
F.uropean scientitic satellites, bu! it was t)y no means clear whether this availability would
be extended to commercially oriented satellites. Eventually, the U.S. government slated
that it would reserve tire right to relitse latmch facilities to European communications
satellites potentially harmfltl to lntelsal's commercial interests. Britain claimed that the
Americans should be trusted for their willingness to offer launch assistance to Emol)e
whenever possible. In contrast, the American policy strengtltened France's belief that
Europe needed its own launchers to support a viable communications satellite program.
Political negotiations and technical studies dragged on for three years tmtil the dis-
agreement reached a breaking poinl at the fourth meeting of the European Space
Conference, held in Brussels on 4 November 1970. Discussions were interrupted after the
first day, as France, West Germany, and Belgium declared that they were prepared to go
ahead on their own. There was no point, they said, in trying to define a European space
policy when the partners' priorities differed so greatly. Britain announced its intention to
leave ELDO, while France denounced the ESRO Convention.
After three more years of laborious negotiations, a solution emerged in the form of
two package deals. These global agreements satisfied the national interests of all the coun-
tries hy abandoning the ideal of a mandatory comprehensive space program. ESRO ment-
be," states agreed on tire first package deal in Decentber 1971. It definitely transformed
ESRO from an organization solely devoted to scientific research into one mainly involved
in applications satellite programs, with only a ntinor fi'action of its budget devoted to sci-
ence. Only the scientitic program remained ntandalory, while all application programs
were optional. The second package deal, agreed on in July 1973 during meetings of the
European Space Conference, established the basic principles on which the new European
Space Agency would he created two years later.
The main element of the second package deal was the 'a la carte program system: each
ESA member state contributed to the space agency's various programs in proportion to its
own political, econontic, and industrial irrterests. Through this second package deal,
France took prime responsibility for the Ariane rocket development program and agreed
to contril)ute 63 percent of the cost. Similarly, West Germany took prime responsibility for
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Spact,lal), a manned scientific latter:tory to be carried in tilt" Space Shutlle <argo t'Ja}; and
Brilailt look resf)onsil)iliu¢ for a marilinw c_mununicadons satellite.
The ESA-EUTELSAT Agreement
h was within the tl-aniework established by the first package deal, howew, r, thai the
satellite communications piogililll finally crone into t_cing, with tilt" support of eight of
ESR()'_+ member ,+tates (Belgium. Britain, Denmark, France, Ital.'+; Sweden. Switzerland,
and !,_'esl (;crtnany). It is ii,nl)orhtnt lo n<)le, however, that lhe |)rogratll was divided inlo
two diflvrenl slages, each rt:quirJng approval by a qualified ma.jority _>t the parlJt:ipalilig
countries. ()nlv the experimental phase of lilt' program actually was approved: a decision
on Ihe operational phase was dt'li',rcd unlil mid-1975.
The main reason f<)r slaggerin R the decision-nntking process was lilt' persislent unccr-
taintv al)_mt the commercial viability of lilt.' planned European comnumications satellite
system, l.Tnlikc lnl<.'lsill, which was niccting a real m'cd by improving conlmtulicalions
t)elwet+il (Oilliii(,lilS, a Etil+lq)ean satellite system sccmed, on Ill+_" evidence available, It) I)c
a hixttl+y that Europe did not really need and that tilt+ slale teh'conununications adminis-
trations could not alfbrd. :\cc<i,-din_ to a I¢.)71 stu(lv l)repat+ed by tile l:]urol)ean
('.onl_Tencc of Poslal and l'elccommuHicati+m :\dministratiotls (knm_'n fly its French
acrol++ynl, (;El'T), tilt" estimated <lt)erational cost of the s.vstt+m in the 198()s would t)c far
in excess of the savings in tbt + terrestrial table netw<>rk. Indeed, the (;EPT stud'+' reported
that lerrcslrial savings would not c++'en cover the costs of live ground stations!' The state
tclecotnnnulications ;+tdnliY|islraliotlS tnadc it <h+at+ that the dtwelopnlent of tiT<_: European
spact' industry could not be financed I)y ctisloinei's. The _<)V('l+illllelllS, ill other words, had
to pay the diti{'reiict' between the acitlal costs of the slttellile system and those costs Ihal
lisei+s llOlillally would have to pay.
"l'ht+ (;EPT t'eporl raised _i+t'ill cllil(eiil. II itnplicd thai poicnlial satellite iiS/!lS would
ilOt list" the s,++'Mt'ill iiilless _ovel+ilillCills subsidized its eliOt+alien. [11 lilt' woids lit lilt" British
(tt'lcgali()tl It> till" ESRO (]oUtlcil: "ttad the pt+qject tlildei ttisctissilln beell a [!.K. naliotlal
|)i+ojetl it WO/lid ct'rlaiilk ilavt' 1)et, il llli-llt'(I do+evil in view of Ithisl I'C])Oil." In facl, lilt"
conlilllinicalioils t)rol_,laiil was riot :t nali<lilal project, liiil all illleinalional ui/dertakin_, its
well as 1)all ot +lilt? iliilch x_/itlel political toill¢'xl ill whicll lhe tiisl l)ackag(, deal was tieJil_
discusscd. The ecoilolnic argiiilienls in lilt" (:F+PT iep<)rt, however, could i]ol be dismissed+
so _-t1)FOgi_illl sli'ale_r_ ' was clab(iriilcd to allow the parlicil)aling stales to dt'tt'r lilt' decision
Oil tilt, pl'll_l'aili'S operational phast'.
NOilelhe]ess, Ii++'t" vt,alS lalei lilt" t't'Otl<ililics of Ettiopt'all satellite ('Oillilltlilit'alilillS
wt'rt' tell tixini I)eiii_ se{tlt'd. A 1976 (;EPT sludy ieporlt'd an esliillaled dif|Terence otal)<itil
._7()l) iniliion I)t'txvt'en lilt" total o])crationa[ cost of the satellite svsiein and tlic leircstiiat
allt'lllalivc. :\ s_>lulion secint'd t)ossit)h'. The stall' lelctonlinunit'alions adniinisiralioils
would t)uild and operate ihc ,_iOillld Slalioiis, while lilaila<t{eiiR:ill of the salt'llite se_ilieiil
would i)c t'lillilSled I() a ilew iilleriialiona] ()l-_aili,_aliOil, called EUTEI£AI'. ESA nleiilt)el-
stall's wt'le t'Xl)t'cled Io cover llll" silOl'lt+all ill ol)ctalin<_ costs.
;\il agi'e('illt'iil tvas iit)l iliiiiR'dJait'lv :il hailfl, llowevcr, and look anol|ici i}irce )t,:ils ot
]lalsh ilcgolialioiis. '['}It" leh'colillnilnicatiOliS adilliliiStialiolls held a Sli-on<_ nt'_otialiil<_
position. Iudced, they had llt'Vel Ibrlnallx requested tilt" iniroduction of a satellite 5,vslt'ill.
Space policy, ll()l flit" needs of the ilSt'lS, h:td tnolivaletl lilt' I_]SA lelecolllnitiili(atioliS pro-
_,l:iiii, and its lilt,till)el- Malt" <t_o++el-illll('lilS could il(lt help accepting the iiscFs' contlilions
Io I)iilt_, it Io coinl)letion. So, ill Ma'+' 1_,)7_,),ESA :ill(| El;TEl+SAT t]nal]v rt, ached till il_l('t.-
iiieill. E_,'\ woiild (<liilri])ule as iliii_h _is ti0 pei-cenl to Et'TI{I+SAT's ol)t'i-aliil<_- costs.
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Conclusion
Fr<>m the users' point of view, it seems that none of the studies that examined tile
economics of tile ECS program were able to demonstrate Ihat its implemcntati<m would
produce economic benefits in excess of the combined cost of the space scgmenl and its
associated ground slation intiaslrucmre. Wider economic arguments and political moti-
vation provided the uhimate justification for program approval. Among those wider
aspects arc the following:
The assertion of Europe's political and technological independence from the two
sttperpowers, which was a particularly key element of the French goverlllllC'nl's space
policy
2. The recognition of the aerospace sector as strategically imporlant lot die develop-
ment of advanced industrial technology
3. The need to qualit}, European industry for competilive parlicipation in lntelsat
procurement contracts
4. The understandillg that the OTS and E(3S programs were tile hearl of an evohition-
ary program leading to other applications fields, such as aeronautical and maritime
telecommtmications, direcl television broadcasting, and Earth observation
5, The search for autonolny of political and cuhural expression (as the influential
French newspaper Le 31onde declared in 1967: "The transmission of radio and televi-
sion programs is one of the most supple and diversified means to assure a presence
and influence abroad.")
6. The general drive toward European economic and technical integration
National governments had diflk'ren! views about the relative importance of these
aspects, and these differences made launching the European communications satellite
program such a long and complex process. In particttlar, the critical issue of launchers vis-
a-vis the commercial prospects of application satellites was the real stumbling block that
risked jeol)ardizing the entire European cooperative space eflbrt. The 1973 package deal
was a real landmark in the history of Eurol)e in space, and it is lair Io conclude by recall-
ing Ihal it was an Ariane rocket that put tile E(_S into orbit.
Chapter 11
U.S.-European Relations and the
Decision to Build Ariane, the
European Launch Vehicle'
t)y l,orcnza Scbesia
Scholars gvncrally recognize, although with diff,'rent accents, that the U.S. policy on
the availal)ilily of launcht'rs tk)l Etuopcan communications satellites inllucnced Ihc
European decision to design and build ils own launchers.: This decision, oft]ciallv
endorsed in .July 1973, led to lilt" CotlStl'tl('liOll c,f Ali;tllC, which today, allot" lllOI-C lhilll :|
dccadv of technical rvliabilir_ and g_.M managvmcnt, has assmcd itself the m:ljority of the
global commcrcial market.
What is still unclear, though, arc the reasons for the U.S. position on l.umchcr tcch-
ttologg/and tacilitivs, and how those reasons evolved ov¢'r timc--from tim litst restrictive
directive, National Security Action Mcmorandunl (NSAM) 338 of Scptcml)cr 1965,
through the tnorc tlexible, and Iltl('Cl'l_.till, position ctmccivcd in the second half of lhc
1960s, to ihc return to a mot\' restrictive policy pttl)licl._ ann_lttnced |)y Plcsidcnt Nixon in
()ctobc|- 197_2. Shapit]g tiffs Ir_tjvctoty ot changing I I.S. policy wcrc fivt: dil[,.,rcnt t_tctors:
I. lh_. amlu_l would likc It> Ihank.[ohn K_igc, hcad ,_l the I.'SA lh(!jvcl al ihc l:ul_>llCan Ulmt'l,,il_
[llntilllIc ill I.'lmvll(c. [I;ll,,. and John l.o_s¢l_m, ¢liIcctOl ill lilt' ,'Slla<t' P,_lic_ Iiislillllc all (_C_ll_t' 'Wnshin_lon
[ ruli,,ct sil_ in Washingloul, D.( :., thr Iht'il insighihll disc ussi_ms (>t Ihv U)l)i_ s addlesscd in lifts arli_ I_'. "['ht' auih.i
ab,(> thanks Ri(hatd P,al ncs, international hi)me (i)llsilll_ltlt ill WashinRton, I).(L, dlld An(h( Ix+beau, Ilrol,'ss<,t
al thc ( ;_mS(,lVatOil c Nali_mal dcs ,\l Is t'l Nli:ti('l s ill Ihlt is, tot th('ir invahmhh' <rificism and t,mlmmlts, l'hc l, ,I IH
and cx.pit,n:.,ilm i)t tllis (linputc(I sllll_, alC cntircl_ Iht' alllhlll's o'_11 lcsponsibilitv A tnmc t,xlt.nsi',{' ;ulal_sis _t
lhl' l)ciiod undm cxalnimlli_*N _i11 bc tound in a b(_k-lcnRih analyli_ al hislol v i:,f[ ',,'g,.-I;.ulopcan spau I> it'lali_m.,
thai Ihc aulhol is { ulll'nll'_ "_.,iitinb_ _ilh John [,ob_sl|, m. 'I'ht' authlll al:.,tl _l_lll(I lik{" Io acknmvlcdgl' lilt' t,xllcmc-
1_ ,.ahlabh' alssisiam e c;t _l_c NASA Ilisiol'+ _lll(1 ,Sc,culil,, ()liltc,, ill tac ililalill R the dcclassiti_ alic,n c;t dill relic'ills
csxcnlial Io Ibis _olk.
2. I"(_r t'xalnp[_', scc l_)hll 1%_xd,*tl. "'lnlt'in:lli{)nal hl'_olVClliCIIl ill lhc [.'.N, SIl:lt c ,'Slali(,n PI,_Rlaln.'"
S/_._, I_.lha> F'cll, uat\ I!IS3, p. IS: "1 I'lhc li. I thai Ihclc "_vanI t._,[M_ll)(t' ill plmidin g lhJI :tn_,isl:llll (' tviniOl( _'d the'
p_,silion <>1those in i'itttopc (p:l_ti( ula_lx in I:_an{t'} _ho _t._c alRllill g II*l dc'_{'l,q)ill R all hld_'l>t'ndcnl I'_m,,pt'an
spa(c capabilil_." I'cl_'t (hcola, ICicl lin R I{_ Ihc,,idcnl Nix,m's 9 {){ Illllt'l 1972 pMit)sl:llClllciIl _111lilt' a_ailahil
il_ _fl .\nltqi_ai{ laun_ hcts in "Em_qu.an-t'.5,. Sl);l_" (i_u)pclatiml al tht' (_rossr_ads,"),pag_,/'Mh'_. Nlals 1990, p. 9'9.
'++l(itc: "Thc t'ltt'( t _,f Ihi'+ llolR _ {ill l{illl)liC x*als (Iv( i_ixc." %co ailsl+ \llUlO RtI_+_,,), "].alllil hhll_ l+:ulilp( ' inl,) %I)at (':
I lit' ()ii_ill <lt lhl' .\iiaiic RI>{ kt'l." papt>i it'ild ill iht' tiill'l lialilillal Astroltaulical ]:cdt.iation .\liinta] Mi.l'liii_.
1995. Ill "|AI II,li'_s_itl(t' d'\l i_llll'." p. _7), ill ]']ll]lll+lllilt'l (]iladl'ali. i'd., I+'ambi/ioIP t<'flIPifdf>£_lqlle: .\'+#i_st#iPee d]lm+,,
{Paris: l{]dilions Rixt' l)ioilt', lt.t{t.'_t, Ihi'. llOinl (>t ".it",,, was CXllit's,,cd Ilillth lllllll' vi_lillti'd) t)x \iidl( lx.bt.au ([tii-
lllt'l Pl t'sidt'lil ot lINES, Ihc ];ll'nt h ",llal t' a_t'lit } }; "11 lit' scinlih' I)tlS cx;t_Ul(' dr' tlitt' qut" '_i It's l-]lals-I'liiS ax;iit'lil
'+t'illhi sans _ondili<m', pal lit uli{'lcs Ii's dcux. lail(CliiClil +, dl' <_)nllih_lnit', lit dt:t i,,ion d't'il_liR<'i It" ili<lTininnit'
.\liiiiil' li'attllclil iainais pit 011l' lilllt'llllt'. [fill' il/llall_,i_t'atlitt" liialaidloilth Ioli{It"t" _,_illS dltlllt' "_111 I'idt"_" qut'
I'l']lilot)c _,t'l air (It' routes |]iCOllS illl allatlh" ih' i t"s<411st ]tci _,l'_li plll_lallilllt' Ih' lalIt CtllS, '+illlS +i il_lilil I:+Oul llllii nil
IIII ail)t)ui d('( i_it +lip, t)llllllilll'tlis dl + t ,_+S.'"
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1. Rising concern about tile "technological gap" between Europe and the United Slates
2. Technological breakthroughs in the field of communications satellites and launchers,
their organizational consequences, and commercial concerns abottt these developnlents
3. The increasing importance of ballistic missiles as a central feature of NATO military
strategy, as well as the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy
4. A thorough reassessment of El|topean space policy
5. A worsening of U.S.-European relations coincident with the international economic
crises of the ea|ly l(.}70s
This chapter examines the tremendous changes that these five factors wrought, as well as
how NASA tried to cope with thenl.
The "Technological Gap"
l)uring the late l(.)5()s and early l(.)6()s on both sides of tile Atlantic Ocean, tile notion
of technology as a key to economic growth gained wider anti wider acceptance at the high-
est levels of decision-nlaking. As tariff barriers between tile United States and Europe
began to relax, factors other than ta,ift_s took on added relevance to econonlic growth and
international competition. In Europe, the chief body concerned with these questions was
the Organization for Econon|ic Cooperation and Development (OECD). + OECD deci-
sion-makers, inspired by the works of such economists as Robert Solow and Edward
l)enison, believed thai the expansion of the labor |orce an<t capital, anti their relative
prices, did not explain economic g,()wth 1)y themselves, but that a "residual [_t.CtOl"
a(cot|nled for a |en|arkable pe|centage of economic growth. This residt|al factor pro-
gressively came to be identitied as knowledge, science, and technolo_,.'
A 1t.)65 ()ECD study pointed out that the United States and tile Soviet Union con-
trolled the bulk of the wo|ld's financial and human resott|ces in the field of research and
techin)logy. In partictxlar, a "lech|lologicat gap" divided the United States from its western
allies. Higher U.S. spending on research and deveh)pment by the state (mostly the mili-
tary) in "technologry-intensive" sectors seemed to have a direct positive influe|lce not only
on U.S. economic growth, but on the position of U.S. firms in international markets and
on tilt: g,'owing number of U.S. firms investing in Europe. _ Europeans viewed a drive
toward high-tech space applications, as well as electronics, co|nputers, and atomic ener_',
as a possible tactic to solve the technoh)g T gap."
._,. Jean:Jacqu('s Salomon, Scieme e! I'olitique (l'aris: Semi, 1(.)70), pp+ ._)I-5,1.
4. Edward Dcnison, ,_;0)z_*_'_!/l'_o_o)*_ic (h_m,th i*l the [,'_literl ._;tate_ and the Alte_ _mti_.,e_ I*e/oTr I _ (New York:
(_ommitl(-c Ik)r Economic I),.'vcloplnent, l!)fi2).
_'). Christopher Ft t'eman and Anthony Young, The I?esearch a*M l),'_,,'lotmte*_l E[/rrrl in Western Europe, North
_*te)'i_a a*+rl Ihe .(io+,iel l :,lio_: Ar_ t(xl_.rime_ltal l_+ter_mtional CoP*qmriso)_ _!] lte_ea)ch l'.'xpe_Mil++_** a*ld Ma_po_+,er in 1962
(Paris: ()ECD, I(.1(;5), p. 70.
6. .]ean:Ja(ques Se)van-S< hreil)er, I,; rlr;/i rzm_;rirai_+ (Paris: Den<if'l, 10(57), pp. 1 I(.)-12:'); see also David
t+)t'('klm. Assistant t_) the Director, to Phili I) tlemily. Stivnc(' Adviser, t!,S..Mission to lh(" OE(]D, leltcr, 3.June
1(.)66, R(; 359, National Al('hi'c(+s, _+ashillgl()ll, D(;.
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Europeans faced a dilennna. By allowing American capital into their countries, lhev
were consigning their indt,slry lo a subsidiary role, ai least in the technological sectors.
The resuh would be technological dependence, uncerlaimy over the availability of
supplies, and loss of freedom in fornnllaling industrial policy. ()n the other hand, if
Europeans refused to lcl Americans invesl, they risked ending up double losers by deny-
ing themselves the capital needed to create jobs. ;is well as manufactured pl'odllctS. 7
The United States recognized that thc technolog T gap should be lrealed as "a prol)-
leni with serious political overtones," ;is Secretary of State Dean Rusk reminded NASA
Administrator James E. Webb in August 1966, because it was perceived ;is such by lhe
Europeans." The U.S. trend toward space cooperation with Europe during the second half
of the 196(1s ha<l its roots in a willingness I>v the United States to reduce thc polilical
impact--and in the long term, the econ<>mic efti,cis--of the technoh>g T gap.
As had happened during the U.S.-European "dollar gap," the State Deparnnent
suggested that it was in the interest of the United States to have a Styling Europe ;is a part-
tier lo increase the prt>sl)e<ls for U.S. econ<.mlic growth." This farsighted political vision,
however, came under attack during the late 196(ts, ;is more and more American ecoxmm-
ic seclors beg.all to [acc! European compel;lion. In Europe, the lechnolog, 3' Rap and the
need to calch up wilh lhe Uniled States ill the space sector served one nlain political
purpose: to convince l_uropeans to turn |rolil science to technologically lelevalll, ((:,lll-
nlcrcially viable endeavors and to cooperatc on technologically advanced proiecls, such as
(;oncorde, Airbus, conununications satellites, and comniercial space launchers. ,,_ulhors,
such as French .j<mrnalist lean Jacqttes Servan-Schreibcr in his book l.e d_!fi am?'ricain,'" not
only suggested lhis policy, but European space <)fganizations a]so endorsed it/t
Intelsat and NSAM 338
The International Tcleconununicalion Satellite Organization (known as Intelsal) was
sel up in August 1964 as a single connnvrcial global satellile system vinl)racing voice.
leh'graph, high-speed dam, []tcsimih', and television services. Early Bird, Intelsal's lirsl
succ('ssflfl g,eostalionary connnunicalions satellite, conl]rmed the promising comniercial
potential of connnunicalions salellitcs in 1t.165.
lJndcr the Iniclsat interim agrt'cmcnls, ils cx('culive body was the American-based
(],{)llllllllllit'alioils Satellile ('.orl)oralion ((]on/sal), which, as illallageF, proposed and
inll)lenmnlcd pr(!iccls. Invcsmlent shares within hliclsal were delcrlnincd bv i)rQjcclions
o[ long-distance traftic likclv lo bc carried by satelliles. (|oil/sat received an initial
61-percent sharv against a _{O-percent shar¢' ti)r all European countries. Because tilt"
voliilg S%'Slelll D,:as ]>ased ()n iilvUSllllUlll shaleS, (]()illSal i.'iljt)_;e(| a de tact() veto pl.)wei ;tilt|
7. Alhcd (hossc:, 77.' tl;'+tr+. AIIm.rr: I,.++qu,au.A..'r.a. lCdali+ms +i..> 1745 {[.,mth+n: Ma<millan.
1{180). pp. 217-31+
S. llvam Rusk Io,Jatncs _Acbh, h'ttcl. 29 .\uRust 19{_fi, R(; 235, 7(I-A-_:FtBS, box 7, NASA I Jislorx ()lilt<'.
Washington. I)(L ()n the necd to ic<huc the polilh al inlpa<l of Ihc Ic(hnoh)gi(al Rap, soy als_ dw hm'_im
Rep<nl ot Ih(' '_+olk tit Iht' _lp;ll g' ( Mun_ il's aid hoc ( _<ltllllliltt'{* q)ll Expandt'd [nlcfnatitmal (;c+<qu+nalion. tql< ll+-
sult' I. st;tonic'hi <_m_ cl ninl R I>_)liti< al ,d_jt'ctixcs fl_I expanded t(_op,:*rali_m hi spacc a_ li'_ilie'.;, prcsetm'd I_n Ihc
(llail hi;in a! IIl_' '_wn khl R _yl>u l) nlt't'linR on 2{I fit i()l)cl 196(i, R(; _55. liO-A-B0Sg, I)<lx ."), N,\S,:\ tlistol x ()lilt <'.
9. F,cc. hn vxamllle, thc2(l()tlol)cf 1!)l_6stalvmcnl <otl<ctningl)<llhical(d!ictlixcsl_)f('Xl)andcdt°°P
cl ;ilion in spa< c a(ti_ilics, bx tim 5;lilll* l/clmflmcnt. R( ; _53. t;9-A-5089, box .r'_,NASA It;story ()tlh c.
lit. S,..l van-_,l hrcil>/'r, lw rb;/7 am_;_q_ai,, lip. I 1!t-_3.
11. .[oathin_ Mhll,.'r, "lib, logical llalkTlotiild and klail _ll lhc TtqEC()M Pl_lLU;tln." ",ira<,
(;OllllllllttHrllirJli_ 8 (1991_: 105--10: .]ohn Klig(' dlld \i111111 Russtl. ](.J.[: i. %_.lrr. ]Or_o-l°77. l']N\ 5,P-117<.2 >
(Noord_Gik: ES,\, 5,1.])lcnlbvi 19_1t), pp. 33-82.
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maintained that power notwithstanding subsequent decreases in its controlling share as
new countries joined lntelsat.':
Ahhough (]omsat's privileged role ill Intelsat, according to one analyst, "assured effi-
ciency and speed" in setting u l) a global satellite system, and its resources "proved critical
to attracting interest on the part of developing countries in joining the enterprise, ''_' it
also nourished U.S. hegemony in tile field, whicla was rooted in an almost total lnonopolv
of the industrial sector. The early entry into the market by such American firms as Bell
Telephone Lat)oratories, RCA, and l tughes, (:ombined with their ability to draw <)11 stud-
ies performed I)y NASA, gave them an advantage ill international eonlpetitive bidding on
lntelsat contracts. One of the big controversial issues within lntelsat was Comsat's willing-
hess to give i)riority to in-house research and development over international contracting.
It was only under ])ressure ti-om other Intelsat nmmt)ers that the percentage of outside
c<mtract expen(tittues t)rogressively rose from 13 percent in 1968 to 50 percent by 1972."
By that time, however, with 52 l)ercent of its capital fl+om tile United States, hllelsat st)enl
92 1)ercent of its nloney in the United States.'"
The White 1 louse was aware of the degree of European dissatisfa.ction with the U.S.
monopoly of (otnmerciat satellite communications, as well as the danger that, through
direct assistallt:e fronl U IS i ill'In S, foreign satellite activity might prolif>rate lhe develop-
Illelll <)f" competitive svstetns. I" President Johnson, after lengthy negotiations with NASA
and the Departments of State, Defense, and (;ommerce, approved NSAM 338, "Policy con-
cerning U.S. assistance in tile development of foreign communications satellite cat)abili-
ties," ill Septemher l {}6B . Iv
The aim of NSAM 338 was, in its own words, "t<_ guide governnlent agencies ill the dis-
selnination of satellite technology and in tilt' provision of assistance which is consistent
with overall policies." I! stipulated that the. United States should not provide assistance to
olher c<ntntries that wottl(t significantly encourage the develol)ment of their eomnntnica-
ti<ms satellite systems. The United States, lnoreover, would not entertain any reqtlcStS 1)v
toreign nations involving tedmological assistance <m satellites or launchers unless the"
assistance obtained would be used ill accordance with lntelsat's rules, and t)rovision of
such services would 1)e "conditioned ttpon express (written) assurances." Nonetheless, the
United States would provide its allies satellite services tot their security nee(lsY _ This was
indeed a very tight political dirertire that did not leave much room for ilexihilit_ in t].lture
international negotiations.
t_. Richal-d <:olino, "['he INI'H ..%,,x.INysl+.'ln: +'Xn()'+'el _,icxv," in.l.el AIp<'r and.loscph Pelm,,, cds., T/,+
IXTJ:'L_+I2' (;lobal._;alellig¢ ._'Wem (New _H]k: ,\lncvi( an Inslitutc of A<+lOllaUlit s and Astl(mauti< s, 19M,t), p. 62. St'c
also Malccllus ,"it+_+xvTlw lpate_mttim+al Tele.mlmu t+i.,tim+ +,'_'nh'llilr ( J*/Za++izatirm (INTT'21+Xt T) (l>Ja(l¢in-I+ad(+n: NI)III<)s
Vt'tlagsgcst'llschafL 1987), pp. 43-48.
13. C,>lino, +'Tim INI'ELSXI" System," p. 62.
14. Stel)ht'n l,cvy, "[NTEt,SAT: Tcchnolog?,', Politi<s and thv Tlanslbt'mation oI ;t Reginm," lPtlePtmtioual
()1gamzatbm 2{) (Sltlllllltq 1975): 661-64.
1:5. A<hh'c_.s l>y Pvofcss<n. IltillllallIl Ikmdi, Ibrmer l)iit.(t{)l + (+cnmal (}fI ESRO, on Inlcrnalional
C,+ol)cration it+ Spa_e, ('.odtlard 1)inncl at Sylnpositun AA,%, 18 March 1971, R(; 2F+5, 74-734. box 15, NASA
llistol'y ()flice; Michael E. Kinsley, Outer ,_;pa('e al+d lmw* ._;am/ums: (;o+,e+*+me++l,B++wne++, amt ._;nlellil+,
(;+m+mutdcatio*+ (New _i,lk:.l_)hn Wiley & Sons, t976).
16. .tim D. O+Colmell toJat:k Valenti, Special Assislant 1o Ihe President, lettcJ; 7 Ma) 1965, White ttouse
Confidential Files, TR 105, hox 9_ci,l.yndon g..l,,hns<m library, Austin, TX.
17. R(; 255, 69-A-5<)89, box 5, NASA Ilislory ()ttice; also in WI ICF (_ onlidential lih's), TR 105, box 9{i,
lxn(hm B. Johnson Lil)Hrv.
IM. A hilatcral I.LS.-l:',iitain Inilit:+u".,' satellite aglet+lnt'nt ++'itssigned it+ 1967, Ir_:ht'l'l+!btp I Britain wotthl huihl
an all-British '+,alcI]ilc I}+l++military c<)Inlnullit aliOllS wilh Australia and the Far East within tht +It'anlew()l+k of;.l col-
laborative Skym't military spa{<' cotnnmnications syslctn. Krigc +tnd Russo, I"mrop¢ it+57m+*. p. 1+,2.
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Military Concerns and Nonproliferation Policy
The Alhmtic Alliance, (re:ted in 1949, had two main ot).jectivcs: social sial)|lily and
military securily. 3"o fultill both objcctivt's, this alliancc always had relied on A|nerica's
ilrscIl:ll of llllCIc:tr wc:t|)OllS. "Flit' l/nitcd States postponed sharing lilt" military burden
witll Ettropc by emphasizing the (h'l(TrCtll powcr C,f its nllch+'ar arst+lla].'" This position
implied that lilt' Unilt'd ._lat('s maintained t+onlr<+l over l|l(_ ultinlalc dccision to use
nuch'ar arms.
The launch o1 tilt" Soviet Union's S[)utnik ill ()t'tob,t'r 1957 tna(h + tilt" cost of dlis
arrangenlcnt sct:m very high to Europeans. U.S. l('rritorv now was ol/cn to Soviet aggrcs-
sion by itltercontint:ntal |)all|slit missiles. Em(>p¢'ans wondered: W<nthl the United Ntalcs
1)e willing to risk an alla(k :gains! thtqr own territo|v for the sake of Et|,ope? Sputnik el)it-
omized tht" (h)ul)h' ll;itltle ilf missih's: the same h|ttn(her that had pill a scientific satcllitt"
in orbit (ould t)t'comc, with some modifications, lhc carrier of a nuclear warhead. The
lTnitcd Sl;lt('s ll()w w_ts caught in an inescal/a|)lc nuch'ar dilemma: anlagonizing its allies
_*,,'_ls dalligtTOllS, l)t'CallSC it t()stcrcd lilt" dcvchqlmt'nt o1 indcl)cndcnt nuclear forces:
]_()ur('_r('r, tilt' U.S. (_onstitution math" tilt' |)resident the head of tilt' a|mcd tkwces and,
lhcFct;!wc, tilt" individual with the last say on the us|' of nuclear weapons, so sharing that
decision with other stat('s did n_+t sccm It) l)c attlh<)rizt'd 1)y ill+." (h:,nstiluti_m.
Thc dih'mma was quite real, tot tilt' Frcnch had r('qltcstcd inf(wtnalhm on an intt'r-
t|lcdhltc ntt(+lcar ballislic miss|h' svstcm |ton| thc United Stales. Tv¢o w('cks after S])ulnik,
tilt+ Nalional Security (;ouncil directcd tht' Eisc,lhowcr adtninislrati(m to dis((m,agc the
|)roduction of nl|clcar wcal)ons outside lhc tnwhuu '+club" and, Sl)ecith'ally, to "f)crst|ade
France not to undt'rlakc in(h:l)t'ndcnt l)r<)duction of such WCal)Ons. "L-''' The National
Sccttrily (:Olm(il was rctvrring to (;cnt'|al (3rot-los dc (;aullc's ,//me de/mpfle and its nit-ate-
g3' iottl +lai.+++t. Upon his rctl||n to pow('r in.lime 1958, dc Gaullc had accclcratcd Slltdics
ot both humchcrs and nttch'ar warhcads. Thc first Frct|(h :ltomic homh (tcslt'd ill 1960)
was huthcr proof of this (h.tcrnfination.:'
t+,ctwecn 1969 and 1965, the United Stat('s devisc(t a hybrid f(+rmuht, the Mullilatcral
Forcc (MI+F), to a])pt!asc European r(.qitt'sts f_:.l-nucIcar tcclmoh>gT+' and to satlist_ c(msti-
tutional law and ill(' Atlantic Alliatwc, l)ut the MI+F I)tovc(l to t)c ;i slow. incxoral)lc fail-
ure. :_ By tilt" mid-lt.)(_0s. |utch'ar issues were at the c()rc of NXI'() dtifficuhics. Thc United
19. [h,+lllas It. I._tzohl, "Th(. End c)l the Beg|lining . . . NAT()'.. Mh,pti(m ot Nuclcal %mitvg_,'" in ()lau
Rim', cd,, ll}'slea+,'t._,'F_tIF/lW771e]+b_matiw }+i'm:*(Nmv _tk: (:<_lumlfia I rnivt'rsitv Ih_'ss. 1985), t). 291.
2U. Nalional Sv{mir+' (:otmtil 57_1/I, ++U.S. Poll('+ _m France," 19 ()ctot)cr 1957. in I.'S. Slalc
lh.paltm,riH, I'._'_A_,I Itdllti._ r_/ tDe ('uit_l .5/,'¢c_ I055 57 {'+_anhingl,,II, [)(:: l'.%. (;mt'_Nmt'tH lhinlin g (ltlh,',
1992), \'_d. XXVII. _l}'_t_'_ /:_+.@' rind (?¢_.ml.. i)p. 1,09, 192. F.r thc l'.5,.-Fivm h lid on tm_lcal insucs, st.(,
M((h',_lRc I;uml), l)a._v, .ml Si/l:lil,gl/• CI.6.'s .t..+t /&' t_m.D i. Ihe I"i_:l I'i#r );'a_:_ (Nm_ "k.k: Random Ihn_sc.
I!h_S). piL t72-87, Xlo+c gCm'lall?., scc I'ascalinc Win:rid. I'.'iw'*d.m,et; Kct_t.'d_, ..d the l_.it, W glttlt:_ o/ ] luol*,
(l+,asingstokc: Xla( milhm. 199:',), p_im,
21. tqn Ihc /',_+' d;/,+7/qw awd the ,)nganizafi_mal t hang,'n it implied, st'(. R+>gm Rht'ntct. +'[ntpli_ ani,m.+
dt +lit l)olhhluc dc d&lt'nst' dills h's +hmlaillCS dr' I'industrh' a<"r+)Hautiqu(' et d_" Ft'spacc," hx lnntilul ('halh'n dr'
(;m.lh'. D," (;e++*ll;et _._ +i&h', V<_I. t, /.*+w:+.+it,: _! l'i.d, jw.demre de I. l+Ya.re (Paris: l.a I),)_ HIm+lHati(,t_ El:maise
Phm, 1992). pp. 1611-63. For al_ Ul><lawd ic_ic_ of Frt'twh troth'at p_+lh"< Mmnh t" VaTss<'. cd.. l.a l'm_._' +'II'r:t..:
( P,rHsst'l'+,: I+',tu",lant. 19!t't I.
22. lh,.' 3,11.1:,,+at'.,inlcnlh'd Io b+.' a ,<,oldinat_'d n;uhinati<,nal d+.'t<+rtcnt tnt(h'at Ib_ic _<msisling o! at
t'h'('l <>1snhln;uint'.+ i;til _in+_ I'ohttis illissii<.s itlann_ql }Y+(t+."+,,s<1[a Tnhlilnttnl _>t Ihtce nnl]lnlalil]l +',. I)c_ i',i_m-
tn_tkin_ "_,,,mhl bc shared, l,ttt l;,>tlht' ultilnalc wsp<,tp, ih,ilit'+ Ibldw use o+ the v+allh{'+td_,x_hkh x_a_it+ l ".S. hands
SI'( > (h'l'llgl" Ball. 77+e l)i_o]#]#: +4 Power (l+.<lst_m: l.ilth'. I+,low.t. 191_), vsl)c( ialh thv (lutlm'. til]t'd "Hit'
/:nlhli.+,hl.d Iliisinc+++,, ot Nul Icai ]x,laliat_Clii+.'lit."
142 (_RENFIN(; S'_I'EMS: EUROPE
Stales strongly resented France's unwillingness to comply with Atlantic Alliance strateg T
and its stated wish to bttild up its own nuclear arsenal. The French nuclear strategT, how-
ever, was linked to its economic policy. "In politics as in strate_' as in economics," de
(;aulle asserted in a much publicized January 1963 speech that referred to U.S. polic b
"monopoly qtfite naturally appears to him who holds it as the best possible system."-'" In
fact, de (;aulle's attacks againsl the dollar gold standard, hnmched in February 1965,
when France presented its dollars for conversion into gold, were followed in 1966 by
France's withdrawal flom NAT() and, in 1967, by tllal country's first nuclem ballistic
missile tests.
The meaning of French behavior acquired a much more disturbing twist in the con-
text of the new global nonproliferalion policy inaugurated by the United States during tim
1960s. After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, tim United States and the Soviet
Union began to ease tim international tensions that had reached a climax during that
hmg week. Tim two superpowers agreed on, and formalized, common codes of conduct
in lhe nuclear arena, including limitations on tim testing and production of nuclear
devices to prevent their proliferation. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in
Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under _,h,_;.I.ler(better known as Hie Test Ban Treaty) and
lhe hot-line agreements were signed in 1963, while the nonp,oliferation treaty was signed
in 1968 only after protracted negotiations.
These international developments paralleled domestically the adoption of NSAM 294,
"U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance Io France," on the nonprolifera-
lion of "strategic delivery technolog3,," including nuclear bolnbs and launchers. _*
Enforcement of this policy was assigned to Mtmitions Control at the State Department--
the agency also responsible tot controlling technological intormation to be sold abroad.
In the context of this InelnoFalldtlnl, lllen, the French independent course was interpret-
ed not only as a refnsal of ekmerican patronage, but, more dangerously as an attempt to
disrupt the architecture of American nonproliti'ralion policy.-'"
Europe's Changing Space Policy
Alter Sputnik, and in parallel with the process that led to NASA's crealion in 1958.
European scientists began to call tor the creation of a collaborative space organization. As
a result, an agreement establishing the F.uropean Space Research Organization (ESRO)
was signed in 1962, but it did nol enter into torte until 1964. ESRO was born out of many
interest, including the scientists" desire to conduct specifically ambitious experiments tha't
n;M/ll'al resources alone wonld nol have perntitted, as well as the wish of some scientisls to
be independent of national ntilitary authorities. The establishment of ESRO also benetit-
ed f,om the spirit of European unity tollowing the Trealy of Rome that oeated tile
Common Market.'-'" The ESRO agreentent glossed over references to teclmological and
23. "Excerpls ti-om remarks b} de (;mille, m'ws conference, l.t.lanuar ) 1963," New )brk 7imeg, 15.lanuary
1963, p. 2. See also Bundy, l)anger and Survival, p. 492.
24. NSAM 294, 20 April 1964, NS(: Records, National Archives. Good indirect intormafion on dw con-
It'lll Ill Iht' directive are to be fimnd in Jamt's Webh, NASA Adminis|u'alor, t<_ Robert McNamara, Set u'etaty o[
l)etcnsc, letter, 28 April 1966,James _A%b. box 2, l.}ndon B..]ohnson l.ibrar}.
25. Frank Cosligliola, l"rance arm the I'.S.: The (Jold Alliance _ince World V_)zz I1 (Ncw x,i_rk: Twa_ne's
huernational tlistory Series, 1tt92), p. 134.
26. Krige and Russo, Europe in Spree. Unless othm wise slalctl, all inlormafion rclaling to ESRO and
ELI)O is drawn ticm_ this wozk.
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industrial concerns. The relevance of space technolog T to fllture econt}nfic develol)ment
was n{}t in(lispulable at the time, noBvithstanding lilt" initial propagandistic effort of some
aertlsl}ace firms; moreover, industrial p(}li('y was still perceived as a prerogative of only
llali(}lial ,_,t)ve Fll Ill {TI 1s.
Starting in 1{.}60, political negotiations on lhe building ofa Eurl}pean satellite launch-
er were under ',va_% leatling it} the 1964 ralit]calion of an agreenienl to establish the
Eur{}peal] 1,auncher I}evt!lt)plnent Organization (ELI}(}). EI,D{) was born out of Brilain's
willingness to "Europeanize" and ct)nveYI It) civilian use a nlilitary missile already in
deveIolmlenh the Bhle Streak. The mission of/his launcher ahvays had lurked in file t)ack-
gr(}und of El,D{}, wht)se t]rst concern was It) acquire ((}r in the case of Britain 1o main-
lain) a technical cxt)ertise ill a high-technt)lt}g) area at a bearable price.
The total spent hy Europe t}II sl}ace ill the lni(l-lG)60s was hnt a small [ra{lion of the
amt}unt of tnoney spent By the Unite(t States. -'+Total U.S. domination of the satellite field
(communications, mete()r()lo_,ry, and navigati<)n) seemed to loom ahead in the 1,q70s. To
c(}ml}ete with the United States, Europe needed to shift its emphasis from science to colt>
inertial and technological endeavol+s. The United States had provided launchers for
national and European scientit]c satellites fi}r free or at low costs. Wh_, then, should
Europe follow tile more costly and risky track of applications satellites anti powerful
launchers? That was the heart (}f tilt" dehate.
The British labor governlnent (1964-1{`}70) was tile most skeptical ()f the Europeal]
states. As early as 1966, Britain nlade it clear that, as far as launchers were concerned, it
favored reliance (m the Unite(t States. The British opined that Europa I, ELDO's firsl
launcher, would be "obsolescent and uncoml}etitive in cost and performance with launch-
ers 1}roduced by the U.S." by the en(l ot the decade. _" This debate disrupted ELDO
negotiations in 1966 and again in 1968, and it formed tim base tot endless quarrels inlo
the 197()s. British Minister of TechnoloD_ Anthony Wedgwood-Benn summed up its
essence when he stated that he was "very lnuch alarmed at the thought that hecause a
thing is European, and because a thing is internatimlal, this somehow excuses us frolll
al)plying economic criteria."-"
Britain eventually did stay in FIll)O, which moved closer It) the French position of
in{lependence from the United States. In July 1966, ELDO apprt)ved an upgrading (}f the
European launcher; Europa I1 would be capal)le of putting into geosynchronous orbit a
170-kilt}gram satellite, compared to 140 kilograms with a Thor-Deha launcher.:" In addi-
lion, on the insistence of the French, ELI)() transferred its launch site fronl Woomera,
Australia, tl} K{iul<}u, French (;lliana, where lilt" French sl)ace agency was hull(ling its own
launch c<}niplex."
Still, n() t]rnl ttecisioll tm the huilding <}t a European ctmmnmicatitms satellite was
reache(t illltil De('cmhel 1{,}71. AIntmg the hut(lies to overcon]e in reachil]g that decisi()n
was tilt" unclear legal tiamewt}lk tk}r salellile ()l}eralil}ns--lhe Intelsat inferrer agreelnents
WClC /ll/(hq- I'CllCg()tiatit)ll ]}etween 1(.}{){.}and 197 IIas well as file availahilitv ()f humthers.'-'
'.!)7. *l(dlcl. "TH.I'2( :< }M I'loglatn." pl }. 379-81.
_S. (2uotcd in Knigr and Russo, l'.rur,/w _t_ _,pau', I}p. 7,1-73.
29. (:il{'(I in J{}hn K1igr, "BIitaill and l'2m(}lU'all St}ate Poli{x in lhr l(.}{;(}s and Earl', 1970s.'" ._,rielm and
I;',h_olo_,q l'o/l_ 7 B(2) (1!}92): I B. l'2m(}i}can ('osl eslilnafi{ms at d]at tim(' madr il {lear thai El ,l)() laun{ h{'Ks _{'i{'
{'xt){'{ It'(1 I{, bc lwi(c as eXl)Cnsivc as thril .\nlcl i(aN {(}lllil{'t t)al Is. M61h'i, "TEl.El 2()M lh(}gram," i}. 115.
:_(}. .]CdlI-PicI 1"(' { :il[ISS{'. "I vs IAII( CUl"_ {'tll(ip{"ciis ;p,31ll AI i_lll{'," ]11 (2h;tfh'_ll, cd., 1. 'rllll]_il#OH l_'(]tlll_[O&rlfpl&
p. 2t.
31. Krig(' aim Russ{}, l'.ur_,pe i:_ "_l;""', I)I )" 7.t-76.
'3L). Altuu{} Russo. 1"2",'HOX 7_'fero,r,ttl_i_li,m_ l'_,g'z.'uttm_' a*_d ltl;' (172S l'ml_'¢l (107#-107"tL f;.SA tISR-13
(N{}(}l(hv{ik: ES,\, Fcl)i II;il % 1991), pa_i,_.
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Both tile Intelsat negotiations and tile debate over the availability of laun<;hers were inter-
related, and Europe hoped to improve its bargaining position by building up a credible
industrial and technical competence--and consequently a political presence--in the field
of al>plications satellites.
That thinking was partly behiild the Franco-German Syml_honie pr<>gram. This bina-
lionat project combined two national experimental communications satellites (called
Saros 2 and Olympia) within a single spacecraft, whose launch was originally scheduled
[_.)r 19707' Symphonic, its supporters hoped, would put German and Frcn(h industry in a
preferred position when Europe buih a communications satellite, I)ut it also would be an
asset during Intelsat renegotiations--not to mention a test of U.S. willingness to launch
European commercial satellites.:"
F_gure 23
The _h),mph_mie _atellite wa_ a binatimatl sal,41il; _m_muni, atimt_ proje+t _p_m_oted t9 t:mtue a_ul (;elmany. 7"he pTv!le(t wa_
a mm,e ttJ pltu'_ Ihe tu_o _m_nt_J_ in a/avored p_ti_m wh_'p_ l'.'ur_Jpe bega_t to buiM _ommunicatbm_ _ale[lite_. ,\'A,%.1 ag.7_ed
tt_ launch ,_,mph_mie with I/u' _hJ_t t_tt_h'_:_la_tdi_t_ that it was to he .¢dv tilt e,.'pc_4_w_lal wtlellile. ((]ourlt'sy (lI NA.%k.
i)holo n(_. 74-tt(;-635)
33. Comnnnfiqu(' (It prcsst+. Sytnphonit-, 28 April 1967, ¢'(_te 81/2't4, article 188, liasse 517; confi(h+n -
tial note on the revision of French space policy on F,ur<q)can launchers, no date ([)osl-19G6), no author (CNES
_)r Ministt'r o[ Foreign Allhirs)+ cftc 82/254, arlich' 25. liasse _0, Ar('hivcs Nati<malcs, Fontainl)h'at_.
:+4. Nicholas (;, (;olovin t<) l)<)nald lhwr_ig, mt+n)orandum ot+_ trip to Ettrol:+<+, nwelin¢ ;vith Bignier, 25
()t tl)l)<.r I.q67, RG ?;Sq, box 65S, National Ar('hivcs: Whirl' llousc to lilt' Prt+si(Icnt, metni>_andunl. _ Fcl:q-uarx
1967, White I l,;lttsc Conli(h+ntial Files, TR 105, box 96, Ixmh>H lL.]<)hnson [.il:,r:try.
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Increased U.S.-European Cooperation?
l)uring the mid-1960s, when space cxpendilurcs reached Ihciv historic peak, lilt"
Vnitcd States s(>ug]ll It+ in(Tt`'ast+ t`oopclalion with EutOl)e ill spact`'. The new inl('rcsl ill
the use of space co<_pct+alion as a means toward achicviug polilical objectives atlFoad put
NASA in a very delicate situation. Nam¢'ly, the dangct was thai coopt'tativt`' pl'f}i('('ls would
not alwms vcinlovce NASA's pv<>granlmatic needs, hi such inslanccs, a NASA working
group on increasing intelnational coopctali<m ill space rt`'llOtled Ihat lilt" Stalt`"
I)epattnlenl and the White t It,use oughl to iustit _' such l)VOjects, +'since NASA cannot itself
.juslily a relaxation of its posturc and l)n)gtammatic nectls."'"
(;oopevati<m in space bctwccn lhc t7nilcd Stallt's and Etnopc had been dcvelophlg
since lilt`' late' 1950s along th¢' rt'sttictb.,c lines established by Arnold Frutkin, director ot
NASA inte]nati<mal allairs starling in Sel/Ic]nl)cr 1939. Tilt`" Utlilt`'d Slalcs offt't+cd free
launch services and space aboard spacccrati fi>r European scit'nlific cx])cfimenls; .joint
ttndcrlakings wcrc "ptncly" scicl',titic. The l)iutncrs cot|sidevt'd this coot)cYativ(' art+angc -
merit highly bcncficial, and it g;.tvc rise 1o R'w oc('asi<ms of rancon _`'
[+ale iu 1965, NASA lnoposcd a new ira!loci to its ["4tvopcan st)act parlncv-s. Known as
the Advanct'd (]<)<q>ctalion Pl<!lCCl, lhc l_vop<_sal vt.maint.t`t within the political tli]cctivcs
set up lly NSAM 338 (September 1065), yet raised tht" lcvcl of transatlantic coopt'ration in
spat{'. As part ()f lilt., Advanced (]oopcnation Pro!jotl, Euvol)V would Ix" responsil/Ic tot
devt%l/ing , a I(.chnoh_gically it(tranced spa(ccr;ttl I<)1 cithcv a s<)lm ov.lut)itt'r mission, and
lhc United Slalcs would pvovidc launch, ttacking, and data c<_llt'ction services.
/\s a French official expressed to (_havlvs B<,hlcn, Ihc IT.S. ambassador in France, lilt`"
offer sccmcd to I)c but "a tlonc to nil)blc on.'"" Morcovcr, othcF crilits perceived lhe
Advanced (:oopevation PlOjt`'cl ll{)l ;is Ik)sleving space dcvclopmenl, l)ul as diverlin_
Etuopc troln lhc CCOlltmlic bcncfils to I)c derived from dcvch)ping comnnmications sap.q-
lites. _* "Ihc l)lO[)osal failed to galvani.,x' lilt`" EUl-Opcan scientific community, and in tilt`"
stmmlcr _t 1966, ESP,() officially ¢h:clined it.
Tilt" United Slates, still wishing to inc,casc inl('rn;tli()nal coopcrati<m in space, trans-
toYmcd lilt`' Advanced (MOl)efalion I:q_>jc(l into ;t l)ilatt'ral vcntuf,p wilh _Ak'st (_evmany
known as llclios."' (]oopt'fittion with \'_k'sl (;cHnam,' had I)cc, mm more cHdcal to U.S.
diplomatic policy, particularly tbllowing France's wilhdrawal from NAT(),"' and as West
(',cvmany cavnc to I)c vivwcd as lhc "lllOSl faithful ally" of tilt`" Unilcd Slalcs ill Europe. 't
35. 3,1t._.lill R ot tilt \Votkill_, (he,tip on l-]xpandcd Illtmnalional (]_Ol>Clalion in tq.pacc Acti',ilics.
"NIIIIIIII;II I, Nolcs." 22 N_.ptClllhc_ 19(_('_. R{; 2._5. 1;9 .\-5089, box 3, NAS.\ l listo_x ()1lit c.
7,6. A_nMd t:t utkh_, h_le_*mtirmaICo.pr_:zlbm i_ ._;/m¢, _(l{l_gh'_uuul (;lilts, N]: l'rcnti_ c-ltall. 1965); I h,mct
Nm_cll. Ih'_,md th,' Atmm/_/u'n': 7he I')_Hx }}'_s "1 Spa,, ,_,+i,'m,' I\Vashil_/lm_, I)(:: NASA S1'-t211, 19St}); John
I+<_Rsd_ m, "'t ".%.-Eu_<,pcan ( ]_. q)_'. alh m in NI_a¢c _;_ivmc: \ 25-hb;u l'cvspc_ ti',c." _cl.m*' 2_3 (6 Jan ttatl ', I{18t ):
1 I- 1G; <,in 1l;u _ic S.V','+ 3,1assvx and 3,1ah <4m ( )_cn R_l>ins. lli*l._ _ ./Ih;li_h S//m, t'ob_ {( :;tmbridgc: ( :;unb_ idRc
t'nivci'..il', l'f,..ss. 19Sli:l; l._vn.'a SH_csta, t-& l':um/;ee/n Cotqw_etio_ iv ,_,pa_' elurin R the" _;ixtu'_. ESA IISR-1 t
( No<_M_!ik: ESA, 199t I.
,'+,7. (Shaulcn Bohh'n t<_ Dt.llaltlnl{'nt _,1 Ntatc. tcl¢'Rn;tnl, ,R MatCh 19(_6, R(; 255, (_9-A-BIIN!I, I)(+x 5, NASA
Itistolx ()llhc.
i_'_. _Ct', I_11 ill'shUl(C, th(' lCpOlt ill lhc D,'cstcft+ ['uti+l)Caut trniun filed in '+l'_tni>pc :\cttts,.'+, I'.N. _m
Np;w+.' Plans," .\+'r+, }brk 7_mr'_, S.IIIIIU l!l_+li, p. 4.
?+!1. .\lcxat+de_ Ilockcl t<_ lam,'s _.Vcbh, Icltch '3 ,\u'du.q IDIW_, R(; 23.">, 70-:\-?, |r)S. box 7. NASA tlisl<>V_
( )lfi_ c,
II). l),pan Rusk to Jam,,'s ",'o,,l:,b. h'm'_, 29 \ugus_ 1!16(i, R(;, _7_._, 70-A-3t3_, box 7, t_ldc_ I: I)alm'l
\l:ug,_lis to I),m:dd ll<_t nit_. in,rmot;mdum, 13 l/c_ cmluq 196,% N.\W. R(; 33!}, b_,x 7_')__, NASA Ilist_l v ()tl_c.
tl. (;osuigli,_la, I+m*ru" and thr g r._., I_+ 118.
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For its part, West Germany, through its participation in U.S. space efforts, was inter-
ested in acquiring a wide range of military-related technology that strictures dating from
the end of World War II prohibited that country ti-om producing. During the early 1960s,
moreover, West Germany purchased military goods and services fiom the United States to
offset the costs of stationing kanerican occupational troops in that country. Now, the West
(;erman government hoped to substitute for at least part of those payments the cost of
procuring and licensing high-tech American equipment to establish a pattern of techni-
cal cooperation and to reestablish German technical capabilities? _
Meanwhile, the United States contimmd to reconcile space cooperation with high-
level deliberation. In March 1966, a special ad hoc committee of the National Aeronautics
and Space Council, chaired by Deputy Under Secretary of State U. ?dexisJohnson, was set
up to advise President Johnson on the topic. The United States favored the work of ELDO,
because its rocket programs tended to serve peaceful uses, were subject u) international
control, and absorbed personnel and financial resources that otherwise migln be divert-
ed into purely national programs that tended to concentrate on military systems. The
dissolution of ELDO, the United States feared, might strengthen national nfilitary rocket
programs and lead to a proliferation of launchels, c_ At the same time, argued Vice
President Hubert H. Humphrey and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, any
increased emphasis on the peacefifl uses of space technolog 7 would go hand in hand with
a decrease in European programs of independent military applications. The aim of U.S.
policy, according to McNamara, should be to stimulate "toreign involvement in space
technology as a means of diverting energies fronl the development of nuclear systems."u
Moreover, in the case of France, encouragenmnt to proceed with npper-stage liquid
hydrogen-_)xygen systems might divert resources from theirJorce de frappe program, which
used solid fuel propulsion technology. '_'
In addition to the dissolution of El,DO, the United States also was distressed over col-
laboration among EI,DO, ESRO, and the European Telecommunications Satellite
Committee (known by its French acronym CETS), because such collaboration could be a
prelude to the creation of a colnbined competitive global space power. As Frutkin wrote
in May 1966: "The greatest danger now is that the crises in space affairs in Europe will lead
to a total redirection of European space effort in competition with the United States." If
El.DO, ESRO, and CETS together established their own system of communicatioals satel-
lites, Europe would challenge and seriously disrupt Intelsat, which was dominated by the
United States. "It seems very important," Frutkin declared, "ira view of this possibility and
in view of lhe difficuh 1969 Intelsat renegotiation that everything be done 1o give tile
Europeans as little cause of concern as necessary regarding U.S. motivation. Certainly, no
dog-in-manger attitude ought to be continued.""; NASA AdnfinistratorJames tA_+bt) added
to FrutkitCs concern. Once the Etnopeans completed constrttction of lhe Konrou launcla
complex, "the European nations could, if they wish," Webb opined, "be in a position m
42. Margolis to t[ornig, memorandum, 13 l)ecemhm 1!16,%
,13, (kmmlittee on Expanded lnlcrmttional (k)opt'ration in Space Aclixitics. +'Cooperation inw>lving
latmchets and launching technology," first mceling, 17 May 1966, R(; 255.69-A-5089, box 5; Arnold Frulkin to
James Webb, '%'isit ol'Si_ Solly Zuckerman," mvmoHn<lum, 5 Ma_ 1966, R(; 255, 69-A-5089, box 7, NASA ]tist<wy
Otfice.
44. Vice Presidcnl |tubcrt lluml_hrvy m IImmhl Ilornig, memorandum, 6 April 1966, NAW, R¢; ?,59,
box 566:.James Webh m Rcfl)erI McNamara, letleL 28 April 1966, James Wehl), box 2, [,yndon B.Johnson Librarx.
45. V','t'bt:, to McNamara, h'tt,.'L 28 April 191i6: ,'Michel Dvl)r(', (;ouve_m,_: M/maires, 195,?,-1962 (l'aris:
Albin Michel, 1988), p. 375.
46. Arnold Fru/kin to .James Wcbb, memolandmn, I I May 1966, R(; 255, 69-A-5089, box 8, NASA
[ [islory ()['[]ce.
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place in synchronotts orbit an <)peral)le comsat spacecraft. '''7 If the United States could not
stop the creation ofa FAiropean regional communicati<ms satellite system, the new lntelsat
()rgani/ali(>ll, th('n under rt+llCgotitt.lion, niight provide a frallleW<)l+k ill which to control
thc [_tll(ipC_tll y,yMclll. _'_
The Limits of American Launcher Policy
Anlerican policy was caught in a dilemma. As NASA reported to the State
I)eparlment, the United States was "z,irhtally al the lilllilLX ¢?f propo+al.s /or cooper+lion which
[ctmM] be made with any hope q/_ucce_.s, itnl('ss the U.S. should relax restrictions in tile two
areas of prime interesl, vehicle tcchn<)h)gy and cxperimentati<m with comsat."*" Th()sc
areas o1 interest fell trader NSAMs 2(,t4 and 338, which NASA Administrator.lames _Ak'l)b
perceived were a "political iNitant" t() thc Europeans and were "exacerbating existing
political strains," especially with lhe French.-"' Revising NSAM 338 might imprcwe
U.S.-Etlropcatl (clarions, (liscottrage l;+mopeans from following a polcnlially comp('titivc
indep('ndt'nt to(tic, and even hell+ the U.S. position in Illtclsal ncgotiatiollS sch('duled to
begin in 1969. +_
The underlying idea +','as to liberalize U.S. policy ()I1 lattnchit+g (oinnlttnicalions satel-
lites. NSAM 338 had delined that polic_ in very strict t(wtns and had left Io the bodies and
agencies of the newly formed lnlt'lsal the responsibility to entangle the development of
c()mpctitiv(' internati(mal tclc(ommttnicati<ms satcllilcs through a web of legal rules.':
This idea was first embodied in a National S(,ctirilv (;(mn(il dirccliv<.' approved its NSAM
354 l)y the" llresidetll it+ .July 19(i6 im(Icr lhc till(" 'q.J.S. (k)op<.'rali()n with the European
I.mmch('t ()rganizatit)n (H J)()). ''+'` The docmn(.nt called for ])osilivc Sul)pt)rt of El.I)()
and the provision ()1 launch v(qlich.'s, c<)mp()n('nts, and technoh)g? tmd(.'r l)r('cis( ` condi-
ti()ns. F<)r cXamlih.', tilt" tccllnolo+..,Q' could I+¢' us<.'d to iml)rovc the capability <)f ((immtmi-
cations sat('llile+, (lilly in accord+n(<." with Inl<.'Isal agrt,,{,m(,nl.s or tt) part|tip+t(" as an ally in
lh(" I.;.S. military saicllit(" system. Th(" t('chnol()q,)' was not to l)c used in nttclcar missile
SVSICIIIN ll()l- t() I)C l)asscd ()ll t() ()lh('l + C()lllllli('s. '(
I)I At(gust I(.)6(i, in appMng NS:\M 354, lh<+' tTnitcd Slates <i|l(,1cd l<) SUpF,()vl EIJ)()'s
(h,v(,hiF, mCnt t)f a Eut-(ip,mm latmch v('hic]e. That supp(1)+t enlai]('d the pr(icttrcmt'tlt ()f
U.S. flight har(lwarc+ as well its assistance (such as technical inlilrmati<)n and 1)ersoml('l)
in the dcsign of std/s<:qtu'nl ELDO l)r()jccts using liqtfid-l+r(>l)t'llanl UpF, Cr stages. The
17. ,[;tlllt,s Wcl)l) t()mlamcs ()'(;()nncll. Sl>C( ial Assist+hi t() th(' l'it'sMent IOt Tch'(()nmmnicati()ns, Icttc),
_)) ()( t()l)<,'l 19(_Ii, R(; 2.r)5, 70-A-3.158, h,()x 7, NASA I lint(>| v ()I fk'c.
IN, W<)rking ( ;t+)u l) ()I htt(:itiati()nal ( _(+()p,.'u ali()ii Sul:,( ()mnlilt,.'c ol lhe Naliona] ,\+_'r(m;nilics antl Sp;t( ('
(;()un(il, "Sluliili_U ; Minutcs," 19 Ma',' 1966, R(; 2-)-). 6!)-A-5089, I)ox 5, NASA I list<)lv ()tlicc.
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50+ \Vcbl) I() ()+())llll('ll. h'tiVl, !+_()(tohct 19(76.
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I'.N. (]l)l)l)('r_lli(>il '+'+iih lhv l_]liil)l)(+_lil l.aiiiicli(>t I)(",l']()llili('ill ()t_;uiizatioll {EID()), 29 Jttl) lt, itil_, R(; 77_..
NSAM ',IF) I, Nali¢)ilal Ai_tli_('s.
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United States also suggested the joint usc of a high-cncrg_' upper stage to bc developed in
Europe, the sale of Scout, Thor, and Atlas rockets to tile Europeans, and the provision tot
a fee lot launch services tilt" sciemific and applications satellite prqjects.'"
Formal discussions l)cgun in Sepuqnber 1966 [ocused, at the request of El.DO, on
general aspects of managcment (such as estat)lishing adequate task definition, contractor
selection, and contract supervision) and on certain spccifc technical problems relating to
the it_jeclion of a satellite into geostalionary orbit (namely, the EI,DO-PAS program).:"'
Sul)sequenfly, an El,DO team visited NASA lleadquarlers and the (;oddard Space Flight
Center, and various technical prot)lems relating to ELDO-PAS were discussed/':
Nonetheless, NASA eluded EId)() t'eqttests l'<)f technical COtlllnelllS Oil stttdies of the high-
energy upper stages. :'_
In July 1967, the revision of NSAM 338, which had set strict limits on the supplying of
launches for communications satellites to toreign entities, received President .]<_tmson's
endorsemenl." Although subst;mtial changes from the torcgoing document were not
readily noticeable, the change in perspective was evident tiom the starl. +vSqmreas lhe orig-
inal text ()p('ned by declaring that +'it is the policy of lhe United Stales to SUl_port (level-
opment of a single global commercial c()mmuni(alion sat('llit(" sysl('m to l/,()vide common
carrier and pttt)lic service commtnfications," tile revised policy declaration read: "The
United States is committed It) the encottragement of international cooperation in the
exph)ration and ttse of outer space." In addition, the rules for transl}+rring teclmolog T
were slightly liberalized by tile substitution of a more tlexible expression, namely:
[14Jithin the limits fixed IO' national w'curit_' considerations and other pertinent
r%,'ulationL_, the United States may decline to make available space lech,oh_gO" to other
,ation_ when (a) such teclmoloLo, is critical to lhe development of a communicalio, gateL
lite capability and (b) it has been determined that thiL_technolog O' will be used in a manner
i,eon,_istent with the _vna]_t of a,d commitments to the continuing development qJ a ._in-
g/e L#obal eommenrial rwmmunicatio,s ,_atellite system as embodied in the 1964 a,q_reement."
55. "Possibililivs and Pf,)l+h'lnS ,>1 Futulc t LS.-Europt'an (;oopcraliolt in tim Spa<e Fi<'hl," remarks bv
Tic, anion I[.E. Nt'st:,itt, l)epuly I)ilt+tl_t, ()tlhc of Sp;ut- atnd l(nvil'onmcntal Science Atlitirs, 1)cpartmcnt of
St;tic, at ttlt" Mccting ot EtlR()SI'ACE, Mulm'h, (;t'rnmny, 21 .June Elf, S, Annex to EIJ)()/(:M(luly 68)WP/2,
] iislolhal .\ichivcs, l+hHopelm trnivcrsilv Institute. Fl_fcncc, [talv. Atlas, already phased otll ils il U.S. military
_chi_ h'+ had a mildmUln of st\ Ill'ily diflit uhics (it used an old Iadi_ guidam'c system, tot example), and il cinn-
paled titXOl'al>l?, against P,lue Slrt'ak as a i}_blcnlial t]lst sla+,d;c of lhc EuFol)t'an launchcL Flutkin to "xVt'bb, Si)m<:
('oun_ il Task (houp on Assislatu c to H.I)(), Intqnol allduln. I,t lure' 1966.
5{i, Interim Response by El.l)() I,_ t rS ¢)[li'f ot 'l'cchnica] Assistml(,.', I),, Clotaitv Wood, NASA I+). opcan
R_,ptcst.ntalivc, 5 l)cccmbcr 1961i, R(; 255, {_!1-,\-5()8_.1, box 7; W.|I. Slcphcn,+, Secretarial F'IDO, to (i. V(ood,
NASA Rel)Ft'sentative, U.S. Embassy, l¢'tlcr, 23.]anttat y 1!167, R(; 2:'>5, 70-A-3485, box 8, NASA Ilistor; O[tice.
57. The l';l+I)() tcatn consisted ofWJ. Mtqhns, EL,D(), Assistmll 'lkx'hnical Director, EI+I)O-15_.S Projecl;
I'.W. Wood, F+[.I)(), I lcad, PAS \_'hiclc S,,'tlic_ll; .].(L th_ggi, So<idld t)pm ` 1'1_)udc et la Realisalion d'Engins
Balistiqucs (SI;_REI+,), Chief Engim'm, PAS l'f,!jc('l; and M. l.auroua, SEREIL l lead, PAS Vehiclc (k_wdinatcd
l)_'parllncltt. Ric hafd Barncs, Memolandmn Iol Ihc RccoFd, lO Febt uarv 1967; Slcphcns to ,'\l noM Fl utkilL h'l-
ter, wilh attta(hed: "Annex on Questions _m Injcction ot Spin Slabili/cd Satellites iuto (;c<_stationm'y ()rbits," 2.t
March 1967: WJ. Mellors to (;illwrt ()uslcy. Tcchnology l)irc_ Iofalc, (;oddard Spa_c Flighl Ccnlt'r, leltcr, 22 May
t967, R(; 255, 70-A-?,485, box S, NASA I lislol _ ()tli_ c.
58. "EIJ)O-NASA relations+ 1967, m;_jot CVCl_tS," atta<'lmd to Incnl<naiMum, I.hod .]ont's to (;corge
M<_r+is, 7 March 1.q68, RG 255, 72-A-3153, box 6, NASA Ilislorv ()tli(c.
5% NSAM 3!+,8 revised, policy ¢<mct'_.fing lt.S. a+.,sistatlc_ . ill the deveh)pment of tincign communit a-
lions satcllitv t apabilities. 12.July 1967. National Sc_ utit?. Atchives, Washington, l)(;.
60. Foreign use of lhe national d('ii'll+,(" ._()llllllltnlkatiollS satellite system contintmd Io be conleml)lated
ahmg lhr lincs o| lit+.+ old text. A bilateral ag, ft't'nl<qlt wilh P,ritaiu_ aloul,_ these lines was signed it+ 191i7, whcrcb?,
Britain w(_utd build an all-British salellitc tb, inilihuv _<taunt|lit< atiollS with Australia and Ihc F'm Easl wilhin Ihc
tialncW,)lk <1t a col]aboratixc Skyn('t militat ', spate cl>nllnunit alil)ns systcln. Krige and Russo, Europe i. 5/m+e, p. fi2.
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|'lie principal new assunlpiicm of lhc docullienl was |he inevhable clevclopnlcni of
iicw regional coilllntlni(illions sySlClllS, If lht' Ullilcd _lalt'S did llOt cnCOllragc thcist,
regional systems 1o .join Inlclsal, thcll, plediclcd Edwald (]. Welsh of the Naliona]
Aeionaiitics and Space (:oilnci], "[ would cxpt'cl lhal lhe illlernalionai sysl¢lil will bc lilt'
one which breaks up and t{lils. '';_ "Flit" goal of t;,S, policy, thel'Cfol'C, was tci allract region-
al svSlClllS into lhc lnielsal t};tll/cwolk where lilt",' could be tonlrolled,"-' bill, as a N.._I_A
papel on lhe dissclllillatioll o[ leCilno]o_, 7' tlV('lSCay, caulioncd, "The hc;lllh ()[ IiHelsal is
assured in pall I)v lhc fccling of lilt" lll;{jlil" inl¢'lsal pal-lllClS ihal lilt') arc indeed pariners
aild nol puppels in all oigailizaliOil doiliinalct| ])v flit' U.S. '''_ If lile !.!niled _talcs weie Ioo
striil_,t'lll ill imposing Icchntti_lgy cxpoli (llllli-ois, lhost" i1;ilioiis nlig]ll (Ollchldc lhal lilt'
Uniicd States did ilol iillend Io allow the|i| Io COliipcIc, and Ihcy inighl work logcihcr lo
crcale a compel|rig saicllitc sy,,.;ICiil, of cvcil Io dctbai upconling Inlclsat negoliations.
The willingness of lhe l_)niled St;lieS Io liberalize its space lec|lnohiRy policy was pul
io a iesi in 1968, when lhe dircclors of lhe Pranc¢i-(',crlllall Sylllphollil" COllllniinic;ilions
satellite program asked NASA Io providc [;lllllt'll vehicles and S('i'_ri('l ' till" ll_?() satellilcs.
After (ollStl]liilt_ with lilt" l)t'pal-illlt'lll (it _laltc, NA,t_A replied in ()cio])cI- l(.)(i_ tllal il
would launcli lhe satellites fill a [72c, "if wc c<luld alliVC at a llltlilial llndclSl,illdilll_ , of llic
expcrilliCnlal characlcr of lhl" plqjccl.'"* Also, re Rardilig lilt" cvt'nlilltl ftlllll-e iisc o[ lhe
satcllhe syslt!lll, thc l_]lliO])Calls wcrc asked Io COil|ply with h'lielsal's lllit'_;, NA,_l;\'s i-epl};
carclhily conceivcd within lh_' logic of NSAM 33_, was inleriir_'ll'd by Syml)honic dil'i'clol's
;is a l!._. i'eliis;il it) launch Eui-<liican c'_mlnilulicalions sall'llill's should liit'v advalict" fi-oln
;ill "exiierinlenlal" 1o an o[)_'ralional ])hast.';:' Tlicref_/re, they cndoi-scd |he iisc of _1
]_]llil()[)(';In ]allll('h('l', evcn if this prospt'cl sCCIliCd ]l'y,s (Cllain and illo1(" expellsive,
The U.S. Space Program and the Permanent
Intelsat Agreements
The year 1969 iil{lticic'(| the (onthi_'n(e of lhc U,S. spacc piograni and Inielsal nego-
lialions. In the spring of 1(`i69, Inlels;il rcnegolialions openi'd, ,ind in .July, lilt' Apollo 1 1
aSllOnauls ])cc;_iinc |lie Eirsl hllinans on lhc ,_vllton. In adclilion, I_:.S. o|'[i'l'S Io eniice
Eiiropl_ans iiTto p;u-iicipaling in l)OSl-Apolhl si)acc |)rogl-ains wt'rc nol ('nlirck, dislinci
fioin the lnttqSal ncgolialions,
In ()clobi,r lgti(.l, NASA Adlninislralor Thoni:is (). Paine ot]_'icd Euiopcans the
opporlunily io parlicil)ait: in lhc dcvclol)lncnl and llSC o| itli aniliilious scl i)f spacc
Iransportalion and t-xploralion pr_!jccls--nanli'ly, a space station inodulc, a il'usal)h'
liaiisporlation svsleln (Ihe St)ace Siiullic), a lug lcl lranst__'i payloads [roni lht' Shull]c to
g('i)S%'ll(hlOllOllS Ol])il, ;lnd ;l llllclciil--po't_<'ClCd l-ockcl (NER\?\) l(il" ]ling-disiaincc inlcl-
|)l_.tilclitly Iravt,I. If Euiopc could ])t" COllvilltcd to ai)andoll its "lrolll)h'-i)lagut'd and
(H. Miqn_lranduni i{>l tile |;lit', "Edwald (L Wclsh on (._)lll'slillns i¢'galdinl4 (:llnilllUlliralillliS S;tiellitc
Pcdicv,'" 9-, No,,ciiilit'l 19t:,li, R(; 2F>,'_, tig-A-,")lt89, box F), X,,\,N,"l I[isl_ux ()tti(e,
(:,9 _,VOl killb_ ( ;|chip ill [illl,rllaliOllal (:llo]/_'l;lllllll NlllICOllllllill¢'l' I)t lilt' Nalilillal .,_('rllllAiili( _,,llld Sl)_tl I'
(klun(il, "_llllllllal', l%linuit's," 19 Ma/ 191Ri.
ti:/. N/'t,_,A int'lnoralldUlii. "(:oillHll ot Foreign Dissl.lilhialillll ill "1'_'_iinoill_y, "+9Fi :\l)lil [gt:di, R(; u.'lT_,
(19-;\+F>(i89, I)<_x ."_,NAF, A t lislox _ ()t]](t'.
6t. l'hc I il;ili_+ii (Olill>_; tlOlli it lCIlO+,]lcI lilt' _qllliitiai _ lilt 1._. polio} oil ];Itlli( ]It'| ax;iil;Ibililx int hidcll in
N,,*ll_..\ AdlllilliSllill¢)l "I'lllllllaS (). ]l;lil/C Io ,_lCllaloi (:]inlon ..\lldclsOll, lclic1, l} _clllcllltICI 1{1711, box 2ti, I'ailic
P;lpcls, [.it)iarv id (:Oll_ll's% MaiHiscripl Division, '_4'ashint41on, 1)(:; ,\lii_dd Iqulkhl. iillelxim_ wilh .]_dui
l_<l,_stl<lll and Li)lCllZ_l _cbcsl;l, N Nllvl,lnt)cl 199:/, Vt';D, hill_lllll, D( :.
t)5. R(lll('ll ,'\ll])ilii/'ll'. hllt'l'_ic'_ _. _ith I.I)l('llt';I _('ll('_,lli+ 17 I)t'(ClllliCI 1991, PaliS.
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obsolescent" launcher program, Paine had argued in tile summer, "European funds
would be freed for more constructive cooperative purposes. ''_'_
ltowever, as European negotiators explained during their first meeting to discnss
Paine's offer held in September 1970, because Europe only had lilnited means, it would
be unable to finance simuhaneously the developnmnt of its own launchers (for commu-
nications and other applications satellites) and significant participation in the post-Apollo
programs. Therelore, European entry into any such cooperative venture would have to be
complemented by the granting of launchers on a commercial basis and withont political
conditions by the United States. The United States replied that, if Europe contributed
substantially to post-Apollo programs, the Americans would provide launch services to
Europe on a reimbursable basis "for any peaceflfl purpose consistent with existing inter-
national agreements." Furthermore, at the request of the European representatives, the
American delegates clarified that the phrase "any peaceful purpose" could include con>
mercial ventures capable of competing with American interests. ';7
The United States nlade it clear, moreover, that the Europeans would bc required to
contribute at least 10 percent of the overall development costs of the Space Shuttle. Those
costs then were projected as being $10 billion <>ver tel) years; the European share would
have been $1 billion spread <)tit over the same period. Broadly speaking, Th&)dore
Lef6vre (who was the president of the European Space Conference and the chief
European negotiator) pointed out, that amotmt would correspond 1o expenditures on the
development of the European launcher. ';_
At the same time as these NASA program talks were taking place, Intelsat negotiations
were under way. The Emopeans were strMng to obtain a more equitable partnership with-
in the system, and they succeeded in obtaining some good results.'"' Among the issues
under discussion was the establishment of regional satellite systems outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Intelsat network. The United States initially argued against regional satellites,
but the Intelsat Definitive Agreements of 1971 opened the way for them to meet
members' nceds for international puhlic communications services. In each case, though,
members were to ensure the technical compatibili D' of the regional satellite with the
Intelsat network antt to avoid significant economic harm to the global system.
Ftwtherm<)re, Intelsat was not permitted to enforce sanctions againsl violators, nor were
its recommendations considered binding, as the United States originally had demanded.
This clause was all the more relevant, because the l)clinitive Agreements deprived
Comsat, the American signatory, of the veto power it had enjoyed under the Interim
Agreelnents. >
These significan[ American concessi<ms, h<>weww, were oflsel by a modilicalion of the
interpretation of the voting formnla in Article XIV (paragraph d). I)rafled in aml)iguous
66. Thomas (). Paine t_> Ihc President. hq_er, 22 Augusl 19fi9, box 23, Paine Papers, Manusclipl
Division, l.ibrary of Congress.
67. Statemenl I)y Piers van Eesbeek relating to the Washington talks (16-17 Septetnber l_.t70) between
the European Space Con[iucnce (ESC) delegation and ESC authorities, 8, October 1970, CSE/CS (70) 23,
I lislorical Archives, European t!nivcrsity Institute.
68. Declavatiotl by l'h6odore Leti"vre, 4 November 1_.170, CSE/CM (November 70) I'V/I, Annex 1,
Historical Archives, European University Institute. Some tlisagleement seemed to exist on this point. Some
observers believed thai tilt _ cost of European participalion m NASA post-Apollo programs would bc avicc the
<'<)st of developing the European launcher.
69. I,cD,, "[NTELSAT," pp. 655-80,
70. Ibid., pp. 670-71. The tcxt, with almcxes, of the INI'EI:SAT agreements, as well as the opcraling
agrccmenl and annex, all of which well[ into etlct t 12 February 1977,, can be fi)und in .'_pace Law and Related
l)mument_: International Space Law l)o<'ument_: ['.S. Space Law l)ocument_, lois/Cong., 2d sess.,June [990, s. Print
101-98, pp. 211-31_,
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terms in order to reach a consensus on the text, the chutse left Europeans wondering what
kind of majority was needed for the approval of an international satellite outside the
lnlelsat network, a prerequisite at that time for its launch by the United Stales. in a letter
dated 2 ()ctober 1970 to +]'h('<)dore Lef{'vre, Under Secretary of Stale Alexis Johnson st:|l-
ed that the United States was prepared to humch European satellites "'in those cases where
no negative finding is tnade by the appropriate Intelsat organ, regardless of the position
taken t)v the U.S. in the vote. "r' The Europeans undelslood this somewha.t "baroque" det:.
inition to mean that a two-thirds vote againsl the prt)l)osed satellite wouh:l be required to
defeat it; il+,on the other hand, less than lwo-thirds of the seventy-seven Intelsat members
were opposed, the United States wottld be agreeable to launching it. In other words,
Europe needed only a little more than one-third of the votes to obtain Intelsat permission
to launch its satellite.
In a subsequetlt letter of 5 February 1971 ,Johnson clarified the U.S. of It,v, which was
substantially limited, h|stead of a two-thirds vote of the lntelsat assembly to defeat a
proposed regional satellite, a two-thirds affirmative vote was needed to support the pro-
posal. _-' According to NASA's Acting Administrator (;eorge M. l+ow, this reversal, if not
acc()lnf)anied I)y a specific commitnmnt in advance by the United States to support the
regional European communications satellite l)rOl)()sal within Intelsat, would "effectively
kill tit(" chances for post-Apollo pavti(il)ati()n by Europe. ''++The U.S. change of position
was linked to pressures exerted by (;OltlSa.l anti the [!.S. aerosl)ace industry. +_
The ()rigin of this policy change cann<)t be ttnderst()od without (onsidering the role
<)f the ()l]ice ()f Telec(mmnmicati()n Policy. (_lav T. Whitehead, a y()ung and resohtte sys-
tems analyst li+om the Massachttsetts Institute ofTechnology, had directed this office since
its incel)tion in Septeml-)er 1970. The aim ()1 tit(" otiice was to define American policy
vis-;'t-vis satellite t:otnnnlnit'ati()ns [of ()vclseas civil|at| operati<)ns, as well as to support tilt.,
:\met|can aerospace industry against what was perceived as attempts by NASA and the
State I)epartment to tqt(tanger the U.S. m(m()pt)ly in communications sat(Pllites. On
7.]anltaly 1971, in the ItlllCh I)ttt)licized "Stalelnenl <)1 (;ovell]lnent Policy on Satellite
Teh'commttni(:alions for International Civil Aviation Operations," the Office of
Telecomnmnicati(m Policy called lot the i,m'rnational tttilization (as opposed to interna-
tional developnlent and utilization, as NASA had proposed) of a specialized aeronautical
commttnicati<)ns satellite system (called Aer()sat) fi)) international civil aviation opera-
lions. > The office's statement, however, had wider implications. In February 1(,)71, <)he
71. t.Ah'xis]()hns()n I() lht+'t)dmc I.cff'x)c. hqtcr, 2()(tol)m I!)70, p. 5, CSE'(;(>mit&ad hoc (71)9.22
April 1971, I list.) ic;d Arthi,.('s, l'_tUOl)t'an t "nivt'i gilv hp+,litut( +.
72+ t'. Ah'xis,l,)hnstm t()l'h('()(h)i(" l,('li"x)<', ](,llt.t, .:") ]+'('btuar'., 1971. (:SE/(:omit(' ad hot (71110,
l listt)ti(al ,;\rt Ill\v:,,. l".tu opt'at+ t +lli'¢t'l_,il t, Institute.
73. P",|vm()ranthln) t<) thv lilt' (t+.'l('t ()nlvlt'n( c bctwe('n l)r. (;eotg(" M. l,ow and Under Sect'ctary Ah'xis
J()hns()n ), 13 .]amtm v 197 I, R( ; 9_').')+ 74-734, box 17, NASA ! listorv ()lfi( ('.
71. Micha('l ]")ClMt'nhcim, "%tlellil(' Splils tr.S., Eurol>t'ans," 5/at+ l"ram'i_o ._umlay Examim'_ am/
(:tmmi+& 7 Mar(h I971, (itcd in Burl Valentine. "l':mope ;tnd the l'ost-Al)olh) Expcricme," 16_+ea)+h t'ol.'r I
(1971-1972+: 117. For ntotv delail ()n tim itressurv |tom ¢_omsat, soy Memor;tndum to tht' tilt' (tch+conlm-cm c
I)ctx_c(,n l,owandl,)hnsol_ ), 13Janttar: 1971, R(; 255. 74-734. box 17;AlnoldFtulkin. Mvnlorandunttothvlilt'
(l+(,I,3wc tncvlin R l)tt'palatit)n, Johnson/'Chal}k <lis(ttssi<)ns), 25 ]anu;u 7, I.qTl, R(, 2.')5, 7,1-7:{I+ box 14, N,.\F,.,\
| lislor,, ()lti(t'.
7."_. "+Nix())) Administration ann()un(es l)()li(,, t)n at'lOl+lautita] sat('llit<" (ttlllllllllli(_lli<)ns." ])r('ss l't'l(';tS¢',
7 ]anua)'}. 1!171. Ri<hmd Nix(m I'r(!j('('l. Whitc lh)usc Contidvntial Fih.s. Stfl)j('ct Fih.s, UT 1. hox I.t, Ex('t utivc
()[lhv ()[ th(" P)('sidt'nt, Nali(mal Al(hivcs+ This xl_ll(+lll('ll[ 1,+;ii_supplcntvnlcd I)_ anothm (m< + issm+d 19 Mmch
I!)71, "Th(. National ])t<)Rtant c))) Sat('llitc Telet()tntnuni(alio)_s IOt htlclnali_)nal (ii_il Avialion ()])o)ations."
altachcd it) h'ttvr, Nilson n) Ilanm)arst)6m, 2 Ap) il I(.)71, fold('v 50771, I li.',l()rit al Afthives, Etu(q)('an t :nixtq sit_
[nstilutc, Flt)t('n(c, [ta]x<
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month later, Clay Whitehead heavily criticized U.S.-European negotiations on post-Apollo
space programs, whose sole otttcome, in his opinion, would be to give away "space launch-
ers, space operations and related know how at 10 cents on the dollar" (a reference to the
American proposal that Europe share 10 percent of the development costs).7'_
The Emopeans reacted strongly to the new restrictive American policy. Lef6vre found
it "confirmed neither by the.joint preparatory work nor by the wording used in the text"
(of 1he Intelsat agreements) and asked the United States fi)r a firrther clarification of its
position57 Not until September 1971, after" the signing of the I')efinitive Intelsat
Agreements, did Lef/_vre receive the clarifications he had been asking for since March. :_
According to those clarifications, the new U.S. position was that the availability of
American launchers was not conditioned on Ettropean participation in posl-Apollo space
programs. Those two issues were now. li)r the first time, separate. The United States would
offer latmch services for satellites intended to provide international public communica-
tions services, including European regional satellites, provided that the Intelsat governing
body approved this by a two-thirds m_jority vote. The proponents of a regional satellite,
then, would bear the burden of persuading the General Assembly that the proposal would
not cause significant economic harm to tire gh)bal network and would be technologically
compatible with Intelsat. The United States would consider a vote by lntelsat to be bind-
ing, contrary to the general interpretation of Article XIV.
The geographical area to be covered by any European regional satellite system, how-
ever, was another point of contention. The preliminary provisional satellite system out-
lined by ESRO l)irector (;eneral tlermann Bon(li at the European Conference in Venice
in September 1970 proposed voice, data, and television services within the member states
of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT),
trot only television services to comltries of the European Broadcasting Area as defined by
tire International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which extended from Iceland to the
North Ati-ican coast and from Portugal to Lebanon and Israel. Representatives of the
Office of Telecommunication Policy, tire Federal Cominunications Commission, and the
State Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs examined the proposal and judged that
it "would appear to cause measurable, but not significant, economic harm to Intelsat."
The United States, though, would not support the proposal if the services oftered in the
European Broadcasting Area embraced anything more than television. The United States
feh that the satellite would cause significant economic harm to Intelsat and was, therefore,
"clearly tmacceptable" to the United States. +`+
Representatives of the (]ommittee of Ahernates of the European Space Conference
(which included representatives of both ELI)O and ESR()) warmly welcomed the "decott-
piing" of hmncher availability and participation in NASA space programs. "_'+The ESRO
76. Clay Wl+iwhead to Peter" Flanigan, memorandtm+, 6 Fel)ruary 1971, Nixon Prqiect, White llouse
(]onfi<let+tial Files, Subject Files, box 2, National Archives.
77. rl'll('ol'll)le [.el<"vre to U+ Alexis Johnson, letter, 3 March 1971, CSF./f;<,mitb ad hoc (71) 12. llistorical
Archives, Etuopean lYniversity Institute.
78. (), this and other aspects relating to the American decision-making process during the l,telsat
negotiations, see Lorenza Sebesta, "rFhe Politics of Techtlological Cooperation in Space: U.S.-Etlropeat+
Negotiations on the l'ost-Apollo Programme," If+L+tor'_ aud Technoloh+ I 1 (1994) : 317-41.
79. t'nder Secrelat'y of State Johnson to Minister l.et+_'vre, texl of letter, ] September 1971, Annex 1, 8
November 1971. (]SE/ComitO ad hoc (71)18, llislorical Archives+ Europeat+ University Institute. See also lilt'
Deparllnent ol Slate tt'legratn on European participati<m in Ihe l)<_st-Al)ollo program, "Visit o1 Minister [+eff'_H',"
24 February 1971, R(; 255, 74-734, box 16; Seco.d Disctlssiotl with Represetltatives ot the Europeatl Space
('+onle'relwe <oncerni.g European Parlicipafion i. the post-Apollo Program, b; February 1971, R(; 255, 74-73,t.
box 16, NASA History ()ffice.
80. .Joinl Meeting of the Comtniltee of Alter,ates _t+¢l the ad hoc (]otnmittee of Officials, minutes, 22
Septembel I !17 I, ( '.SE./(3S( 71 ) IW/27th October 1971. I listorical Arch ires, Europeat+ University Institute.
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(kmncil soon afterward adopted tile so-called tirsl package deal, which called for U.S. and
European participation in Aerosat, the creation of a weather satellite program, and cov-
erage of the cmnmunicalions satellite program to include the full European Broadcasting
Area its defined bv the ITU. The package de.tl also realfirmed the priority of European
htunchers, although (mtlle condition that their cost would tlt)t exce+`?d 125 l)Cl'C+.qlt t)f
eomparal)le non-European ones. If the United Stat+.'s denied launch services, then th¢'
acttLal cost of prodttclion, as well as any development costs, would bc permitted. *t
l,eff_vre now reqttesled fronlJohnstm fu,thcr explanation of the U.S. stand on launch-
er availability, as well as American support for a Et,topcan communications slttellite wilh-
in lntelsat, based c,n specilk ot)erational syst+`qns, missions, geographical coverage,
tiequency bands, and technical configurations.*: In his rcph: of.June 1972,.Johnson point-
e+`l Io three difficuhics: (1) its economic impa<.t (higher charges It)users); (2) technical
incompalibilily (the satellite's orbit placed it too close to the Uniled Stales coastline); and,
most itttpt)rtanl of all, (3) the definition o[the EttrOl)can region.Johnson explait|ed once
and fin all that Ill<." lhlited Stales would not SUl)port the COllct'pt ot' the European
Broadcasting Area its del]ned l:,y the ITU, which covered the former French colonies of
North Ahica, the wvstern portion of the Soviel t!nion, and the hums bordcriug the east-
ern Mediterranean, including haq, bul not Saudi :\,al)ia. "+
In ()ctober 1972, lhesident Nixon laid ()tit th<`? U.S. position on tilt" availalfilitv of
lalm<hcrs in tit+_' tblh_wing terms: "IJnitcd Slatvs latmch assistame will be avaihtbl<) to
interested countries and international organizations fin those satellite pmjecls which are
tor peaceful lmrposes and are consistent with obligations under relevant international
agreeltlelltS and al+l+an_(:t/letlts." With respect It) cotlttlltttlicaliotlS satellites, Nixon
declared:
1. The I'.S. will prm,ide ap[no/niale laumh a._i_lance /br those .s.tdlile .o'gtems o. which
lnlelsal make_ a /avomble _ecomme.dalio. i. accorda.cr wilh ,U'ticle XIV o/it_ defi.ilive
arra.gemenl. 2. I] lau.ch as_ista.(e i_ requr_lrd i, the abv, me q/ a filvorabh, r+'c.mme.-
daliml I{¥ lnleLgal, /he l :.iled ,glaleg will prot,ide launch a_si_lam¥'/br lho,se ,_]!,glglllg which
the I _.iled ,S'lale_ had _upporled wit/m* l.lelgal so IonLr as/he coun/r',, or i.tmnalional e.li-
O' wquesting the a.g_i_la*tte conside_:_ in .qrood /?¢ilh lhal it ha_ met its relative obliKalio.._
u.der A Hide XIV O/the d(finile arrctngeme.I. 3. 1. I/m_r rrt_e_ whmv requesls Jbr lau.ch
as,sista.ce are maintained in the ab,+en+wo/ a /m,orabh, l, lel.sa! mommendalio, and the
17niled Stales had not supported the proposed system, the It.lied Stales will ivach a de¢i+ion
on _uch a wquest @let talcing into account the tte£.ree I+, which the proposed &stem wouhl
lu, modified i. lh; light of lh+, /hclo_:s which were the ba._i_.fi. the lack of _upporl within
l,leZ_al."
81. Rt'pI+It b'v the 5,('ttt'tat y (;choral ol th<' Eun<q)can S;pa_t. (:onlervntt' <m tht' ,_,latu:., i+l l_htn_q),ean
Sl:+a,_e lhogramm+,'s, 7 DCCelnlw] 1972, (;SE '+(',M (l)t't. 72)5, I [i:+,torical :\nchivt's, Eurol)t'an ('nivcrmit'+ Instilutc.
.%,vc also ;\t tuuo Russ,+), The t+]arl_ IJewehlpmenl .] lhr 7)'ll'¢tJllllllllllJttllJOll+ .'_alellile Pro£,'Pnmme i. I(.W¢O (1065-1071), ESA
t ISR-9 (Noordw!ik: ESA, 1993).
82, 'l'h6odorc l,ct_:xre to U. Ah'xis.lohnsmL lettt'r, 22 +, December t971, Annex. to (]SE/(',S t72)1.
4 .]anttary 1972, t [isloli(;t] Archives, Europcaul t !ufivvt sil: hlslittllt', l'hc t+lllilt + ('x(hatlg(' ,)1 cl)flt'SpOlldt+llC_ +
b('tx,.c,pn l.et/wre and ,lohnson tip Io t l_is date is in (:SE/(:<mfit(' ad hoc (71) 22. 22 l)eot'mhe_ 1!171. ()n tilt'
Em<qwan c<mmnmications '+,alcllite program, set' Russ(L 77te lqar(v l)eweh,pment+ pa++im.
83. The definition o[ Ihc Eut_qman t+,noad_asting :\rca is cited in Axailalfility ot l.aHnchczs tin tht'
Emol)Caut (kmmltLnicati<m Satellites I'roRrammc, 22 SCl)t('mlm_ 1972. ESR( )_ PB-TI'II.(72)5, I tislon i_al :M _ hi_cs.
t+_lllOp('Hll 1111iV('l'SiD. hlsl{[llt{',
8,1. Ri(hard M. Nix(m, "Ltnit(,d Nlat(.s l',)li( "+'(;()'++,'t mnR lh(, Pt o',.ision ol [,_lllllt h :\ssiM;lll(-(..'* !) ()( l(>l)(,i
I(.)72, ()II]( <,, ()I thc l)I<'sn F;<.( t<'t:tn_, Washingt<)t'_. I)( :.
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This declaration gave rise to dissimilar interpretations in Europe and the United
States. Wtmreas the Europeans saw it as sanctioning the de facto binding character of any
Intelsat recommendation, U.S. officials, in contrast, stressed tile second and third points
and emphasized U.S. resi)lution to offer the broadest guarantee of tlexibilily vis-fi-vis
recommendations made under Article XIV?"
After the launch faihtre of Europa 11 in November 1971 and then its cancellation in
April 1973, the directors of Symphonie were without a launch vehicle. They then turned
to both the United Stales and the Soviet Union. The Soviet lntercosmos space agency did
not oppose the launch but stated it would not be technically feasible until 1976, which was
too late fi)r the Europeans. The United States, on the other hand, was ahle to promise a
first launch window in 1975. After protracted negotiations, which remain an object of dis-
pttte today, an agreement was reached in June 1974. In this agreement, France and West
Germany confirmed the experimental character of Symphonic, and if the satellite
entered an operational phase, the two countries agreed to conft_rn_ to any decisions
reached within Intelsat? '_ Meanwhile, the European Space Conference had adopted the
so-called second package deal, whose three main programs inchtded the Ariane
]auncheE .7
Conclusion
Between 1965 and 1973, NASA confionted two conflicting trends: the easing of con-
trols on launch services and overseas technology transfers and the pressure frmn the
telecommunicatitms industry to tighten those controls. NASA had to shape those oppos-
ing trends into a coherent policy vis-fi-vis European requests for communications satellite
launch services. Some U.S. officials viewed sharing technolo_' with Europe as achieving
two policy goals: (1) bhmting European criticism about the technology gap and (2) divert-
ing resources from military rockets to civilian launchers as part of a global policy of
nonproliferation. The United States abandoned this strategy when France acquired its
own military launching capability.
Much of the tergiversation between the United States and Europe over conmmnica-
lions satellites and launch services took place within the framework of Inlelsat negotia-
tions for the Definitive Agreements. The ambiguous wording of Article XD/provided the
United States grounds on which alternately to soften or harden its position on the cre-
ation of a European satellite system outside the Intelsat nenvork. Behind the hardening
of the U.S. position was pressure from Comsat and the aerospace industry, which exerted
pressure directl' or through the Office of Telecommunication Policy.
85. Creola, "Ettr_pean-tZS. Space Cooperation," p. 99; Richard Barnes to John Logsdon, letter, 28
February 199{i+
86. Note pour le Conseil d'Administration du CNES [Centre National d'l_tudes Spatiales] par le
Secr6taire executif fi'ancais de Symphonic, "Situation des possibilit6s dr lancement du satellite Symphonic," 17
September 1973, and CNES, Secr6tariat execufif Symphonie, Rapport de prbsentation, 25 Octobre 1973, c6te
81/244, art. 188, liasse 517; DGRST, "Note sur le programme Symphonic," 18 June 1974, c6te 81/244, arl. 187,
liasse 515. Archives Nationales, Fontainbleau. See also the exchange of notes in United States "l'reatie._ and Other
lnternationalAgreements, Vol. 25, Part 3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). The atnhor is
indebted to Richard Barnes for his reminder of this last publication. The two Symphonie satellites were placed
in orbit in December 1974 and August 1975. ('laude Carlicr and Marcel Gilli, Le.s trentepremiire_ annog du CNFS:
l.'Agencefi'an(aise de l'espace, 1962-1992 (Paris: I+a Documentation Fran,;-aise, 1994), pp. 227-30.
87. Krige and Russo, Eunq_e in Space, pp. 111-12.
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Figure 24
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The decision to proceed with the Space
Shutlle program also had an impact on U.S.-
European cooperati<)n. The Space Shuttle
seeme<l re) promise an extraordinary qualitative
leap in launch systems and their cost etti'ctive-
hess, and ii ills<) seemed to make any European
rocket obsolescent. Thtts, to a certain degree, the
Space Shuttle decisi<m reduced U.S. interest in
preventing lhe Etiropeans from developing their
own launch capabilities.
Equally important was a real shift in U.S. pol-
icy vis-a-vis Europe. Whereas /he Kennedy and
Johns<m administrations ha<l tried to appease the
Europeans, as confr<mtati<ms between the United
Statcs and the Soviet Union played in the back-
ground, Nixon shifted fiom confrontation to
d_tenle, [hereby weakening the political weight
of the Atlantic partnership. Then, in the summer
of 1971, Ihe Unite<t States experienced its firs!
trade deficit since 1894, as well as a severe reduc-
tion of gold reserves, which led to the decision to
slop selling gold to fi>reign banks and to abandon
the so-called Brcmm Woods system (the fixed
gold-to-dollar exchange rate instituted following
World %%u I!). A 10-percenl across-the-board
import dilly was.illS! another troubling economic
signal to Europe. As often occltrs, economic crisis
feeds isolationism, especially in the face of an
expan(ling, competitive European Economic
Community (Brim|n, I)enmark, and Ireland soon
I)ecalll0 i](_w ilt(qill)el's).s'_
By the first years of Ihe 1970s, efforts lo liber-
alize American policy on launch services and the
sharing of technoh)gy had come tifll circle. They
had faile<t in the tilce of prevailing internal eco-
nomic interests, increasing competition from
European industry, changing priorities in U.S.
[i>reign policy, and European developments in
both the military and space fields. From the
European perspective, the unwillingness of the
United Slates t() provide firm assurances ()f
launcher availability for communications satel-
lites was t)t=l one []l('l()l" that lead to the European
decision t<) endorse France's I,-IIIS launcher
(later known as Ariane). That decision has to be
undcrslood within lhe COlitexl of strained U.S.-
French relations--itself a legacy of the dissension
88. (:osligliola, k'mme and the r',g., pp. 167-72. Scc also I'icrrc Mcland_ i, Urn" ime_taine alliame: Les l{'tat_-
[ 'ni_ el 17iurope, I977 1983 (Paris: t'ulflit alions tit' la Soibonnc, 1!18,8), l)l ), -I,5-77. and Ihc insightful at t Olllli ;viit-
ten llx the Anlctitan aliillassad¢lr 1o ihc Euilll)t'an (]onHnunilics, Robert S_ hacl,'c1, The UnhinwdAllia_ce: Amm'ica
and lhe liut@+'an (;ommunit+ (Ncw "_i_rk: l|aupcr, 1975), I>I >. 42-53.
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hetween Charles de (;aulle and I,yndtm.]ohnson--which endured well into the 1970s, as
well as the confused nature of the European space feld.
Institutional uncertainty regarding the flmlre of the European space organization was
particularly acute hetween 1966 and 1971. Financial commitments were weak in compar-
ison to NASA; industrial experience with satellite technology was limited; international
legislation on communications satellites was not yet defined; and the attitudes of poten-
tial satellite nsers were conservative because of the tmcertainty of commercial revenues,
the high costs of the system, and anticipated problems of technological reliability:' Not
until Decemher 1971 did the ESRO (]ouncil endorse the start of a communications
satellite program, the Orbiting Test Satellite.
Furthermore, not all the European states agreed entirely on the objectives of region-
at space policy. Britain ahvays criticized proposals to build a European launcher and pre-
letted the less expensive route of relying on U.S. satellites, while Italy was interested only
in projects that gnaranteed contracts tk)t- its industry (this was apparently not the case of
the European launcher). West Germany, after the tailure of Europa II in November 1971,
was eager to assume the prime financial burden and contract management for Spacelab,
while withdrawing its earlier support for an independent European launcher. France and
Belgitnn were the only countries that never varied from their support of a European
launchei:
Even within France, thongh, not everybody was in favor of a European launcher.
Nonetheless, those who supported it--de Gaulle and then his successor, (,eorges
Pompidou--created a strong constituency, and they made good use of American launcher
policy to improve their position. Of equal inlportance is the fact that the technicians who
thst conceived Ariane did not look R)r a technological breakthrough, which would have
been politically and economically difficnh to champion given historical
circumstances. Instead, they sought to design a technically easy and reliable rocket, draw-
ing partly on knowledge acquired through the development of Diamant." A national
latmcher was neither financially possible nor strategically convenient: the project had to be
European to distrihute the financial burden and to secure timtre users. ''_ Also, it had to be
technologically uncomplicated to prevent the cost overruns that had haunted ELDO's past.
In Ihe end, all of the reluctant European partners were induced to participate in the
second package deal. The European decision to build Ariane had many roots and motives,
among which was the unwillingness of the United States to guarantee availability of launch-
ers tor operational communications satellites. The decision to build Ariane, however, was
not assured until the very end. The hectic bargaining that took place in July 1973 testified
to the diffculty of the process up to the very last ntotnenl, and it dramatized the central
role of international bargaining. If West Germany and Britain did not have their pet
projects (Spacelal) and maritime communications, respectively) to protect and to garner
support for, the hirth of Ariane probahly would have been a far more traumatic delivery.
89. Mfillvv, "TEI.ECOM Pl'(Igl'iHll, " pp. 105-40.
90. Set, Iht- ilhlminaling contrilmtion ot Andr(' Lebeau, "l.a ilaissalltC d'Arianc" in (]hadcau, ed.,
l.'amMtion technolo_que, pp. 754t 1, and the ensuing ([ebate ;itlll/)tlg eyewimesses of I|lt' tilne, iMd., pp. 95-108.
91. (]NES, Rapport groupe sectolial 6, Programmes d'i'tudes ¢'1 dt"veloppement (h*s laineras, 30 June
1970, c6tc 81/401, art. 70, liasse 17t.t, Archives Nationalcs, l'aris.
Chapter 12
The Formulation of British and
European Policy Toward an
International Satellite
Telecommunications System: The
Role of the British Foreign Office
by Nigel Wright
Several acc()unts of the cstal/lishmcnl ()f lnlt.lsat have tended to present Britain. and
tilt: British Post Office spccitically, as a villain, desiring Io obstrutt the ca|ly dcvt'lol)menl
of a satt'llile svslt'lll [O SCClll'(" all CXlla lt'itsc ()n life tor its large inv('slllltqlls ill Iransoc('an-
it' I('l(:phon(" cables. -+By ('()nc(mtraling on th(' SUl)pt)s('(l intentions ()t 1hi" Posl O|ti(e. such
at(()llnls have lendcd to ignor(, lilt' roh' of other govvrnmvnl departments in the fOl'llltl-
]ali(m ()f British policy. Moreover. while idcnlit_in_ tilt' foreign policy-oriented nature of
tilt' Kcnncdy adminislralion's salcllite (:o|nnntnicalions Roals. tilt" ]ittq-alttr(' ()n inlelsat
has not looked in any dr'tail a! tilt" parts playt'd l)v <)x('i-st'as lort'ign ministries wilhin the
overall ('Olll'S(" O[" tilt" inlt'l'g()V('l'lllll('lltal ll('_olialions lhat pl-othlc,p(:l |lll('lsal.
This chapter pr()vidcs a fttlh'r pictmc of British governmcnt thinking by conccnuat-
ing on the r<)lc of t]lc Brilish Foreign ()tticc in lilt' prcliminary phasc of the explorat()ry
int(wg<)vcrnmental distussit)ns that <)((urrt'd during I!)G2. This phase pro'ceded l)oth the
formation of the European Conlk'rcnct" on Salcllitc Comnmnications ((:ETS, the French
acronynl) in I()(_)_+att(l the formal nmltilateral neg, otiati<)ns that l)egan at tilt" start of I(.)(+4
and led t() lit(+: [ntclsat Interim Agrct'mt'nts (>f mid-19G4.:'
Throughout I .(+)(+_,ahh<lugh British officials WCFe aware ()f the potential thrt'at lhat an
+._nlt+lJ(an satellite svstelll pos(+d ['()1" British and (_()mmonwealth cable inltqt'sls+ tht'i|-
dcsil+c It) pr<)tv(t those interests did not equate attt<)mali(ally with a desire It) frltstrat(" lhc
carb/dcvch)lmWnt ()f satellite c()mmunicati()ns. British <)lticials rt'alizvd Fr()m th( + outset
that satellites and cal)h.s wottl(l play ((mq)l('|ncntary roles within lhc overall syslcm <)f
inttqnalional C<)lnnnlni('alions. Ill fact. ratht'r than wanling It) stall satcllitt' communica-
lions, nlanv ill Britain. b<)th in and out of government. 1)elievcd thai Britain should con-
struct its own satellite system in collaboration wilh tilt" (]onmlonwt'a]tll and Europe. This
I. "l+Inc It'+,t'atlt h ()It ++hi(h this chapter is based ,*as +.Ul)l)<)l ted b,, at S(ien((.' and Engineering R(,s(,a)(In
(_oui_( il,, E(()U()lui(-and S()(ial R('sc+uc h (_oun(il stud('ntshil)+ Thc auth()i w()uld likv t() fllank Philip (;,unmwtt
I()) ]+is su_gesti(,ns and <()mtnt.ntn (m an ca,lict (halt.
2. F(:,t ('Xaml)h's ()I this t('ndcn(v+ s('(' l)('Ibctl l). Smith, _[]O_+II+llII#I_((IlilDI ])_' .'_++tellil+v A +7+i.n /Pl l¢+'tPoff*e+l
(l.ev(h'n, MA: A.W. S!jthol], 197(+), I ). 136; Wa]tm McDouRall .... The lleav+'.* a.d lh; l'.aPlh: A l'.hl/r+d llAlo) 3 +Jl
the ._,}'++++,.A_+,(New 'J_))k: l))asi( l).)()ks. I!)8:+')),l)p. 351_-57.
3. ']'h(' Ibrnml l)(.)iod of u('g<)tiati+m is (()v<'r(+diu .ludith "]'cRR('rKild<)w,l.lds.l: l>.lio ,'tl<i/++,)'_Dihwi.+a
( l .cxingt())+. M\: It.( :. I I('alh, 1!)73}; Jonalh+ul F\ ( .all<)wav. 'fke l++)lili++rtP+r/1(+1_..I.£5S+./.g,tdlit+' r+'.,+mu,++ati.,_
(l.cxit+gton. MA: l.cxinRl()n Bo<)ks. 1972). lhcsc works lotus mainl% <)n dc_ch)l)mCltts within th(" [l)it('d Nlatt's.
h(>w(._, cl.
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system would have been bt)lh separate fiom and competitive with a U.S.-initiated system.
Foreign Office officials, however, considered that British interests would be 1)etler served
if Britain were to cooperate tully with the United States in constructing a single world
satellite system in which as many countries as possible were represented. It was inevitable
that a single system would be led by the United States in its earl}, }'ears. Nonetheless,
Britain's cable interests could still be safeguarded fl'om within that system. That safeguard
could be achieved if Britain insisted on taking an active role in the system's design and
operation, thereby ensuring that it flflly met the requirements of Britain and the
Commonweahh, as well as Western Europe and the rest of the world.
Britain and the United States
By tfie early 1960s, Britain had long held a prominent and leading position in inter-
national telecommunications.' After World War II, Britain maintained this position with-
in the framework of the (;ommonwealth 'Ikqecommunications Partnership, established
under the terms of the Comnmnwealth Telegraphs Agreement of 19487 During the early
1960s, the (]ommonwealth accounted for al)out 20 percent of the world's total intercon-
linental telecommunications traffic, with the Unile(I Kingdom alone accounting for
10 percent. This strong position was based on an extensive network of cable and radio
facilities. These facilities were set to be extensively modernized through the 1960s with the
installation, in successive stages, of a comprehensive system of high-capacity repeatered
submarine telephone cables, which were a recent innovation first introduced in the mid-
1950s. Spanning both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and connecting together each of
the major Commonweahh countries, the new netwo,k was expected to meet
Comn|onweahh traffic growth into the 1970sY The overall Commonwealth network, com-
prising lhe international communications t:acilities of each memher country, was coordi-
nated by the Commonweallh 'l_lecommunications Board, through which each party Io
the 1948 Agreement was required to consult witfi its partners before extending or adding
to its part of the network.
By 1960, several British government departments, including the Post Office and lhe
armed forces, had expressed an interest in the practical and commercial potential of com-
munication by satellite. As yet, however, the whole subject was ringed with various techni-
cal and commercial uncertainties. Very little experimenlation had been done wilh actual
satellites, even in the United States, and the commercial feasihility of satellite communi-
cations had }'el to be demonstrated practically. Nevertheless, the Post Office, responsible
4, The tola] Ill.'[ OlltS[;tlldhlg investnlell[ i-(!pt{,sl.,ll|(.d by lhe assets makin_ lip lhe (][)[llnlons,','uatlh sys-
tem was approximately £110 million (more than $300 million). "Means ot Asso( ialing Commonwealth Countries
with a European Regional Organisation," tllldated draft, circa lale August 1963, F() 371/171060, (;P1173,/289,
Public Record Office. I,ondon (hereatier "l,ondon PRO"). For lhe origins and subsequent devclol)men_ of the
(]ommonweahh nelwmk, see Daniel R. l]eadrick, Tke Invisible Weapon: "l'elecommuuicatim_s a_zd lnternatiozml I'olili_ _
1851 1945 (Oxt0rd, Eng.: ()xloHl Univmsity Press, 1091); t lugh Batty-King, (;irdle Round the Earth: The 8tm'y o/
('able and Wireless and it._ PT_'dece_._m:_ to Mark the Group _ Jubilz.e 1929-1979 (l.mldon: Heinemann, 1979).
5, The original parties 1o the 1948 Agreement were Auslfalia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Soulil
At]+ica, Southern Rhodesia, alld the t!nited Kingdom. By the end ot 19fi2, (:eyh)n, Cyprus, Ghana, Malaysia, and
Nigeria had joined, while South Afiica had withdrawn t)'mn the Commom_'eahh on becoming a republic in 1961.
6. The Commonwealth "round-the-world" telephone cable scheme had been accepted by the
Commonweahh gt)vernmenlts dtuing 1958. h had been estimated to cost a lola] of £_g million--a figure thai
included the Anglo-t'anadian share of the first transatlantic telephone cable, TAT-I, laid in partnership with
AT&T. Britain had agreed to contribute 5{) pcrcenl of this total. "Proposed Commonweahh Pacitic Telephone
Cable System," Post oJfir* ElectricalEngineers 'lomu_a153 (April 1960): 42-44. This scheme included cables to South
Africa thai subsequently werc constructed outside of the (;ommonwealth network.
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for Britain's commercial trh,c(mnnunicati()ns op,urations, realized thai tile U.S. lead in
Sl)a((" and satellite te(hnoh)gy, if translatrd inlo a [!.S. monop()ly over commercial satcl-
lilt ctmmmnications operations, cotfl(I I)<.'(+()mr a threat 1o the commercial viability of thr
Comm()nwcahh network. _ I)(,spitc this concern, the Post Of]ice did n<)l expect that satel-
lites w<)ttl(l ever wholly rcphwe (al)Irs. Rathrr, it rxl)cctc(l that the two media woul(l havr
"(onq+h+nwntary" roles within tile overall syslcnl ()f intrrnational tclcconmnmicalions. +
Mindfttl <ff the various tmcrvtahttics, the British attthorities were kt+('n to Sla',' al)rcast
(>I U.S. technical devch)l)nwnts and, whcrrver l)omsil)Ir, to l)ccomr asso(+iatrd with U.S.
cxpcrimcnlal l)r()gram.s. British (_fli(ials solicited technical (lis(:ttssi<ms with tht,ir c<)ttntcr-
parts in t]lc U.,%. govcfnm('nl. As ;_t 1"Csttlt, a joint (ivil-militarv mission hcadc(l by Major
(;('nrral [,fslic (It" Malaprrt Tlmillicr of thc (;,tl)mrt ()fl]cc traveh+d to th(" Unil<_'d Slat('s
(hlrin_ ()(t(+l)rr and N(r¢cml)cr 1960. l)nring this visit+ NASA ()fl]cials hwitcd tlt+_"Post
()tfi(r to l)arli(il)ale in N:\SA's l)ro,_ram of satrllit(" (onnnm+icalions eXl)crim(-nts." A
tn(+nx<wandtntl o1 tn+(Irrstandin_ was si_nrd thr Rfll()whLg Frl)rtlarv, therel)y laying, lit("
gronn(lw()rk Ibr Post ()ffi¢c involvcmt+nt in NASA++ rXl)Ct-imcnta] a(tivc satrllitc pr()gnam,
R<.'lax. l,atct +, lolh)win_, an agreement l)rtw('cn NAS]\ an(l XI'&T, thc F'osl ()fficc also
agrerd to ])arti(il)atr in thr Irials of AT&T'_; own eXl)erimcntal satellite pvqiect, Telstar."'
i\s its contril)ution to thr Rrlav and Tclst;u- it, sis, tl+r Post ()[l](c tmdcrtook to (Icsign
and (()nstrn(t an experimental <_riitm(l slation in Britain. Folh)wing rxtcnsivr sttrvcvs of
thr sonthwt'st of England, a site WaS (hos('n at (;oonhillv l)owns c,n the I+izard t)eninsula
in (;ornwall. _ l'hc United Stales had 1)trill a large al)Crttnc horn antenna at Andovcr,
Maitlc, whi(+h wa_; l)r()trclr(l fr()m hra,+ T h)(al wintrr snows l)v a racl<)mc. Thc (;oonhillv
antcttuta, t)v (()ntrasl, took lhc IT)tin <)f ,m tm(<_vcnc(l slcrral)Ic cighly-fivc-i_)ot-diamctcr
(twcnty-six-lnrtcl-(lianwtcr) l);wab(_h)id dish (()nstrtwi¢'(l to withstand gales rather than
snow. I)csi_nrd 1)v Htis|)and and (:<). ()t Shrftiehl+ (',o(>nhillv brnid]tcd greatly flom that
((mtl)am,"s ratlicr CXl)ericncr with thr _30-1bot (st'vcnt_-sixilltctct +) .|odre]l Bank radio
Iclcs(opc. Alth<_tlgh initially ('onslrtt(:tr(I Ibr CXl)erimcntal tests with Telstar and Relay, the
(;(>()nhillv anicntl+a wa.s intrndr(t t() l)c compatibh' with a r,tn_c ()f salcllite designs an(l
orbits and s<i (()tfld srrvr ,t l]klutc Ol)Clali()nal svstctn. Aflcr it++coml)Irli(>n in mid-1962,
7. I lclbcll _( hilh'l ha_, str<)n_l_, :+,nff,_c'+;lcd tllal a ",att'llhc c<)mnnu+it alhmP+, m_)n(>l)<+ly ',,+:ts. in la('l, a t<in-
+_(iotl_, p/)al of m;tnv [ ;.S. policy in;tkcl_,, whl) ,rxhil)ilrd "_+.( t,liiptl]'_i_.t ' (h i;.,," to tl31is[_,'I l)crrnan<'t+tl)to AttWli(ittl
hat+d', lhc i_.nlrt lhifi',h c(+nlintnli(ali()ll',, _,t£pcti(+i it,." l lrrhcll I. Schilh'r, +'+la_s ()OIlilllllll]('(lll(Jlt'+ (lll(_ +_+l+'l#l (Ill
I¢m[:in' (Nrw _k: +\u_Hstns M. Kt>lh'x. 1970), i ). 136.
+g. For rxplr'+sions ol this ,.ir+_, nt.r Pat ]i;tlllt'lll;tl x l)rbatrs. I louse oI( ',<mmlon+;, V.(;'._;2, Wlillcn ;lll+s'++,'t'I_,,
21 l)c(cnil)t't 1964), ((_1. 1_9-!t0, aii(I V.(7_-)(.i, ()i+li. _ Ma',. 1(.)t;2, _.1.20t-5. lhr /(lii(hlsi(lil Ih;il lit,th _,atcllitcs :ill(l
i illllr_, w(lilld I',c ;tl ( <)nllll()d_ll('d hi :i (()lll])l('lll('llllil _, i rlalil)n.,liip ha',; lhc (llr.,iou _, ])icl cdclil i)1 lhe _lC(Olillll(l(1;I-
li_+il hcr, vcrn ,,]il)l IWa_<,<"t adi(_ _ill(l tch'141at)h ( ablc:, ill Itit. lalc |970,,. _;r,c' I h'adrick, [m,i_ihD >llTa[J_m, ('haptci I 1.
9. "1)i,,;,. u,..',ion,, v,ilh Ihr Natior, al At.i(iti_illli( _, _iil(I _;i)a_ r AdliliiiiMiltlioil." ll<l_,l ()ftlcc int'lil_)lilil(ltlni.
964 :'xii_ll,,l I{tt_1. (;AI>> I{_. t "71 t i.I I b;(G1 Ill, Li)lldl)ii I'R(). hliliallv. Iht' lhi'.,t {)lfi(,r wa _, Ic:.,_;l'lilllti:_i_iy.lil: _il)lllil Ihi',
i>tt$.'i lhilll xt(. inil4hl Ill)V, ('xt),<'l I. (]al)htili lloc, th (d llir l>(p,t ()lti(c had le(ri',cd N.\S:Vs hr,,halioii ',,ci ,, ((>o11,, in
the ,.>',c_;i)l ()lht.i,., _ilill)ll_ i|l(" l+llni]lici (Ich'gati(_n. ll(l<llli npi)_ilClil] ) x,,';ts illl_t'_;illr Ihal N<sl,"4,)l'', _iilthol-ir+ ,.,xlt.n(I-
i.([ I(I lh(' ",l)hvic <it '.;_lt,.'llitc (<_lillllliilil alillll'_ tlli(I lt'p,;tl (1('(I AI &'l" u', the Ili(lIc anlt;oiitcili',c lifl2,_ilii]_tlil)ll V,ilhhi
Ih(' lrliih'(l .Nlalc:.,. _,cc D. <;il),,on. ininutt.. {I l:cl:,fii:ii', I{ttil, P() 371 ,' 1377,_41. IAS 17,1 "& l.i)lldlin |:'P,].(). _l'c al,,o
ill)It III h,..low. II '-,h(>nld t)t' tt'(ail,.'d tll_ll hi l)t..(t'int)ci I{ttiO, Ihc l.]i,,cnh(>v.,'ci a(hnini,.,liali(nl had i_,llcd ;l '.,l;tlc-
iliClll <l[ il', ])ll'|l'fic(I ,,atrllil,.' tl)lllliililii('_ilioli _; llolh), in ',;hil h h eilil)liasi/cd the tra(liliinlal flih' ()l t)ii',ait'
ill(hiMI v in 1!._. t i)llllniini(_iti(lii_.
10. Af&T alid Iht' l)l)',l ( )lti(c WClt' I(lii_-'.,Icuidilll4 t)li,,illC,,,, i)arlncl'S, ha_ing, inlro(htt cd ihc |'ir_;l HallS,_ll-
lalilil ladiolrlcph(mr SOl ,,h r', in Ihc lille 1971is ail(l lhr tii_;l Iran:sliilallli(" ich'phonc cable in lhc 1(.t_l(ls,. h/ liill+
AT&T ah ca(l'_ had ;r, kclt th(' l'o_,t ()lt](r io l)arti('il)atc in c',.pcriniental _;atcllilc li ial'., 1)('t()i c NAS:\'s dr'( i';,i(nl ll_
I>l'l(_nlc itlx<,ix_'(I hi ".,iinilai nial.,, l>l)',iiii;i_l('i (_,<'nt'lal ll) Plhilr Mhli'_trit <_',_l,,l_ atl(1 t:, _Cl)lrinl)cr 19i:,0, PREM
1 I ,'31)9bI, lxn_(hni PR().
I I. [r_hnit;ll (h'l;lils (li lhl' (',oonhillv statior, (;111 t)l' h)tind in F:l.t). "]'a,.lllr, c(l., '/71.,' (;rlo#P]Ul(X tSifp'rt:
(;+mlml+_l]_:+li<,t_ .";ah_lhlr (;r_,uPlr] ._l'l(llT¢t#l (I.(in(hln: 'l'hc ]ilsliltiti(ili o[ l']lct Irical l_{Ilgillt't'Is, 19(:,'11.
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(;oonhilly's construction was believed to have cost only a fifth of the price of the U.S. sta-
tion at Andover): British officials were hopefill that British industry would 1)e able to sell
and btdld similar stations around lhe world for use with an eventual commercial system.
On 24 July 1961, President Kennedy issued an invitation to the nations of the world
"to participate in a commtmication salellite system, in {he interest of world peace and a
close 1)rotherhood anaong peoples throughout the world. ''_:' He had adopted the goal of
an international satellite communications system, in part at least, as a means by which to
restore and maintain U.S. technological prestige in the wake of the recent space success-
es of the Soviet Union. _* Soon aherwards, U.S. officials explained their view that there
shottld be a single global satellite system offering nondiscriminatory access to all coun-
tries. Only one such system could I)e financially viable, they claimed, because rival com-
peting systems almost certainly would cause each and every system to stiffer a financial
loss. I lowever, they did not inake (lear the form thai they imended international partici-
pation to lake. There was thus some suspicion that the United States intended l() build,
launch, and control a system entirely by itself wilh other nations' participalion being lira-
lied solely to the role of users ()f the system, thereby cementing a U.S. monopoly.
Kennedy's invitation focused British lhinking. Britain would hav(! to acl quickly 1o
forestall the perceived U.S. threat to lllc (_ommonweahh ]letwork. Ideally, Britain would
need to act before the Unites Stales had laken its own planning to the point where that
country was ready to initiate concrele action. Before it could initiate any action of its own,
h()wever, the British governmenl was bound to (:onsider the inleres{s of its
Commonweahh telecommunications partners and to consuh with them accordingly. For
this purpose, a (_omm(mwealth Satellite Communications Conference was arranged to be
hel(l in I,ondon in the spring of 1962. _'
The Post Office had the primary responsibility for civil telecommunications, and it
had the task of coordinating the details and agenda for the Commonweahh Conference.
The views of other interested government departmenls had Io I)e laken into acc()unt
when determining British goals and policy. To achieve this, an inlerdeparlmenlal working
party was established at the beginning of 19(')2 under the chairmanship ()t Sir R()l)ert
Harvey, the Post Office Deputy l)irector General.
In addilion to the P()st Office, two other departmer[Is look a special inlercsl in satel-
lilt" commtmications--nalnely, Ihe Ministry of Aviation and the Foreign Office. The indi-
vidual positions that these three look into the working party stemmed from a numl)er of
different considerations and criteria, ahhotlgh tlqere was consideral)le overlap among al
leasl somt_ of lheir specific goals.
12. R(mald C. II()pt':l()n('s, "S;llcllil(, (:onlllllllli{;lliOll,.;: the Sali('n_: l:a(ls," 15 March 1963, F()
371 / 171048, (;Pl 173/:48, I:)n(ton PR().
13. (;alloway, The Polilic_ and TechnoloL. % p. 26.
14. Vernon Van l)vke, l_'ide and t'owetv The ttalional_, _/ the Space I'rotrram (Uvl)ana: t!nive_sily of Illinois
Press, 1964), p. 25.
15. ']'h(' Post ( )J'l](t' <)Kigimdl 7. ha(l imcndt.d t() seek ils C<mm]onwcallh i)a,tn¢,]s ' views during 1961, bul
the c(mli_rt'nc(' arranged fi)r I11(' ciid of Ih;tl vt'ar was postponed until spring 19fi2, I() allow |()r Ihc conchtsion
()f lht' m'g{_liafic,ns loward lht' t'sla|)lishm('m ()f El J)O, thtwet)y allowing the (on[_.'len('e I(} m('('! wilh Ih(' knowl-
edge that an in(iel)('nd('l_l Europ(-an laul_(ht't would I)('('omt' a_ailal)h" i_1 due ('ours('.
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The Ministry of Aviation
The Ministry of Aviation's iulercst in satellite communications arose fron+ its role as
the dc|)at+tmcnt r¢'slmnsible fi>r Britain's contril)ttlion tt) tile European I,',ttll1(']l('l
Devch)pnlent Organization (El+D()). In this capacity, it inlcndcd t() advancc the interests
of b()th ELl)() and the British ael+<)spac+. ' in(hlslry.
El+l)() itself was in large part a product of Ill{" British gl)V(,l-nlll('nt's d('sirc t<) t+<)stt'r
(l()s(', p<)litical tics 1<) th(' nations o1 Wcsi('rn Eur()p('+ csp¢'cially thos(" of the (;onmion
Market." Its origins lay with the cancellation of Britain's Bhtc Streak missih: p,+<Wct in
1960, when the possibility was raised of contitming tim dcvclopnl,.'r_t of th(" basic r<)(kct,
stripped <)1 its Sl)Ccifically inilitary aspects, to produce a satellite launcher.: The only jus-
tification that British officials could find tor proceeding with this expensive ])rojccl, rather
than relying on U.S.-buih launchers, was that an independent British launcher c_)uld bc
user[ to launch coinmcrcial conlnmnications satcllit¢'s. This reasoning rcflt'ctcd a bcliet,
widespread in both gov('l+lllllCllt and industry, that while the United Slates would lit: will-
ing to make launchers availabh' to other cottntrics t_)r scientific satellites, aiid t<l Britain for
ntilital+y satellites, lhey would bc unwilling lo launch t+orcigl+ comnnnlicali<ms satellites +'rod
Iht'l-el:,y pl-t,VCllt lht' (!tll('lit._Cll('c of commercial {'Olllpetition with a U.S._)wncd svstcn_. '+
Sul)s,p<itttqttly, Bhte Streak was enlisted in Britain's attempts to intprovc its relations
with Western Europe. Ill fact, bv the end of lq60, the (;abinct had deternlincd that the
dt,vt,lopnlcnl of t+ltt_' Streak sit<mid I)e continut'd only within the COlll(!xl of Eui-opeall col-
hil)<lralion, and Ibis oplion was pursucd.'"
The coiilnitTcial poiential of salellitc coiiiliitlnitali<lns Was still regardt'd as the itit)sl
significant roll: for lilt arltlaI launcller. Thc Minislcr o[ Aviation, Pclel ['hlll'tli'y(lO[l,
slll.'s,s('(l Ihis potential ;is lie lOtllCd (]<lllllllOllWt'alth _111(| l_]tllopcall capitals in st'al+th ot
Stlpl)Olt t<_l a collal)oialivc project. (]OllilllOllWt'ali]l ('<ttllltl'it+s exprl,sscd ]ilth" inil'rcsi,
h<>wevci, leading Ttiorneycroft to concenti+ait • his ellofts within l'_uropc.-"' Aftcl + ;/ pro-
lracled period of nel4otialion, those i!ft<lltS h'd to tile eslablisluneni <t| H.1)O. whosc
(](inv('lltiOll '_,';Is oli(-IIt'd [i.)l :-;igllaitllC t:allV ill 1962:"
ElJ)()'s inhial ])ro_lalll did nol include aiiy plans [_)1 a (+Olllpielillqllaiy piO_l+anl ill
sall'llile ('Oililiillnitalions l+eSealCll. This a|)s('ii(o r¢'tlectcd British alld Pi+l.+li(h ]l-lpaSilly
opposition, alOll_ with the objections of llic British Post Office. which was concerned by
till.' likely coinl)licalions lllali a l_]uro])e;in salcllilc ])rol2,rain would iniroduce into the exist-
in_ (]oniinonwcahh partnershil). Ncverl|icicss, Ihc Minisliy of Avialion retained its iniercsl
in s;il<.'l]ill" (oiiinliinil'alions alld was iii/t'ni Oil usiillg a l_]ilropean lailnclier Io ]aunc]l salt'l-
lilts in Ihc ];il('l st;i,_l.'s of whalt'vcr inlc,tilalional svsieill was established. The MinislVv of
16. lnitialh, tile Blitish /._l)xt'ililllCnl's intl'nli<ln had 1)t'cn to t_lsl{'l tlllsel links ll<'txvccn Ihc |'ui{lllc;ul
(]oillilil)ll Malkcl ;Uid Ihc (oiiilllil',, <_t ihc l_]iiIllllcati ]+'lt>l" I'i adt' ,\ssol iatillii. ,,'%tili iliCil dr'( i,dlin io al)pl ) li_i ;i(lii-
al inmnt)ctship in lhc (;i)lllln4111 Maikcl _ls ill)l I;ikl'li uniil nlht-I 9GI, lohn (Laiiipl)ell,/',dil,a_d lle<.,Ih. ,{ lli.S..mpD_
([:mdcm: Iqinlil o, I{i{il), i)p. 113. I lli.
17. F,_ ti hllll'l _l((l)lllll (it El+lt()'s oliL4ins alid ihl' pail played I)'_ lhe Mactiiillali _o\l'illlilt>lll's
EUiOllcan aspirations, sec.]ohn KliRc, T/u' l.umh r!/EI.DO, ESA ItSR+7 CNomdw!ik: ESA, M;ul]l 19{t3).
IS. Ad Ihw Minislciial (]<lilllililll't' llll Illuv _lll%ik ((',i_'_ 716), niilllllt's <it t]i_,l ili(+t>lillg, 6,[ul) I*:#IRL
(:All [30 171+,, [A)lldllll I'R().
19. _\<l lh_t Minislcrial (_omnlilicc oil I;luc Slrcak ((;EN 716L nlinutes ot thiid inct.tm_. 7+l)c_t.lnhc_
I<.ifiO, ( _AI _, 15;0' 17?,. I:md_)ll PR().
21t. Ihc (',l)inlnlmwt':+lih _tllt-I l_]liil)pcan gl)xl,ililliUiils sliat_'d a inlllii;i] anlipalh_ low;lid
(]OlllllilHll_ I'{I]lh-I_]lll I)l)t';iil (< _llal)_,t _lli<ln. t hm<'_cr. ,\uslt alia was in_ ludcd ill I]ll" llit'iilt/l'l shill i>l [_{1,1)() I_ Xilt uc
ot lht' t'xll'Ilsi_t' %_t:1)()1111'1{Iill( kl'l l{tllgl' [111111l_lil'lt' the l+_tllopt'all latlnclR'l i_'<[s t(i t){' titcd
21. Fol detailed ;l(t (llllllS o[ Iht+sc Ilt'_<lli;lli(lllS, S('U Krigc. 77tr I+:lumh o/l'7IJ)O: Micilelangchl l)t' Maii;t,
77u' /Itstm_ ,,/El.lJO I'a_t I: lq61 I%-I, ESA IISR-I(i (Noovdwiik: t;.Y,A, Scptctnl_ci 199'./).
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A_fiation's officials expressed doubt that ELDO would be allowed a role in a U.S.-led system.
For this reason, they expressed a strong preference for a separate Comnlonwealth-
European satellite system within which ELDO could be given a guaranteed place. If
desired, the operation of this separate system cotfld then be coordinated with its U.S. coun-
terpart such that both would eflectively become subsystems within an overall world system.
The Post Office
The Post Office position derived from an interaction between its membership in the
Commonweahh Telecommunications Partnership and its statutory obligation to conduct
its operations according to strictly commercial criteria. Initially, the Post Office favored
the establishment of an independent Commonweahh-European satellite systeln, because
it believed that the design of a U.S. system would not adequately meet Commonwealth
requirements. The Post Office was aware that U.S. organizations, including AT&I, want-
ed to establish a satellite system at the earliest possible opportutfity and that proposals had
been made for h)w-ahitude systems using as many as 50 satellites in random polar or
inclined orbits. _-' The Post Office saw such a system as best serving the needs of the
Northern l_teinisphere and the profitable transatlantic telecommunications routes, h di(I
not believe that such systems would provide the broad global coverage that was necessary
to meet fully the needs of traffic among the Conmaonweatth countries, which were wide-
ly dispersed over both hemispheres.
Both the Post Office and the Ministry of Aviation had made studies of possible satel-
lite systems. Each had concluded that the broadest coverage would be best provided bv a
system of position-controlled, as distinct from randomly orbiting, satellites in medium-
altitttde equatorial orbits:' 1,aunching such a system would be well within the expected
capabilities of the ELDO launcller. However, such orbits could be best reached using
launch sites on the equator, and for this reason, the studies had raised considerable doubt
about the suitability of the Australian Woomera launch site, |tom where the El+DO rock-
et would be fired initially.
The Post Office realized that the U.S. lead in deveh)ping both launchers and satellites
meant thai the first commercial satellite communications system to be orbited would
almost inevitably be U.S. in origin. Despite this, its studies had suggested that traffic
growth would be such as to allow a second syslem to be established profitably in the mid-
1970s. The Post Office believed, therefore, that its participation in a U.S. initial system
should be minimal and take the form of a lease of circuits rather than a share of owner-
ship, while Britain and Europe buih up their capability to construct an independent
second systelli. :+
The obligation to flfliill its pttrposes according to commercial criteria had specitic
consequences for the Post Oftice's views concerning the procurement of equipment for
22. AT&T proposcd such a system 1o Ihc Federal (:ommunications Commission in July 1960. Smith.
Communication tO, .STitellite, p. 58. The company's ('xperimeu_tal Telstar satellites were intended to be the |orcrun-
n('rs of a system of this type.
23. I,ong Distantt' Communications by Satellite, subcommillct' ol Iht' .Joint Civil and Services
Telecommtmicalitms Committee, Memorandum JTS(61)II, 31 O(tobt'r 1961, CAB 134/2144, l+ondon PR().
The current thinking of tilt' Post ()flice with regard to the design of a satellite system is oullined, albeit without
specific rctkq'ence to Commonwealth t'e(ltdrt'mt'nts , iri W:J. Bray, "Salcllite (]omnlullicalion Systems," Post O/rice
t(h,ctrtral Eng, tneep:s '.]ou rna155 [July 1962) : 97-104.
24. Ronald C. H,,pc:lones, "(:ommonwealth Conf+:rencc' on Satellite Communic_tions," 2?, March 1962,
FO 37 I/165275, (;T2/54, I +ondon PRO.
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diesecondsystem.Theassessmemthatasecondsystemcould be profilable depended on
a number of assumptions, one of whictl was that its costs should inch|de only lht" cost of
pt|rclmsi||g launchers arid noi tile full cost of developing the European launcher.-"
Moreover, the Post Office wanted 1o insist lllal 1lie European launcher would be used only
SO 1011g as its IJtll'ChHS(" ('()st w_ls 11o 1110Fe til_tll tll_lt [(11" till equivah-ni U.S.-tmih launchcr--
a tend|lion that the Post Office extended to all forms of relevant equipment. _"
The Foreign Office
Officials within tilt'. Foreign Office look a wholly differe|lt approach Io thai of ttwiv
colleagues in the Post Office alld tile Ministry of ..\viati<m, While tile Post Office had
al)proaciled lhe lllalll_r Prom the persl)cC/ive of a tOllllllel't'ia] le]('conlllllinitalions orga-
llization, and tile Mirlislry of Aviation [roili lilt Mandpoilll o| lilt' British and I"]lllo])eall
ael'oSi)ac(! hldustries, Foreign ()filet ofllcials adopted a lllli('h I)roadt'r view. Alongsidl, the
iecinlical and conlnlercial issues, lilt'), recognized lllali), political tirol)lelns with t)olential-
ly contliclint 4 iinl/licalions iill- Britain's relalions with lilt' (]onlnlonweahh, l_]ur<i|)e, anti
lilt' l_Tllilt,d Stales. For liw Foreign ()||ice, it was as illl])orlaill to resolve and lecon(ile
lllese t)lol)ll'lns as it was lit seltlle tl gllalalll('t,d alld ])lOlllillelll role for Britisii alld
IQirol)ean indttstr,v in tilt' c<lnstrtlCliOn of a satellitc syMelli.
Foreign ()|lice ofl]cials tinderstood lilt' illl])Oilallce wilh which tileir Alllerican Colin-
lelDalls viewed tile foleigll policy aspects of satellite cOlnllltillicaliolls i.tnd iheh" desire for
a [)restigious technological coup within tilt" (l.)lllexl ill Ihe (;old t01"al-. They realized thai i1
Britain was to build a sei)arale and colll])elhlg salellitc sVMelII O[ its own, it would effec-
iivek, l)e i-l{ieciillg [J.S. |_)l('ign policy goals. ,,ks tile lea(ling ally of the Untied Stales, Brilain
sllould look Io sut)|)oi+ting those goals and sllottld co_>])erate fully with tile United States
fl'olll tile olilset, Ttlis did tier lilt!all tit;it Britahl silott]d fidlow lilt" United States blindly
alld t_)lt'_o hs own industrial and t-ollllllilllicati_lns [l/ft.,rests, Rattler, Britain sil_luld seek
to ICllli)er any ltlleal Io its hllereMs floln wilhin the single world s)'slelll, by illflllencill_ lilt'
svstelll'S design and operation in such ,i way as to a(l.'Ollllllodale thllse interests. It could
cllso I].irlill!r Iloth its OWl| and { LS, _oals ])y [)crsliading the l_]urol)ean and (]onllllonweahh
c()tlnilies i]laI they, too, sllotlld join the single world svsl('lll. If lilt" latter nations were to
accept siniihu p()licy goals to Brilain, then all wotlld have a strollger bargaining position
if iiiey wcre Io _.'liter negotiations with tile United Stales ;.is a bloc. li was inll/oriani, theie-
tel'e, tilat Britain should be prepared to show decisive leadership to bolh tilt'
(]OllllllOl/Wl'allh all¢l _4(estelil gttl'ot)e. For lilt' Foreign Office, in lilt" words of an iniel-nal
illelllOralidlllli, till' establisilnlent of a gioi)al satellite svslem was a "major exercise hi
ililerllalion,il coot)eralion" ill wilich:
75. Maiiiic_, Ill'tin Io ill_' S_.'cll'lal'_ ot _iat( _t_ll Ail, nl(,lllOlandilln, 12 b,la_ 1961, AIR _,,'2255, [,olldoll
I>R(). |'tie l'ost ()ftll_.' v, as quiw adaniaiil llial it _luld liOi co|illill|ill- _o I|lt! cosl o£ lhc [+_'urol)l'ail lallll_ h_'i (il
i"_/'11 Io il i)rol)lls_'d i)i(igl;llll (it llasil sall'llilc it'sl'_lr( h ini_l iechniqiu's t(llllllll)ll 1o _1l';lllg(" i)[ ditluiciil salcllile
at)l)li_ alioils.
21i. l)lniilt4 19(_3, file PiiM ()[]]ct"s COilllllt'i(ial bian was coin|)ared witli thai (it (]oilisal ill Ih_' I'niled
,t'_l;it('_; ill<' elliS, dilt_'r/'n(t' tit'twl'('n l]ll,'lll _,_,'_l_,iudgcd Ii> I)(' thai Will?li'_ls (]OlllSitl's _.olI1111o1( ial hias t]t_,()ll..d t'._.
indli_lll, Ihal (it Ihe P_lsi (lllicc did Ilill till(If l_,rilish illduMrv. ,_('t" IQlwaid tlt'7tlh IoJuliall .+_,lnl'l y, t'll¢ [il_,lllC. ,'_
,lul_ 19i:_3, F() 371/17105-_. (;PI 173,/1_2, l,ondoii PR(). h nhouhl b_, iioicd, howt'_ci, Ihai tht' l>_si ()tticc's _>iii-
lliel'Ci;il bias liv.'_llll oll['+ Ih;tl it was not i)rci)ar/,d ill sul)sidizc l_]tirot)t';iii hidtiMl'¢ 1)%-t)a>ing ii(llWOlIlt)('lili_+t,
i)ri_,s: lliis did il<ll p_e_hidc the t).ssibilil ', oi sul)sidx liom i'l_ewherc in gov('rlli11('lil.
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7'he part that the United Kingdom plays.., should be commensurate with our sta_+di,g as
a Great Power and will have an intportant bearing on the development of our relations with
the United Slates, liurope, and the Commonwealth. It will he q[g_eat importance.[br us to
ensure that we am not pulled one way IO, our desire to co_rperate with the t _nited States,
another @ our desire to act as good Europeans, and yet another IO' our desire to p_vtecl
Commmtwealth interests. It will _mt be easy to reconcile the.w divePl,rent i_tterests, and we
shall L,'reatl_, imJnvve our chances qf doi_tL{ so (] we devote as much con._truclive thouLrht a._
possible to the who# problem and theft Kive a decisive lead, both to l;urope attd to the
(;ommonwealth. _7
For the immediate flmue, howew'r, the Foreign Office needed first to get its views
accepted by the British govermnent itself. Only lhen would it have the authority to begin
to influence (:ommonweahh and European opinion. The tirst step in this process was to
persuade the officials of other British departments--a task pursued within the interde-
partmental working party established to determine British policy in advance of the forth-
coming Commonweahh Conterence.
The Interdepartmental Working Party
The working party frst met in.]anttm'y 1962. At that time, the thinking of officials in
Wbitehall was donfinated largely by the concept of an independent Commonweahh-
European satellite system. This concept also was reflected in the working party. Consistent
with the positions outlined above, the l'ost Office and the Ministry of Aviation thvored an
independent system. '-'_Only the Foreign Office rel)rcsentative, R<>naht C. Hope-Jones,
offered any significant support for a single system.
ttope-lones offered a ntmtl)er of arguments against an independent system.-'" He
argued that a second satellite system would be unlikely to succeed because countries tbat
btfih grotmd stations for the U.S. initial system would be unlikely to duplicate their invest-
merit with a second station to use with British satellites. Moreover, the Post Office's fawn--
able assessment of a second system's commercial viability had depended heavily on the
assmnption that it would take 50 percent of the proftable transathmtic traffic." In its turn,
this assumption depended heavily on U.S. goodwill toward the second system--a
questionable assumption when the second system inevitably would tmdermine the prof-
itability of the first. With regard to a U.S. system meeting (_omtnonweahh requirements,
Hope-Jones saw no reason why the United States wottld not want to contigure it to meet
the needs of the (_ommonweahh and others. There was some indication that U.S. plan-
27. (_at)inct (',oml)ined (]omnmnicalions+Eh'clronits (_ommiltee, (:(:C((13)4, Memoratldum t)v the
Ftneign ()/lice, tmdau'd, circa February 1963. CAB 134/1 t5l, l+<mdtm PRO. Although dating ti-orn 19(;3, this
(itlole lle,,'erlheles?:, is, of a piece with Fort'ign Office t'tnnnlt']lls Ihrottgh 19ti2.
28. Ronald l lope-Jones to M.I). Buth't, h'tler, 26 November 1962, FO 371/165249, London PR().
29. tlope-lones smnmarized his argunlents in an internal Foreign Office report during March. See
"(:<mm_onwealth (:onfi'rence on Satellite Commtmicafi<ms," 13 March 1962, F() 371/165275, GT2/54, I,ondon
PR(). More generally, tlopez]tnles rrp.rtcd his belief that "American thinking... [with regard to the practical-
tiles ot inlcl national cooperation in the lictd of salellile comttmnicalions[ . . . is not nearly as [ar advanced [in
progress] as is sometimes supposed, and l believe thai if we couM get a mandau' from the (:otnnmnwealth to
discuss our ideas with European countries and could then obtain their support in principle tor a joint approach
to the United ,_tale_,, we should regain a great deal of the initiative now held by lhe Americans."
30. At that time, transatlantic routes accounted [i>r almost 80 percent of total inlercontinenta] telecotn-
mtmications trMfic. Thus, the key to prolitability for ally satellite system wottld t)e tilt' extent ot + its access to
trauls, allaaltit IraJ'lit and revellues. Parliamenlau'v Debates, IIous¢' of(](mlmtms, VJi74, 2,9 Mar('h 1963, col. 1719.
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nern ahcadv had appreciated British views on the deniral)ilily of lilt' equatorial orl)il. If thin
was so, an American syntenl also lllight lint + thil[ ()rllil, ill which cast a st'c<)nd svstctn would
I)c largely a duplication of the first.
ttope:loncn sttccesnfully persuaded tilt" Pont ()trice to ac'cct)l that a single svst(+m
would I)c pl+elkT, lblc to having two or morc compcting natcllitc svntcms in exintt'ncc. With
the Post ()1tit:t+ having shitted its grt)unct, the overall I),llancc ol opinion within the work-
ing party shifted nimihuly. (:<mscqttcntly, lhc 13ritish clclegati<m to the Commonwealth
(;onti'rcncc was bricti+d to ('ncomagc (;onlnt()nwcalth ;uccptanc(" Ibr the desirability of
broad international c¢)operati<)n with the United Statcs, involving both tilt'
Comm<)nwcalth and Eur<)pc. At tilt' sam( timc, thc conlk'rcn<c nh/)uld t)e encouraged to
cndorsc further ('xph)rat<)ry talks with Emopc and with thc [+nitcd Stales. British minis-
tern wt'rc not vet rt'ady to rule out the possibility of ;t Scpitl'illc P)rilish s,ttcllite systcm, how-
ever. The Minister of Aviation, among othcrs, was ('OllCClllc([ th;tt xA'hIIIcVc[" Sittellitc synt('m
ctnevgctt shtml(t provide a gllarmlntt'('d rolc 1or tllt+ El+l)() 1,umchcl +.Thus, while sin|slots
endorsed the ()ftitial I/riot tiir the British d(,lt,galit)n, they did n<)t want to settle tinal pol-
i(v until aflcr the full rf)lmd of t+x[)h)rat<)r?c talks. ()sly Ihcn, with a ch',lrcr idca of ti)rcign
il{tcnlit)ns, would they tk'cl vt'ady to decidc whclc tilt" 1)alancc of Brilain's best irll('rcsln lay.
The Commonwealth Conference
on Satellite Communications
The (;ommonwealth (_<)ll|erellCt" IllC1 ill l.ondon fi+om 28 March to 13 April 1962. h
c()n(hMed Illal slttcllitc ct)mnnmications wcre technically fi'anilllt', but that Ihcrl' was slill
much tmccrtainty rcgal+ding tilt" basts [i)r dctaih'd syntCnl dcsign ;tnd c(Oll(:.nti(" estimatcn.
Nevcrthclt'ss, tilt+ c<m[i:rcnc(" ti'lt that a commcrcial satcllitt" svSlClll sh<)uld nerve an slits',
C()lUltri(!n |is was 1)onsil)le and thai "tilt" idt'al a]-rangcnlt, nts would I)(" for tilt"
('.omnt(mwcallh If) play a lifll part ill a broatllv based svmtt'lll of satcllitc conununications,
rather than bccfmlt+ wholly dept'ndcnt oll the United St;lit's, or ;lltt+rnately neck to go it
alone in co,np('tition with tilt+ l.!nitcd Statt's. ``+_Thus tilt" (:omnlonwt'alth slt<mld seek to
COl)pcrate liilly with the United Y,tatcs and with EllI'<)|)cHn countries. _-'
The confcv('ncc's C]ldorscnlcnt of a (;onlmonw(';-llth approach to Europe, alongside
that t<) the United States, had I)ecn secured only through strong Foreign ()ftice pressurc.
(_()llllll()n'wcillth rel)rt'nt'ntalivcs had nho'wtl illl CXII'CIIIC rt'hlt'lallCC If) ClldOl'SC c()()|)(,'l'ilti¢)ll
wil]l \_k'stern EIIl'O[)(', f('_il'illg thai tt,lt,t:Olllln/lnicaliollS would bCCOlnc on( Ill()l'C eCOllOltl-
i¢: fit'ld in whicll tilt' balmlcc of P,ritish attenti<)n wonld shift away fi-om the (_onmlonwealth
and towarl[ Eur<)pc." Altntralia and (_anac1a would have F)rt'l_'rred a more lintiled li)rln of
Connnonwealth coopt+ration with tile United Stalcs. For tlm nmalh'r, less dt'vel<)ped coun-
Iricn, ItlC_lllW]lilc, nat('llites hcId ltO ilnincdiatc illtCI-CSI, bcc;Ittsc thc (;onlnlOITWealth tclc-
l)h<)nc cal)lc schcnle was CXl)t'ctt'd to meet their nc(.'tln wcll into 1he l(,)70s.
For p<)lilical 1ciisons connccted If) their gt'nt'ral p()licy ()f st'eking closer ]inks with
Eur()pe, Brilish ministers and ()||icials, including thont" in tht" Foreign ()ffice, had intend-
cd that, |i)lh)wing the Cf)nmlonwt'alth (:t)nferenc( +. cxplorat()ry talks should ]7(" h(']d with
Euro])(" in advance of any similar talks with thc (!nitcd States. This plan prf)vcd t() bc
31. (',al)in('l t".(_)n(mm P<)li(', (_<)mmittvc, E.\.((_,2)_0, m('m())_m(hm) I); th(' ])osln_aslcl (;choral+ 13
.Jim(' l!)(i_. (:.\B 134,1691;, I.()ndon PR().
32. R('gisn } ntmll)t'r 22325/(i2, Fih' 2,-\, SWI ) 21, l))litish Tch'(om :\)( hi_c.,, I.ondon.
33. l:<))('ign ()trite blh'I, tm(l;ttcd.(ir(a ,Mmch I!)63, i:()371 171030,(;Pl()23:3(A).I,ond(m I)R().
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imt)ractical. Discussion within the Conunonwealttl C<)ni_'rence had been constrained by a
lack of detailed knowledge of U.S. plans and intentions. This uncertainty made it difficuh
t() discuss anything concrete, and the same limitations equally would affect talks with
Europe.:" For practical reasons, tberetore, it was accepted that talks with the United States
shou](l be initiated first, and preparations went forward (in that basis.
Alongside the purely practical consi(terations influencing the (lecision to make the
initial aI)proach to tile United States, the Foreign Ofrice also believed that an initial
al)pr()ach to Europe would restrict Britain's opportunities for making the U.S. authorities
aware ()f Commonwealth requirements. !I was concerned that tile other Europeans might
insist that the approach to the United States I)e made bv Europe as a whole, speaking with
one voice. If the rest of Europe did not accept Britain's (]omnmnwealth concerns, that sin-
gle voice might well be antithetical to British interests. Such a move would i)roduce a clear
(onflict between Britain's (3ommonwcahh interests ant| its desire fi)r a ch)se association
with Euro[)e. Tile risk of conflict would bc lessened by stating (]onllnollwea]th needs to
the United States ['trst, tlm,eby avoiding a need to seek European agreement on this point.
Discussions Between Britain, Canada,
and the United States
In accordance with tile Comnionweahh Conference recomnmndations, Britain and
(]ana(lajointly initiated talks with the United States; the U.S. Stale l)el)artnlent agreed t()
a meeting in Washington on 29-31 Octol/er 1962. An earlier meeting had not been pos-
sible I)ecause of the lengthy passage througll (3ongress of the Communications Satellite
Act. Tile U.S. (]omnnmications Satellite Corporation ((;omsat) envisaged by tile act had
yet to be established, while tile law itself had left many aspects of tim|re U.S. policy an(I
intentions quite wtgue. Amidst these dolnestic uncertainties, the State Department did
not want to be seen to have preempted tuture U.S. policy. Its officials stressed that the dis-
cussi(ms would be l)urely exploratory and that in no way should American comments be
taken as expressions of furore :Mnerican policy. '_; For the British, too, the talks were not
inten(lcd to be anything more than exph)ralory, given that tim British ministers them-
selves had not yet decided British policy. "
Tile British came away from Washington with tile feeling that the discussions had
been 'Triendly and completely frank," with tile United States officials having given satis-
t_tctory answers to nearly all of the (tuesti<ms aske(t of theln. _r Tim Americans assured the
British that the}' did not intend that other countries slmul(I he limited solely to the role of
users of a U.S.-buih satellite system.
There was general agreement with a British statement that tile development of a full
global satellite system would be evolutionary in character and that it would be cons|fuel-
ed in successive stages, tile first of which would be provided t)y tile United States to cover
the busiest traffic routes. This "evolutionary concept" represented Britain's wish to
reconcile its desire t(/ support a single global system with tile desire that British and
European industry should be able to provide equipment for tile system. Thus, although
the United States would |)roy|de tile initial stage, the system's coverage an(l cal/acity would
3,1. lh)l)e-lcmt+s I[) l_utl,,q, 26 N(r,'rmb('i 1962.
35. Minute to the Posltllastt'r (;('tlCl-al, 13 Noxcnll)Ct 1962, Rt'gistiy tin. 22325/112, Fih' 2A. SWP
2(i(Rcvise), British 'l'elec(ml Archives.
36. R:I.R llarvcy, minutes, 22 O(tobct 1962, FO 371/165249, (;Pl73/39, l+ond[m PRO.
i+;7. Satrlliw working t)arty, minutes ot the eighth meeting, 8 Novvmb('r 19fi2, Registry n,. 22325/62,
Filr 4, British "I+c[e('omAt(hives.
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be expanded in sut)scquent phases, and the system might use equipment It-ore other+
countries in a number of ditibrent, but complementary orbits. The British stFesscd theiY
belief that as time went by, and as Britain and olhcl- nations developed tile appropriate
lechnoloRical capabilities, they should bc allowed to supply the llC(csS_tly c(]uil)lllt+nt ti)l"
the later stages alongside U.S. in(htsttv."
Alth(mgh U.S. officials talked fic,:'ly about full international pavticipati<m, lhcv would
not agl-t't ` It) l<`'l<w<`'nces in it l+)lilish-llt-t'I)aled sununaty of lit<,' talks that ltlClltiolICd both
"'int<.'l-nationa] OUOl)e,ation in lit< +` p,ovisitm at+d dt'v+'.'l()ptlIClll Of a satellite sVSl<`:itt" iltld
"the |iced |or dec|slims about design and construt'tion to |)c takmljt)intly bv tit<`+count,ies
[)a]ticipating it+ tile system" lest Ihest' Im taken as an express|tin of U.S. policy. Ill the|t"
place, the United Slatcs suggested weaker phrasing: "broad inlmnalional parficipati(m'"
and "the need |or consttltation in &'sign and collstl'ut'ti()n nlatt('Ys. ','++
(_oming away fiont these talks, Sir Rol)elt I larvcy, tilt" leader of the Bvilish dcl<`+gati<m,
had felt that lllattCl+m llt)w Wcl'c Ill|It'|| IttOt'C uncertain l+t:gatding ftlttll+C __!._. polity. +'+
Ronald ]lope:tones of the F<)t-eign ()ific(' was tin tvss i)¢'ssimislic, ]n)wcv('r. tit +t+ecognizcd
that [c.S+ (+fl]cials had been faced with domestic c(mslt+aints |hal prevented them |t<mt
being move fortltc<mting in their ac(:cptance <)f Al+igl(',-(',iuliv, ti;m views. +'
British-European Discussions
The Washington talks wmc followed by ¢.xplotatoly talks wilh Europe. The British
Post ()l lice al+vangcd tot these to It<`' under the auspices of the Tclcconmntnications
(;(mlnlissi(m of tlt<`" Etn-ol)<,utn (;onle,cnc<`' of Postal and Tclccomnnmicati(ms
:\(hninistt-ations ((',l+'+l"l', Ftcnch acronynl). The tnc('ting was held in (_ol()gnt + ()n 12-14
l)cc('ml+t'v 1962. (',ill)m-t (:avt('t + ()f tilt' (T.S. State l)cpavlnlcnt it+Ibt+mallv addtesscd th<`'
l'clcconmuuticali<ms (;omnlissiotl. (|:+u-tel outlined tT.S. thinking {)i+Ja "single global svs-
ten|," cottstrltctc(l thv(mgh "'full int(,'rnationa] ¢'oopct-ati<m." His ]Hes(mlation strongly
inthlcnccd tilt: sui)sequenl cotn-se of (:1_1"I+ discussions.
The Europeans expressed support fi)r the U.S. vision of tit<`" tutul(' dvvclopmet|t of
slttcllitc ('Olllll/tllliCitli(HlS,. NollC showct| atl'v dcsiFc to t'stal)lish a :+,;cpalatc Elll-<)l)c_.tn salt'l-
litt" system. At tilt" saint' tithe, th("¢ did not iltl('t_(I Io 1)cconlc wholly dcp<_'ndcnt on lit<`'
Unitcd Slates, and they wcvt" inlcnl on playing as full a palt as po,+siblc ill tilt' design and
lllitllag<`'lllCt/l ()1"the single global svstelll, its well its ill tit(" consttuction of its later stages.
('.EPT mclnbel-s t-t_j('ct<`'d as prcnlatuvt + French and Swedish |)roposals for thc establish-
mcnt of it tovnlal Etu-opt'an satellite organization, limiting thmns¢'lvcs It) tot-ruing an ad
]lo<`: conmlitl<,'t' t>t (;EPT itself. This committc¢+ would study lit<`" lcchnica+l as])c<`ts o1 tit<`"
lttol)lcm in gteatcr detail and would dvati the ltasis of it conlnlon (]EPT position ahead of
talks with the United Slates."
Alth<)ttglt tlt(' (_EPT nteeting, had (,[]i,('Iivel'+' (indorsed the Foreign ()ffi(c's views, tilt"
lattvt+ ncvcrtllvlcs'+ was unhappy with tit(' ch()icc <)f CEPT as the R)cal p()int fin the
vxph)l-itt()Yy talks with Eut-o])c+ Tht" Ft)l-<`'ign ()fficc felt l]tat (:H)T inenlbers, who wet('
dl+iIWIt tl-()ln tilt' |t'h'tOllllllttnit'atit)llS atlllllol+ilics, ()f thcil" Ycsp('ctiv(" gt)V('l+tllltCtlts, w()uld
'.+,_. R(,nald (;. lh,l)t':lon(", to ].F. I h):.,i('. 5 N,),.t'mh, cl I(.)62. I:() 371 11+521(.), (;I'177, '27. l.,)ntt()n I)R().
3!). ]"<)t('igll ()flit t' biit'i+ ut1(|_ttt'd. (ilia Mirth l!11")3.
I0. Ibid.
tl. Rmlald (;. ll<)pc_joncn, handx_littvn sh'cvc holy, B Noxt'nlhcl 1962. F() 371,'16521!1. (;PI73 2_;,
[.l)ll([()ll I)R(). I [(',p('-J()nc', v, as Stilt' lh;tt "thc AlllCti(alln attt' ll()t t, ill If() (I{)tl])l ;tb()lll OIll asl)halitms antl kn,:)s',
that lhcv ,,rillha,,|' It) at ( ()into<+dart"tl',t'm il) w(+rkin',4,)ul tht'il own plans l<:,va sinRh' gh,hal s_,+,tcmt<)lw at hic,,vd
h,+ lull inlet i)ational l>avticil)ation."
t2. Rt.gistl_ No. 227,23 (i2. Filv 2A. _,WP 31 (Finatl). l+,lilish '[t.h.(,ml _l( ]l+'_cs, l.,,,,d,m.
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be insufficiently aware of the polilical (limcnsions of the problem. _' Underlying this dis-
satisfaction was a much deeper difference of approach between the Foreign Office anti
thc Post Office. The Post Office ohjected to the fi)rmcr's desire that the making of satel-
lite commtmications policy should he rem<lved from the technical level of the telecom-
munications authorities," wishing instead to conduct matters according to traditional
international telecommunications practices in which fiweign policy issues had played very
little part.
The Foreign Office knew that traditional practices would he inappropriate to the spe-
cilic issues raised by satellite conmmnications. It realized that the Post Office could not he
relied on to insist on a role for European industry. The Foreign Office also feared that
French President Charles de Gaulle might want to insist on an independent European
satellite system and thereby prevent a broader U.S.-Emopean-Comntonweahh system
tiom taking shape?" The Post Oftice would he tmahle to handle that situation. By the end
of 1962, while it had not as yet expressed any preli+rence tilt an independent system, tile
French government had indicated that it would be treating the whole sul)ject as primari-
ly a political issue. The French liJreign ministr b the Quai d'Orsay, wottld soon he given a
prominent role in determining French policy. "_Thus, while the CEPT meeting had indi-
cated an al)pment Ettropean readiness to endorse a single glohal system, with even the
French representatives signaling their al)proval, its position had been derived largely front
technical considerations. The (]EI)T meeting's views might }'el he overruled once
European governments hecame more lully aware of the wider l)olitical, commercial, and
industrial issues involved in estahlishing a satellite organization._:
Conclusion
The round of intergovernmental discussions outlined above wits wholly explorau)ry,
and no tirm decisions were made during its course. Throttghout, however, Foreign Oftice
officials worked to secttrc broad acceptance at home attd abroad for their own view of how
international salellite communications should be deveh)ped--namely, through a tiflly
,t3. Ronaht (;. tlc_p,c-l_mes, minute, 21 l)ccetnb(('r 1962, FO 371/171046, (;P1173/3, lxmdon I'R(). A
t _,.%.St;lit + Department oili( ial had conuncnted thal the Posl Olficc seemed to icgard satellites as lilth' m<_t_' lh;m
"it lch'grallh l+<de in tilt' sky." l ltll)(('-lon+.+s str+.'ss+cd that sat+.'llilc c_mmmnications had I_) lie thotLght tJlas a +,pact'
activity lust as much as :l ccmlnnlnications activily. As a space aclivit), it was the most likely lield it+ which to set m c
a li uitftll international co<)perati(m ill the I)cacctinl uses of <nm+r space, which was a nl@w int('rcsl (d'the (?nitcd
Nail(ms.
44. This di|li'i++.'nc+. ' was nol uniqut' I_) Britain. Gillwrt (',m+tcr <ll th((" LI.S. St_+.te l)eparlnlcnt had n<m'd
similar t'<)nllitml,++; I)(qV,'t'lql th(' tt'l('+.i)l]mlunicali(:+ns aulhc*ritit's and [kJlCigtl Ininistries within y,(('vetill I":tll+t)ljl*_tll
c_mntries. 'l'h<* same (liltiq-ences also existed in the tTnit+.'d States betwt+cn tit+_' Stale [)cpartunent +uld (](mtsat,
with the latter having adopled the w<wking atliludcs <if I|le traditional c<nnnnlnications carriers. _+hile th((" Slat+. +
1)_+lmrtnl+.'nt wanled satellile communications t<l be handled through titllv multilat+.'ral neg_>liati_ms, Comsat was
pressing tilt matters to bc settled t|lrough I)ilateral agreentcnts. (;alloway, The Politics and "l'edinolo_.,, p. 11}3.
45. t [op¢'-loll+.'s to l+,tulh'r, 26 Ntw((*tnl)(('r 1962.
,tfi, Wh('n lh(' Frcnc|l h'at ned of tile Anglo-Canadian visit t_) Wanhingl_)n, th(w asnumt+d lhat B| train had
I)r_)l)osed a li)rnlal t !.S.-(',(Jt1[inlonwt+ahh collal)_)rali_>n ill prcli'ICXl(t + I+) +t l'_urol;,ean co]lal>oratlon cent(+red on
El,lit), resulting in "P..adm'ss ill high qluarlcrs" within th+.' Fren(('h g<)v+.q+nm(('nt (that is, (;eneral dc (;atLll(('). Paris
Enlb;tssy'Ii'h'gram No. ?di2, 7 Nov+.'mber 1!}t;2, F() 371/165249, (;PI73/3f), l+ondon PRO.
47. M.I). Buth'l m tlope-Itmes, ht'tt+.'r. 7 D+.'c+.'mber 191i2. FO 371/165251, (;P173/63, L<md<ln PR(). An
<dlicial ot tim (,_uai d'( )rsav had Ic+lt+ll),tLth'r, a nl+.'nllwr ol the British Embassy stall in Paris, that as yet th+.' Frcmh
gl)xct iim+.+nt ha((I not decided its salcllilc t ()nlllltllliCatiq:)ll:.i p<_licy, whilh ill illlV ('vl'nl wouhl hay((' to tie al)l>rC_'+-cd
by (++.qlt'lal lit +(_attlh'. I'he Qttai d'()rsm' had ul_ knowledge ot a paper tallied +_t Iht' (IIqPT tn_+cting by the Flcn_ h
Icl+.+(Imlnnmicati,:_ns auth<_ritv. +[his impel had lint bc_'n alulh_+_i,'ed and. as such, (ouhl m_l,, bc reg_udcd as giv-
ing lilt l)Cis_m_d views <)I the l:Icn(h Ich'c_)mmtmi(alions atltll()lily l+,'l)l(+St'lllativ¢+s who lla(l Wl+itlCll it.
I_[_Y()_I) I11]+i]()N()_I't I[,_RI,_ l (_(.)
F,_uticil)at_r,,' iINcrtlstlio11+tl _'O<_l)¢'t-sltix'¢' ¢'l]_)Yt in which sill n:_l+.+ml+crsw<_uld h+_v¢' st lighl to
l)iu-ticil)atc ill th,_' de'sign, _'on_,l+'tt<.'lioi++ mltna_'mcttt, _ttt(l _l)ct'stlio++ <JI"a siNgh" ',,,'_+t'ld
sstt_.llit¢ , s._+.st¢,m.
l+,v the t',+_l of" IG)(+_, SUl)l)_,rt l_)r tht' F_,tm'i_n ()flick" x'ic+xvof h<)x_,salt'llitc c<,mtmmi¢st-
ti<ms i,+hould dcxt'lo I) had l)t'_'n t'Xl>r¢'ssc'+I l)x' the (+<+tt+monwt.altl+ at+<l h'+' t];¢' l+_tHOl)t'atl
tch'cotnt+tttni¢'ati<_tts attthot+ilic's tC'l)r_'s¢'tttcdin (_I_I:'+]'.Althott_h a lltlllll)i_,l <)l BYitish itncl
(_<)ttlit+it'++ta] I_tt+<)l:,¢'avl ])<>liticiiltls ;tJ+cl indt_slrist]isls still ;x'itt_t_'+l an indt'l)¢'nd¢'ut l(ut-Ol)¢'iul
s+tt_,'llit¢" sv_,tt'm with whi_+h to c_m_l)t't¢' xvit]+ ii U.S. svstt'm, t_+ l_tH<>l)t'it++ _<)v('rn+m¢'ul lhHs
l_tt hitd CXFq+<.'sst'dit dt+siYt" to cst_d)]ish a m<.'l)arat¢' s,,+slcm+ At lh¢' s_tmt' tim_', thc l_,+t ()flitc.
_l¢'sl+ia¢+its St_l+l)Ot+t l_)r 11+¢'goal ol +a sit_gh + sx:st¢'m, sMcl d¢'sl)itt' tht" ol)vi<_us R)n-<.'ign_p<_licy
iml)li_+tti_ms ol +tht' sul)jt'¢'t, xvsts anxioHs to d_'ny [_)rt'i%n+ mi]+isltics st_+_,+tol¢' in+ the' st'lllin_
,_I i)_,1i¢7, h_st¢'ad, it ;x:isht+d l_ lH_)¢'¢'t'd b,,: the satmc c<+mmc+,cial l)ra<+ticc's that l+;_+l g<,v-
t't_+¢'_:l tht" it+tto<Itwtion of tclcl:,ho_tt" tstl)l_.'s st li'w ,,'_'a]s l)_¢'vi_)ttsl.', '`This attittt<:It" was sl_itn-{'cl
It,' <>tl+t't+ l_ttr<)l:,_'iut l('h'colnllltlniClttlio++s _Ittlhoi+ili++'s sl+ll_lhv (_+ttlsltl. Nc+_'¢'t+thtdrss, cltLI'itl_
the' c<_tusc _ l _.)I+?,,+l_'sl+it_' such illt_'ln_t] <_l)])_silion. l_urOl)¢'a_ ,_ovt'lllll_t'ntm ",x:olll_| opt to
])t_rstt<. • _¢'g_)tiati<_tts with tht' (Tt+it_.<l .%tatcs o++ som<.+thit;g simihtr t_> the" full tt+ttllil+_tt't-al
hstsis that Itst<l l)t't't+ t+t+t_>mm¢'ndt'd l)_,' lh¢' Fot_.'ign ()ll+ct', tlwrcl)', rt_it'clhlF, Sill in+lcl)CH-
+It'_+l ;tnd wholl_, c_tt+l+ctiti_'t" t¢,Sl>_)ns+.' t<_ the t:t_it_'<l Sti_t¢'s.

Chapter 13
Originating Communications
Satellite Systems: The Interactions of
Technological Change, Domestic
Politics, and Foreign Policy
by Jonathan F. Galloway
Te(hnological change can have both evohtlionary and rew)lutionary consequences.
Some participants in the policy process in the 1960s viewed satellite communicati<ms as
ushering in a new era of global peace and imdc,standin g. ()thcl-s viewed lilt" new tech-
nolog T its threatening vestc(t interests and creating new entrel)reneu,ial op])ortm+ities.
The policy-making process that led to the establishnmnt ot tilt' original conununica-
lions satellite institltlions--fi)r example, (',o,nsat, Ill{" I)efense Satellite (',ommunications
System, Intelsal, and Intersputnik--was an mena ()l cooperation, compelition, and con-
tlict. The actors ill that policy process were national and international, and thus the
p|ocess was, in many respects, Iiansnati,:mal.
The rationality of decision making cann<H be understood holistically or comprehen-
sively, |)tit aS pl+a,glllatic, incremental, and muddled. DominaIting decision makin R was the
breaking down of national borders and 1)arrims to ellll'y illlC, elllCl'_ill_ global ('()lllIIltttli-
cations markets, x:iq, paradoxically, the (l-eatioll (if a(lvanced (lefense communi(-ati<ms
satellite systems during tilt" (;old Wa, era reflected the drive to deft'rid the territorial
integrity ()f slates and military alliances.
Looking back on thc Vt'_4F_, ])ctwecll S])ulnik and lilt" eslat|)lishln(qll of tile Intclsat
I)cfinite Agl'eClllelItS ill 1971, the thI-cC l|lellleS ot' the 1972 book by this aulhor' can l)e
seen in a slightly ditl('rcnl light. Th()se [hellleS D,_el-(q (1) rcv()lutionarv or evolutiona,-y
technological change, (2) Ihe breakdown of barriers between making and m_derstanding
foreign and d()mesti( policy, and (3) models of ralionality in policy making apl)rol)riate
to changing contexts. Those themes remain very relevant, despite lhe more colorful and
even dramatic new w)cat)ulary introduced by the likes of New| (;ingrich, the Tofllels, e and
Kenk:hi Ohlnae. _ The economic and technological aspects of globalization often are
thwarted t)y, or exist in paradoxical and ambivalent contiguity with, lhc forces of resuv_y|l!
Iocalism and the economi( doctrine of neomercantilism. The world is not a tidy place.
There is chaos, and at the edge of chaos one new world ordcr is nol emerging. So it was
ill llle 1o|mative pcri()d of satt'llite (-()nnnunicalic)lls,
I. .](malhan l:. (;allowa}, The Politi(_ atM 7}'chmdog) o/ Salellilr Commu)ti_ali¢m_ (l,vxingl()n, M.\:
[.cxmglon P,ooks, 1972).
2. ,,\l_m and I Icidi "l'()fllvr, m (.reatin£, a .Xr_I' Civiliaaticm. The I',dilic_ o  the 77UM Wav_' (Atlanla: I tUlW_
l'ul>lishmg, 1994), i). 33, talk ab<),.l! "lh(., Thild \Va:c,'" th(' cud ()I uali,ma.lism, and fly.' coming oI gh)balizali(m
and l)()rdvrlcss slates.
3. K('ni( hi ()hmau', Th. l_:_t_l_'rl,'_ P,b)bl (N('_ Y()ik: l la11)(') (',(dlms. 1990).
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Foreign Policy and Domestic Bargaining 4
Tile Connnunications Satellite Act of 1962 provided for lbreign participation "ill the
eslahlishment and use" of a communications satellite system and authorized the corpora-
lion tormed by that act (C()lllsat) to operate the system "itself or in conjunction with
[oreign governments or business entities."" What [orm would participation lake? The
statutory language was open ended. Parmership could comprise system use, ownershil),
or research and development. Which particular torms of cooperation would evolve was
not mandated hy lhe law, yet it was clear that operational relationships wotdd have serious
consequences ft)r domestic and toreign policy. Thus the substance and the fi)rm of United
States toreign policy goals to pl'onlll|e leadership, international peace and understanding,
and the rapid estat)lislm]em ola global system were entangled in satellite communications
policy decision making and negotiations.
ll)( ooperate with oilier (:otlntries, it was first necessary for the United Stales to devel-
op a cohesive al)proach toward ouNanding issues. Developing thai approach enlaih.d a
gradual working out of the relationship hetween the U.S. government and Comsat.
I [owever, early consuhalions and hrielings at the international lewq occurred at tile same
lime as the crystallization of domestic policy. While it is sometimes fashionable tot analyt-
it Inut)oses to separate domestic and international discussions, in this case tl_e separatit)n
is not legilimate: foreign policy consuhations affected the domestic bargaining position of
the United Slates from the spring of 1963 to the summer of 1964. The tblh)wing is a dis-
(ussion of domestic developments whose consequences at'li'cled the formation of tLS.
policy toward international arrangements for communications satellites. Attention is
tiwused on the establishment of Comsat and its relations with the State Department and
other agencies responsible tilt toreign policy considerations.
After the incorporation of (',omsal in the District of Columl)ia, President Kennedy
appointed thirteen Incorporators on 15 October 1962. Althougll lhe Inc()rl)()rators were
political apl)ointees, Kennedy combined politics with exl)ertise. The lncorl)oralors chose
Philip L. Graham, the lmblisher of The _¢'hshington Post, as their first chairman on 22
Octot)er 1962. (_;rallalll beaded ('.omsat tot only three months, resigning in,January 1963
filr heahh reasons. During those tllree nlonths, howeven he strenuottsly objected to what
he saw as the interference of the Stale Depm'tmeIlt in the international aspects of
Comsat's plans. The State Deparmmnt had been briefing Emopean telecomnumications
administrations on American policy, and (;raham t|l(/ught that was (_onlsat's prerogative.
This attitude persisted with (;raham's successor, Leo D. Welch, who t)ecalne chairman
and chief executive officer in Fehruary 1963. .; Welch formerly had been chairman of the
hoard of Standard Oil of New Jersey. tie was dedicated to tim proposition fllat the private
seclor should determine p()lk T. Welch viewed the State Department noI as all all}', but as
an obstacle. This was also true of his attitude toward the Federal Communications
(_()mmission (FCC). tie charged the FC(_ with the "invasion of the managerial flmctions
4. This section is based on (;alh)way, The Politic_ and ?;_chn0h>_;9,), Ill ). 80--h'14.
5. The Comnmni_ations Salellilc A(i of I(.)('12, sections 901(a)(5) and 305(a)(I).
6. At the smnc time, Kemwdy al)p()intcd 111. Joseph V. Charvk as presidcllt and prin(ipal operating
omcm of( ',mnsat. (',haryk was formerly unde) se('relary of flw Air Force, a Imsincssman, and a univcrsity scien-
tist. Also. in Fet)ruary 1!)('13, Comsat's articles ot incc)rp()rafion were al)proved. The artMcs and b}laws may I)e
ti)und in Nt'll/ttt' C(mmfiltc(" ()n (:onnnercc, Com)nl_mralio,_ .Satellite lmo)poralio)_ fh,a*irl£r_, 88th Cong., 1st s('ss.,
i)p. 35-3!).
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of the corporation" ill connection wiHa the FCC's directions on how Ihe ((-orpol-ation
should disburs(,: ils funds.:
On file olhvr hand, (;omsal's r(('lalionshi 1) wilh NASA was always cordial. During |Is
incorl)oralion [_crio((l,, when its finamqal resources cons|sled only o| I/orrow(('d !funds, _
Comsat depended largely on NASA programs Ira its research and dcvelopnl(,'nl. (;lose and
COllSlanl COOpt'l'atiOll thus was a prime necessity tk)r economic survival, but NASA also had
the responsil,)il,ity, under the (:ommuni((_ations Satell,ite Act, of cooperating with (:omsat in
research and devel,opmcnl.
On tth(,"whole, tlhough, relations tmtw(.'(,'n tl,w government and Comsat were somewl,la, l
less than iccleal, as a resuh no! o[ lptwsonalily conflicls bul of opposing views based on
differences of opinion. While Ill,," governnR'nt looked fiwward lo close cooperation and
reg-uhtlion of Comsat, Wehl,I saw (;omsal as a traditional ipriwttc enterpris(,'. (/,wcrmn(.'nt
officials saw (',omsal as an (,'nlir(('lv dillk'renl entily, lllOlC like a publi((" utilip,', or (,'v(,'n a (.Tea-
lure of lhc gov,prnmenl. Under lhe (_ommunicalions Satellite A((I, (;omsat was to serve
l,mblic as well as privalc pm-pos(,'s. Morcov(.q-, (]OlllSal was not subject to r(.-gulalion by lhe
F(;(;, like all, ofllm carriers, but l,)y If,hi,'((l,heclor of l(,:lc(('Ollllllllni((xllit)ns llhlllagf'lll(('llt alld
dW President, in lhc exercise o[ his tk)rcign attairs powers, as well.
The initial (.:slFangClllClll l,)('Iw(('ttql Ill{" Stale [)c[)_UtlnClll _tlld (_OlllSatl ".,v;_ls esp(('((ially
crucial` fin-loreign policy and l,br((fign relations. (;omsat was under no firm statutory
rcsl,_onsil,)ilily to (,onsuh with Stall(.'. Thus, (:omsat leaders (,'ould choose to fi)llow their own
individual l,)retkq(,'nces. The ability of Sial``' to pcl'Sll_lde Welch of its prcrogaliv(,'s also was
l,lampered l,w tl,lt" St;ale Dcpartnl(,'nl's w(,'ak t)ow(,q position in domestk politics. 'I'o ()VCl-
come this disability, Slate tt-i(('(l, Io convince Comsat l|la.t its views were also lhc Eurollcans'
views and Iha! (',oxnsat was not onl} a domestic corporation, Ilut t!h(('chos(,!ll inslllllllUlll of
Am(,,rican toreigu policy.
Whil(," positions b(,,p,vc<m (k)msat and the gov((,rlnll((qlt were nol pol,ariz(,'d, th('lC wet(("
fimr issues whose rcsohHion involved diflt'rt'nces of opinion: (1) owuershil); (2) |he t_nm
o|" an inlernatiomd agvccnlelH Ill|lateral or multilateral); (3) (_Ollls_ll's managem((ml ,-ohe
(complete or partial,); and (4) the rohc of g(,)v(,wnnwnt ill tile negotiation oi, intmnalional
itgl(!Clll``'lllS lO (.'stablish If'It," SVSI``'III. This lasl issue, in parlicular, ipilted (]OlllSal, St)Ill(,' t:,f
wlhos(.' officials thtmght it should un(,Ih'rlak((' negotiations, agahlsl the St;lie l)el,)artm(,'nl.
To resolve thes((_ iSSU((rs,Comsal and th(.' Slate Departn|ent agreed in lure" 1963 to work
out principles for hllernadonal parlicipalion. During the same monlh, F'resident Keml(,'dv
cslal,)lisl,wd tlhc Ad I hw (',ommunications Satellile (',roup under file.joint chairmansthi I) of
l)(,,l,mW Attorney (k'neral Nicholas Kalz(('nl)ach and the President's Special` Assistant l,_,,-
Scicnc'c and T(,'chnoh)w l)r..Jerome B. Wiesncr. Tthis group exercised file resl)onsil)ililit's
ol the dir(,wtor of tt,l,(,(,{)llllllllni(_ltiOllS IllilIl:|_Cll'lelll ])('('klll_;(:()[" _-t V_lC;{n("¢ ill 1]l[ll of'rice."
/st sul,)commille(,', ((om[:,osed of rcpres(('ntatives fiom lilt" l)eparm_ents of Still(." ;.llld Justice,
tlhc F(_(;, the Space (;otmcil, and lhc office o| the director oi, telecommunications man-
:.lg(?lll('llt, kcl)t al')l'(('asl of (;,OlllS;tl's dl-afl principlcs for international` cf)ol,)(,'laliOll.
Initially, the ideas of tilt" Slat(,: Departnlenl on I|IC probl'cm of foreign l,)al-ticilmtion
did not coin((i((l,c with tihos((' o['(_OlllSal. D,k'h'h wished to estalblish a (_OlllSal-OWll(('d .svsl(('lll
Ihrottgh a series of |)ihlleral inl((,rgov(('rmn((mtal agrcem((mls in whiclh (;omsat was th'c pri-
7. [.,:'o D. Wchh t,, IC William th'm',, (;h;d_man ol F(:(:. Icttcr, 7 AuRust 1963, rel)tmtt'd as Ainu hm,mH
(:ill 1'.%. (:OII_I('NS, ]1OI1_('. (_OIIHIIiI|CUO11 [IIIUI sl;II(' illld Foreign (;¢mmw,(e. (.'ltDIIIIIIHIIIIIH_II_ ._'att'l/tlr ._ttl ::/
I0:_2 Theki;st }i'a_;88111(:ong,.,|st svss., 1963.11. Rvp_.S09, p. 19 (hercinallcl dled asll. Rcpt. 809).
_. In 19G3, Ihc F(:(: pc, milp.'d (_m_sat "to }_l_:,, $1.91}0,(RI0 puv.,uaut Io ;_. line ol (rcdit ;LO e,pm,:nt
t_ S5 million cntcl,pd inlo I:,x the to, potation wilh 10 _.mmctcial t)anks." 11. Rcpt. 809, p. I 1.
9. [h)usv ( ],HIIIIlilIC(' Oll |IIt('l'Sl,ll(' ;llldFoneign (_OlnlllUlC(', l[, Rcpl. 809, p. 29.
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mary negotiator. This conception of international cooperation clashed with what State
viewed as politically feasible and desirable. To Stale, it seemed that some form of joint
ownership would be necessary. If other nations were to have no control over the system,
why shoukl they cooperate with it?
The State Department also thougtll that it would be necessary to conclude both inter-
governmental and commercial agreements. As eltrly as the fall of 1962, William Carter of
State's Bureatt of Economic Affairs considered that negotiations on two levels would have
to be undertaken to expedite the estahlishment of an international system. On one level,
discussions between governments would conch(de an agreement on the principles of
international cooperation in space communications; on tim other level, technical and
bttsiness accords between the teleconnnunication administrations of the various countries
would be arranged. These accords would be analogous to traditional agreements for the
management of cables and radio. Tim necessity for the two-level al)proach was based on
State's assumption that other nations would be unwilling to.join a venture whose polilical
and economic consequences were complelely removed from their inthtence. Tha!
assumption was I)ased on Carter's experience in (tiscussing satellite communications with
foreign countries in 1962 and 1963.
The chairman and president of Comsat were not advocates of the same line of rea-
soning, even though they also had engaged in international c<msuhations. In May and
June of 1963, they had held meetings with representatives of Western European na+tions,
(:anada, and Japan. ''' V_qlile the), had not reached any detinite conclusions+ they favored a
(_omsat-owned, Comsat-negotiated ventttre.
Nonetheless, within Comsat, Edwin J. Istvan, who came to Comsat from the OItice of
Space Systems in the Department of De[_'nse (I)ol)), dral'ted it set of principles for inter-
national participation that was nearer It) the views of Still('. Istvan based his sct <)t"princi-
ples on three propositions:
Partnership in file international system could take one of three torms: (a) space seg-
ment ownership, (b) communication terminal ownership, or (c) mulual aid to assisl
<levelol)ing nations.
2. System ownership should be established by an agreement belween Comsat and the
participating fiweign entity; the U.S. government would not play a prime role.
3, (]omsat would manage the system to the extent of controlling its own percentage of
ownership and controlling contract awards.
"_*,k'lch rejected Istvan's proposal; he maintained that the best system would be technically
integrated and centrally owned and tnanaged.
The Ad Hoc (2omtnunications Satellite Group thought ditt+erently, however, ht the
course of Comsat's discussions with the group, it became evident that the government
tavored an approach closer to that outlined I>y lstvan. Is(van played a crucial role by point-
ing to the possibility of separating space segment owne,'ship from station ownership. The
government accepted this idea, but not the second or third. The government c<mtended
that it had developed the capability at its own expense and theretore should have a cen-
Iral role in determining how it was to be organized on an international, as well as on it
domestic, basis. The State l)epartment feh lhat olher nations would not be willing to
10. ('.omsat. "Statement Relating to Allli_ipaled Pa, ticipati<m bv ]+'oteign (;oVt'llllnt'nls ol Business
l"_tltilics hi Such it Systeln," reprinted in H. Repl. Slltl, p. 6.
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cstal)lish an internalional agtcemcnt filrcommunications satellites along the saint" lines
its the cable arrangenmnts. Negotiations between governments would be required to
lessen ti_.ars thai comnnmicati<lns satellile tcchnohl_ would disrupt existing investments
twfi>re lilt+X,' had been amortized.
The Ad Hoc (_omnnmications Satellite (;roup obiected to IslVall'S third idea ((iomsal
management) not so much filr ils substance as its form. Other nations would be more like-
ly to join a system, the group pointed ore, if(:omsat's management role were played d<lwn.
'l+hc St+tit+ I)cpartnlent thought that (knnsat's managentenl role should be worked out in
tlegotiltlions rather than prochlinlcd beforehand. ]ks Ill(" United States was tit(' only cottn-
try with dt+vcloped potential, it would bc natural fi>r other nations to agree to (;omsat's
pvintar_ position.
The Slate l)cpartnlent was especially concerned ab<mt presenting a flexible and
altractiv( + proposal to other nations It) pr<imote tilt" cstablishnlent of a single gl<ibal system
rather than a ntmlbcr of compethlg systems. Writing in May 1963, the Stale De]mrtment's
Dcpttty Assistant Secretary fiw International Organization A.ffairs stated that "economic,
technical, and political considerations all point to the desirabilily ofa singh" system." A sin-
glt' Y:,',/Mt'lllw<)tflt[ av<)id wastcful (lul)li(alion ()f CXl)t'nsivc satellite an(l grotm(l facilities,
would enhance tit(: i)(/ssit)ility ()f "fruitful exchange of ('<)nmnmication t)etween all COlltl-
tries, +' would avoid "destructive (:ompctition," would t_tcilitale technical COml)atibility
II<.!tw('Cll satellites and ground ICFIIliII_iIY,, w<ntld ;tsmttl'(" tile b('st list + o1" y,C;tl't'u frequency
spectra, and would pronlote operational cfticiencv and tlexit)ililv in routing messages. _'
In light <d these advantagt's, and considering its opini<>ns on fiwcign attitudes, it is no
surprise that tim State Department ol)jectcd to Welch's ideas and wished 1<_tnodit_,' th<lsc
of tilt' preliminary dra[t drawn up by Istvan. It was of lllc utnmst imp<wtancc to [)roj(,ct il.ll
hnagt' of pat+thin-ship rather than ol:patcrnalistn, atcordhlg to lit(" State l)cll:Utnlcnt; oth-
(.rwisc, U.S. ll<)licy would lend weight t<) ())nlnnlnist charges of exph)itati<)n by capitalist
m</n()p<)lics lind, I)_rlhtwntore, could (ql(Ottlag(' the (,stablishmenl of COml)Cting svsl(,tns.
An htt('gyal part (if the gt)vcrnnl('nt's stand ti)r a m(ir(, tlexiblt" nt'gt)lialing poshion
was its (()ntcntion that (_()insat should itndcrlakt' its discttssions with |_)rcign I('lccomntu-
nicati(ms athninistralit>ns in light of consuhalions with interested <I_,OVel-lllll('llt agt'ncics.
The itnplicati<ms of vii+ions tlccisi<ms wct+c t_o Ira- rc,lching to bc c<msidcrcd merely Imsi-
hess rcsl)Onsibilitit's. F<lr instance, Illc State 1)cpartm('nt thottght that svstt'ln choice "will
have inlllOrtant conscqu(:nces on coverage and I)urdcn-sharing, 111("avaiial>ility <tf satellites
for communication bctwt+en and within countries+ and lht" COSt of ground inslallations
which nations will have to build. +'l: In addition, the Stilt( + l)eparmwnt asserted:
77w egtablishmettt q] global satellitr commu_6catiotts will invoh_e intertmtional (liM'llsgio?l
o/other que_timts: the handli_q_ o/ research, dtvdopment, mam(fiu'tute, rtttd launch: prn-
ticiflatitm it_ owm'r,_h@ qf g.mut+d trrminals and .satdlite._; allocatiott o[._atellite ¢hannel_
belu,ret_ u _eand u.',e,':s,"mean s (¢ deler mit_ittff the _tu tuber a t_d Ire'alton O],ffrou n d termi_a{_;
tedmical .standardization; mle-makinLr: a_sigta_re to h'g_ drveloped toutlhJes, posgihh'puh+
lit u_e_ _4 the _)'_tem t__'govert_ment it!fi,rmalion a qrencir_ O/the t ".N.; am/mert_.s o[ /acili-
lati_ff the e:cchat_Lw O]proq, rams between nation_. _
II. Richmd N. (;mdnct. "Spa_c Mctcotoh)gx and ()mlmutfitalioI_S: A (ihallcngt' It> S_icn_c and
Diphm]ac?,, +' l)epartmr++l .] 5tat,, HullHin tN ( 13 Ma'+ 19ti3): 77.1. It tna,, Iw a..kcd v,h., c<)mpctition is l_cm'li_ iM v,'ith-
ill the ('llilcd Y,httt's and di,,aslr_ms <nttsidc.
12. Ibid.
13. lb_d.
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Decisions <m all these problenis would require the closest possible cooperation
between ColllSat alld the government, according to the State Department. In many cases,
the government's role would be regulatory in addition to being promotional. However, tile
dilficuhies in evolving a working statenmnt of principles continued into tile t_tll of 1963.
During the summer, C<>msa[ discussed its draft principles of foreign participation with
tcprescntatives of tile Departments of Stale, Justice, and Delense, NASA, and the FCC, as
well as with tire President. As a resuh of these discussions, (;omsat slightly revised its state-
lnent of principles, but not their substance. Welch still insisted that Comsat be tile <)wncr
of the entire system. Comsat also discussed its principles with the common carriers and
interested commiltees in (_ongress, but in the course of these discussions, no significant
abridgment or change emerged.
The chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Full)right
(D-AR), expressed dismay that gowwnment participation in the preparation of the prin-
ciples was not more apparenl. In reply, Welch expressed the opinion that it was. Other
colnnlittees, howevel; were not opposed to Comsat's position. Thus, as tile time to start
actual bargaining with ()tiler countries approached, the U.S. negotiating position lacked
cohesion.
h is somewhat surprising thal "_¥elch's views had IlOt moved m<)re toward center in
light of Europeatl attitudes. After a June 1963 meeting of potential partners in l,ondon,
the British government sent the State Department an aide memo|re in which the British
Ielated American policy as they I,nderstood it. This brief stated that tile United States
tavored shared ownership and pluralistic decision making. The statement was approved
by State and cleared through Joseph Charyk, Comsat's president, before being sent back
to tile British. s_+t Welch was still at+guing t'or 100-percent Comsat control. Fulthernlore,
as late as September 1963, he (and the carriers) objected 1o the Istvan proposal of two
agreements--one governnlental, tile other between communications entities. Although
Ill(' government, Congress, and 111("carriers cleared a Comsat drafl on negotiating princi-
ples on 4 October 196":L g()vernmen! clearance did not mean approwd.
At tile Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference in (;eneva, an intormal U.S.
policy group was hard at work trying to convince member countries of the International
Telecommtmications Union that the proposed system was not an American monopoly in
disguise. Later in October, a meeting t)etween the United States and European nations
produced the harmony in the U.S. position that was lacking as a resuh of purely domestic
discussions. The European grottl), known as tile European Conference on Satellite
(:ommunications ((;ETS, the French acronym), had tornmd 1o negotiate with the United
Slates. The CETS nations made it known lh;.ll they WCl(! unwilling to negoliale with
(]omsat on a bilateral basis. This blunt t_ttct of necessity changed _&'lch's outlook on the
character of an inlernalional system.
COlllsal now agreed to principles t]lat pointed to joint ownership and to negotiations
conducted by a.joinl American teanl representing equally lhe government and Comsat.
Henceforth, Colnsat worked more clt)sely with the State Department at tile international
level. It was agreed, moreover, that a joint negotiating team headed t)y D&lch and Abram
(_hayes, tire State l)epavlment's legal advison would represent tile United States in fl)rth-
coming discussions '_ith European and other nations interested in establishing at global
communications satellite system. (]omsal and the government also agreed on an explicit
tovml,lation of principles m serve ;Is lhe U.S. negotialing position. Thus, tile stage was set
for a harmonious approach to establishing a gh)bal system.
Possibly reinfiwcing close relations belwee11 (]OlrlSD,I and the government was the
apl)ointment of several notable government officials to (;omsat positions. In January
1964, NASA (;eneral (;ounseIJohn A..Iohnson 1)ecame vice pt-esident in charge of Comsat
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intcrnalional aft_drs, l.cwis Meyer, lormcrlv an Air Force dt'F, Uly |i:,- financial analysis,
became (:omsat's finance coordinalov. Richard Colino, previously with the Slate
l)cpartment and the F(](L t)ccamc an assislanl to John .Johns, re. Ira addition. I,ouis B.
Early and Siegfried I!. Rcigel; both of wholn had t)cvn with the IL&ND Corporal(ion,
j()in('d (]()lllStl[ |() S('I'V(' ilY, ('hi(q ot C('()ll()llli(" analysis and manager ()1 s,,s[(qns analysis,
respectively. Whih' one might have vxpcctvd lht, go'ccrtml('nl to play an ,lctivc volt' in pro-
Inoling sla[|]ng of this kind, Ibis was no! the case. Folmcr govt'rnln('nl ])ersonne] tamc to
(]omsal Ix'causv tlu" firm was anxious to find a nuch'us _d i)eoph ' with satellit.e C(Hllllllll/i-
(';ttiolls ('xp('l'i('ll(c. ,_11('|1 ;t Illl('hqls ('(HI](L I)c I(HIII(I (HllV ill Ihc ,_()"/t'l'lllllCll[ ()l ;HII()II_ ('('l-
tahl selc(ted carriers an(1 In;ulttt_t('ttn'cl'S, stwh as AT&T ;in(| R(:A.
Foreign Negotiations fbr International Arrangements
Thc Sl)aCC arc put lh(! s]nalh'r induslrializcd nations to a gFcat disadvanlagc com-
pared to 1t11' two supcrp<)wcrs. Thv allies of the Unitcd Stalcs in %_',,'t,stcrn Eur()pc and clsc-
whcrc could dcvclo I) their own capal)ililics in space <)lily through a svmbi_tic rclalionship
with NASA. (]ool)cvativc (,xpc}imcnts most o[icn we}c ;urang('d on a })ilal("}al basis. Eat-l_
during th(' sl)a((" :tg(,, though, _N{'stcrn Eurol)CamS saw lilt' advanlagt' o[ lmilding nnlhi-
hltt'ra.] t)rganizations to ])t:.<)] their l't'%()/ll'('t'_, ;1111t (hll:-, tlm'clop a Ic{hnolt)gical I);is(" inth'-
])('lldelll c.[ tht' Uniter[ Stales.
At the intcrgovernmental level, discussions h'adiug to 1111" cstal)lishmc,H ol die
ElUOl)can S])at,.' Rvsc;uch (7)Fg, anization (ESR()) l)cgan in 1960 and mHcrcd inlo ftncc tm
20 M;u-ch 196,1.-]'hc stal('(| l)tnl)OS(' of FSR() was "to I)rovidc to]', and t()})romolc, (ollal)-
oration among Ettr<)t)can statt's ill s]);t('(" rcsca,'ch and tcchnt)logy cxchtsivclv for ])caccful
purl)oS('s.'" 'l'ht' COml)ositi(m oF tilt' organization in('lu(h'tl ncutFal nations, so thc i)t-()viso
"cxt+ltlsivcl'_ ' I_)t +peaceful purpt)scs" had tn<w(' than rhcl(wical important+c. ESR() proposed
no military pt+.jccts and restricted its activitics I(_ those <d scat'nitric iml)Orlancc, rather
than cxtcn(ting itsclt +into thc r;t(c lot pv('stigc, :.;c(urilv. :,t1/(I weahh. A second Eurol)ean
multilateral Sl)aCc organization was lilt' Europt'an l.aunche] Dcvclopmcnt ()rganization
(E[,D()), {onct'ivcd ;.is ;.t rcsuh of Anglo-French discussions eatIv ill 1961. The convention
('stablishing it entered into f(wcc on 21,I Fcbrttar'_ 11,)64. El+l)() planned to develop pro-
grams ill intqe<_tolog_; navigalion, t(,Icconltnuni(alions, and scicntit]c icSCalch.
:\ nongovcrnm(*ntal, inlthilatcral, nonprofit organizati<m of ('<msideral)l(' inH)ortan(("
was Eur()Sl)aCc. Its mcmbcrshi]) includ('d 146 a('r_Sl)a(t" companies, including cighl L!.S.
('()mpani('s as associate m(.mb(,rs. Form('d in l(,)61 on the initiative of certain Bridsh and
[gFcn(h industrial groups, l".urosj)act:'s principal ()bjc(tivc was to crcatc ;I \_,k'stern
Eurol)(';m industrial COml)lcx ca[)al)l(' ()t l)r()vi(ling ('X])('l'l assistant(' and advice on Sl)aCc
|)lOgl'illllS lo g()Vt'l'lllll(qllS, sli|)}+anati()nal b()(li("s, HII(| pt'iVat(" illtert'sts)'
"l'hcs(" th]ce mttltilatt'ral ()rganizati()ns rCl)r('st'nted Western Eur<)pe's organizatimlal
l(,SpOllS(, Io tilt' spat(' age. Thcv had Ill/It'll widm" inltTt'Sts tllall spa('e COllllllilni(';lliOll [)('1"
st*. Ill ('t)lltlals, I to t]11" Unitt?d Sliit('s, ",,_,'hcl'(' (()lllllitllli(ations carriers were OWll('d I)V l)rivatc
(Oml)ani('s and ]('gu];lt('(l l)y tilt" g()v(qnun('nt, thc principal communications agcn(i('s in
toreign (ountrics at thai tim(" v,,cIc g()v('rmn(mt a(lministrations.
I'hc prim(" sour(+c ()f l_tll'()|)('altl ("x})t'l'it'll('t" ill int(q-nati<)nal ('Ol/lllllllliCaliOll:'i,, itll(| tilt'
Ill-St organizalic)n t() (OOl)(:lat(' with tilt' United StaR's ill Sllch sl)a(c ('<)ll]llllllli('ali()llS
It. [h_' ti)ll()wing inh)rm_ui()n on ESR(). El.l)(). and Eul()Sl)a((' is [ha',v,l h()m lhitish ]nti)t,m,tio,i
Svrvicus, Britai. a.d Spa: l(ew'a.h (l.,mdon: ().'llllal ()|li(_' _)t ]ntoimali(m, 1965)..5,(.(. also (".S. (:_mRlcss,
S,('mt(('. ( 'ammfitl,.'(' (m Acl(mami( al and ."i.pa_(' Stion( ('s, I.te_ .ati.../C.,q.'mt/.. a.d OL*._a.i:..ti.n/i. O.te_ ,Spa..,
89d] (;_m_., I st scss,, I!}t_5. S.tati R_'p_). I, 1)(,( um('nl 51;. i)1). 11}5-17, 123-28.
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experiments as Echo and Telstar, was the British Post Office. As early as 1960, tile
Commonweahh Telecommunications Board's technical and traffic meeting discussed
radio communications via satellite. The British government subsequently invited its
Commonwealth partners to the Commol_wealth Satellite Comnmnications Conference
held in London in April 1962. According to the British Information Services:
The C'onferem_ recognized that it might be some years hefore satellite s_,stems could become
technically Jeasible, and, having regard to the researeh and devel(5Oment work heing unde_
taken in the United States and d_ewhere, that at_ commercial satellite s),stem shouM serve as
large a number r_countries as possib& and should have maximum flexibility. The Conferev_ce
al_o ack_owledged that sateUite communications and submarine telephone cable systems
would be complementar_ one to anothe*; and had regard, throughout its discussion, to the pro-
jetted submmine cable deveh>pments hoth tO, the Commonwealth and t_, other countde,C"
While the British viewed satellite communications as a possibility for the 1970s, that
view did not mean that they were ohlivious to the potential economic threat to cables.
Shortly after the enactment of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Britain and
Canada suggested that exploratory talks be held with the United States on the develop-
ment of an operational systemY _The Department of State concluded that talks w<mld be
beneficial, and from 27 to 29 October 1962, representatives of the British Post Office and
Foreign Office, the Canadian Ministry of Transport and Department of External Affairs,
and an interagency group headed by the U.S. State Department nleI. The British and
Canadians "emphasized their desire to participate fully in the technical development,
ownership and nmnagement of the system. '''7They thought, however, that another gener-
ation of cahles could be laid before a space commnnications system would be operational.
The United States took this opportunity to explain the purposes of the Connnunications
Satellite Act, emphasizing the desirability of a single global system as opposed to compet-
ing national systems.
Tim British reported that they were expecting to submit a sunmmry of these discus-
sions to the European Conference of Postal and Teleconnnunications Administrations
(CEPT, the French acronym) to be held in Cologne in December 1962. The State
Department thought this move would only relate American ideas secondhand. Therefore,
the State Deparmmnt sent an American team to Emope to brief CEPT members prior to
the December conference. During these meetings, and in the comse of the conference, it
became evident that the European conntries were quite excited about participating in a
joint system. The torm of participation was not set out precisely at this time, however.
More detailed consideration at the international level would have to await the tormation
of specilic proposals by Comsat. The role of the State Del)artment was to lay the ground-
work for these discussions.
During these preliminary meetings, the principal State Department representative,
Gilbert Carter, perceived a pattern of internal competition within several European coun-
tries. '_ Past international telecommunications agreements had been negotiated on what
15. British In[i>rmation Services, Bi4tain and ('ommomuealtk Telecommuplic<_tim+_ (lxmdon: Central ()tticc
of [nfiwmalion, IC363), p. 26.
16. Dcpartmcnl o|" Stale, Summa 0 (![Activitie_ o[l)epartment ol Slale HelalinLr lo the Communications Satellite
Act o[1 q62 (Sepwmbcr 211, 1963). Reprinted in [ t. Rcpt. 8(}9, pp. 25-27.
17. Ibid.
18. t1.S. Congress, |hmsc, Committee on (;ovcrmncm Operations, Militm;_ Operation_ Sub(ommittee,
tlearin_, ._iatelhte Communhation_--1964, Parl 2, 8;"Ith Cong., 2(I scss,, 1964, p. 661, hereinafter cited as Satellite
('ommu nicatitms tleam_K_,
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might be called a nonpolitical hasis. European teleconmnum:ations administrations had
1-)argained with AT&T and other carriers regarding lhe laying of new cables or the sial'l-
ing tip of radio services. Foreign offices were not involved in these negotiations. However,
the economic and political consequences of coninnmicalions satellites were far from pre-
dictable, so it was natural lot foreign offices to I)eco,ne involved. The resohltion o[ ques-
tions affecting hr()ad national interests could not he left to traditional means.
Telecomnmnications experts, tm the other hand, warlled to preserve the old way of dt)ing
business; they believed that diplomats only cleated difticuhies.
This domestic alignment or)served by (',after in certain Eurt)pean countries corre-
sponded to the ])attern wilhin the United Stales. _I_)one tiained in international l+elations,
this pattern pointed to the existence <)f a sttl)eultltie hi the international environnient
whose representatives had morc in common with each ()ther on a functional h'vel than
the), did with nationals of their own c()untcies who lmrf(wmed different tasks. |'lie transna-
tional cohesiveness of coninnnlications administrations, though, did not serve as a barri-
er to participation by others. The inlr<)duction of slttellitc communications into the inter-
national environment could not be isolated, as was the introduction of telephone cables
in 1956. Broader national interests were at stake.
In Great Britain, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Oftice, and aerospace companies had
a great interest in space comnnmicatitms. This hioad range of interest also was lhe pal-
tel'll ill Fl'all('e, lQi'es[ (;eFlllall)', alld olhel" counlries. The ralionale that had led to the cre-
ation of Eurospace, ELDO, and ESRO worked in terms of space communications, too.
Europeans telt that in view of the U.S. technological leadership, their interests would he
served best if they could sl)eak with one v<)ice rather than many.
The tirst concrete nlanifT.'station of a European regional approach came ill the CEPT
conference held in Cologne in I)ecemher 1(.t6'_>.1'he Telecomnnmications (:ommittee,
one of the permanent Ol_allS t)[ l]le ctlnleF(ql(e, set up a committee to: (]) study all prol)-
lems relating to the organized participation of all interested European countries and tile
operation of a single world network of commtmications satellites; (2) establish the hasis
of discussions to be held between the CEH' (OUlllries alld the United States for the estat)-
lishment and operation ()f a single world network of communications satellites; and
(3) determine the basis lot a world organization to manage such at network. The creation
of this CEPT committee signified that Europe would lake a regional approach to the U.S.
proposal rather than negotiate a series of bilateral arrangements and that _vVcstern Europe
accepted, in broad ot,lline, the idea of a single world system.
After the 1(,t62 conf;,Tence in (:olt)gne, Western Europe proceeded in high gear t<)
organize a European say in spacv communications. At a July 196.'3 intergovcrnmental
meeting in London, (:ETS set up a strttcture consisting of steering, organizational, and
space technology,' conunitlees. The conuniltee se! up by CEPT in December 1962 became
the advisor lc, (:ETS on technical matters. Sul)sequentl,v, in Novemher 1963, CETS agreed
that it "sht)uld he set up It) pv<)vide to the extent possihh', a ct)unterpart to tilt" U.S.
Communications Sittellite (_()rl). lComsal] ."'+
The existent:(: of a European regional approach set the stage for definiliw" negotia-
tions to establish an operati<mal global system. As a prelude to formal tneetinRs, a team <)f
American officials from the Slat<." Department, the FCC, and Conlsat met with technical
experls from CETS to discuss the outlook tot satellite c()mmunications in the near
fll/ure. _" The first fornial meetin<_ took l)lace in Rome in February 1(`)64. No diafts we,-e
19. l)+..F, allmt.nt ()J F;tal('. '+.'g,Unllnal'+ (>f Etu<)1)cat'J Rt'gh)nal ()rgani:ali+)n in t|;c (:()intnttni(alion'_
Satcllilt' Vivid," i('I)lintt'd in l '.% C'.t/_+v'ssi+mal F(e+.)+l, b4Ftlll (:(int.|., 2(I st.ms., p. 173.
2(I. .'salellile (T+.n*m+tlicaliotr_ llea)'l_l£_, Penl I, t). !:;1(;.
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tabled at this meeting, but a thorough discussion of the general principles ibr tile pro-
posed system's franlework resulted.
One of the basic system characteristics agreed on at the Rome meeting was the idea
o[ an interim system. The participants felt that establishing a permanent international
plan would be premature in light of the many economic, political, and technical
tmknowns. Another area of agreement was that (]olnsat should act as system manager on
behalf of all the other participants. `+.'While ownership would be joint, Comsat would
assure its commanding place by managing the system. On the other hand, Comsat was not
to have a flee hand. The idea of an international steering committee to oversee develop-
ments was discussed.
As the Rome conference ended, considerable agreement on all but three major areas
emerged: (1) the duration of the interim agreements; (2) the allocation of ownership
quotas; and (3) the voting procedure. The alignment of opinion on these issues pined the
United States against CETS. The Europeans wanted a short interim arrangement, while
the United States wanted one of considerable duration. The rationale of the American
position was that a longer interim period would provide more experience on which to
base tim permanent arrangement. The United States also wanted a longer interim period
to retain its initial leadership position. U.S. negotiators t_ared that the time needed to
negotiate a pertnanent arrangenmnt would be so great that it would run counter to the
mandate of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.
The Europeans, on the other hand, hoped to increase their satellite ability at the ear-
liest possible time and therefore pushed fiw a short agreement. The idea that short inter-
im arrangements would lead to an increase in Europe's stature may have been wrong,
however. As the system was to be global, the increasing nmnl)er of non-European nations
ill the ventnre lnight align to work against the increase in European inf]tlellce.
Nonetheless, it was the position of CETS at the Rome conference that the interim arrange-
ments should last for only about three years.
The Rome conference also included the ownership issue, which revolved around the
amount of capital the Europeans wished to invest in the systent. The greater the amount
of a country's capital investntent, the greater its percentage of ownership and thus, ])()ten-
tially, control and rate of return. Expressing their optimism on the prospects for satellite
communications, the Europeans wished to invest more money than the United States
thought they should, r-' Moreover, the U.S. negotiating team argued for substantial m_tj<)r-
ity ownership by (:ontsat.
The voting issue concerned the fornnfla by which the system+s steering c(mnnittee
(which came to he known as the Interim (;ommunications Satellite Committee) would
decide on various matters regarding system management. Because the United Slates was
to have majority ownership, it naturally would be able to control the majority of votes
under the system of weighted voting that everyone envisaged as legitimate. The problem
lay in the amonnt of control that the Europeans wanted. Important decisions would
involve weighted w_ting encompassing a greater ntnnl)er of votes than the United States
alone possessed. An}, other decision-making tbrnmla would destroy the concept of part-
nership. The issue, the,'efi_re, was not weighted w)ting, but how much of a majority, in
addition to the voles of the United States, would be required to pass a resolution. The
United States feared that CETS might w)te as a bloc, and that would constitute a veto even
under a weighted voting arrangement. The Europeans feared that, if they were not given
21. &ttdlite ('ommunication.s tteavin_s, Pa_l 2, p. 6ti3.
'2"2. Scc Ihc tcstimony ot ,.\brant (:hayes in Satelhte Commu,itatia,+ lleaHn,qc+, l'art 1. p. 363.
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SOIl1("assuranc(_oi1lilt" crileria [(n lnaking, decisions on ][)FO('lll'('llltqll, (Ill gFOIlll(| slaliOllS,
or on other matters, flleir standing as parlncrs would Ix' meaningless.
Tht,sc thr<:w issues--the <:luralior_ of lilt' interim arrangements, ownershiF,, and vof
ing--donlinated the discussions and negotiations lhal Iollowed tilt" Rome contercncc in
February 1964. Additional prol)h'ms, such as svstmn use by DoD and possible memhership
by lhe Soviet Union, weft" delibcratcd, lint Iht'v did not impinge direcllV ott the progr_'ss
of events leading to the estatflishnwnl _d the interim syslenl, Ttlosc two probh'ms wcrc
handled at a fttlurc date, as discussed lalcr in this chapter.
The next meeting iollowing the Romc cont_.rt.nce occurred in l.onthm Ir<ml 6 to 8
April 1964. At Ilia! time, lht' [.[.,%. ncg, otiating lt'aIll advanced two agl'<.'t'lnt'lllS--Ollt" ,_ov-
ernmental and the other commtwcial. The United Slates feh /hal Europe, Australia,
Canada, and Japan would insist on an inlcrgovcrnmt'nl:ll agreemeut rather than a purely
COllllll('l'Ci;tl ;ll+Fallgelll(qll a,_ had b('t'II chal'a('ttwislit" in cable ((mSOllia, :_ ;.ill(1 lhert't_:nc
tilt" U.S. team canw prepared with a drill <d a siulple inlt, rgovernmcnlal "tmll_rclla" agree-
111(:I11."' |l received lentalive approval tiom tilt' Ettr<_peans.
A period of intense drafting activity then ¢'nsued. In May 1964, two mr:clings took
place to compare <:|rafts (in l,ondon) and to slttd+v ira[lit statistics (in Montreal). Thc
l,ondon tnectin R was not a nt'g<_tiating scssi<+n, but ;tit attempt t_ deveh>l_ htn_tta_c lot
those points on which no stfl)slantial difli'rcnces had arisen. Thc Mottlrcal meeling on
traffi<: projections was important, I)('tause owncrshi]_ in lilt: interim svst<:'m was Io r<'th'cl
lit{" actual dislril)ution of international tclec<mnlmnicalions traffic. To mcasurc that traf
tic, the 1963 Internati<mal Tvlcc<mmmnicati<ms Union's l)rqjt'cti<ms lot Ill<' vc;ir 1!11:,8
scrvcd as it base. Those statistics Wctc rccxamhlt'd to (|clcrntinc whal shat<" of total inlt'l--
nati<mal traffic could b<:"handled legitinlatcly l+x conlmttnications salellitcs. "l]lc Montreal
meeting agreed thal tit+.+ Unitcd SIt;llt's ha<l mot-c lhatll ,_0 pcvc<:'nl of thal total trat]]c, but
(lid not detcrminc how mtt(+h tn<ne.
The next meeting 1o discuss sul)stantivt, difl<.'rcnccs ()(turrtP<:l ill lx)nd<)n on 15 and
16June 1964. The issues of inlcritn agrcemcnl duralion and svstcn| ownership rt'achc<:l
resohtlion. "I'h<_sc atlending decided that the ltlanned Interim (]onmn,nicalions Satellite
(]ommittee wouM slfl)tnit a rt:port no later Ihan 1 .]anttary 1969 to all parties ,'octroi-
mending what changes, if any, sh_>uld b<" madt + ill the "Interim Arrangemenls." An inter-
national conference would consider the report, t)ttl if no changes werc agrecd t<>, tilt'
hlterim Arrangements would lt,initin ill t'tfi,'cl. This conlpronlise gave lilt" t:nitcd Slitl<'s
Ill<:' assttrance <:,t at ]easl five ycars ot CXllm-i<'ncv lx'lbrc htying out tilt' definite arrange-
ments. Tilt' Europeans were satisfied l)ecltllSC [i',/(' yealS was IlOt SO long as 1<_ pr<ijttdicc
their positi<m in tit<:' coming dt'cadc, whcn Ihcy hoped Io havc devchq+ed it grcater tcch-
rto|ogical base in satellile c<mmnulicati<ms technology'. ;_
The issue of ownership allocatiOl]S was sculcd by giving (]otnsat it 61-pt'rct'nt undivid-
cd interest of the space syslcnl. ()nc should beat in mind that th<:" glound slati<ms Wt'l+C
not inch|dcd, its they were t<_rctnain in nati<mal hands. The total ICtu'opean particil);tli_m,
;is well as that of tilt' (_anadians, .]',llmnvsc, and Australians, was 3<.I l)t'rccnl. > A dilficuh
fact't <)|" lilt' allocation tlccisi<m was hmv It+ itl'l+;lllgt + It)l" lilt" itct't's, sioll ()1"Ilt'W nltqnltcrs to
tilt" Interim ,&rrangctncnts. The l(tu-<+pt,ans ])ushcd to have the United ,qtillt's aRt+u<' ttl;ll,
tt l) to a c<'t+tain point, all new signal<wies' shares sh<)tt]d (omc out _)t the (TN. quola. Tilt"
Unilcd St;tit"+ successfttlly rcsist<'d Ihis move; inslc;td, il was decided that every<rat's shirt'
23. lkM., p. 661.
2 [. Ibid., p. 66t.
_>. St.c Aiti_lc IX td Ihc lntcl im .\llanRcmcnts. 2 I'.5,.1. 17(17_, 1.1.;\._,. 7_6 II;.
26, %t't' Antwx ,d Spc_ ial .\g_ccm_'nl, in hilt'tim \t zan_cmcnl'+,.
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would be cut oil a pro-rata basis as new participants.joinedY 7 (]omsat's quota, however,
could not fall below 50.6 percent, thus assuring the firm a majority voice during the peri-
od of the Interim Arrangements.
At the end of June 1964, only one important issue remained: voting. A conference in
Washington, D.C., held front 21 to 24July 1964, resolved that issue. On important deci-
sions (for example, system choice, rates, ground station standards, or contract letting),
the Interim Communications Satellite Committee voted by a weighted lnajority of
12.5 votes above those controlled by Comsat. All other decisions were by simple majority
vote, httt all parties committed themselves to try to arrive at mtanimous agreements. In
addition, if a decision concerning the hudget, the placing of a contract, or the launching
of a slttellite were delayed more than 60 days, a majority vote of only 8.5 above those votes
controlled by Comsat was required to pass. -'_ For this system of weighted voting to be
acceptahle to the United States, the CETS had to convince the Americans that it would
not vote as a bloc; otherwise, the formula gave the Europeans a veto.
The w_ting formula was related to tl_e crucial matter of contract awards. Article X of
the agreement specified that "the Commiltee and the Corporation [Comsat] as manager
shall.., seek to ensure that contracts are st) distributed that equipment is designed, devel-
oped attd procured in the States whose Governments are Parties to this Agreement in
approximate proportion to the respective quotas of their corresponding signatories to the
Special Agreement." This particular provision was very difficult to negotiate. European
industry had lot)bled through organizations such as Eurospace to pressure their govern-
ments into negotiating tor a plan dial would assure them snhstantia] access to the pro-
curement processY" The Europeans wanted an allocation for procurement on a national
basis according to quotas of capital contrihulion. _"The compromise provision allowed lot
geographical distribution only when competitive hids were coml)arahle in terms of the
hcst cquipntent tbr the hest price.
It was obviotts to most participants, though, that Europe wotdd be able to contribute
stthstantially only in the 1970s. Ahnost the entire initial system would be bnih by the
United States. Already, contracts had been signed with Hughes for the Early Bird slttellite
in March 1965, and Comsat had reqttested design contracts for an initial system from
Hughes, AT&T, RCA, Space Technology Lahoratnries (TRW), and ITT. Comsat was to
make a choice from among these ahernatives in the fall of 1965--1ong hclore dte
Europeans wottld possess the level of technolog T iequired. _'_Nonetheless, the voting pro-
cedtn'es and the procurement provision assured the Ettropeans that they could he part-
ncrs in research and development its well as in system use.
Thirteen governments and Vatican Cily initialed the "Agreement Establishing Interim
Arrangements tor a (;lobal Commercial Communications Satellite System" on 24.|uly
1964. The agreement then was opened for signature t))' the governments or their desig-
nated c(mtntnnications entities on 20 August. Thus, a joint venture for space comntuni-
cations, known its Intelsat (the hlternational Telecommunications Satellite Consortiuml,
(alne into existence.
27. Satdlite ('ommu_m'ations ttea_4nff_, Pall 2, p. 667.
2_. Article V ((+) o| the Intt'rim Atrangemt+nts.
29. Satellite ('olmtl+l]H(rltiotts [leaz+ltlgrs, Part 2, p, 681.
30, Ibid., p. II)(I.
31. Ibid., p. 739.
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Foreign Relations and National Security
Thc prosp('cl[ ()l a shared sysl[cm bctwcvn l[hc Inl[erinl Arrangmnents and l)ol) was laid
I[o resl[ ill July 1(.)64, lint the issues involved arose again in c(mnecl[i(m with 1)ol) use ot
hll[elsat for adnlinistral[ivc lira!tic. Similarly, l[hese issues surfaced ill lernls of the NASA-
(;OlllS+tl[ agl't't!tll(Plll[ concerning c(mmmnicati<ms for l[llt" Apollo hmar progranl and the
F( ;( ','s "aul[horizt:d user" decision iu tilt' StmlmCr o! 1(.)66. The use of Ill(" ]nl[cIsall[ svsl[¢'lll l)y
1)ol) involved three qucsl[i(ms: (1) g<)v('rntncnl[ rclal[ions with prival[c enterprise {tilt" sub-
sidy issue); (2) rcquircmmll[s and capabilil[ics of l[hc milil[arv COlllllltllli('al[ions s_,'stt,nl; ;.In(l
(_+) !(>reign l+clati(ms lllall[t'l'S, such ;Is lh(" ]/,onloti<m of IT.S. leadership ill c_munuuica-
l[i(ms satellite dev('loplnt:nts.
in.January 1.q65, a controversy art)so as t(i whcl[hcr DoD should use its own svsl[cnl t(ir
both bttlk !raft!( and tll+g¢+lll[ nati()II;.l] s('curilv nt'c(Is. (_()lllSal[ xv;,is all+aid l[hat if D()D Llscd
ills ()wn svst(qn tot all ills Ira!fit, tilt' th-m's financial tul[ure w()uld 1)(' dhn. The milh[alv
share ()1 +all I!.S. ()v(']-scas tr;-tffic aln(m]ll[(+d t() 30 l)(q-(cnt. (_olnsal[ lna(!c an ()l+t}.+]- t() D()D
afl[t'r tilt" (h'nlisc ()f l[hc shared system plan. Tilt" new l)r()[)()sal w()uld c()st $50 million, but
D()I) tlt]ncd il ([()wn t)ccaust + it cost half as mu(+h ,is th( + Phil(() svstcnl. ':+ tlow('v('n the
Pcntag(m di(l assure (+.()nlSa.l lhal ill would n()l[ put all Doll ll+affic l[hrough its own svstcnl.
Dr. EuRcnt" Fubini, I)('l)uty [)ir('cl[()t of Defense Rcscarch and Engineering, estimated that
"¶):3 or (.)0 l)tqccllt of<mr ttattit +will not go Ihr()ugh l[h(" milhar} svslcnl."u. As it lur]lc(t (lUll,
though, two vtuu-s late!- DoI) was l)lannhlg 1(+ havc a thir(t i)tits nccds nlel[ ir_l[t'rnally and
two thirds !)v lease fro]n conllne]cial (arricrs. _+'By .[_lllll;,(l+y 1(.)71, iu fhCl[, l[hc l)eti'nsc
SaEellitc (kmununications System (I)SCS) was using 44.2 million two-way channel miles+
{)2 p('r('t'lll[ of which wt'rc lt!ase(l from priwltc carriers and the or}let 38 l)er((+nl goV('l'lllll('nl
()wn('d. I)rivatc (arrims thus did not rt'(eiv(' the shaft' ()f 1)usin('ss th(,v had anti(il)ated.
F()] (:()lunnnlical[ions sal[cllil[c scrvict' ill I)al+l[icular, l[ilc Dol) spcnt $9'2,74(;,3t+0
through c<)nnn('t+cial carrit!l+s in fiscal l.q70, while sf)cn(ting $111 nfilli()n on his own
I)S(:S 1 sal[cllitc. Ill a(ldilion, tilt' DS('+S li satcllh[c was I() have 1,300 full dltl)lcx v()ic(' (han-
ncls, c()tnl)ared I[() I)S(:S I's live It) l[welvt" (hann('ls. Ftnl[h('rm()t+c, I)oI) funding for space
c<mutumi(+ali()ns l-()s(' fr()m $62.(.) million in fiscal 1(.)72 I[o $1(.)2 milli()n ill fiscal 1(.)73. This
(h-anlal[i( in(r('as(' art)s(' froth lille sl[_tll[ ()t" ;I Ilt"W lll()l)ilu ('()lllll/lllli('_tliOllS salcllite s't,'sl[t'lll
called FI,EE'I'S,XF or the Flecl Satellite ('()llllllltlli(';ll[iOllS SVS,I[t'lll. _+'
The inl[crcst of l[]liS issue lies iu evaluating l[hc intportancc (if g(lv('rnnlcnl[ assisl[ancc
It) (;(}lllS,;_ll[ :IS :t lll(+_lllF, of prolnol[ing Ill(' R)rt'ign poli('y goals of thc (k)mnmnicati<ms
Satellite Act ()f 1¶16_. The differenl[ roles of l[he corporation created a para(tox. I+eaving
asidc l[hc pr()s and cons <)f l[ilc financial c(mtroversy, _)ne can make the f(}llowing policy-
()rit'nl[('(l <)bscrval[i(ms. If (',(mlsat is a privat(' enl[('rl)rise, ill would be (onttarv I[() [Yet" enter-
prise philos()l)hy !or l[h(" govt, rnmcnl[ I[o assisl[ it, especially if the gov('rnmenl[ could
pl(}vidt' ills ()wn scrvict's m()rc ('(on(mlicallv. On l[h(' ol[h('r hand, if (_t)nlsal[ is vicwcd as lhe
(h()st'n insl[rum('nl of A]n(!ri(an !()reign ]){)li(y in spa(c (()lllnllllli(al[i()llS, it would b(' con-
l[rarv I[() l[ht" nal[i()na] hll[crcsl I[() re!us(' assislan(e I[o (_Olll:";;ll[, wil[tl()ul[ which its financial and
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political image and stature abroad might be damaged. As (]olnsat was a little of I)oih, one
can readily i.inderslalld why lhe subsidy isstle was a mailer of both donlestic and foreign
polk:}:
The same general analysis applies to the crilicisms voiced against tile 1965 cOnll'ac[
that NASA, lhrollgh tile National (]onununications Systelll (NCS), made with Conlsal to
provide COlllnlunicalions for the Apollo prograln. President Kennedy established lhc NCS
in 19(73 to unit}' and integrale all govcrnnicni conununications capabilities. The ttousc
Military Operations Stil)coinlllittee was a lorceful political actor till tills isstie. :c The Scllaie
().)lnlllittee till Aeronautical and Space Sciences also addressed ill(- progralll. <_
Concerning the subsidy issue, Rcllrescnlalive Fernand J. St. (;ermain (D-RI) observed:
"This is supposed to be a t)ublic tort)oral!on, and as 1 recall, tile logic bellind tilis and the
argiiineills bellind tilis were we waill Itlis io be a public corpora!ion because lhe
(;<)verlllllenl silouldn't I)(. in t)rivate business, and hcre, lo and behold, the (;ovcrlllllCllt,
one agency in itself, is going to buy 45 t)ercent. ''_"
Repl'esentalive William S. Moorhead (I)-PA) asked NASA Asset!ale Adniinislralor
Robert (;. Sealllalls,Jr., whel]lcr, when lhe o])porluniiy lo gl_'l a regular CtlSlOllt/w elOil] lilt!
Doll had disappeared, (]olnsat ]lad not "turned [o NASA to bail them out <if a hole?""' Bul
(]oinsal had not re(]tiesled the Apollo conununicalions prograni. NASA, wittlin the frallle-
work of tile NCS, tlad exalllilled all ltle ahernalives and had, on its own, requested die
N(]S nlanagtq Io contact (loll/sat. _L
The U.S. governnlenl ilad docunlenls Io prove that !Is choice was nlade after all due
deliberation--as distinguislled [toni the (]Olllsal-DoD case. The House Military
Operations Sul)conunittee was especially concerned about the real econonlies involved,
however. _-' l|erl)ert Roback, the siatt" administrator, observed thai the (;ommunications
Satellite Act provided that a separate gt)'_<'ernlllClll systClll could be created in lhe nation-
al illterest alld tllat one of [hes(_ ililerests was et(inOllly. I¢ fie l%ras COllCt'rlle(t ill ])arliclllar
thai it huge ])art of the decision-niaking process was classified. Tile feeling of tile Military
Operations Subconunittee seemed to be that too nnlch secrecy might cover up hidden
purposes. The sut)comnfiltee was willing to accept govcrnnicnt subsidy of Conisat, if it
served to strengthen Conlsat's position in !lie international bargaining to establish detin-
it!w: global satellite communications arrangemenls afler 1969.
Tile Military Operations Subconunitlee also feh Ihal the secrecy surrounding tile
negolialions between (]olnsat alld tile NCS should be renloved because the Ilse of taxpay-
ers' nloney oughl to be tile sul}ject of public debate. On the other hand, t)ublic debate
llliglll ilndellllille the purpose of tile contracl, if ill reality ils llurpose were to subsidize
(]olnsat. Foreign governments would rccognizc thai goverlllll,_.nl subsidies to lhe firlll
were a reality. Perhaps this was the reasoll for the goverlllllellt'S secrecy. Nonetiieless, the
governlllenl l)rovided evidence thai Ihe COlllritcl wiih (]OlllSal was tile lilosI elticienl and
econonlical ahernalive available." The outside el)server is left witti a partial picture.
J7. [.S. ({engross, Illmsc, (]ouuniilcc lln (iovci nuicil! ()pelalions, Militm'y Operatious, Subronunilicc,
Ilea_fng_, Mi_ile and .gpa(e (;round Nuppor! ()peraliml_, blglh (]Ollg,, 2d scss., 1965, hel'chlailt'r (ilcd as Mis_ile and
.'_pa<_. (h <mmt ,'_upp,_ t l l+vxHng_.
38. t7.S. Congress, Senate, (]onlniiticc on Aerouautical and Sl)atc Sciences, ]leaff_iK+, .%'aliotta[
()_mmu++halim++ Satellite Pr+JKrams, 89th (Stag., 2(1 se,+s., 1966, pa++im.
39. Mis_ile alld ,'_]mce (;rm_nd Support ll_,am_K_, p. 29.
40. Ibid., ]). 35,
41. lbid,, p. 1511,
42. Ibid., lip. 26-27, et pa_lim.
13. Ibid,, p. 77.
44. Ibid., pp. 1511-51, et pa_im. The COliira(l _ls finMly ncgl>liatcd in cmly 1966 calh'd tbi :l Ihr_-c-ycar
cl)iilra('i ll)la]iii_ ilil)lt" lhan $3bI,9 illi]]ioli.
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Tile tilird and nlost iniportant problem tilat arose following the d<,'tnise of th<,'joint
(]()IIIS_LI-I)oD proposal C()liCel'l]lC(| the "aUlilOl'izc<,t tlscl+" iSSll<e, Sectioli !{05(]))(4) o[" tilc
(]ol]tW.,lllni<,:ations ,";,aleilite Act autilorized (]OlllS;It "It) conlliW[ witll ;IultlOl'ize<,l /IS<,'FS,
in<,'luding tile United States (;overnnlent, for the services of ttie tonnntulications satellite
system." On<," interpretation of tills section would allow direct (]omsat-Dol) contracting
witil no necessity for FC(] +approval. Tiffs interpretation was that of file drafters of the leg-
islation, according to Edward Welsil, Executive S<,'Cl'<,'titl'v ()1"tilt" National :"XCl'Oll_ll.llics i.lnd
Space Council. Anottler interpr<,qation required tile F(](] to d<,'termine wilo were ";ttllilo-
l'ized users" anti UlltlCl what t:il('lllllslall<,'<,'S tilt" gOV<.'l'lllllellt would fit this (ill('gOly. I)oD
proceeded on tile basis of til<e first interpretation wilcn, ill J;-lnllal+y 1966, it n<ltif]ed
(k)msat of its need fin thirty voice circuits ill tilt" Pacific,'" TIw F( ;( ; operated on tilt" basis
of tile second assumptitm when it instituted a pul)iic inquir,:', "In tilt: Matter of Authorized
Entili<,'s ;rod .,\utiloriz<,:d Us<,!rs Under tilt' (]ommunic;itions Salellile Act of 1962" (1)ock<,'l
No. 16058), in tilt," spring of 1965."'
Tile [)<,'fens<,, (;onmuulications Agency (D(]A), which coordinated separate c(nmnu-
nications svstcms of t11¢"armed services, consid<,'red (:omsat Io tic the Ix'st <,arricr. it noti-
lied the other international carriers of its traf[i<, nceds ill tilt Pacific a full thrcc nlontils
aftcr it tlad notified (kmlsat. _:It was not surprising timt, after tilt" submission of i)voposals
from five carri<,!rs, ('.olnsat's l)rovcd to tie rite })<,'_.;t. I)(]A signed a <,onlract wittl C<mlsat on
26July i966. h also was not surprising l]lat the F(_(], acting as lilt' l)rot<,'(tor of tilt" status
quo, decided fllat (]olns;tt cottid d<,'ai only witll the govcrnmcnt dir<,'<,tiy "in uniquc and
cx('<,'ptional circunlstances." (in 21 July i966, I tw F(',(: issued a "Mclnorandunt, Opini<m
and Stal('ln<,,nl (if Policy" to this effbct. '_ +I']lc F(](; believed that (]()lllSat was "prmlarily ,l
cal'ri<,w's <,artier'" ;uld judg<,'d "Ill;it if tilt" (;()V<,'l'lllllt'IIt t)l" <)thcl'S Wt'l-<C It) obtain (scrvic<,,)
dir<,'<,'tly fl-ont (]OlllSitl, tllere would b<,' serious advens<,' ;Iffk'(ts upon tilt" w<,ql-tx,ing of th<,"
<,omm<,w('ial tele(<m:mnmi<,alit)ns industry and tilt general publi<," it serves."
Th<,wc was a clear difler<,'nc<,: of opinion, if not :t confli<,t of hll<,'l'cSt, 1)etwe<,'n file FCC
and Dol). ()no way m resolve flit differ<,'nce would hay<,' been tbr D(:A to notif _, tilt' FC(:
ltl;tt lilt" ciI'CIIIIISlitIICCS 'Will'((' "so lllli(lll¢" ;llld cxc<,'l)tional as Io I+<,'qllil'<, • service directly fl'Olll
(k>msat." Ahholtgh i)(:A t('1I that way, th<,' stalelnent was not in<,htded in tilt" (ontra((t; oth-
<,'rwisc, tilt FC(', would nol il;tvc approved it."'
This issue rcccivcd t:tnlgrcssitma] attention whcn Ih<,' l[,)use Military ()ix, rations
Sul)(ommitt<,'<,, stt,l)p<,,d ill to r<,'(onmlt,nd "tilat tilt" D(]A _tssigll Ill(' (]()lllsat (ontl-att It) ()Fit!
OF Itl()l+t' Atll<,'l'i(';Ut int<,wnatiomtl carri<.ws, 1)asc(i up(in an across-the-board substantial
redu<,:tion ill chavg<,'s fi)r satellite and cal)le circuits ill tilt" P;tcif'ic ;tr<,'a.""" All agreed to lifts
solution. Ti_c cost saving to tilt" govcrnnlent 1)y redttcing composite rates on all 128 cable
circuits leas<,+d ill tilt+ l'acific by tilt" Dol) was gr<,';tter than $6 million per ycm, ill contrasl
to lilt,' ,._i.() million in savings that would have been reali/c(i Ily dealing directly witii
(]OlIIS;tt f+of thirty <,ir<,uits. '_
.15. [r.s, (:ontgn,vss. llous(', Commiltt.e <m (;o'+('rnunelll ()pt.l;tlionl,,, Milit;u_ ()pczatiom, Stnht olnnfitl('c.
tleari_+g_+, (;+n,rzmm'vz! 1 !s¢' +_/Sa/el/zlr Commumralion+, _gth (;.rig., 2d st's.,.. 191i6, pp, 4t-13.
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49. Rcprintvd iu ibid., p. 717.
.")(). ['._. (]OIlglt'_,_.. i[OlP+(', (;t)lllIllitt('t" ,'III (;OVeltlIllt'Ill ()l>Cl;tli<ms. l').t+-/hiPd ltepmt, (i¢_v+'+mm.+tl Ik+ .[
Ml.llite ('.mmunitati.P+s, 8901 (:<m,,4,, 2d sess.. 1966, II. Rvpt. No. 1836, p. 7.
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One can conclude fron_ this episode that a new technolo_, (communications satel-
lites) was slowed down to acconunodate established interests (cables). Nonetheless, the
results ofincrementalism and the consensus approach produced economic benefits in the
short run and avoided a sudden, potentially destabilizing decision. The FCC's "authorized
user" decision showed that the issue of cables versus satellites may never be unequivocal-
ly resolved. A mix of the lwo, although slowly modified over time, will persist. By 1972, in
tact, the new office responsible for coordinating governmental communications, the
Office of Telecommunication Policy, recognized that the heyday of decision making
through systems analysis had passed. Rational decisions in areas where one does not have
all the facts, and where the tacts changed fronl day to (lay, required day-to-day decision
making. This conclusion seemed particularly apropos a generation later, as the Joint
Chiefs of StaLl consider suhstantial reductions in DoD's reliance on communications satel-
lites because of advances in fiber optic cables.;'-'
Intelsat and Intersputnik _3
Satellite communications and foreign policy problems also entailed strained relations
with the Soviet Union. During the 1962 meetings of the I,egal Subcommittee of the
United Nations Committee on the Peacefid Uses of Outer Space, the Soviets objected to
the Americans' Project V_st Ford and the operations of Comsat. Their objections seemed
to render unlikely the conclusion of an agreement on legal principles governing truman
activities in space. The Soviet draft of legal principles relating to satellite communications
asserted that space cooperation was incumbent on all states and that the implementation
of any measure that in any way might hinder the peacefifl exph)ration and use of outer
space by oltmr countries should be permitted only after prior discussion of and agreement
on such nteasures among the countries concerned. The Soviets also declared that all space
activity should be carried out "solely and exclusively by States.""'
The Soviets directed tim draft of principles against Project West Ford. Needless io say,
the United Slates fottnd it unacceptable, not because it wished to carry out this project or
others without taking a proper regard tot the opinions of humaniD', but because it did not
wish to subject national programs to a Communist veto. The United Slates objected to the
declaration that all space activity should be carried out "solely and exclusively by States"
hecause it undermined Comsat as a somewhat private entity. By stressing the exclusiveness
of state responsibility tor and control of space endeavors, the Soviets meant to downgrade
the role of private enterprise or, as the Soviets would call it, exploitative monopoly. Clearly,
the Soviet draft of principles wimessed the intrusion of the (;old War into what had
seemed a promising move toward cooperation in the fi)rm of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
letters. Nevertheless, the end of 1963 saw a spirit of agreement. The Soviet Union agreed
to omit the consideration of the lninciples the)' had so strongly urged in the United
Nations Legal Suhcomnfittee. The General Assembly was able to tmanimously pass
Resolution 1962 on 13 December 1963, but the following year ushered in another period
of renewed Cold War competition.
The Soviet Union evolved a position extremely critical of Comsat and Intelsat. The
Soviets were slow in wlicing this antagonism, however, and most likely came to it after a
52. Pal Cooper and Rol)ct't 1 lolzcl, "DOt) Eyes Satellite AIIcrnalivt.," Space N_qvs 6 (7-13 August 1995):
1, 28.
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period of protracted deliherations. In February 1963, the American Embassy in Moscow
delivered a note to the Soviet government suggesting that it might be usetill to discuss a
conunercial conununications satellite system."" Tile Soviets, though, considered such a
meeting prematme+ They also had this attitude during the Extraordinary Administrative
Radio Coni_rence later in the year.
In 1964, however, the United States initiated concrete negotiations with various
Western European and other nations. Ill Febrnary 1964, perhaps tor reasnns of intelli-
gence, tile Soviets expressed an interest in consultations with the United States. They sug-
gested that a meeting be held in Geneva, during the May and June 1964 meeting of the
Technical Subcommittee on the Peacefhl Uses of Outer Space.
The United States agreed to this proposal; after all, the Communications Satellite Act
mandated agreements with other nations. Therefore, in June 1964, a U.S. team of gov-
ernment and Comsat officials tlew to Geneva and briefed the Russian delegation to tile
concurrent London negotiations on the Interim Arrangements in terms of tile negotia-
tions h)r estat)lishing a global commercial system. The Russians asked a few questions con-
cerning whether the allocation decisions of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio
Conference were definitive enough to warrant the engineering and construction of an
operational system. This line of inquiry reflected the Soviet view that operational arrange-
ments were premature. (]onsequentl_; at the end of the meeting, tile Soviet delegation
pronounced that the United States was still ill "an experimental phase"; the negotiatitms
were "all American or U.S. inspired experintental program," and the Soviet Union was
"not really ver.v interested in it at this time." They conch,ded: "We will continue to do
some experimental work on our own. And perhaps at some time in the filture we will get
together and talk about the whole project again."";
This rather opaque, lukewarm statement did not rel]ecl tile ideological opposition to
priwtle enterprise that characterized Soviet attitudes later in the year. Perhaps an expla-
nation for this statement lies in tilt" agreement conchlded bv Dr. Anatoli Blagonravov of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA Deputy Administrator I high 1,. Dryden c(m-
cerning U.S.-Sovict coiq)eratitin ill space. By leaving the door open, Blagonravov may have
expressed an altitude t:onlrar.v lo lhal of his political superiors. Tilt" Soviels might have
had much to gain from c(:,Ol)('raling with the lnl(,rinl Arrangements, such as the pooling
of resources and ltle culling of costs. For political reasons, though, the arguments of econ-
otnv often have gone unheeded.
In the fall of 1964, at meetings of lhe International Institute of Space Law anti of lhe
United Nations Comnfittee on tilt' Pcacefnl Uses of ()tiler Space, tile Soviet Uni<m and
other (:onm-nlnist countries expressed strt)ng opposition to lntelsat as a device for trans-
t_.'rling space COlnlnunicatitms into the hands of U.S. private capital. In Warsaw, Dr. I.I.
Cheprov read a paper in which he contended that it was "tile duty of la+_yers imposed
upon them . . . by rest)hltions of the U.N. General Assembly to see to it thai (omnnulica-
lions t)y nteans of satellites t)ettmlc +available to the nations of tile world as soon as t)rac -
ticable on a global and nlm-discrintinalory hasis...' IRes. 1721/XVI). '''_ Cheprov
(lmlentted that tile lnterinl ArrangemelllS were a tneatls of i)erpetualing the Comsat
55. 'l_.stirnom ot l.Villianl (;ilb('r_ CaFlt'r ir_ A?etellit_ +(,'ommuPei:atirm+ tteaPi+Pg_, l'arl Z p. 665. Much +)1 th<'
fi)ll<)win K inl(+llnalion on t.S. discussion,; t,_,rilh the _,llvict /'ui(m (i)lll( ++-,['l{)ln this st)tilt t'. pp. 665-61;, and Il(mt
William (;illwvt (_altt'l, intmvit'+_ wilh .l(mathan F. (;alh)wa_, l)('p;llllllt'l)t OI St_tt(', V','ashinglon. l)(:, lS Mal(h
1965.
.r-)('). I'('stim()n,, (ff Willi;tm (',ill)(.)t (',;u Icl, _hid., p. (;(R').
")7. I.I. (:il('l)l()'_, "*%,)m(' l.cgal l)lol)Icms ,)I llllt'lll;lli()llitl Nl)a((' (;omtmmi,.;_ti()ns.'" l>)m,'+'di_+ff_ r,[ flu'
_,+'+,+')tth CMIru/+O.m o, the Law ./ Outer '_pa++' (Vicntla: S;l)rin_vt-Vctlag, 19fi5).
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wa_ the 3lol_ti_ia satellile, _hown above. Critical _)[ (.'om_at, the 5;oviet I 'mort atLrued at the 1:ttited ,\)aion_ a_td itl othe_ /_*ram_
rtgam_t /he role o/private enteq)ri_e i1_ q)m_" _ommunitatirm_. ((]()lAt'l('Ny (1t' NASA, phot() tr<)m tmnumbclcd t,.fldcr,
"USSR Molniwt gcneral," NASA History ()ffitc)
monopoly. Not only would the partners in the Interim Arrangements be victims of
monopoly domination, but so would the Americans themselves: "It is well known that pri-
vate enterprise in the United States has a long experience of discriminating against
Americans themselves, so how can we expect this enterprise to be unbiased and just on
the international scene?" Cheprov quoted the opponents of the Communications Satellite
Act as evidence against existing American policy.
These charges echoed at the meetings of the United Natious Committee on the
Peacelifl Uses of Outer Space held between 26 October and 6 November 1964. The dele-
gates of Communist bloc countries criticized lntelsat as a profit system for the benefit of
Ihe undeveloped countries at the expense of the developing nations. '_ Second, they criti-
cized the Interim Arrangements as a violation of the principle of sovereign equality
because of the procedures fi)r weighted voting. Third, they reproached them as an attempt
to create an organization outside the more appropriate organizational and political frame-
work of the United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union. These
58. See [rnilcd Nalions I)ocumcnt A/A(;. 105/'PV.2{_-35 tier lifts lind the fifth)wing ideas.
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charges, couched ill Ira{lifional Cold War senlantics, were placed in a difli:rcnt perspective
by the dispassionme analyses of file representatives of file United Sum's and Britain.
The U.S. representative poimed out fllat a system based on profit was not necessarily
exl)loitative: "P{'rl]aps what we refk_r to as a 'prolh m(_dve+ in lifts counlrv is no! as far
removed as it might tits! appear to be fi-om w}la_ son,'fimes is mmskm,d ti-om O_e Soviel
press as being 'profit incenlive. .... Fhatcher went on 1o suggesl thai the Communisl rich'-
gales might be mistakenly conihsing participation in lntelsa! wilh access: "It is clear from
tile agreements fllenlselves.., thal participation in flwse arrangements is open to all still["
members of the fl'U [ hlternalional _Ikqccomnmnications Union ] and fllal whether m not
a Slam is a particiF,;_ling metal)on access to the system is on a {omplelely Dee and non-
distrinfinatovv basis to all states."
_'Wslern delegates did not wd{hcss the Soviet charges at that time. tlowever, several
considerations in this regard may be Incntioned. First, the i)rinciF, le of sovereign equality
in ,some arrangements is not im'ompatil)lc with the In-iuciple <)f weighted voting in otllet+s.
Politi(al treatit's are ttsttallv based on sovereign e(lualit_,, although even in that case the
('hired Nations Secmity (kmncil can be vicwed as an cxcelllion. Functional arrangements
may involvc special tormulas rellecling unique silualions and rt_sponsil}ililies, :is with the
case {if" lilt: World Bank, tilt" hltt+rnatit}nal M<}netat-v Fund, and lnlels;ttl. Thus, weighled
\'{}ling {I{}es n{}l I}er se lead to exfll<filadon.
Se{on{I, Intclsal was not divorce{t |Tom Ill{' franww{}rk of Ill{' I.;ni/c{l Nations or Ill{"
Internati{}nal "Ikd{,c<}nmnulicati{}ns Union. l'lw Extra{wdinarv Administrative Radio
(2}nlk?reil{t' <}[ the Intern;itional "Ikqc{'omnnunicalit}ns [!hi{in established Ill{' te{lnfi('al
fratnework flu" the tmntation o[ a system {if c{mmmni{alions satellites. The I.!niled
Nalk}ns d{}cs not discourage I}m YHltl(}l'..---ill (;llil[}[{'l" VIII of its (;hitFt{"l_¢+'lICOlll-;.tges tlle
formati(/n {}t regional atrangt?ments whose I/rin(il}l{'s harnlonize with th{lse (}t" Ill{"
Charter. It was s{}nwwhat strange fin tilt' Sovi{,t Uni<}n I<} {'titicize tilt" I_;nited Sl+tlt's fi>l+ cat--
t+ying on <}i}erati{}ns bey{>n{l the fringe, when Ih{' Rttssians themselves often appeared as
tit{" {'{}nstmunate dev{}lees {if selfhlsttlati<}n. ! Iowever, Ihe l;tcli{ {}f calling for in{reascd
inlernati<}nal cooperation fi}r olbers, wbih" reneging on illlerll;ttiollal {-ollallorati{}ll ilseII +,
was a tamiliar Sovi{q practice. In fact, whal {:,n{" s:,i',,,,: ill this ill_+;t;tnc{ ' was an{}lller f{}llll {if
{omt}{,dti{}n--c{}tnpctili{m to set? who {'{}{)pel+;tI{+{{ the In{}_;{. t+,ecattse both the United
Slates and the Soviet Union continually t}t-onoun{ed fl]eir (ooperalive inlenlions, it can
be intcrpr<.'led as a mark of i}reslig{ ' to have a ]}ellel I{'{{}l'{l {}f international {<}llal}oration.
As NASA Adtninistvat{ir.]anws E. Wellt) slate{l: "D{!s]}itc its t}l{}testations of peaceful inter-
esls, tile So',¢iel space plOgr;tm {';Ill sh{}w I]{} comparal/le (t<} our own) engagement in
c{}{}per;ttive rt'lafi{}nships. '''_
T{} {}ver{{}me this {{}{}perative weakness, tile Soviel Uniol] proposed its own illlern;l-
ti{}nal satellite {;ommunications system, Intersl}utnik. ()n 5 August 1968, the Soviet (hlion,
Bulgaria, (;ut)a, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, I'{}land, and Romania submitted a
draft agt{*en]enl lot lntersl}utnik Io tit{' United Nalimls."' The l/rOl}osal took _/dv;+tllti:tge <}f
scvtwal apt)a]t'nl weaknesses ill the ]nlels, al ap/}r{}ach. Ill the first place, file only lllellll}el-s
of luterSl}utnik were sl;:lles, _ln{I t_[le voting I}x{>{edure was one vole per slilIe. This
approa{h <}bviouslv had app{+al t<} many ((}lllltlies, t<}l il ('OlltlaSt<.'d tavorablv with the
image of In/elsat as l}eing {l{nninalcd IB a private U.S. {orl}orali{}n. Ftu-thernl<}r{', Ill{'
Preatnble l<} the draft c{}nteuq}htl{'{[ Ill{? estal)lishnlent {}[ a system that woul{l t/vovidc
direct tlt'oadt'asting front satellites. Stt{'h a svst{'m could I}vpass ill{., need t(} establish
exl}t'nsive ground statil}ns t<} r{'lav signals from s;tlelIites in spa{{!. Thus, if such a dire{1
t)r<}atlt+asI system were imp]it'd, h]lersputnik could grt'ally aid the I{,ss {|evelope{t countries
59. N.I._;A A'ea,_, 25.]anuar'+ 1965, pp. 13-1t.
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by enabling them to circtmwent the need to establish a costly cmnmunications infi-a-
structure. Finally, the lntersputnik draft agreement allowed [br more than one interna-
tional communications satellite system, whereas one of the main criticisms of Intelsat was
that the signers of the Interim Mwangements committed themselves to a single system.
Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, the lntersputnik draft had several drawhacks.
First, during the same month the eight Comnmnist states proposed their own system, the
Soviets launched their invasion of Czechoslovakia. The callousness of Soviet behavior
toward their own all), overshadowed any possible propaganda benefits fl'om Interspumik.
Another drawback to lntersputnik involved a number of ambiguities in the draft pro-
posal. One concerned systenl ownership..,Mticle 3(2) slated that the satellites could be the
property of Interslmlnik or leased to Interspntnik by its lnember states. As Stephen E.
Doyle wrote, this provision "could be construed as a Soviet effort to ensure that the USSR
would he able to provide at least some of the space segmenl requirements of the interna-
tional system to the organization on a lease hasis with the USSR collecting the rent."' It
follows that, in contrast to Intelsat, Intersputnik would be a coordinating umbrella orga-
nization rather than one that is the sole owner of the space segment. However, similar to
lntelsat, Article 3 (4) of the draft stated that "the ground complex shall be the property of
the States which have construcled it in their territory." A filrther aml)iguity in the
Intersptmfik proposal concerned the lack of any requirement thai there be nondiscrimi-
natory access tor all users--a reqttiremenl clearly slated in the Preamble to the lnlelsat
agreement. On tim other hand, Article 1(} of the Communist draft slated tl,at "tim distri-
bution of comnnmications channels among states niembers of the organization shall be
made on the basis of their need for communications chmmels." Paragraph 2 of the same
article stipulatecl, however, that slates had to pay for its channels at fixed rates, which was
certainly a strange, albeit understandable, requirement |or a Comnmnist organization
ideologically committed to the proposition "From each according to his ahility, to each
acco,'ding to Iris needs."
Yet another atnbiguity in the Intersputnik draft concerned the organization's execu-
tive and governing structure. Each slate had one vote, and actions required a majority of
two-thirds; consequently, a minorily of member stales could stall an initiative backed by a
simple majority. <' In addition, unlike lntelsat, lnterslmtnik lacked an international execu-
tive bod> but instead had a secretary general whose responsil)ilities seemed to include
much executive as well as administrative authority.
In addition to these ambiguities, a third major drawback to the Soviet Interspntnik
draft proposal was thal no stales look the Soviets up on their offer four ),ears after its sub-
mission. It was true that the draft llC'aty of 1968 was superseded by a treats' in final form,
which was deposited at the United Nations on 15 November 1971, but that treaty had not
come into torce by mid-1972. Furthermore, Ibm years later, Intersptmfik still had not
begun actual operations. The Soviet Union had established a domestic system, Orbita,
which was quite success|ifl and extensive, but their interest in international space commu-
nications lacked the vigor of their other programs of space exploration and exploitation.':'
Nonetheless, the Soviets had plans to launch a synchronous comnmnications satellite,
to be called Statsionar 1, over the Indian Ocean. This position would allow it to cover pop-
61. Stephen E. Doyle, _An Analysis of the Sotialist States' Proposal for INTERSI'UTNIK: An
Inletnail<real Communication Satellile System," Villanova I,aw Review 15 (Fall 1969): 83-105, quole on p. 88.
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ulatcd arcas between Britain anti.Japan. Also, the Soviets ]mlpcd construct ground stations
at>road in Mongolia, Cul)a, the United Arab Rct)ublic, and Mall, '_' bul it was unlikely that
the system would have been able to compete on a point-to-point basis with lntclsal. The
only potential threat to U.S. leadership ill Intclsat <ould have come, bul never did,
through the establishment of a direct-broadcasting system.
In summarizing the competitive features of U.S.-Sovict relationships regarding satcl-
rite communications, one lllllSl emphasize t]ql;ll [he United Slates had a commanding h'ad
in cxphliting the early tct:hnologQ, for purp()scs of intc,national c<mmnn)ications. The
character of tilt: U.S. leadership was su<h that il damag{'d tilt: prestige |)lit nol lhe sc(:uri-
ty of the Soviet Union. The Soviets wcrc not impervious t<) prestige COml)ctilion, but
through 1!)72, thcy c()nlincd their rcsp(mscs t() idcoh)gical thrusts and limited intcrna-
ti<mal experiments."
IF tile Soviet [Tnion had been al)lc to establish a dirc(t-br()adcast television service t()
the newer nations, they might have had at their disposal a powcrlul instrument of prol)a-
g,an<la and mass communication. '_ In the early ",cars. U.S. policy makers were not blind to
dirc<t-broadcast possibilities. In [_lCt, considerable discussion of such a systcln had taken
place in the United Nations and in (kmgrcss.": These systems, though, did not comc into
their own until Ihc late 1980s. By then, the (;old War was coming to an end, and compe-
tition in (omnmnications satcllilcs was mainly a market phenomena, not one between
CllCllly St_ltt's. ill t_tct, |)y Ill(: I(.)(.}()S, Intclsat was lacing the pr,,spcct of privatization, and
Intcrs[mtnik was thinking of mo<lcling itself (m Intclsat's early liti" history!
Conclusion
The origins of comnnmicalions satellite p<)licics, programs, and ill.slilutions ill the
1960s and early 1970s set off an avalan<hc of new <+ot|nntmi<ati<ms satcllitc techniques
their continttc t() this day. Ill SOlll( + ('as_.'s, the original l)laycrs have fallen victim to their own
successes, or they arc making lhcir way with the same natncs in increasingly deregulated,
privatizcd, and interconnected glol>al nctworks and welts. Comsat still exists, but events
have overtaken its [orcign policy goals. The Dct(:nsc Satellite C<mmnmicalions System is
ongoing, lint its role allcl tilt" (;old War has changc<l. Intclsat exists as an org,lllizalion set
11t>by trcaQ, but it may split up into two or more paris. Mcanwhilc, tile Soviet Union has
disinlcgralcd, but lntcrsptHnik continues to operate while lhshioning itself on the mo<lcl
O[" the old ]lltclsat.
_|l_lt l('SSOllS (|o(?s tilt' p()liti(al scientist draw |1-o111 tile hist<)ry o| ('Olllllllllli('_lti<)llS
satellites <)vcr the last three d(,cadcs? Do wc really have t't,VelHy-t'Wcllty hindsight now, (>) <hi
our g],ass(!s li]t('t out certain ])('rspcctiv,es that arc crucial lot mldcrstanding tcchn<)h)gical
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change, domestic policy, foreign relations, and national sovereignty at the dawn of the
twenty-first centnry?
From the vantage point of today, the themes stressed in the author's 1972 work on
communications satellites remain salient and even more pronounced. The importance of
technological change is manifest, and the distinction between evolutionary and revolu-
tionary change pointed out in 1972 is still probably correct. A technological change can
be evolutionary--for instance, the move from geostationary satellites to low-Earth-orbit
satellites. Yet there can be revohttionary economic impacts on industry structure and no
political effects--say, in terms of the balance of power or the national interest. In the
main, the consequences of technological innovation in communications satellites have
heen evolutionary, and it is certainly ironic that cables, not coaxial hut fiber optic, are
making a comeback.
From another perspective, policy making in a l:ast-changing environment may be
shocked and compromised by the system's changing structure. Such an environment will
affect rationality in decision making, as well as the boundaries of political systems--how
wide they are and how porous and tenuous they are. Another effect will be on democra-
cy. If globalization processes become encoded in the technological logic of global com-
munications satellite systems, then locally based checks and balances and systems of
accountability may be undermined, or put under great stress. However, checks and bal-
ances and accountability may reappear at the global level in terms of market-based incen-
tives and the requirements of international regimes.
In today's world, we see great fi)rces pushing in both directions--toward global eco-
nomic logic and toward local political control. Nationalism seems to be both resurgent
and atavistic. We live in a time of paradoxes and ambivalences. Communications satellite
technology is one small part of this total technological, economic, and political reality. It
is a microcosm, and its history and its lessons point to a better understanding of our age,
which may be called "an age of ages"--the space age, the nuclear age, the computer age,
and the information age. One must not forget, too, that this is the age of democracy.
Perhaps that is the most pertinent lesson of the history of communications satellites: if the
technologo, has globalizing effects, eventually felt at the level of the individual, then com-
numications satellites, as part of the worldwide communications revolution, will be part of
the world movement toward democracy.
PART III'.
The Unfolding of the World System
Geography, Politics, and Culture

Chapter 14
The Pursuit of Equality: The Role
of the Ionosphere and
Satellite Communications in
Canadian Development
by Bert C. Blevis
Canada is a vast country. It spans six time zones, and much of its area is dominated hy
rugged lerrain and inhospitable climates. As a result, large stretches of tile cmmtry are
sparsely populated. Most of the population is concentrated in a thin strip ahmg the U.S.
border, and even that is clustered heavily ira the most southerly portion of the country,
extending from Windsor, Ontario, in the wesl to Montreal, Quebec, ira the easl. Unlil lhe
advent of satellite communications, the greal rural and remote expanses of the comatry
lacked access to telecommunications and other services taken for granted in the southern
urban areas. Well beR)re satelliles arrived on the scene, however, Canadian researchers
vigorously pursued other avenues of communication to bring the nation together lhrough
the enhancement o[ long-distance communicalions.
Early Ionospheric Studies
Canada's early interest in the ionosphere stemmed fiom two somces (Tahle 1). One
was to understand the phenomenon that gives rise to the beautiful dist)lays of amnral hore-
alis (the northern lights), st) often visible over Canada. The auroral bnrealis is especially
prevalent during certain parts of the solar cycle and at particular times of the ),ear. The
other sore-re was the attempt to mlderstand the vagaries of the ionosphere--particularly
the causes of disturbances and blackouts experienced in shortwave radio propagation.
Indeed, the earl), hmar radar work carried out ira Canada in the late 1950s was not st)
much to look at the Moon as a means of communication, or even to explore its surface.
Rather, it was to use the Moon as a reflecting (or, more correctly, a scattering) ol2jecl
beyond the ionosphere to sludy the effects of the Earlh's ionospheric layers on electro-
magnetic radiation passing through them, including the Faraday rotation of the plane of
polarizalion. The historic message from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Canadian
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to commemorale the opening of the Prince All)erl
Radar l.at)oratory on 6June 1959 was lransmitted via the Moon. (:anadian ionospheric
_oncerns during lhe 1.qS0s also exlended It)Ihc problems of using radar It) deicer any mis-
siles thai might pass over the country's polar region.
This early allention to the Moon, as well as contemporary studies of rel]eclions from
meleor trails, led to a predilection It) consider passive satelliles, particularly for secure
communicalions. Other passive communications were investigaled, including large
retlecting balloons such as Echo, clouds of dipoles placed into the Earlh's orbit (I,incnln
Laboratory's Prt_ject DA.sl Ford), and various proposals for muhifaccted satellites.
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Dale
1839
1882-83
12 December 1901
1932-33
1{,)41
1947
40ctoher 1957
January 1958
July 1958
31 De(:emt)er 1958
11 March 1959
6June 1959
16 Decemher 1959
1960
29 September 1962
1962
,June 1962
Table 1
Canada's Early lot_ospheric 15oKrams
Program
First magnetic ohservatory estahlished at the University of Toronto
First International Polar Year'; measurements of magnetic and auro-
ral phenomena
Marconi's transatlantic transmission to Signal 1till, Newfi)rrndland
Second International Polar Year; field stations established in north;
e('lif)se rneasrrrelrlerl[ s
Ionosonde installed north of Ottawa by the National Research
Council
Formation of tire (_anadian Defence Research Board; continuing
ionospheric studies at tile Defence Research Board's
Telecommunications Estahlishment
Sputnik I, the first artificial Earth satellite (Soviet Union),
International Geophysical Year
Explorer 1, the first American satellite; discovery of tile \Sin Allen
behs
Satellite proposals invited by the Space Science Board of U.S.
National Academy of Sciences
('anadian proposal submitted for topside sounding satellite
NASA approval in principle for topside sounder
Iamar communications demonstration at tile opening of the Prince
Albert Radar I.ahoratory
l.etter of Agreement ))etween NASA and the Defence Research
Board tot Alouette
Echo I
Ah)uette 1, Canada's top-side sounder and the first satellite by other
than the Soviet Union or the United States
Telstar I, the first transatlantic television via satellite
First Black Brant Ilia atmospheric research rocket launched
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August1963
29 November 1965
February 1967
30January 1969
August 1969
1 September 1969
16 May 1970
31 March 1971
20 April 1971
November 1972
April 1973
May 1975
17.]anuary 1976
15 l)ecemt)er 1{.)78
Table 1 (continued)
t5og_am
International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS) program,
through a (',anada-U.S. memorandum of understanding for a join!
program to launch Ibm-additional satellites
Agreement with NASA tbr (:anadian participation in the testing of
experimental communications satellites, including a commitment to
build it grotlnd station
Ah)uette 2
Re<:<mmmndatio1_ that the prime Canadian objective in space tech-
nology' be its applications to domestic telecommunications and
resource survey
ISIS 1
Forlnalion of the l)el)artlnent of (;omnmnications
Establish/nent of Telesat Canada
First aircraft-to-aircrldi voice tla1_slnission using the sixth 151wo111
Experimental Satellite (LE_6)
ISIS 2
NASA and the Canadian Department of (k)mmunications sign an
agreement Io begin the Comnnlnicalions Tec|moh)g T Salellile
(CTS) program.
Anik AI, the tirst domestic geostafionary communications satellite
(C-band)
AnikA2
Anik A
(]TS/lleln]es, rite firs! high-l)owered, Kn-band satellite and !he
world's most i)owerful to date
Anik B, !he [irst commercial hybrid salellitc, operating in both the
(;-t)and and ll)e Ku-band
September 1987 Ennny Award !o NASA and lbe De/)artmenl of (;ommunicalions fin.
tile ltermes contribution
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Alouette/ISIS
_qlen Sputnik I was launched on 4 October 1957, scientists at Canada's Defence
Research Telecommtmications Establishment were among tim first to monitor its trans-
missions and determine its orbit.' In July 1958, the Space Science Board of the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences invited proposals fi)r scientific experiments to be conduct-
ed with satellites. Canadian scientists were eager to participate. On the last day of 1958,
the Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment submitted a tormal proposal to
the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for a top-side
sounding satellite. NASA accepted the proposal in principle on 11 March 1959, and the
project (known as Alouette 1) became a joint undertaking between Canada and the
United Slates through a letter of agreement t)etween NASA and the Defence Research
Board on 16 December 1959.
With the launch of Alouetlc 1 on 29 September 1962 (jtlst befbre midnight
Vandenberg Air Force Base local time on 28 September), Canada became the third coun-
try in space after the Soviet Union and the United States. The stage was now set t+or the
untolding of Canada's space program.-' However, the government's decision not to devel-
o t) satellite latmch t_tcilities in Canada restricted the space program to projects achievable
only through international arrangements with foreign space agencies, such as NASA and
tile European Space Agency.
The principal experiment on the Alouette spacecraft was the ionospheric topside
sounder, whose two rigid dipole antennas extended twenly-three nlelers and lofty-five
tnelels tip to tip, respectively. Other experiments included the measurement of cosmic
radio noise, w:ry-low-liequency radio emissions, and energetic charged particles.
Within a short time after the successful launch of Alouette 1, Canada initiated nego-
tiations with NASA tot additional scientific satellites. On 23 May 1963, those negotiations
led to the creation of the International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS) program,
consisting of Alouette 2, ISIS 1, and ISIS 2. Alouette 2 (launched 29 November 1965) was
a inodified version of Alot,ette 1 and included a probe experiment and an expanded
sotmder frequency range. The two ISIS spacecraft (laullched 30 January 1969 and
31 March 1971, respectively) incorporated additional equil)ment filrnished by the United
States.
An international working group, called the Topside Sotmder _,kwking Group (but
later renamed the ISIS Working (;roup), was set up in 1960 to provide guidance to the
program. In addition to the United States and Canada, Australia, Britain, Finland, France,
India, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway became involved in the program.
Betore Alouelte 1, scientists had virtually no direct knowledge of lhe ionosphere
above approximately 300 kilometers. The Alouelte satellite instruments provided infor-
mation on electron distributions, their temporal and spatial variations, their irregularities
and resonances, the influence of incoming charged particles, cosmic and solar noise,
polar cap absorption, solar wind penetration, and ion species in the Earth's atmosphere.
The two ,Mouette and two ISIS satellites were extremely complex spacecraft fi)r their
time. They set records fiw longevity and estahlished a precedent fi)r a long history of inter-
I. For an interesting history o[ the Canadian space program, see Doris tl. Jelly, Canada: 25 }bar_ in
,S_mce (Montreal: Polys_ ience Publications, in _ ooperation wilh the National Museum of Science and Technolob,, T,
1988),
2. For delails of Ihe devt'lopnlent of the Alotleltt', ISIS. and Hermes satelliles, as well as a number of
inleresting anecdotes, see The<ulme R. H+IIt/ alld hvine Paghis, .'_'pa:ebot,:+Td (Otlawa: t;ovel'llllltqlt o[ Canada,
[)eparltnt'lH of (]omnuttfi('ations, 1982).
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national cooperation in space. Alouette 1 was designed to have a lifetinm of (me year. In
private, project scientists hoped to gain at least a month of data t)om Alouette 1, but in
reality, the satellite provided data for more than ten years. The ISIS satellites remained
operational fi)r ahnost twenty years. In 1987, Alouette I was selected as one o1 the ten
greatest engineering achievements in Canada in the past century; in 1993, the Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers designated the Alouette/ISIS program an
International Milestone of Electrical Engineering. Scientists from ten nations published
approximately 700 scholarly papers that described the results of the Alouette/ISIS pro-
gram. This was perhaps tim most prolific of any such program.
A fourth satellite in the ISIS program (ISI_C) was to have been launched under the
agreement with the United States, but it was abandoned in 1969. Canadian space policy
had been undergoing some fllndamental changes in the previous years. In 1963, for exam-
pie, the Canadian government decided that the technolog T that had heen resident in the
Defence Resemch Telecommunications Establishment tmtil then was to be transferred to
industry during the ISIS program as a means of augmenting the Canadian industrial space
capability. Then came a Fehruary 1967 government report (the so-called (_hapman report),
which recommended redirecting space technolo_, research to specific ai)plications--in
particular, communications and remote sensing. The objective was to place elements of
space technolog D' vital to Canada under Canadian control, as well its to tosler a Canadian
space industrial capabiti%' to meet Canadian needs and to address export markets.
A Global First
Ewm armed with all the new knowledge about the ionosphere, the emergent com-
munications satellite technolo_ _ottered the only practical solution fi)r providing reliahle
telecomnmnications--particularly radio and television--to the 20 percent of Canadians
who had no possibility of sharing in the communications and information revolution. To
achi('ve the Canadian government's highest ohjective of providing basic telecommunica-
tions services to all, Telesat Canada--initially half owned by government and half hy the
private sector--was created on 1 September 1969. :'
The launch of Anik A in November 1972, and the inauguration of service in 1973,
i)laced Canada in lhe forefront--the first country in the world to implement a domestic
contmercial geostationary satellite system. To complete the initial system, two other Anik
A satellites were launched, one in April 1973 and the other in May 1975. Similar to other
conmmnications satellite systems of the time, all three Anik A satellites operate(l at
(]-ban(t. The Anik B satellite, launched 15 December 1978, was intended to provide
"Felesat Canada with capacity as a backup tot the Anik A series.
Hermes
After a long series of discussions, the Canadian Department of Communications and
NASA signed an agreentent on 20 April 1971 to undertake a joint program called the
C()mmtmications Technology Satellite (CTS). The CTS was to replace the fourth space-
craft originally planned as part of the ISIS progrant. Because of the number ()f
technological (hallenges that had to he ()vercome, however, the CTS program was n()l
3. lion. (:.M. l)iui?., A l)ome_lit ),atel#ite Comml_#tiattion_ ,_,_stem fi*# (;atutda (()liawa: (._u,.'('n's Prinl('i;
191i8). 'e,hi_ tl ;',,i.'., il (]_lllAdiall go_,('l iiiiiciIl while papci, ill_li('d thai "'a ,:l()nlesiic salcllit(' ( Ollllllllllil ;lli()ll +-,s'_sl('lli
is ill "dial iliip(lllaii(e tiil Ih(' gi[iv, ih, tirl)siicril)iilil[ liilil'_ o1( ]aii_i(la. alid sli(liil(t I)_' ,<'slal)lishcd ;is ;t lilalll'i lit
f)riorii)."
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Figure 26
l_n..¢t.'d i. 1072, A.ik A (ab.vr; made Canad. tlw /i_sl .m.l_s evcl to [_lflll_rlgt?tltf ' ft tIl_gf'l,_'_lil tfllltmFtglfll _'O$ltlltttllflt_'
wltcl[ile _l'_h'm. (((I)Ultt'sx I)l N.\_,.\I
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without its detractors. Nonetheless, file Canadian govermnen! agreed to take the lead and
undertake the development work at its Communications Research Centre. This center
originally had been the Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment: it was
transferred to the Department of Connnunications in August 1969 and renamed.
Tile objective of the CTS |)logva111 was to atlvallce the state of tilt" art of communica-
tions satellites by developing a system capable of operating at higher powers and higher
ti-equencies than existing systems. Such a system thevel)y would make direct commtmica-
lions possible with low-cost (at 1he lime) ground stations in individual homes ant| {om-
mtmities. The program also aspired to deveh)p and tlight-test a three-axis stal)ilizatio))
systeln l(/ maintain _lCCllrale alltentla pointing antt It) condtlt't ('olnlllllllicalions and
technological expel-illlents with Ill(" svslelll. All ;.l(']tliliolla] t)]_ietlive of the (:I'S [)l¢)gralll
was to imprt)ve Canadian industrial capability in the design and manulacture of spacecraft
and satellite subsystems. The prevailing political environment inVluenccd tile commmli-
cations experiments, focusing on an evaluation of lhe economic, social, and political
inlpact of the introduction of new services in the t_.nu/-e. Those sevvices included lilt, pro-
vision of medical and educational two-way televisi<m services It) remote areas, conlllllmitv
interaction, the delivery of government services, and direcl-television brt)adcasting.
(ianada designed, buih, and operated tilt" CTS spacecrafl. The United Stales provid-
ed the high-p,)wer traveling-wave tube tbr lilt" san'lliw transpondcr, as well as test and
lattn(h services f(lr the sl)a(e('ralt anti io(ket. It is interesting to note also that the origi-
))a] (:anadian proposal i)lchMed a suppleme))tary |:band mobil(' satellite commlmica-
titres |)ayload. Thal payload was dr()pped in favor of the higher fiequency (twelve- and
tburteen-gigahertz) communications package when it was lear)ted tim! the launch vehicle
pr<)vided by lilt: United States precluded the inchtsion of both systems.
Canada and the L!nitcd Stales s]_;lrett the itse ()t' tilt! salel]ih' equally. Subsequently, in
May 1(.)72, tilt. Eurol)ean Space Research Orga,fization (now tilt' Eutopean Space ,.\gency)
also p;ulicil)aWd ill tilt- (TI'S program. The Em-t)pea_ls agreed It) provide several compo-
netlls t(ll +use in future European conmmnications satellites, including a twenty-watt lt-avel-
|rig-wave mmsmitting tilt)e, ill Icttwn for devel()ping lbe solar alravs ;|l lie cost to (];l]]ilrl;L
The (]'IS, latmched 17 Janttaty 1(.)7('). was rena,ned t h'rmes in Canada when service
I)egam on 21 May 1976. The inaugnralion ()f service included a t)t)c-hotu color televisio,l
teleconfcrence betweell NASA's Lewis Research (k'nter in (',leveland, Ohio. and tilt"
(;ommttnications Research (2mire in (-)ll;iw;l. Ontario. (;anada chose lilt" name from
classical (;reek tnytht)h)g T. tlermes, tilt" son ()f' Zeus, was cousidcred to be the god of
science and invention, as well as eh)quence and dreams. The t termes spacecraft was tilt"
most powerful civilian spacecraft (as measured by effective isotropically radiated power)
vet launched. Designed to endure two years in space, t termes operated for almost t(mr
years bef()rc it was lost.
l)tuing those fou, years, the satellite fhltilled all ot its objectives, ltermes perft)rnwd
vari()us (omnmnicalions experiments that prt)ved its usefulness in I)roviding lnetli('al ;tnd
edu(alional services to remote areas ("telemcdicine" and "tele-education"), in promoting
connnunilv interaction, ill delivering government services, and in denlonstrating direct-
to-hotne television using very. small reflector alllellnas. It is Iwlieved lllal the first ever
directil()-home satellhe television broadcast was that t)f a ('.anadian hockey game in May
1!)78. The t)r()adcasl was tlansllliltetl via the ttermes satellile to a sixty-centimeter dish
antenna set up at the home of a Canadian embassy official in lama, Peru, during a re(el>
ti()n f()v an inuwnati(mal meeting. In August 197(`), t termes, rep()sitit)ned over the Pacific
()cean, served in a joint satellite conmlttnications wt)rkslmp with Australia and in a
denlonstratitm t)f direct-teh'visiotl I_road(asting it) Papl,a, New (;uinea. Sul)seqtu'nlls+ con-
lv()l ()1 Ill(' salt,llite was It)st, and all (()mnluni(alit)ns ('ease(l.
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Nonetheless, for Hermes's accomplishments in the field of television broadcasting
and its applications, the Communications Research Centre and NASA jointly received an
Emmy Award from the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences in 1987. Because
of the need to have some back-up and follow-on capability for Hermes in the event of fail-
ure of any one of its many innovative subsystems, the Canadian government arranged with
Telesat Canada to include fourteen-gigahertz uplink/twelve-gigahertz downlink transpon-
ders on its Anik B satellite. As a result, Anik B was the first satellite in the world to oper-
ate in both the C-band and the Kn-hand.
Mobile Satellite Communications
As early as 1967, Canadian researchers were involved in trials with the United States
on the use of ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) satellites for mobile services primarily for
defense operations. The use of UHF frequencies on U.S. experimental military satellites,
such as the LES-5, LES-6, and TACSAT, offered the possibility of small, lightweight mobile
or transportable terminals. Several demonstrations were carried out in land, maritime,
and aeronautical environments. The world's tirst direct aircrafHo-aircraft voice connnu-
nications via satellite took place on 16 May 1970 between two Canadian Department of
National Defence aircraft.
The Canadian Department of National Defence continued to use U.S. satellites;
Canada never implemented a military UHF mobile satellite system. Nonetheless, the early
Canadian efibrts led to a proposal, although never implemented, to include a UHF
transponder on the Hermes spacecraft. The idea of a Department of National Defence
MUSAT (Mobile UHF Satellite) eventually resulted in a proposal tot a civilian mol)ile
communications satellite called MSAT. Ultimately, with the encouragement of the
Canadian govermnent, and in cooperation with NASA, Telesat Canada and several
American companies (which later formed the Mnerican Mobile Satellite Corporation)
undertook the development of two satellites to provide mobile satellite services on a com-
mercial basis in North America. Later, the responsibility for Canada's inw)lvement in the
project was transferred to a private firm, TMI Communications.
Conclusion
The rest of Canada's communications satellite program is more recent history.
Canada was one of the founding nations of the satellite-aided search-and-rescue system
known as COSPAS/SARSAT fbr Cosmicheskaya Sistemya Poiska Avariynych Sudov (Space
System for Search of Distressed Vessels in Russian) and Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided
Tracking, which became an ahnost instant success after the launch of the first spacecraft
in 1982. Researchers at the Communications Research Centre participated in the
European Space Agency's large, high-powered, nmltipurpose Olympus communications
satellite. These researchers continue to make major contributions to the development of
new communications technologies, to carry out studies on the next generation of satellite
communications systems, and to explore new ways of providing access for all Canadians to
the new multimedia information superhighway.
Telesat has gone on to launch its Ku-band Anik C, C-band Anik D, and the hybrid
Anik E series of satellites. Anik E made history when both of the two other satellites failed
during an unust,al solar event. Telesat subsequently has hrought them back to full opera-
tion, Mobile communications satellite studies at the Comnumications Research Centre
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have led to lhe manuf_cturc t)lAmcrican Mobile Satellite (]orporalion's AMSC-I salellitc,
which was latmched in 1995, and of MSAT-I, launched on 20 April 199r; and placed in
gcostationary orbit al 1075 ° West.
Teleglobe, Canada's international lelccommtmi(:ations carrier, is a signatory Io and a
major pliuer in Intelsat and [nnlltrsal. ]1 also hits become a partner in l]lt" Oll)('ollllll Litlle
I_EO (low-Earth orbit) s;_,tellite and now is parlicipaling with TRW in lht" Big I,EO salellite
program called Odyssey.
Canada. spurred on by the necessity (_f providing fi)r the social, cconomi(, and polit-
ical needs of a population widely, dispersed over a vast, and somclimt, s inhospitable,
terrain, and subject to a harsh climate, played a major role in ihc cx])loration of the
ionosphere and in the early international developmt.nt of satellite comnmnications, It has
maintained its leading role through stlccet.ding gcnevalions of new s;tlcllil¢'s ;uld lechllo-
logical progress. Canada can lw CXl)eCted to rt_main at Ihc |f)lc.'fl'olll o[ satellite commu-
nications technology well int_) the |Ultll¢'.

Chapter 15
The Long March to Space: Satellite
Communications in China
by Zhu Yilin
China entered tile satellite field in 1965 and has been developing applied satellite sys-
tems for economic, scientilic, teclmological, educational, anti cultural uses since the
launch, on 24 April 1970, of the first Chinese satellite, Dong Fang Hong-1 (DFH-1),
named fiw the Maoist victory song. By the end of 1996, China had launched thirty-seven
of its own satellites, including sixteen returnal)le remote-sensing satellites, seven comnm-
nications satellites, two meteorological satellites, and twelve scientific and teclmical expel-
imental satellites, as part of three applied satellite series: low-Earth-orbit returnable
remote-sensing satellites, geostationary Earth orbit communications satellites, and Sun-
svncln-onous orbit meteorological satellites (nee Table 2). This chapter describes the
tievelopment of, and the benefits derived fiom, China's communications satellites.
China entered the field of satellite communications to improve the relatively under-
developed state of its communications inli'astructure. In June 1970, the Chinese Academy
of Space TechnologD' proposed a preliminary tectmical plan for a connnunications satel-
lite. Not until February 1975, however, did the State Council of China approve the
"Report on the Development of Chinese Satellite (Mmmunications," which had been out-
lined bv the State Planning Commission and the National l)efimse Science and
Technology' Commission. Approval from the ,_,tate Council of China meant tllal tim task
<)f developing the c<)untry's satellite c<mnnuni(ati<ms was incorporated in state l)lanning.
Experimental Communications Satellites
China launched its first experimental conmmnications satellite (the so-called Test
Satellite-l) on a l,ong March 3 rocket on 29January 1984, placing it in a nonsynchronons
orbit. St,bsequentlv, the country launched its first geos}nchr_mous experimental commu-
nications salellite £m 8 April l_.iS,t and parked it in ,tn orbit at 12,5 E al)ovc Ihc C(]ll_lt_)l"
(see Tablt' 2). The satellite I)egan its trial ol)('iation ill May 1984 mid subseque,ltly has
Opelated normally. It provides (]hina with ,_variety of services, such as connmmicalions in
relllf)lc flistricls; lhe inilllat,k_t'lllel/I ¢)1 "0,'iltel- ( ()lls(,r'vittil)n and electric power; leh'phone,
Iclegram, facsitnilc, pictut+e, and t-lala transmissiotl: and the l)l<mdcasl of at standat-d lilm'
;rod stan(I,u{l ['le(lllell Q. Its :tCtllal liR'time in Sl)aue has greatly excceded tile expected
lln'ec ve;ll'S.
The DFH-2 Operational Satellite
(_hina als_ has i)laced into geostaliona|y orbit tour o])eralional communications satel-
lites tmrked al 110.,5 East (E), lOW E, 87.5 E, mid 98 E above the eqt|ator, respeclivcl}.
There arc lwo kinds ot these satlellilt's: lllc" 1)FI [-2 (l)ong Fang l t_mg-2), wlfich is basically lilt'
Sitlne alS the experintenlal sittellilcs, and tile fimr I)FI I-2A satellites, which are modilied ver-
sions of I]le IIH t-2.
2O,5
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Figure 27
A n lntel._at I'( (F-81 _ao'llite tTlct)'e¢l live tele_6sim_ pittures t!]l_re_idetlt Nixo_ '_ hi_tm'le 1974 trip to (_lli_la. At the time, Chitta
_¢ml_ht access to the lnteL_at _'_'_tem, trot claimed it _L,oztM _lot _oin a_ Ionl._ a_ 7hiu,an was a memlm_ hi 1974, eighty wT_et_
me _ttt'ie_ we_' h_ tel._at meml.,et:_. (( "._LIt I_'sT,' _)[ NASA)
The DFH-2 satellite was launched into geostationary orbit (103 ° E above the equator)
_n 1 February 1986. It carried two transpon<levs and a domestic heam antenna. Its uplink
and downlink communications l]'equencies were 6,225 to 6,425 megahertz and 4,000 to
4,200 megahertz, respectively. The antenna beam can cover the whole tervilory of China,
thereby providing ef[_'clive commut6cations to outlyitlg districts, such as the Xinjiang and
Xizang Aulonomous Regi_)ns, |]-ontiev stations, and islands. In April t986, the DFH-2 satel-
lite took over broadcasting services fiom the experimental communications satellite, and
on 5 February 1987, il began providing tifteen channels for foreign program broadcast-
ing from the Central People's Broadcasting Station. The numher of channels availahle fi_r
foreign hroadcasting increased to thirty on 30 September 1987. The DFH-2 satellite
remained in cotllil'lllOtls lJse until 8.July 1989.
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l,aunch Date
24 April 1970
Table 2
China's l,aunched Satellile_ up to Auffust 1995
Satellite Name Launch Vehicle Brief Hema@s
I)ong Fang Fhmg-I Long March 1
3 March 1971 Sh!jian-1
26July 1(.)75 "FI'_I
26 N()vcmbcr 1975 RRS_I
16 December 1975 TT_2
30 August 197ti T'I'_3
7 I)cccmber 1(.}76 RRS_2
26 January 1978 RRS_3
20 Stq)lemt)(w 1981 Sh!jian-2
Sh!jian-2A
Sh!jian-2B
(`) Scptemt)cr 1(`}82 RRSS-4
I,ong March 1
Fengbao-I
Broa(t(asl music "Dong
Fang t tong"
Long March 2
Operated fi)r eight years in
orbi!
Fengbao-1
All onl)oard systems Ol)eral-
ed normally
Fengba<)- 1
Operated in t)rbit three
days before landing
I.ong March 2
All onl)oar(t systems operat-
ed normally
I.ong March 2
All onboar(t systems op('ral-
cd normally
1(`) August 1983 RRS_5
Ol)('rat('d three (tars and
then landed
Fengbao-I
Operated lhr('e days and
tht'n landed
l,ong March 2
l,ong Mav('h 2
Three satellites launched by
()tie rocket fi)r the lit'st time
2/).latmary 1(.)84 Tcst-Sat('llilc-I Long March 3
Operaled fly(" (lays an(l then
landed
8 Al)ril 1(,)84 ECS
Operated live days and then
landed
(;alTie(| out (onlltlllllie_t-
tions, opcrati<mal, and tech-
nical tests
l,ong March 3 Slationcd al 125 + E above
eqttat()v (m 16 Al)vil
12 Scptemt)cr 1(.)84 RRSS-6 l.ong March 2 Operated live da'_s and then
landed
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Table 2 (continued)
Launch Date Satellite Name Laundt Vehicle
21 Ocmher 1985 RRSS-7 Long March 2
1 February 1986 OCS-1 lxmg March 3
6 October 1986 RRS_8 Ixmg March 2
5 August 1987 RRS_9 Long March 2
9 September 1987 RRSS-10 Long March 2
7 March 1988 OCS-2 Long March 3
5 August 1988 RRSS-I I Long March 2
7 September 1{188 Fcng_,un-I l:mg March 4
22 l)ecember 1988 ()C_3 l,ong March 3
4 February 1990 OCS-4 l,ong March 3
3 Sepwmbcr 1990 Fengwm-1
I)aqi-I
Daqi-2
l:mg March 4
5 ()clober 1990 RRSS-12 Long March 2
28 December 1991 ()(2':,-5 l.ong Ma,ch 3
9 August 1992 RRSS- 13 l,ong March 21)
Briq Remarks
Operated five days for land
survey and then landed
Stationed at 103 ° E above
equator on 20 February
Operaled live days for land
survey and then landed
Operaled five days and then
landed
Operated eight days and
then landed
Stationed at 87.5 ° E ahove
equator on 23 March
Operalccl eigh! days and
then lanclect
Achieved predicled goal
Stationed at 110.5 _ E above
equator on 30 l)ecember
Stationed at 98 ° E ahove
equalor on 14 Febrttary
Transmitted cloud pictures
|o Eal-lh _tnd llle[:tstlred
almosl)heric densilv
Operated eight days and
then lat/(led
Failed to achieve preset
orbit because of lm,nch
vehicle taihne
()petaled sixu:en days and
flwn landed
6 October 1992 RRSS-14 Ixmg March 2(_ Operated seven days and
lhen landed
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Table 2 (continued)
l+auneh Date Satellite Name Launch Vehicle
8 October 1993 RRS_5 Long March 2C
8 February 1994 Sh!jian-4 Long March 3A
3 July 1994 RRSS-l 6 I+ong March 2D
30 November 1994 Dong Fang Hong-3 Long March 3A
TTS Technical Test Satellite
RRSS--Returnable Remote Sensing Satellite
ECS--Experimental Communication Satellite
O(_S---Operational Communication Satellite
B_4gf Remark.,
Operated eight clays, but
fhiled to land because of
malthnction
Operated in a geosynchro-
nous transfer orbit
Operated fifteen days and
then landed
Placed in quasi-geosynchro-
nous orbit, but failed to
station because tirol had
drained
The DFH-2A Satellite Series
The first I)Ft 1-2A satellite was launched on 7 March 1988 and parked at 87.5' E above
the e(luator. All tour (_-tlan(l llallsl)(ln(lcrs ab()ard the satellite have seen servi(e.
Transl)on(lcrs A and B relayed the thst and second channels of the Cenlral Peol)le's
l_roa(lcasting Slation. Transponder C was used to transmit programs liom Xizang televi-
siol'J station and I() provide special services for the Bank of China. Transponder D was used
to transmit programs [iom the YuntJan, (;uizou, and Xil+jiang television stalions. The
power outl)ttl of these transpond('rs was 25 percent greater than that of the DFlt-2. They
were designed to last 4.5 years, or 50 percent hmger. Moreover, the DFI|-2A can provide
3,1)00 telcphotle channels or four lclevisi<m channels in contrast to the 1,1)00 telel)hone
channels or two television channels t)r<wided by the DFtt-2 satellite.
On 22 I)ecember 1988, ('.hina successfully launched the second DFt t-2A satellite and
parked it in a get,stationary orbit at 110.5 E above the equal<)r. Its fotar transponders
relayed educatiotlal television programming over thirty channels and provided specialized
(ommunications services. On 4 Febrttarv 1!)91), tit<_"third DFtl-2A satellite was successful-
Ix' latulchcd and parked in an orbit at {)8' E above the equator. Sul)se(ittcntly, the lbm-th
I)H 1-2A satellite was launche(t on 28 l)eceml)er 1991, but tmlike its sttcccsstid predeces-
sors, il did not ac]li<.'ve tilt' desired orbit becattsc ()t a firing failure of tilt" launch vehicle's
third stage. Nonetheless, the salellile cnlercrd an clliplical <)rbit using an <)nl)oard tnot<m
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Figure 28
Launched itt 1988, the fi_:_t o]" China '_ DFH-Z4 _e_4e._o] _atellite_ t_'b_yed television prol_wamming to ke3_ provim'ial capital_
and provided _pe_ial _ervi_e_/br the Bank of('hina. ((;ot.trlesy _)l the (]hinese Academy of Space Tectm_logy)
The DFH-3: The Second-Generation
Communications Satellite
The second-generation DFH-3 communications satellite was a medium-capaciu' space-
craft designed to take over from the tirst generation of satellites and to satist_' an increased
demand for domestic communications capacity. It was to be put into orbit by a new launch
vehicle, the Long March 3A. The beam of the DFH-3 communications antenna was
designed to cover more than 90 percent of the territory of China. The DFH-3 satellite car-
ried twenty-four C-band transponders, of which six were medium powered and were to be
used to transmit television programming; the others were low powered tor carrying tele-
phone, telegraph, facsimile, and data transmissions. The DFH-3 was capable of relaying
six channels of color television programming and 8,100 telephone channels simultane-
ously. It was designed to last eight years, providing television and radio program and com-
munications services to the entire country by the year 2000.
With the launch of the DFH-3 satellite, Chinese eommmlications satellite technology
will reach a new level. The DFH-3 was to be the first comnmnications satellite geared to
the needs of the whole society as well as to the needs of business and the state. For the
most part, the Chinese Academy of Space Technolo_' carried out the design and mann-
facture of tbe satellite in Cttina, although some tiweign electronic devices and mechani-
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cal parts were purchased, and some components were produced in cooperation with the
(;erman tirnl MBB (Messerschnlit-Bolkow-Blohnl).
On 30 Novemher 1994, tile DFH-3 satellite was launched (about a year later than
scheduled) into geosynchronous transter orhi! on a I,ong March 3A rocket. It was then
injected into a quasi-geosynchronotts orhit through maneuvers carried out by tilt"
onboard propulsion system. These maneuvers showed thai tlle satellite's system design
and technical concept were feasible and correct, but unfortunawly, the satellite, on file
verge of success, could not maintain its orbital position, l,eakage in its attitude COnlrol
thrusters had drained its tirol supply. (]onsequentlx; tilt" DFH-3 did not hecome operatiw,.
The results of in-orb|! tests indicated that tilt" onboard subsystems, including the transpon-
ders. were all normal. The Chinese Academy of Space Technolog,T is currently reviewing
its syslems and subsystems in tile hopes of allempting another launch.
Benefits of China's Communications Satellites
Communications satellites have brought almul nlany social and economic benetits to
China. The application of comnmnications sawllites to tile development of tile colnltry's
telecommunications, television, and radio inl}aslruclures has allowed China to leap over
lhe traditional development stage and to realize cotmtrD_,ide coverage in a single step.
Prior It) I[le arrival of satellite conlnlunit;ations, China's colnlllllnicati()ns and broadcast
services, especially its long-distance coinmunicati()ns, were backward. No! onl.v was tile
number of telephone channels small, hut the quality of comnnmications was poor. Tile
poor quality and depressed quantity of leleconullunications services severely linliled Ihe
development of the Chinese economy: the speed of information Iransnlission is one of the
inos[ important factors affecting economic, cuhural, and educational developnlent.
Since t984, however, to effect a COtlntr}_vide svsteln of COlllllltlllications satellites,
(]hina has established a number of ground sawlliw stations ill several cities, such as
Beijing, Kunming (Yunnan Province capital}, Urumqi (Xinjiang Autonomous Region
capital), Lhasa (Xizang Autononlous Region capital), and Nansha island. Numerous
diverse governlnellt agencies, such as posts and telecomnnmicalions, petrolellm, mining,
water conservation, electrical l)ower, news, and the military, transnlit lnos| of their tele-
phone calls, telegrams, facsimiles, data, tables, and pictures via communications satellites.
The result is a significant inlprovcment in communicalions, especially long-distance com-
nuulications, and the overcoming of communications difficuhies in remote districts. If
China were to establish a high-quality radio and television broadcasting network covering
up to 80 percent ()1 |he country using traditional llli(Towave relay technologQ; the cost
would be a|)ollt 2 billion yuan ($370 million at file 1993 estimated price and exchange
rate). "I'll(, same services ('an be provided at a cos| of only 1 billion yuan ($185 million at
tile 1993 estimated ])rice and exchange rate} by a conlmnnicadons satellite system.
By lhe end of 1995, more than "{0,000 receive-only stations had been built. The qual-
ity of television program transnfissions has been enhanced and geographical coverage
expanded. (;hina has established more than 100 comnnmications ground stations so far
with antennas larger than five meters in diameter. In tilt, field of educational television,
lilt" combined coverage rate achieved hy the Central Television Station and local television
stations was only 33 percent heft)re 1983. The quality of transmission was low, and its effec-
tiveness was poor because of geographical and climatic conditions. Sullsequently, howev-
er, comnmnications satellites began carrying two educational stations with a total o[
thirty hours of daily programming. By the end of 1995, China had more than 1,00(D
educational television receiving and transmitting stations, more than 10,000 receive-only
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stations, and more than 62,000 display points in tile national educational system, repre-
senting a coverage rate of more than 83 percent. According to a poll conducted by the
Chinese Educational Television Station, the total population receiving and watching
educational television programs has reached 30 million.
As for long-distance telephony and telegraphy, if China were to establish a communi-
cations network linking all of its provincial and regional capitals by means of microwave
relays and coaxial cable lines, the estimated cost would run into billions of yuan (nearly
$1 billion). Use of a satellite colnmunications system lowered tiffs figure to only 500 mil-
lion Dtan ($93 million). By the end of 1995, China had more than 8,000 domestic and
25,000 direct international satellite channels available, as well as ten special satellite com-
munications networks tot specifics uses in the development of petroleum, mining, water
conservation, and electrical power. At present, China is constructing a number of medi-
um-sized satellite ground stations to add telephone and telegraph satellite channels. The
number of very small aperture terminals countrywide has reached 35,000.
Satellite communications also has aided the field of finance. By using satellites for
fired transfers, China's banks can reduce greatly the amount of money that is in transit
flom one point to another and that, as a result, cannot be used. Tim total amount of funds
being transferred among Chinese banks at various levels is, according to one study, as
much as 50 billion yttan ($9.3 billion) at any one moment, and the average time required
for transfer is six days. By managing the transfer of funds by satellite, this figure can be
reduced by as much 50 percent, so that an extra 25 billion yuan ($4.6 billion) would be
available fl)r six extra clays, thus increasing the amount of working capital and greatly
enhancing the availability of flmds. The DFH-2A satellites now transmit financial data for
the Bank of China. The bank's network is centered at the Beijing head otfice and includes
350 branch offices. The network not only helps modernize fired clearance and transfer
transactions, but also provides financial management information services, telephone
communications, I)usiness training, and teleconferencing.
For the management of railway traffic, the satellite system of communications and
train dispatching has enabled a dramatic increase in the density of train traffic. The time
interval between two trains in motion can be reduced fi'om the present eight minutes to
three minutes, thereby doubling rail transport capacity without much extra cost. In
contrast, the construction of a duplicate railway line from Beijing to Shanghai to double
transport capacity would cost 10.2 billion yuan ($1.89 billion), whereas building a satellite
conmnmications and dispatching system would cost only 1 billion yuan ($185 inillion).
Preliminary studies to help select a suitable system are currently tinder v_'ay.
Future Prospects
Ahhough it is a geographically enormous and populons country, China basa limited
economic capability. As a result, the country finds it impossible to increase to a large
extent its investment in space efforts. Therefore, the selection and planning of its com-
munications satellite program, with an eye to its obvious social and economic benefits,
have critical importance. China urgently needs to develop satellite communications and
broadcasting capacity to offset its shortage of educational and communications services.
Moreover, since the end of 1980s, the demand on COlnmunications satellites by both
domestic and foreign ttsers has increased rapidly. In particular, the recent appearance of
the so-called information superhighway has increased flnther demand on communica-
tions satellites. Undoubtedly, the communications satellite will be one of the main
thoronghtlares of the filttlre infiwmation superhighway.
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For these reasons, during the l/)90s, China undertook a large-scale development of its
conmnLnications satellites. Future satcllites will operate n<)t only in the C-band, as do exist-
ing satellites, but also in the Ku- and I.-bands to meet the requirements of educational
[clevis(tin, tixed and re<(bile commmficalions service, specialized data transmission, radio
brt)adcasting, and television transmission. In all(lilt(in, China plans to develop small, light,
inexpensive satellites tt) meet the requirements of domestic and ti)reign users tit" small and
medit|m scale.
At present, some satellites can broadcast directly t<) hi)rues in several devel<)ped
countries. The United States, Britain, France, (;crmany, anti Japan have their t)wn direct-
television satellites, so thai families can receive and watch televisitin pi()glalns relayed
directly t)y satellite. It is.just a matter of time t)etore China will develop direct-television
broadcast satellites. Satellites also have tmparalleled advantages over (ilht.i media for
mobile (()minim(cation. In recent years, a variety of rot)bile satellite conmnmications sys-
tems have I)een i)laced in high, meal(tun, and low (irbits or are in the planning stage.
(;hina, too, st, tits re<it)tic c()mmmficaiions satellites, and it is pt)ssil)le that a mobile c(nn-
nnufications satellite system will he developed in the not-too-distant Inture.
To meet the futtue demantl for satellite han(Iwi(hh tot the national high-speed infor-
mal(tin network, If'levis(tin t)roadcasting, anti m(lt)ilc communications, (:hina will need a
large ntunt)er of satellite transp()nders by Ihc vt':u" 2000. P|tt)lit conmmnicalions will
require sixty to sixty-five transponders, including tivc to seven in Ku-1)an(t, while the
special communications needs (if various g()vernmt'ntal agencies, t)anks, and larg(" cora-
l)antes will reqtfire an additional twenty-five it) thirty transl)onders, including twelve It) fit L
teen in Ktt-1)an(t. The c(itmtrv's remaining conlmnnicati()ns will reqttire sixteen transpon-
tiers, with Ibm in Ku-hand. lt is an(toil)art,it th:tt tht' nmnber t)f users (if tool)(h, satellite
commtmicati(ins will increase to betwt't'n 200,000 anti 300,000. In Ihc lit'hi of television
hr(ladcasting, the (:entral Television St:trios, thc if'Icy(st(in stations ()I tim(v-(in( l)rovinct,s,
city-slates, anti aut(in()mous rcgi(ins, and the t'stimat('(l fore to six cducali()nal television
(hann('ls will rC(lUirc a minimmn of lorry-titre l(i tiiriy-eight Iransl)(in(hus. In i()tal, (:hina
will rcqtfirt' 145 to 15!:) lransl)onders at leas! 1iv the year 2000. including twenty-one l(i
tv,'t'illv-tiV(' KIl-bali(l Iranspon(l('rs with l]ti,¢-t0tlr i() s0veniv-tive ilic<_itht,rt/ (if 1)and_vi(Ith
(.'_tch. To in('(,l ihost, r¢!qtiirt'nl(,nis, (]liili_i In((st I:,nild Clll(l ]:nin(h :-;ix lit sevt,n s_ll(.,llii(,s, if
(.'ach sal('lliit" c_irrii.'s iwt'iHv-fonr lransl)on(lvrs, or t(iiir l(i tiv(' salellilcs, it e:ich carries
thirty-six lr_iilsponders.
The Next Generation of Commtmications Satellite
Tti salisl\ iht,st, increasing conlnlnnicaiions needs, consolitlalt, dunlesiic nlark('is, and
l)elielral(" inlelnaliliilal in;trkels, (:hi(ill will tO((is on Ihe dev(ql)t)nit'lll tif salclliics of high-
('i" tltl;ilit_, ;in(l l()wl'r CliSt. Th(' (:hint'st" ,\(il(lellly ()(" Slia((' Tt'chn(il(igy, llliViilg tlcvi'lcii)cd
ail(I l_itincht'(l lW(i gCl/(.,lalilins i)f c()nlilnillic:tlilins s i viii ('s, ]l:ls lit,grin (twit'whig its s_ll(.,l-
lilt' ('xilt'ri('iic(' ;iil(t is slti(I)'ili<_ hifcitUi I('(hli<)log} illld iil:iliagt'int'ni iiitqh()(ls. The thsi
sit' l) iiltisl It(" lit Slalidaidizc _i iX)lit(ill(it plaitS(tin It(is tot :i series of saicilhcs. Tht' i)lail_)rni
is lit(' hast' (itll sliicllil(,. Tht' its(' lif_i sl:uid,ird cliillillOll t)]:tllOiin (till siiiil)lit _' lilt' Wolk ill
(lt'vc'lol)iilg ii ll('W pi;llf(irlli t(il" c:tch iil'w salcllilc. :\ tt'w sl;indlird lll;ilt(ililiS capat)h" of
s:llist_'ing tht' li('t'ds (if 'viii'ill(IS l)a,,l()il(ls will ])(' dcvchil)Cd. Tilt' iliaill ()l)jcctivcs (if this
al)l)r(i_i(h {llt' I(i I'('(hl('t' (levt,h)l)nit,nl tiln(', to illl])l'(i'¢(' s:llt'lliit' (inalily, and Ill ](iw(,r costs.
Th(' (:hincsc sl)act, illdllSllV is (lllTt'lil])' (h'vchipin_4 ](till serifs ol Slalldar(l plal]{irlllS,
()ill" ()1 whicli is :l _t'()sl;ili(iliar_,' orhii sait,liht, i)l;llt_irni 1() b(' tiscd in cOlnlliillli(_lli()ilS salt,l-
lilts. The 17)l,s;-I ])hlllOrln ilSt'd I)'_ Ih(' 1)1:11-.<tc()ililillliiic;ili()ns sal('Hile C_ill Slll)l)()rl a
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payload weight of 150 to 170 kilograms, while its solar array is capable of generating 1,600
to 2,200 watts of electrical power to supply a payload electric power requix'elnent of 900 to
1,000 watts. The DJS-I platform also had 1,270 kilograms of available propellant tbr
orbital maneuvers and an expected lifetime of eight to ten years.
The DJ&I platform will be ttsed to build additional medium-capacity communications
satellites and to provide dual-band (Ku- and C-band) communications, mobile communi-
cations, data transmission, and other services. To satisfy, the demand for large-capacity
satellites, China plans to develop a third generation of connnunications satellite, one with
large capacity and a large platform bus, dubbed DJS-2. The main capabilities of one
option tentatively planned fi)r the DJS-2 include such features as the ability to support a
payload weight of between 400 and 500 kilograms, a solar array output of 4,500 to 6,000
watts, electric power available for payloads of 3,000 to 4,700 watts, 2,200 kilograms of
propellant available for orbital maneuvering, and an operational lifetime of fifteen years.
The DJS-2 common platform will be able to carry twelve Ku-band transponders of 100-watt
outpnt and twenty-four ()-band transponders of sixteen-watt output, or fourteen to sixteen
Ku-band transponders of 120-watt of output. It will serve to build large-capacity Ku and
C dual-band communications satellites, Ku-band direct-broadcast satelliles, and tracking
and data relay' satellites.
As payloads are the core of a satellite and the decisive t'actor in determining its uses
and performances, and as the technical level of Chinese payloads is nmch lower than that
of adwmced countries, China must develop or acquire critical payload technologies on a
priority basis. The main p;wloads of a coanmtmications satellite are iransponders and
antennas. In the field of transponders, China must first develop Ku-, l.-, _, and X-band
transponders, dual-band (C- and Ku-band) transponders, higher powered transponders,
and onboard processing techniques. In the field of antennas, China first nmst develop
muhibeam antennas, controllable spot-beam antennas, changeable-shaped-heam anten-
nas, and a number of other anlennas, as well as the techniques of onboard switching and
intersatellite linkage.
While the Chinese Academy of Space Technoloh'_ / will carry out much of this devel-
opmental work, international collaboration must be an importanl part of those efforts.
China should enlarge its range of cooperation with other countries and seek to collabo-
rate at several levels in muhiple fields. These efforts should include the importation of
certain critical technologies that are of great importance, but such efforts require addi-
tional flmding to develop and are difticuh to achieve in the short term. China also should
contract with toreign countries for some subsystems, while the design and integration of
the satellite system will remain the responsibility of the Chinese Academy of Space
Technolog T. Finally, China should carry out general progxanls of international coopera-
tion tot the joint development of new satellites, such as that undertaken with Brazil tor
the development of the China-Brazil Earth Resonrces Satellite Ziyuan-1 or the Sino
satellite being developed jointly with French and German companies.
Chapter 16
No Free Launch: Designing the
Indian National Satellite'
by Raman Srinivasan
The Indian National Satellite (INSAT) was the IIIOSl advanced nonmilitary satelliw
ever launched am_vheve. The satellite was and continues to be promoled I)v Ihe Indian
St)ace Research Organization as ils flagship satellite and as being (listin(llx Indian in char-
acter. While most satelliles htltill a single, well-detined mission, 1NSAT was a multipurpose
geostationavy salellite, lls peculiar design arose partly [?ore very tmttsual design constraints
placed on i! t)y India's insistence tha! the salellile carry at least four different payloads.
The mosl signiticanl of !he payloads on INSAT w:{s a package ll|a.I could receive lele-
vision programs from selecled Slalions ill New Delhi and Ahmedabad and rellanslnil !hem
Io relay s!ations in Amvitsm, goml)a_; Madras, (;auhali, and Calcutta. hs importance arose
ti-om i!s special ability to transmit educational television F,rograms directly Io specially
designed teh'vision se!s owned conlnnulally by flmusands of relnole Indian villages. Mare,
Indian leaders h¢q>ed that a significant t)a¢ti<m ¢_1India's SOllln()lelll villages !bus woul_l
be awakened.
The second package was designed io provide !elephone, lacsimile, dala, lelegraph,
video tex!, and other comnmnicalions services alllOllg metropolitan areas. The thicd was
a remole-sensing package tmill to suYvev lhe nation's resources and Ihus hel l) in ils devel-
opment plannin R. The las! pa.yh_ad was ap, ingenious meteorological system !ha! nol onh'
llanslnilled pictures of cloud coven bu! also collected weather information from several
!housand unmanned da!a collection poinls on the ground; il sewed to trigger selected
disasler-warning sirens in isolaled coastal villages under the imminenl lhreal of cyclones.
Thus, INSAT had Ihe communications capacily of an in!elsa! IX,' (the slate C,i the all
in torero!re!cations sa!elli!es when INSAT was designed), a meteorological payload eft>t-
!!rely equivalen! !o the (;eoslalionary ()[)el-aliollal Environmental Satellite ((;OES)-A
(then the most acIvanced of weather satellites), and a direct-broadcast television system
akin to the Apl>licalions Technolog_ Satelli!e (ATS)-6 (once again, the tiontier ot:tech-
nolog)), all wrapped in!o one compac! package. INSNI" was a crowded Indian bus shol
into Sl)ace.
I. Senior i..'lircd Indian ¢_tti(ials who Ilaxt" it'ad Ibis It'xl lla'..c ad',ris_.'d Ih_. ;lilt11111 thai il _ (_lllaillS Malt'-
li;lls "ot at St'llSili'_(' IlaltllC," (:onlidcntial _;O[lltCS llli|'g t)J.. tiHiiId ill IV¢O O[ Iht' dlllhOl'S I)alpt'lS, "INSAI: lhe
P.litics ot Apl_ropriating I [igh "l'echnc_log2,"and "SITE: T_aditionalizing ,Spat¢' Technol,_g',," t,qx,s¢ lipl malm-
stripts, seminm l>alWVSin Ihe ;llllhol'S [){gSSt'ssitllI. l.rnh,ss hlditalt'd othm'wisc, lifts (haF.It.r is ('Xlla( It'd |lOl'tl
Ihos(' Iw¢_pal)mS. Movcm't.r, ('xl,eu,;ivt'inl(.Yvit.v,:swith Indian spate [)r_)glam ix'vsonm'l t.mm Ihc I)asis ot solnc
I)t lht" asst'rlions m;tdt' here. '['he alHImr wishes to thamk his advis,_.s. Raja Rao, his c.[h'aRucs al Ihc [Tnb.ersilx ot
I'cnnsvl',alfia, and the _t/it ials ol Ihc hill!all spate plogl;un lot hclping, wifll bolh Ihc rt'st'af_ h and the wilting.
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INSAT Historiography:
Questions, Sources, and Strategies
The history of INSAT was shaped by India's desire to "gatecrash" the glamorous world
of modernism. When India gained independence in 1947, the moral authority of
(;andhian nonviolence and the grandiose global vision of Nehru produced a heady
euphoria. India not only wanted to join the part}, of the moderns, but insisted on wearing
nothing but a loincloth, like Gandhi. Nowhere were these contradictory aims more appar-
ent than in India's approach to its space program.
India made it clear, privately and through self-righteous declarations in international
torums, that its plans tor space technology were driven by "real needs" on land. Indians
argued that technology in space was practically worthless without a vast array of other
technological systems on the ground. INSAT sought to demonstrate the practical benefits
of advanced technologies to the poorer nations. Its ground systems were designed to show
that space technology was a technology appropriate for underdeveloped societies2
INSAT could be equally renowned for the many meanings loaded into it. At one level,
INSAT embodied the tensions and aspirations associated with decolonization. At another
level, it illustrated the use of technology as an instrument of foreign policy. From the point
of view of a third world country, it was also an example of using technology for economic
development, social and cultural change, nation-state building, and the formation of a
nonaligned bloc of third world nations politically equidistant from both tim Soviet Union
and the United States.
The past is a perishable resource, particularly so in the hot and humid climes of India.
There are no depositories of documents, such as NASA's archives, for the Indian space
program. The custodian of the satellite, the Indian Department of Space is a somewhat
secretive quasi-governmental institution. In a society still largely oral rather than textual,
crucial decisions are far less likely to be committed to paper than they are in the West. The
culture of atttonomy in these institutions encourages minimal documentation of deci-
sions. Also, as is the case of good Hindus, the Department of Space cremates its dead
files--and fairly regularly, too. Furthermore, that peculiar literary genre of the British Raj,
annotations in official files, has declined, as has other institutions of the Raj in posteolo-
nial htdia. Thus, researching INSAT poses many problems.
The sources tor INSAT's history are scattered. This chapter relies extensively on field
work, interviews, and archives in the West. Access to information was achieved in India
using the data obtained in the West, such as limited access to the Indian Department of
Space records.:'
From Atomic Energy to Space Research
The Indian nuclear and space programs, although originally the private _4sion of a
few scientists, quickly crystallized as high-priority progranls of the new Indian state. A par-
liament, largely ignorant of science but lusting after advanced technology, approved the
programs. An impoverished mass of mostly agrarian taxpayers funded the nuclear and
space programs. These progrants became planned efforts to appropriate alien technolo-
2. Vikram A. Sarat_hai, SciencePoli_y and Nalionall)evelopnwnt (l)elhi: Macmillan Company of India, 1974).
3. The author would like to thank an ammymous worker in the Indian Space Research Organization
tot granting limited access to lhe leCovds of tile Department of Space. This person, of all the people the author
met in India, understood history.
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gies, paths to ral)id industrialization, ways of calching up wRh the West, and symbols of a
resurgent India.
Just am it is necessary to know Mahamm (;andhi Io appreciate the history of indepen-
dent India, an awareness of ttomi J. Bhabha is crucial It) tile story of INSAT. By crealing
new institutions for the adaptation of advanced techno]ogi('s, Bhabha laid the foundations
of INSAT. Ills approach to high technolog 3' continued It) shape the Indian space and
nuclear programs tbr nearly folu- decades. To know and appreciate the liti" and work of
Homi Bhabha is to understand not only INSAT, but also other high-technology enterpris-
es of the Indian state.
Bottl to all influential Bombay Pars| thmily ill 1909. dw young Bhabha altended a pri-
vale school established prinmrily for Eurol)ean children, t le pursued a career in 1)hysics,
starting witll undergraduate and doctoral studies at Canlbridge trader the tamed physicist
Paul l)irac, as well am at the Cavendish Lal)oratoly. He quickly earned a reptnalion as a
brilliant theoretical l)hysicisL and he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society ill 1939.'
On a short holiday when World War II erupted, Bhabha acccpted a specially created
readership in cosmic ray physics at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, which was
[oun<led by his relatives, the Tara fanfily, lShabha decided lo concentrale on the difficuh
task t)f creating new institutions embodying a new cuhure of science 1)etiuing modern
India. The Tata Trusts, comr<)lled by his close rclativcs, aided Bhabha ill this task. Ill 1945,
a generous and timely grant enabled hiln to crcale the Tata Inslilme of Fundamental
Research at l{mnbay. There, amidst beautiftd paintings and landscaped gardens, Bhat)ha
l)lannctt how to shape tilt: future of India.
A member of the Bombay Parsi elite by birth, Bhabha cattle into frequent conlact with
the leaders of the nationalist nlovenlent, such as Nehrtt and (}andhi. The indel)endence
nltwemcnt received financial contributions from the merchant-princes of tilt" Pars| com-
mtnfity, and nati<malist leaders were often their house guests. These inti)rnlal ('onlact,'.;
with the statesmen of India becatne important ill helping tilt" v<ntng I tmni Bhat)ha direct
India's high-technology ventures.
Just after independence, Bhabha quickly obtained tormal approval Io create the
Atomic Ener_,_' (:ommission. Under its Hmbrelht, he organized a vast cmpivc of research.
(2my|need that even a backward totlnll-V such ,ts India could catch ttp with the West it) an
emerging field such as atomic euerg T, i)recisely because _)t Ill(" field's nasct'nt t'llal'actcF,
Bhat)ha effectively welded (;andhian nonviolence and lhe rhetoric of tilt" "f)eacefid uses
of atomic energy" to Nehru's inspiring, if occasionally irritating, 1)hilosol)hy of political
nonalignment."
Although India began with atomic energ 3' [)1"Ogl'allls, it quickly diversified into space
research. Propelling lhis move were both Indian and fiweign influences. Bhal)ha's exten-
sive travels in the West and his own interest in the l)hysics <)f the Ul)l)er atmosl)hcre ah'rt-
e(I him to the growing signitlcance of sl)a(e te(hntdog3'. He gradually exl)an(led tire
t. The" (mh schohul_ xv¢_lk on t hmliJchangir l_,h;d_h;i in a coulp;u;uivc Stlld_ <)1 Bhuhh_l and Mcghnad
S_+,}l:t. R',d)t'll %..'\lldt'I_olL Buildinff ._;_"'nti/i_ I_t_lilul/on_ i. l.dia: .'_aha and I_habtla (M_mltcal: (',¢*nlte tbl
I)cvl'h)pitlg-Arca %ludics, Mt(;ill l.!tfiversil',. 1!175). Tlw sell|era oll P, habha also draws cm: R.P. Kulkmlfi and V.
S;uln;i, tfomJ Bhabh.: l'altu_ ,[ Nuch..r Scie_l¢e ?n l_:lia ([:h)ml)ay: Pol)tdar I'rakasham 1969): I'.R. PishalOlv, C U
Ram.n (Nc_v Delhi: Pul)li_;_ti.ns Division. Ministr_ ¢_I lntolmaliml and Broadcasling, (;ol('l-lllll('nl¢_[ India,
I982); (;t'orgy (;rvcnstcin. "A (;('nlth'nl;ul oI the Old St h,_cd: I lmni lShal)ha and lilt' 1)t'_t'hq)mt'ul _)1 Scicll(c ill
India," Amemrtz_ Srhola_ 61 (,Summm 1!192): 10!)-19; Shiv Visvamtll'lmL ()t:.'rznisinLr ft. ,_hicmc: I'Iu' Maki./.( O/an
lz+du_lnal I¢ewa_+h l.ah.mt._s (l)vlhi: ()xli)rd [mXCl si_,. l't css, 19,_5); (;. \'enk;ttraman,.]rm_ m'_ int. l.ikdm 15/, .rid
.'sr_e.¢c o/C U. llama. (la.;it_alolc, India: hldi;m Atadcm_ ,)1 Stim_cs in to_q)Clation with Ii_diml National
."G,:ion( v A( adcmx, disuil>utcd bx ()xti_t d t'llixcrs m. Ih v+.s, I 9+q,_); _t'..well as t hmfiJcha_gil I_h;ll)ha. _,rU'mc .rid the
l%d:l,+,m+ o[l)eve[opme,l (Bonll)ay: Atonlil Energ T E+,t+tl:,lishnlclll ol Botnh;_.3, 1966); the "'Bha|)ha R¢'l)_Wt," lilt' l)_q:+-
uhu name [<)_ India (Rcpttl)lic) Electronic +, (_ommitlt,t., I(h'chlmits ill ].clio He/..I (B_mlh;13: India (;<_x<'_ lllllCIll
[hc';s, ]"('l>rum; I!)(i6).
5. F,>, ;l hismlv ,ff Indi;l-U.S. r,t'hllimls after W<lrld \%ar II, :_ SUrl)risit++<,r,l'+ nt,glt,ctt,d I't'NI';II( h ill'{'il, s('c
[ t.'_A', l+n_tntds, 77+;' ,_p+'ctel o/,\'eTlttali+m: The I/,Ill[ ._'[+llg+ flHgt lk+" ]'.'+ltt'l_q'llrP O[IJN' 7"hi+d lX;.l+l. 19.t _1960 ( Nt'w 'Y¢)uk:
( _<dl_tnl',ia Utfixctsit,. Pt vss, 19_9).
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domain of his Department of Atomic Energy to encompass the upper atmosphere and
thus, eventnally, space. The Indian National (;ommittee for Outer Space Research
(INCOSPAR) was constituted in early 1962 under the umbrella of the Department of
Atomic Energy. As a result, all space-related research was embedded in the technocratic
Department of Atomic Energy until 1972, when an independent Department of Space was
formed.
With the death of Homi Bhabha in an airplane accident, a new generation ascended
to the throne. The generational transition, although nonviolent, produced discontinuities.
In the area of large-scale science, Vikram Sarabhai succeeded Bhabha. Similar to Homi
Bhabha, whom he had assisted in space research, Sarabhai was born into an elite family
with a pronounced interest in social reform, the arts, and letters. His father, Ambalal
Sarabhai, was one of the leading citizens of Ahmedabad, approximately 300 hundred miles
north of Bombay. Ahmedabad, proudly proclaimed "the Manchester of India," had
become a major textile center by the early twentieth century, thanks to the enterprise of a
group of intricately connected Gujarati.lain families. (;lose ties grew between the Sarabhai
family and national leaders. The Sarabhai family, described by a Rockefeller Foundation
officer as the "Medicis of Ahmedabad," played a crucial role in postcolonial India."
Vikram Sarabhai and his sisters, children of a wealthy Gujarati merchant, were edu-
cated at home by a carefully selected group of Indian and foreign educators inspired by
Maria Montessori. As a child, Sarabhai met national leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi,
Jawaharlal Nehrn, and Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi, as family guests in the Sarabhai
mansions. 7 At age seventeen, Sarabhai enrolled at St.John's College in Cambridge in 1936
and completed his natural science tripos in 1939. The onset of World War II forced hiin
to return to India, where he continued to study physics at the Indian Institute of Science
in Bangalore. There, the young Vikram Sarabhai found the opportunity to work closely
with C.V. Raman and Homi Bhabha. Alter the end of the war, Sarabhai returned to
Cambridge to finish his doctoral dissertation. On his return in 1947 to an independent
India, Sarabhai, like Bhabha, persuaded charitable trusts controlled by his family and
fi'iends to endow a research institution near home in Atunedabad, the Physical Research
Laboratory. Barely twenty-eight years old, Sarabhai had embarked on an intense mission
as a creator and cultivator of institutions.
Building Coalitions
Despite the fi'ustrations and disillusionnmnt of India during the 1960s, the early ),ears
of the Indian space program were euphoric. Vikram Sarabhai, a playful, Krishna-like suc-
cessor to the solenm and remote Bhabha, ushered in a decade of naive technological
enthusiasm in India with the formation of INCOSPAR in 1962. Sarabhai's personality def-
initely generated excitement with the space program. Only someone endowed with at
least some of the attributes of IZo-ishna could have built India's space program in such a
traumatic decade.
Like Krishna, Sarabhai played several roles in his efforts to nurture the frail space pro-
gram in its early years. He was a roving diplomat, teacher, strategist, friend, counselor,
leader, and system-builder. Within India, his unusual combination of scientific eminence,
6. Erik Erikson, (;aT_dhi_ Truth: On the O_Tginx t_ Militant Non-Violence (New _brk: Norton, 1969),
p. 298. For background on Ahmedabad, see Kenneth L. (;illion, Ahmedabad: A Study in Indian Urban tfi_tory
(Berkeley, CA: University of Califi_rnia Press, 1968).
7. The section on Vikram Sarabhai is drawn from Chotubhai Bhatt, "Vikram Sarabhai," Elet_ronics India
2 (]anuary 1972): 35; Padmanabh Joshi, "Vikram Sarabhai: A Study in hmovatiw: Leadership and Institution-
Building," Ph.l). diss., (;l_iral University at Ahmedabad, 1985.
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aristocratic background, and disarming simplicity created a loving loyalty, often amount-
ing to devotion, among those who knew him. Sarabhai's first attempts at technological
evangelism within the Indian bureaucracy resuhed in the Arvi Earth Station, the creation
of which knit together a strong network of allies for tire space program and set the pat-
tern for the way in which INSAT would be constituted?
The Arvi terminal, now a prominent landmark on the Pune-Nasik Road, stands as a
testament to India's first success in space technology. Sarabhai had to persuade the rather
conservative engineering bureaucracy entrenched in the Ministry of (;ommunications m
let him build satellite telecommunications terminals. The Overseas (;ommunications
Service had made plans to be connected to the international telephone network provid-
ed by Imetsat III, and it needed a ground station in India.
Because no one in India had built a ground terminal before, RCA was retained as a
consultant and subcontractor for the electronics. The design of the antenna itself was
based on the drawings of a similar antenna huih by the U.S. firm Blaw Knox, but the engi-
neering construction was done with the help of a Tata company, TELCO. The Arvi station
was ready by October 1969, ahead of schedule. Sarahhai's ability to snatch the Arvi pro-
ject from R(:A resuhed in saving India the equivalent of about $800,000 (in 1969 dollars)
in foreign exchange and created a powerful profile for the space program within the
hureaucracy. More importantly, it redefined the rules of the game. The space program
acquired operational autonomy from the bureaucracy.
The sheer [brce of Sarahhai's personality subdued open dissent, and his reputation
enabled him to slice through the bureancratic jungle. Assured of loyal support at all lev-
els, from the prime minister to the peon, Sarabhai, as did Bhabha, set out to secure coop-
era[ion from tire spacefaring powers. He first turned to the United States. Unfortunately,
NASA's pragmatic director of international programs, Arnold W. Frutkin, had heard it all
hefore. Frutkin previously had been inoculated by none other than Homi Bhabha him-
self. Thus, Sarahhai's eftbrls tO gain U.S. assistance met with polite btll firm refltsals."
There was, however, one important exception. During the early 1960s, NASA was plan-
ning a series of advanced technolog?/' satellites known hy the acronym ATS. Leonard Jaffe,
NASA's director of communications, informed Frutkin of the need to field-test an ATS pro-
ject, which involved the direct broadcast of television to receivers from a satellite. At the
time, this technology,' was untested. The commercial and political advantages of a satellite
system that could beam programs directly to television sets attracted NASA polic}_makers. >
Frutkin and Jaffe examined a world atlas for a suitable site for tire ATS experiment.
The three countries that were large enough and close enough to the equator tot testing
a direct-broadcast satellite were Brazil, China, and India. Brazil proved uninteresting; the
population was concentrated in a few cities, and conventional television broadcast tech-
nolog,D, was clearly a better solution. The People's Republic of China was oul of tile picture
tot political ,easons. Therefore, India was the logical choice. It was densely populated, yet
only Delhi had a television transmitter (a small one) lef! hehind by a Dutch electronics
company afler a trade show.
8. Kamla Chowdtuy, "Viktam Sarahhai: Institution I_,uildt'r, +" t'hy_ic+ News 3(1) (1972): 17; K_hitish
l)ivalia, "lb. \eikram Sarabhai: An Enterprising Industrialist, +`Physics New+ 3( 1 I ( 1!)72): 19: M. Sacabhai, This Ahmr
i+ True (l+ondon: Meridian Books, 1952).
9. Arm+hl Frutkin, inlervit",v, Washingl_m, 1)(:, 4 ]atmarv ItlO;9, NASA tlistorv ()[tlce, Washingt<m, I)(::
Salish l)ha',vatl, interview wilh ;utthor, Bangah>re, India, 5Jatnlaty 1990.
10. Arnold Frutkin, inlcrview, Washington, l)(:, 5"_January l!18,.q, NASA History Oftice; l,eonaud.]a[[;p,
i)elsonal comnnufitali_m; ,lames D.'_(t, ,Satelhte (k;mmuniraliotls and I)IP," ,_'j,_lems (Oxlou'd: ()x[o]'d [TniVclsiP,
I'rcss. 1992); Mit hacl E. Kinslc v, Outer ,'s_mre and hlne_ ,%'H_clt/m'. (New Ym k: John Wiley & Sons, 1971i).
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Frutkin and.|affe calculated that it would he expensive to have a conventi()nal televi-
sion system covering the entire country; a satellite would provide a cheaper alternative.
Apart flom being free of technological encumbrances, India possessed other advantages.
Politically, it was an ideal location to demonstrate the peacefifl uses of U.S. space tech-
nolo_' and to heat the Soviets in technological diplomacy. The potential tor propaganda
was immense; Frutkin vowed lo exploit it to the flfllest. His earlier experience with Bhabha
had taught him to negotiate with India. '_
The U.S. State Department, however, was not enthusiastic about India, having heen
fi-ustrated many times in its crude attempts to win India over to the "fl'ee world." An
embarrassing controversy over placing Voice of America transmitters in India remained
fresh in its memory."-' t laving heen turned down recently, the State Department was not
about to ask India if it would let a U.S. satellite beam television programs directly into
remote villages. The request had to come from India. Therefbre, to spare the State
Department further emharrassment, Frutkin arranged to have Sarabhai approach NASA.
Sarabhai agreed gleeflllly.
He requested the use of an ATS satellite for a year to conduct a satellite instructional
television experiment in India's villages. He saw a great opportunity to convince India of
the need to invest heavily in space technolo_', a unique chance to learn the ground seg-
ment of a satellite system from the Americans, the possibility of baptizing a whole gener-
ation of In(lian scientists and engineers, and a systems management lesson t0r an INSAT
satellite. The Indian Department of Atomic Ener_' and NASA signed an agreement for
lhe Satellite Instruclional Television Experiment (SITE) in 1966.
The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
SITE,':' a massive experiment in social engineering designed jointly by NASA and the
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), is a fantastic tale of technological coopera-
tion hetween tmfriendly democracies. Indian engineers l)laced television scls in 5,000
remote villages spread in six clusters across the snhcontinent. Half of the televisions were
fllrthcr modified to receive programs directly from the ATS satellite, and each of which
was equippe(l with a large, distinctivc dish antenna that dominated the village landscape.
ISRO technocrats, spurred by social engineering ambitions, devised a highly sophisticat-
ed COml)uter program that chose villages specifically tot their hackwardness. Most villages
were not electrified, and many could not he connected to the electric network within a
year. Therefore, space technologists reengineered the television sets to adapt them to the
rigors of rural life. Many were powered by solar energ D' and batteries. NASA wanted to test
some new solar (ells and encouraged the use of such television sets. _
For a year, from 1 August 1975 to 31 July 1976, hundreds and sometimes thousands
of villagers gathered daily in fiont of each of these 5,000 television sets--placed outside
likc a processional (leily of a tenlple--to watch educational televisi(m, which showed them
l 1. R.S..lakhu and R. Singal, "Satellite To{ hnoh)gy and Edu< art(m," AnnaL+ ofAi+a*M S_m+* l,awli (1981):
400-425.
12. The United Slates wanled a Voice <}fAmerica tral'lSlllittcl" oil Indian soil to counter c{}mmunist pro-
paganda in South and Si)tllh{'alsl Asia. Scc.]am{'s Tyson, _&,_'. hm_natiomd Broadca_tingand National ,_'curi{_; (Nc',v
hbrk: Ramapo Press, 1983),
I 3. ,-_ll {!Xl)Cl'illlt?Ill akin /o SITE was c,mdu{ ted using va{li_} lc{hnol{}g T ti'om the mid-194()s and illl{} the
195()s. ttowevel, SITE did not sccm 1o have utilized lhe hislori{'al cxI}cricn{',._ {}f,,'hher Ih'..' ,.'ducalional vadi{}
experiments {)r a similar rural television cxpcfimenI c{)ndu{ted in Europe during the eavh,' 195{Is.
It. Arbind Sinha, Medm and Rural l)e_elopment (New 1)elhi: {_(mCel}I Publishing COral)any, 1985).
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Figure 29
,-t technician with the Indian 5J]mce I_e_eav+h Or_aPtizatio_t (I?;t¢01 staP_+ts r?ext to a wo?kiPtg mrulel n/the solid-state tel_,i_ion
_et, de_iff_?ed I_,ith ,\,-_.SA as_i_ta_tre, /or +_se it? SITI( (._alellite ln_trtt_'tional Telt_,i_ion l-xpeTiment). The pict_re e]_itomize_ the
c_nlrasl helwee_ Indian t?aditir_?_al r_al _'++ltI_v' a?+tl the high-technoloL_' donIain o/ _atellile +omm?_nicatiott_, a_ _t_ell a_
l_tlia?+ tet:h_t??t'ratic hopes o] tt_ittg 5;17'/¢ to _ati_ D' the ?v+tr_t?"_ '_ social ent,_ineerinL_ ambition, s. ((',otH tt'sy of NASA)
how to lead better lives and grow more fi}od. During the day, the village school children
watched science experiments on television. Not all the viewers were villagers. Often, engi-
neers and btueaucrats watched. The American embassy in New Delhi had a SITE televi-
sion set. In Sri l,a_ka, Arthur (_. (;larke, theJtfles Verne of satellite communications, was
given a sel to watch SITE from his home. Every m;_jor newspaper? it_ the world wrote about
SITE.
After a year, NASA parked the satellite in a new orbit away from India. Clarke plead-
ed f<)rcefully with NASA 1¢>continue this rew)lt_tionary experiment beyond the stipulated
one-year period. Many leftist jot_rnalists voiced the disappointmet_t of villagers.
l)elegations o| villagers trekked sew'ral miles to meet government officials. Hundreds of
t)ostcards petitioned the government to contitaue the program. Several of the anthropol-
ogists slalioned in villages to study the effects of SITE stayed longer to conduct posl-SITE
e'¢ahtatiot+_s, then retttrned home to write lenglhy rel)orts. _+'
SITE was, thanks to Vikratn Sarabhai's foresight, a.joint efl'<_rt of All India Radio and
Doordarshan (h)dian Television), the Ministry of Telecommtmications+ the education
and agriculture t)lit)islries, and ISRO. ISRO, of <:<)urse, had the final responsibility for the
i)roject's exectttion. Althottgh ISRO engineers were reasonably contident of" being read}+
with the techt_o[ogies for h+mdling the +.YI'S-(_ground segment, they necessarily had to del-
?gale the t+tsk <+[1prod?icing [)rogratm+ting to the Mini,,;try <)f Telecommtmicatiot+s and,
within it, to All India Radio and later D<_ordarshan.
All India Radio was an inertial I)tueattcracy totally tmequipped to imagine the possi-
I}ility of l)rodttcing six hottrs t)t +edt_cational television every day t_r a year in fi)ttr differ-
ent languages. Acc<Hding to the agreemenl l)etween the l)el)artmcnt of Atomi{ Energy+
15. ,\ntht_t (], (]];tu'k¢', :t_cr,_tt t+, ()_l, il: ,,I ,_tienlifi? _l?H_,biog,_rzph_': 7he |_54tin_,,_ o[ A_th?_t (;. f'larke (Nt+w "J_rk:
,]t_hll \Vilt'v illld NI>tI'_, I!_1).
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and NASA, the Indians had agreed to feed the satellite six hours of television program-
ruing for 365 days. To be fair to All India Radio, one must remember that the voracious
appetite of ATS-6 amounted to ahnost twice the annual harvest of the extraordinarily
active Indian commercial film industry. At least in the eyes of its Indian managers, SITE
quickly transmogrified itself from a boon to a devilish nightmare of a bargain to be fnl-
filled by them. ''_As late as January 1975, less than six months before SITE was to go on air,
only enongh satellite fodder for one month was on hand? 7
SITE provided a perfect opportunity for Indian engineers to acquire a wide variety of
valuable technological knowledge--the sort of technological learning that occurs on any
project. What marked SITE as an exceptional technological enterprise (and of importance
to INSAT) was the way in which SITE 'affected those Indian engineers who went to the
United States to help NASA prepare for SITE. The ISRO liaison in the United States
between 1969 and 1973, Pramod Kale. had been recruited by Sarabhai to work in the Indian
space program. Kale and other ISRO engineers working at NASA learned to design an
advanced operational satellite, and Kale eventually became the project manager of INSAT?"
The phenomenal success of SITE in penetrating remote regions of rmal India
impressed everyone. It gave the Indian space program a level of state support that was oth-
erwise unimaginable. SITE provided ISRO valuable technical expertise in building and
managing the elaborate ground systems needed to utilize an t , satellite. It also enhanced
tile credibility of ISRO in the Indian scientific community and in the international space
comnnmity. Indian scientists and engineers were n|ore willing to work for ISRO. The
recruitment of young professionals t'rom elite engineering institutions increased for the
first time after Sarabhai's death. SITE opened critical paths in the rapidly emerging
European space programs. ISRO was accepted as an equal partner in several critical coop-
erative programs managed by tim European, French, and German space programs. Tile
collaboratitms with European space agencies brought ISRO decisive technologies and
much needed experience. Tim experience and confidence gained abroad fed into the
design of INSAT. It also enabled India to practice its own technological diplomacy--one
based on nonalignment. '''
More important than all the technical expertise gained fiom SITE was the educatitm
that ISRO received from the Indian villages it had set out to instruct. SITE planted the
seeds of social responsibility into the rain(is of India's elite space engineers. It etched
India's social contexts into 1SRO space techm)logy. Exposure to the complex problems of
India's villages tempered technocratic grandiosit}: Ahhtmgh rural television promised rev-
olutionary social changes, it also revealed the limitations of teclmological fixes.-"'
Unraveling INSAT
Homi Bhabha had begun scouting for a satellite for India as earl}, as 1965. He was
unwilling to purchase a ready-made satellite, because Indians would not learn anything
about making satellites. Instead, he sought technical assistance in tmilding a satellite and
met several times with Arnold Frutkin to discnss U.S. assistance. Frutkin, however, saw no
16. On All India Radio, see K.S. Mull[ok, 7hngl*'d 7hpe_: 7he ln_ide Stray oflndian Broadcasting (New Dtqhi:
Sterling Publishers. 1974).
17, Arnold W. Frulkin to Yash Pal, letter, 30,lammry 1975, NASA It[story ()trice.
18. M.S. Svidhar, "% Study of Indian Space Technologists,"]ournal *?[Library and In/brmation Science 7t2)
(1982): 146-58.
19. (;.A, \4m Reeth and V.A. ltood, "Review of ISRO/ESA Cooperation," conlerence paper, Rome,
1983; V!jay Gupta, ed., India and Non-aligv_ment (New Delhi: New Literature, 1983}; tt,W. Brands, The Specter oJ
Ne_zlrali._m.
20. Vikram Smabhai, ,_4encePoli¢ 7 a*ld Nationall)evelopm*:nt (I)elhi: Macmillan Company of India, 197.t):
Vikram Sarabhai, ManagementjorDevelerpmetlt (Dt'lhi: Vikas Publishing l[ouse, 1974).
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practical benefits for NASA from teaching Indians to build satellites. Vikranl Sarabhai
(!IIC()[III|CI'('(| CV(_'[I gl'C_tlCl" o|)stacl_.'s--nol oHly IllOl'C lCSistancc It) tcc]lnolog T |I'DIIS_(!I', bill
also systematic pressures [tom the Uniled Slaws and its allies, especially Britain, aimed at
discouraging India's space program. Hesitantly, S,nabhai initiated planning for an Indian
tlational satellile, to I)_, calh'd IN,":,AT, in 1967.
Systematic thinking ab<)ttt INSAT began in mid-1968. A st'vclltccn-ll/CIIlt)ci- ¢'omtnil-
tee of engineers and scientists based at the Spac¢' Scictwc and Techtl<)log_' Center in
Thttmba condttcled a preliminary tbasibility stttdv, honicallv, Ihcir preliminary rcporl did
not consider the development of lhc payload or salellile. They had c<mcluded th;t.l tilt"
first sal:cllitc had m he buih in collaboration with olhcr counlrics. They lind not antici-
pated _,_'slern resist',mcc to the IransRw of space tccht/ologff'. :_ Thus, lh¢" iirs! step in
India's satellilt' program colwcmlt-;tled on the gvotmd sv:,;,lUlllS. This oricnlalion conlinu_'s
to characterize lhc Indian spacc' program toda,,'. The preliminary 1968 t_'asil)ililv stu(tv
explicitly tbcuscd on t',vo/asks lhal the Indians could scc Ilwmsclvcs doing: (1) designing
<wt)ital parameters and ground stations and (2) developing those tcchnoh_gies fiw which
no foreign ;issislan(¢' was avaihthlc, snch as i)rof)cllants at/d r<wket gtfi(lancc. -'_
India's initial emphasis, them, was Io t)c on the launch vehicle rather Ihan the' satel-
lite. By 1968, negoli_tlions wilh NASA to borrow lh_.' ATS-6 had gctleralcd considcral)le
optimism about l T.S. technological assislatlce. Stt,,'cral American aerospace firms, such as
(;cncral El¢!ctric and I ltlght!s AcroSl)aCc, had shown a ket'n dcsirc to collahoratc with
India in building ils fiYsl operalional Indian sal('llil¢', l low¢.'V('l, Ihcs¢." ¢!allY ctfiwts t_) bttild
a htunchcr were unusually optimislic.
S;_ral)hai, ;ts (lid Bhabha, limntl lht' Uniled Nalions an cftbctivc tbrtnn Io argtt_,' lot
technological assistance. An inlcrnalitmal sounding rocket program condtwled il). India
t)rought basic rocket Icchno t)g_' tronl the Unilt'd Nlitlcs, FI'itlIcc, ;tll([ Ihc Soviet Union.
I h)wcvcr, scaling tq) to rockets (al);d)lc of launching ot)cralional salcllilt's was a daunting
task. Sarabhai and his collcagtlcs recognized lhc n;mlrc of Iht" challcngc: India would
have to ()blain latmch services, at least initially, from cilher the I_:nil(,d ,%I;lll,!s o1 the Soviet
Union anti l)l;mne(t its salellilt's a(t()r(tingly.
In 1970, Vikram Natal)hal annountcd plans t()r an Indian Nail(real Satcllilc (INSAT)
at the Bomhav Nalional Elt'clronit's (:()nfi.'ren(e. At/ending Iht" (Ollt¢,rt, llte was al'l impres-
sive colleclion of academics, industrialists, politicians, l)tnc;nlcra_s, researchers, scit'ntists,
alld cqlgint,¢,rs, as well as a substantial crew of Indian ,journalists. _:' It was a perfect place to
n_antffacltnt' cons¢'nsus fi)r a national salellile. Sarabhai's prcscntation of llw INSAT plans
fl_rilled the crowd. 1)issenling (ttk,slioners were co-ot)tcd by well-informed "Sarabhai
boys." Sarabhai's IN,";AT was i)rimarily a direcl-broattcast s,acllite meant to educate Indian
villagers through/¢qevision. To secure a wide rail.go of support, Saral)hai indicated the l)OS-
sil)ility of including a nunfl_er of special 1)ayloatts Io s:nist)' special clients. Fie also drcw
altention to the proposed SITE plan, which at the lime was being worked oul by a.joint
C()lnnlillt't- of Indian and [T.S. ellgineers.
However, lhere was nol mttch demand fi>r lelecotnmunications ll-(llll the Postal and
Telegral)hs l)epartmcnl or liw remote sensing from the Ministry of Defense. Weather intor-
marion was not highly sottght afler either. Unlike mosl of Ihc parlicipants at the
('OllfCI'CII('C, I, hc Yt'prcsttlH;tlivcs of gOVCFIIIIlCIII t)tll't';tHt't';t('ics were nol excited hy
21. ,\ll_)n_mous, I'_ehmma_,,l')'a_ihd_ts: ,'qturl_' llepml (";,atcllitc Ih_!jc_) IBomba_: India (h_xt.rlm_mt lhcs_,,
l':)liS), t ). _.
'2'2. S_cchmi Ra_) and ,S.K. Sinbad, "()_bi_ l)ctc_minatkm h)_ ISR() ,_alcllRc Mission,s," .ldvame_ m ,'_pa.,
l?.e_ea_H_ 5(2 ( 1.)8.)):147-153; M_nta_ Swdmm_, l_'pmti_gA_ms: Thet'_,de_alAHn_ t(x]_oH_ Admi_ist_alhm l 9_'5 1_45
(New _rk: Kings Cr_wn lhess, 1947).
2'3. (;(IVUI IIInCIll HI II_dia, l'r..'¢'dmg_ "l the Nah rm:d l','[eH_._;_ (,'o_!/)'t_'me ,m I"l_'Hromcs (l_)mba'.,': India
(;_xc_ imw_H I'wss, 1972L
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Sarabhai's technological evangelism. It seemed, though, that they realized they could not
pose any significant opposition publicly. The primary thncfion of Sarahhai's INSAT was
rural education through direct-broadcast television, making it explicitly a permanent
replacement for SITE. If in the process 1NSAT could serve other needs, thai was so much
for the bet{m:
Shortly after travelling his 1NSAT plans, Vikram Sarabhai {lied, in December 1971. Ilis
death caused serious concern about the flmne of INSAT. Unlike SITE, which had NASA
for a godfather, INSAT had no powerftd patrons outside the Indian space i)rogram. Ew-n
more troubling was that no obvious successors to Sarabhai came forth flom the Indian sci-
entific COlnmunity. At the same time, the U.S. Congress delayed the ATS program through
budget CtllS, giving time tbr India to revamp its space program. ISRO engineers commit-
ted to INSAT look pains to disconnect the fates of INSAT and SITE, which had been tied
together implicitly; in the hope of ensuring INSAT's survival.
Toward the end of January 1972, tile Indian government ottered the leadership of the
space program to Satish Dhawan. Dhawan had worked fi)r Hindusthan Aeronautics
I.imited, India's state-owned aerospace industry, and he was familiar with Soviel aerospace
lechnologD'. Ill appointing Dhawan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced the cre-
ation of two important new organizations. One was the Department of Space. Dhawan
convinced Gandhi to headquarter tile Department of Space mvay flom New Delhi, in
Bangalore. The Del)artment of Space was to be overseen hy the other new institution, the
Space (_ommission. At the same time, lhe space laboratories in Sarabhai's home town
were consolidated into the Space Applications (;enter under liar" direction of Yash Pal of
tilt" Tara Institute of Fundamental Research. Also, the space laboratories in and around
Trivandrum were consolidated as tile Vikram Saral)hai Space (]enter. Brahm Prakash,
recently relired 1]ore tile Bhal)ha Atomic Research Center, was persuaded to direct its
activities.-"
Dhawan's leadership marked a signiticant change in the Indian space program. India
could not withdraw fiom SITE without seriously jeopardizing its relations with NASA and
Ihe United States. Dhawan recognized that i! had to make SITE a success. ()n the other
hand, plans tot INSAT could be shelved, especially because i!s adw)cates had separated it
froin SITE, and there were pressures from the Planning Commission !o discard INSAT.
The Ministry of Finance and tile Planning (]ommission saw no cash t]ows in tile original
educational television version of INSAT. Fortunately, the light over INSAT resuhed in a
compromise. No decision was made one way or the other. The government waited until
SITE was completed to evaluale proposals fi)r INSAT, even though il ineant ;-lit expensive
hiatus in the social revolution catalyzed by SITE.
Dhawan pushed hard 1o make SITE succeed, tie saw the future of INSAT, if nol ISR(),
at stake. When SITE was hailed loudly as all tmprecedenled success I)y the _slern media,
thanks to NASA's self-interest, INSAT revived. Between 1970 and 1977, the Minislry of
Tt, lecommunications awakened to the necessity of satellite technologies. The Prime
Minister's ()ffice had also become aware of the potential revolutionary capabilities of
dire{l-broadcast satellite television. ISRO personnel, tired by Sarabhai's vision, succeeded
in creating a small, independent rural television station based in P!j, Gujrat. Nonetheless,
the Prime Minister's Otfice began to see the spread of satellite television of the SITE vari-
ely Io 1)e socially disrul)tive. It wanted llollling more than a gradual social revolution.-'"
24. K.A.V. Pandalai, "Aerospace Personalities: Prof. Satish I)hawat_," Aeronautical Society ,!/India .\},w_h,tler
3Gq) (August 198(,): 2-12; Satish l)hawan, 15o_pect_/i,a .S]mre lndust U i*_ India (I_,angalor¢ ', India: l'aliala
"I'edmical Edtuation "l'vust, 1983).
25. Salish 1)hawan, interview with aud_or, Bangah)lc, India, 4January 1990,
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Much had changed bv tilt+ linl¢' the INSAT (l,mc,ppt rcvivcd in 1977. l)hawan, whih'
wcll respected, did not l,l,munanl,t thl," itdllu'ncl,' tllat Sarabhai had. Back-l,)fthl,'-vnvl,'lol)C
calcuhltions, on ilel I'CVCIII,ICS _Cll(+l'illCd t)'_ I'111"}11Cdttll,'ati<Hl lhll,nlgh satcllilc tclcvision,
did not hold any wcight wit]l<nll Sarabhai. Thc Planuin g (kmltnission, in collabl,mtlion
with tile Primc Minislcr's OHil,c. sought 1<) ,_rotmd INSXI"s dircl,t-broadl,,tst capal)ilily.
Also. the Minisnv ,)t Finance nladc it (lear Ihitl INSAT had to bca fully operational ;tnl,I
I'CVCntl('-t..,rCllCl'illing satellite t_/l- it [O ll,'l,'eivl,+ huldhlg. This i,nplicd [h;ll INSAT had to bc
a collat)oracivc vcnltnl,' iuvolving lilt' [)Cllill'tlIICll[ ()t'Sp;II,'C (dh-ccll} Illll,[Cf lilt" pro'view of
the prime minister), the _;|l_;llllllHn Postal mid Tl,'ll,'graphs l)cpartnwnt under lhl,'
Ministr,, of (kmmnmications, tilt' Ml,'tcorl,>logical l)cpaftn/cnt of tilt' Ministry of Tourism
and (;ivil Aviation, and l)ol,lrdarshan aud :\11 India Radio id the Minislrv of hltortnaliou
aud lhoadcastin'4. Studdcnly, INSAT had tivc till,mrs, bul tilt',, wcrc all _ssificd btu-caul,ra-
cics dating t+t<ml I]w British Ra!} into which had lransmigrawd a thoroughly Indian s<ml.
They hal,t little conu'nitmcnt to Sat+abhai's vision <)t INSAT as an cdtttational tool.
Par_tdoxicallv, All India Radio and l)l,_l,lrdarshan _rtll'_' anxious ,ol to bt" saddled with thl,"
dircl,t-I)ll,)al,lcasl SC_lllCllt. Thc_ tbm'cd tilt" l,'hl,)t-l,"of [_.'cl,[ill<_ tilt" (IClllOll satellite. fhc <_<r_-
ci-nllICnl revealed no inlcntiou l,lt fl-ccing brl,)a(l<aslhl R l}om its Iota] conlrol, hi additi_m.
maiutaining several tu,ndred thousand vilhtgc tHcvision scls, as calh'd lot in lilt" INSAI
plans, was a logistical nightnlmc [or an 7, go'+'crnnlcnt 1)mcautrac'+'. Thus, lilt" market fi_r
1NSAT changed radically between 1970 and 1977.
Many idealistic ISR() CIIgilICCI'S, fl'csh t'l'l,ml tilt' expcriencc of SITE, rcalizcd Ih;l[ tilt"
original iNSXI' might llc h!jackcd. Thcy refused to consider any INSAT dr'sign that dil,l
not inl,'ludc a dilcct-broadl,ast tclcvisil,m payl<md. "I'llp]al,'alc thClll, till.' INSXF design l,onl-
IlliIIcc, llOW il I'C;I] working g,'l,mp with t'llgitlCl,q'S fl'l,)lll tilt Ministry of Fch'clmmnnli-
cations. _iI._lCl,'d 1,::, iuslall a tclcvisil,m tl-;lllSlllillcl" l,'()lllI)}tl'_lbh' l,() lilt" (:,lit' tlSCd ill SITE.
l lowcvcr, tilt+ lqauning (:onnnissil,m rl,'fuscl,l to s;.ulttion till,fifty till gl-l,)lllld cquil)mcnt,
sttch as te]evisil>n sets and antmlnas. Such a COml)rl,mlisc scrvcd ()l/]y It,) Sit',.'(" l_l('t'. Thc
activists ill ISRO v.,';tlllCd to llc prcllarcd for ;ul OpF, l,)rtunity to ICllCW SITE. On tilt" dark
sidc, this dccisil,m Ill inl,:hldc a SITE capability inlpl,lscd ll,/tlgll l,Icsign COllSlFailllS <oil
INSAT. For instance, il increased lhc i)l,)v,,t:r nccdcd to kccp thc satellite alive.
X.Vhy did Indian spacc tcchnl,)logists prctcr not to l,tcsign scvcral Sillglc-purpl,)sc satt'l-
lilcs? Each such satellite would have 1)con fairly simple and Imih whh prl,lven, oft:-l]lc-shclf
tcthnolog T. Bttilding several satcllitcs also would havc spurrcl,I tilt" serial l)rl,+ductil,m of an
Indian Sl)aCc platlorm. The l,dtil,ial answcr t<) this <d)vilms qucstil,m is lilt' ccl,)nl,lnlil,s of
satcllhc launching+ Because Indian rockcts wcrc inl,apabh" of launching a satellite hllo
g,t'l,)staltil,lIlary orbit, hldia had to purchase Ikwcign lilllnch sl,'rvi('cs. "Tht'rc arc no frec
launches," NASA told Dhawan. The Sovicts l,lil,I not lannch gt'l,)stalionary satellites; lht'ir
launch pads were too far lliOllh tlo ac]licvc all cquatorial orbit. Tilt Eurl,)pean Sp,lcc Agcncy
()tl_'rcd flcc laun(:hcs, trot l,mly l,m cxf)l,_rimcnlal rockcts. ]NSAT clntl(l not bc risked on
experimental i-c,ckcts. Rough l,:alcl,lations shmvcd Ihil[ Ill( + launch costs of a muhipur])<lse
s;ttc]]he w<mhl I)c l<_wcr I]lall l]le cost ot +lal,mching I]ll-eC ()1+t(:,llI" smaller spacecraft.
The tcchnl,)hlgical palrhnl,lny of SITE cs])ccially hlthlcnccd INSAT. The success of
SITE, irt a sense, blinl,led INSAT dcsiRncrs. ['hc activisl l,ultl,u-t' ()t tilt" Indian space pro-
_4ratn did no! pcrnlil lcistu'c introspcl,til,m. The shorlaRc of skilled personnel ensured
tnininlal dissent l,m tcchnl,>logical ahcrnalivcs. T]w Unitt'd States--and Canada Io sc,111c
extent--lured away a signiticant number l,d elite ludian cnginel,'rs and st'ion(is(s, sltmting
tilt" gFO,,vlh of a hcahhv scil,'nlitil, comnmnilv.
Ml,_rcl,_vcr, ISR() prl,lgfcssivcly Iosl lilt, allilitv to dcfinc the satcllilc. !,'X_ll¢+llSafal)hai
stul,+ecdcd Bhal/ha, hc COtltinuct] to fi:>llow his nlcntl,_r's sll';.ilcb,r'}' wilhoiut r<.,sponding to
changes in the gcopolilical c<mtcxt. India did not t<_nnnilnd thc saint ln<_ral auth<_ritv it
had cvcn in lilt' cm-lv 1950s. Also, Sarabhai was nol fully awarc ot lilt nmtivations
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prompting NASA and the United States on SITE. He could not foresee that SITE com-
mitted the Indian space program to an expensive detour that would uhimately freeze
unwieldy features, such as a television transmitter, into the second generation of INSAT
satellites. After Sarabhai's death, the Indian space program had to compromise more to
keep its allies. Dhawan had even less room to negotiate than Sarabhai. In the meantime,
tim space organization had grown into a large bureaucracy. In real terms, budgets did not
grow at a healthy rate. Dhawan sought to balance carefully the diverse needs of his vari-
ous allies, while preserving a demanding coalition.
Nut all of the payloads on INSAT had powerflll patrons fighting for them. The
Meteorological Department was not really interested in the satellite. Its clients were small
farmers who did not know how to lobby for their share of technology. Yet, the designers
of INSAT added the meteorological subsystems. In doing so, they made the satellite even
lnore difficuh technologically. To predict weather, INSAT designers placed a camera on
the satellite. Thus, the satellite could send pictures of cloud movements that could be
used to predict weather patterns. The camera required that the satellite be ten times more
stable in space than it needed to be tot the other missions. This added another dimension
to INSAT's technological complexity. Why was the weather subsystem not left out? Who
would have complained that INSAT did not predict the weather? A few people on the
INSAT design committee experienced a deeply feb responsibility to the Indian tarmer
and stood their ground in design committee deliberations. India's effi)rts to get INSAT
huih required it to harness several payloads, to yoke several interests, and even to create
new constitnencies. INSAT became a crowded Indian bus.
Conclusion
Indians dv nut enjoy concluding stories. For complex epics such as the Ramayana and
Mahabharata, conclusions are often beginnings. In 1947, an independent Indian state
came into being. Barely two years after independence, food shortages forced the govern-
ment of India to beg from the West. The United States, especially under the Johnson
administration, cynically sought to use India's food crisis to further its own Cold War agen-
da. The uneasiness between the two countries is evident in the history of India's nuclear
and space programs, especially when they are seen in tim light of decolonization.
The history of INSAT is also a case study in the emergence of a nation-state in South
Asia. Nascent science and technology' institutions learned to deal, trade, and negotiate with
the West under the leadership of Bhabha and Sarabhai, both of whom came from mer-
chant-industrialist families. Doing business with the rest of the world, a skill not in great
demand during centuries of fi)reign oppression, was what INSAT taught some Indians.
The rise of a professional, middle-class leadership in the Indian space and nuclear
programs may be read as an indicator of the growing integration of the Indian nation-
state into the t,unily of nations. The politics of accommodation vividly illustrated by INSAT
is at some level a comlorting sign. The politics of foreign aid and the geopolitics of INSAT
show India that nothing comes free.
Chapter 17
Footprints to the Future, Shadows of
the Past: Toward a History of
Communications Satellites in Asia
by Brian Shoesmith
"If a new means of communication makes its appearance, who are its patrons? If new
knowledge is produced, who cont[ols it and for whal ends?"
IBrian Stock
"Satellites already have inspired one revolution in Asia. In the space of Ibm years since
Star TV was launched in Hong Kong on llle Asiasal 1 spacecrafl, satellite and cable have
transtormed the face of broadcasting in the region."
--Brian Jefliies'
Writing a history of satellites in Asia is like building a house on quicksand. For a start,
there are contextual problems with the [elm Asia. Questions that quickly spring to mind
arc: Precisely whose Asia are we lalking ab<mt? Which Asia are we speaking ot7 Then there
is the techn<>log_; itself. Satellites are a comparatively recenl addition to the repertoire of
available communications media, and their slatus remains largely unresolved as olher
communications teehn<>h>gies compele lot markets. Furthermore, conditions surround-
ing satellites in Asia are volatile: more satelliles are latmched; new regulations on their
uses are allllOtll>ced by national ,_oVeI'IIIIlelI[S; alld llew stralegic alliances are t<>rge<t
among governmenls, satellite providers, and commercial In<mdcasters, thereby ch>uding
the issues.
In short, identil),ing the m_j,,r lrends and comributions to the evolving mediascape
of Asia is difficuh because things change, quite literally, over night. Consequently, the fq:)l:
lowing analysis of the forces shaping the current Asian communications satellite environ-
lnent is ne<essarily provisional. One should bear in min<t thai contingency seems to be the
ovcrwhehning (telerminanl of the direction the communications in<lustry h.as taken in
Asia. Nevertheless, i| is appropriate thal a history of satellites in Asia bc begun--if |or no
oflmr reason than that, within a rapidly changing scene, there is a need to chart the timn-
dations of wha[ has t)ecome a powerful regional fi)rce--befi_re they, too, are <:h)uded t)v
the ti>rces <>fchange.
To understand how powerful an inlluence satelliws have had, it is necessary to oul-
linc briefly the mass media systcms of Asia that havc bccn challenged by the new u'ch-
nolog)'. The [ollowing discussion is a "twoad-brush" approach. (;lcarly not all Asian media
systems have developed along identical lines, nor have they been confronted with the
same regulalory svstems or subj¢'cu'd to lhe same levels of polilical censorship.
I. By|an Stock, l.t_teuing fiJr the 7i'xl: On the t'sr'+o  the l'a_t (Bah|mine: '['h,.' Johns ltopkins Ini,.cvsip,
Pvcss, 19!10), p. 21; Brian .]cfhics, "The Sky's Ihc [,imil," t"aplia_te_, I:'_ouom_ t'b'vicu, 158 (1995): 49.
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Never01eless, one can say that almost withoul exception Ihe modern mass media ill Asia
were introduced into the region by the colonial powers. Initially, it was the press, followed
by radio then television, which tormed the postcohmial Asian media inherited by the
nationalist regimes and melded into indigenous ideological systems. The media became
indissoluhly linked to localized concepts of development, heing assigned an entirely dit:
tbren! sociopolitical function than that of the Western media. The media in Asia have
developed within nail<real ideological frameworks since all least the 1951)s, and they ale
best exeml)lified hy tilt" Indonesian stale ideolog_ of [mncasila.-'
The signiticance of sawlliles lies in their polenlial lo precisely and coml)rehensivel',
suhvert l)vior national systems of control of the media. The material presence of satellites
in Asia has totted tilt" various Asian governnmnts to rethink their policies <m broadcast-
ing and torero|utica|ions. The corollary of this is that the polilical will of the Asian slates
to relain SOllle vestige of conlrol over lheil nlediascape also has lorced _reSlel-n llallsna-
tional broadcasters to reevaluate their broadcasting practices and ideologies.'
A second |ea/lUe of salellites requiring elucidation is their scope. When Apstar 2 linal-
ly gets into orbit, it will have at too|print that (:overs the whole Eurasian landmass, part of
East Aft|ca, and lhe western Pat|tic vim. All polilical boundaries and Io[)ogral)hical imped-
imenta will be transcended, fultilling a trend begun in lhe Victorian era with Ihe intro-
duction of telegraphy.' The geopolitical consequences inherent in this situation were
recognized at the heginning of this century with the extension of teh'graphy in the service
of cmpirc. As Ilallord.I. Mackinder wrote in 1904: "For the lhst time we can perceive
something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world,
and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects.., of geographical causation
in universal history." For the thst time ill history, there was at potential for an "empire of
the world" dominated hy whoever controlled the pivot area or "heartland" of Eurasia.-'
Satellites are more than arlifhcls of universal history, however. They also have pro-
found commercial attd cuhtlral attrihules. Since Rupert Mttrdoch purchased Star "I_ 7 in
1993 front tile Hong Kong coral)any l Iulchinson _qlampoa," a ntuntmr of other European
and tT.S. communications companies, such as Pearson and NBC, have entered Ihe domain
of Asian satellite broadcasting5 There is a view, generau'd la,gely I)y Asia's booming
economies, that Asia holds a vast inarket of consumers waiting it) be serviced 1)y an end-
less supply of consumer goods. In many respects, this view echoes thal of the Manchester
school of nineteenth-centttry England, which viewed (_hina similarly as a vast market tot
their products and which inlhtenced British foreign policy accordingly.*
2. The tivc principh's of pancasila arc: Iwlicf in at single supreme (;od; a just and civiliz('d humanity:
national unity: demo¢ ]ac)q h'd by Ihc WiNf|OIII Ot t OIISCIISIIS ;I.llll)llg I'Cpl'CSctllalivt's; and social justice Ibr lhe IWO -
ph' ot Indonesia. Edward Janner sinaga, "Indonesia," in Achal Mchra, ed., 15e_ Y,)stems in A£1g4N StaO:s
(Singaptwc: Asian Mass Communication Rt'sc;ut h ;rod hflbrmalitm Ccnllv (AMIC), t989), pp. 97-39, esp. p, 27.
3. John Sin<lait, "The Busint_ss o1 hHcrnalional Broadtasling: (hdtura] BrMgcs and Barriers," pal)m
read at Commtmicalions Research Fotum, S}dnvy. 19-20 Oclober 199r_: Will Atkins, " 'Friendly and Usctul':
Rul)er_ Murdoch and the Politics ¢_1"Teh'xision in Scmlheast Asia, 1993-95," Media h_te,'nati,mal Australia 77
{August 1995): 54-64.
•t. James W. (;are)', Communication as (.'ultur*': Essay_ ¢m Media and &uicty (lxmdtm: trnwin I bman, 1989},
pp. 201-23; Daniel Czitrom, /_ledia and the Amenta_* Mind: I')zml Mm:_' to MH_uhan (Chapel l lill, N( :: Uniw'rsilv o[
Norlh (_molina Press, 1982), pp. lIME.
5. Cilvd in Slcphen Kern, "l'he Cullu_e o/ "lTme and S_mce, 1880-1918 ((;ambridge, MA: tlarvard
Univcrsilv Press, 1':)83), p. 228.
6. Atkins, " 'Friendly and Usctul','" pp. 54-64.
7. Nick Masters, "UK's Pearson sccmcs a significant staku in 'I'Vlk" "lbh't_i_ionasia, March 1995, p. 8.
8. Mary (21abaugh Wright, The l.a_Z _'tand o/ (,'him,_e Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih He_t_rratim_, 186_187,t
(Slantind, (:A: Stanti_td University Press, 1957), pp. 23-33.
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Techn<>h)gica] issu¢,s ;tlso must lie ad(h+css¢'d. Thvet" ill I)avticul:u" stand out. Fh'sl, tilt'
ability to develop ;:lil¢t nlaint:+in it satellite inf,:lstrut+tUlC ilnl)lit's a ])owerfid cton<)lili( t)ilsc
and techntdogical sophistic:lti<)n. Second, access tt) satellite tcchnolt)gy :list) iml)lics a conl-
l)licatcd set <ff int<`,tnationitl tcl;ltions. In rcality, t)lllx, tht" Unitt+d Stal<`'s ;11 th<`" ctl<`l of the
(_t)ld Wiu had th(" tlect'ss:uv <`'c()tl<)lllic [lower to dcvt'h)p an :+tilt)ill)mOllS satellite pFo-
gram. All other l)rt)gr+tms wcrc hyllt+ids c<md)ittillg, in varying dcgyecs, h)c;d tcchnol(+_'
with im]lort<`'d tt,chnolt_gics. Thus, the (lis:lstv()tls A1)st:u 2 latmch ill .]:lnll_uy lt.)_.)3 <`<>m-
1)illcd it satellilc dcvclopcd t)} t the" Amt't'ic:tFJ (+()liip:lllV l lugh<`'s Acroslmcc with a (:hitlese
I.ong M:uch l<)ckt'l. The hyl)vid tcchn<d<_g_y ;q)t>roach first dcvch)pcd in Indi:t where local-
ly l_ll)ricatcd satcllit<`'s were COlnt)int,d with cithcr [!.,_,., Russi:ul, or FreNch t-ockcls
throtlghout the l<.)60s :lnd 1970s. Australi;I :lth)ptcd similar str;llcgics i]l Ihc mid-19S0s
with the l;+lmch of AUSSAT. Europe has l_),lil<`'(t its own c<)llst)rtilml tt) l)roducc cotnmtl-
nic:ttions s;itt,llitcs and :It the s:ttllt" tinlc tnakc the tcchnolog T :iv:iil:d)Ic t<, others who wish
to put satellites iHto o]l)it. Thus, <)no can stl_gcst th;It col+lllllttnit:|tiolls satcllitt+s ;ut" the
ptodlwt of ct)tnplcx global techttological svslctlls that incltldc Asia stvuctttt-allv :Is a paFt-
tier, unlike I)rcviolts world conunttnic;ltiotis s+vslt'lllS th:lt incltldt'd Asi:t t)nlv :Is :l client.
Finally, th<`'vt' is the qt_<`'stitJn of the rcl:ttiot/shi 1) tlclwccti t<`,chnologv and cldtur<`'.
St)<`ial scicnlists still have a tcnclcllcv lo ch_lraclcvizc cxplan:|tory systems of ch+tngc that
ft';itlttc IcchFH)log T :is detcrmillistic." l._!nli_rtlm:ltcl,,'+ th<`" spt'ctt't- of technological d<`'lct-
minism will not tlisal)pCav, irrespective of vvhcthcr it is colwh<`'d ill tcvttls of "hm-d, +,"soft,"
ov t<`'chtl<)l<)gi<`al i+lomctitt|tti wh<`+tl lhc vclati<>tlship bctwccn tt+chnologT and cultiH-e is dis-
ctlsscd. The h<`'at gentry:tied I)y discussions of I<`,chnologic;d d<`,tcrttlitfistn clavities n<_thing.
R<`'garding cotnnHmic:itit_ns tcchnol<)gics, it w<_Itld I)¢'l)veft'tal)lc to list" the Innisian ICI+III
"l+ias. "'+' I I:u+<dd A. Intlis pl;iccd t<)llililUllic:itit_llS lcchntdt)gi<'s :It tilt +cot<`" of cultttral :wtiv-
its: and :u+gttt'd, persuasively, lh:it all such tcchntdt_gics h:tvc tither ;t lempot-al of sp:iti;d
bias. These :ugunl<`'tlts at+<.• well rehearsed and tcqtfitc litll<`' _'lal)oratit)n ]lclc, '+ cxct'pt to
s:tx: tll:ll cotnmlt]lications s_tcllit<`'s have thc most 1)vtmouttc<`'d s[)alial t)i;ts of any ¢ommu-
nic:ttions tt'chnoh_h-,+ yet d<`'viscd. Apst:tr 2 is the cxt'mphtvy cast.
If we vi<`,w commutiications satellites silnply as avtithcts, w<`"can truly formtthttc ;t par-
ti;tl accotlnt of thciv histol'):. Thcl'C is no dottbt th:tl t<:chnical de'vcl<_pm<`'nts in t-t)ckcIl",,
stdid st:it<,+circtfitr+v, digitiz:ttion, ;lnd Inini;_tttl'iz;ttit_tl all h;wc pl;wcd cvtwial vol<`'s in th<`'
tttllolding histt)t-v, :Itld any ct)mpvelw,)sivc accotmt h;is t() :record tht'tn duc sig_lilicanct'.
According to (:mt)lyn .M:u+viu, though, "the c;irly histovv of electric ]m'dia is less thc cvt>-
lutiotl of tcchnic:d clficic,lcics in conltutmicatioI_ that+ it styles of :ucF, as l+ov tlt'goti:tting
issues cFucial to thc c<)nducl of social life, ,`'+ :rod "[W]hen audiences become oFg:mizcd
:u-olmd these uscs, the histt_vv t)f fllt" new tiicdit_tt+ l)cgins."'; With these l_tctots ill mind,
this discussion l)rOl)OSes a history of ctmmnttiic;lti_)ns satellites it+ Asia that h+ts thtcc dis-
linct slttgcs--all of th<`+tn linked to Ihc dcvcl_q)tneHt of television ;is it mt,dium i_l Asia.
St:iS,<`' onc lasts :q)l/roxitn;_tcly tYom 1<.)62 tllllil tilt" I:ttt" 1980s and is ch;uact<`'rized by ;I
pcrccptioH th:tt s:ltcllitcs shotfld 1)c h;ut_t'sscd [br development l)ur])oses, pl:tcing them
sccurcly in thc public sector sphctc td bw)adc;tsting hist<)v.v. Sl:+.gt.' tWO is it slit)H, tr;lllSi-
lit)ll:t] |)cviod sp;t_miHg the end of the 19S+ls and is characlerized I)v a response :ullong
Asian g_)vcvtmi<`'tlts It) lhc t'tld of thc (_old W:u. Stage lhtc<`" l)cb,dns in 1991 atld is
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characterized by the dominance of commercial forces ill Asian broadcasting. In making
these distinctions, they are not posited as exclusive. They are clearly not exclusive, as the
transformation of developlnent communication fl-om a didactic practice to a postmodern
application demonstrates. '_ Moreoww, public broadcasting retains a strong presence in
Asia. In short, what ;Ire described here are dominant trends.
In the Public Sphere
Asia officially entered the space age in 1965 with the founding of tile Centre for
Training and Research in Satellite Communicalion for Developing Countries in
Ahmedabad, India, under the direction of Vikram A. Sarabhai, although research had
begun earlier in 1962. _' This discussion of satellite ct)mmtmications in Asia during in the
period 1965-1988 is organized around three themes: ( 1) the carryover of an ideology' of
public broadcasting into satellite communications that was consonant with Asian political
ideals based on notions of development and nationalism; (2) a view that satellites were an
expensive and scarce resource whose use should tie limited to development communica-
lit)n; and (3) problems t)f ,egulatitm by international bodies thai emphasized a "tirst-
come, first-serve" basis--principals that were contentious 1)ecause, even at the earliest
stages, they were l)erceived as disadvantaging the develol)ing nations. The period is also
characterized by a shift away from In(lia toward China as the principal space-oriented
nation in eXsia. "Fhe shift is emblematic of China's changing econonlic and political status
in Asia, signit}'ing changing geopolitical realities that will inform this discussion.
Sarabhai was both visionary and persuasive"' and had a clear agenda tbr satellite com-
munications in India. That agenda was to serve the educational needs of India's rural lmP-
ulation rather than the entertainment wants of tile urban masses, lle forcefully articulat-
ed a developmental ideology that has governed India's use of satellites until very recent-
ly. It llliISt be acknowledged, however, tllat I)roadcasting in India at the time was not only
limited, I)ul highly l)ureattcratized, and it was aimed principally at education and infor-
mation, placing a very tow priority on entertainment. Thus, both terrestrial and satellite
communications in India were locked into the public sl)here and organized accordingly.
It was nol just domestic policy that shaped Indian space policy in this period. Under
the leadership ofJawaharlal Nehru, India became the leading exponent of nonalignmen!
in international affairs and thus sough( aid and advice from both sides in the Cold War.
This policy applied to satellite lechnolog3/;is much as any other aspect of Indian realpolitik.
Between 1967 and 1979, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) COOl)crated with
NASA, the Soviet Union, and the Franco-German SynH)honie program on space projects.
In 1967, ISRO negotiated with NASA [or access to its Applications Technology Satellite
tATS)-6 spacecrati for one }'car to ctmduct tile Salellile hlstructional Television
Experiment (SITE). In 1975, India launched its Aryabhata research satellite using a Soviet
rocket in 1975, and later, during 1977-1979, India ctmducled the Symphonic
Telecommunications Experimental Project (STEP) with the Franco-German Symphonic
satellite administratitm. The outcome of these collaborations was that India had the lIlost
advanced space l)rogram in Asia 1)y the end of the 1970s. This ellor! t)rol)al)ly for the mr)st
part dissipated because it was too oriented toward development and too heavily Imreau-
cratized. The experience of SITE exemplifies the situation that deveh)ped.
14. Pal l loward, "The (]onli'ontation of Modern and Traditional Knowledge Systems in l)evelopment,"
(:amMian lou))ml O/ ('ommunicati.n 19 (1(.)(14), http:/ /t'di(',tp) ost.sh_.ca/tjc/(jc-inli).html.
15. Heather Hudson, ('ommuni¢ation Satellites: "l'hei)l)evel@mem a)td Impart (New M)rk: The Free Press,
1990), pp. 202-07.
l li. Ibid., p. 202.
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ltl 1967, (,'ngin(,'(,'rs fi-om ISR() visited NASA to sl.dv Ih(' A']S-6 satellite [o ass(,'ss
whether its capabi]iti(,.s suited lheir nt'cds fi)r d(,w(,'h)])ing SITE, a rtwal-based itlslrtt(,lion-
al network in India. The manm'r in whi(,h SITE was sol uP, organized, ol)cvaicd
(1(,)7.'5-1<.)7(S), and ¢?v_tltLal<.!din IIOw well known.': What SI'I'E revealed was a s(ct ol I]ss.res
within lh(,' Indiaul stale at)l)ar;atlls. P)v Phtcing r(,'sl)onsibi]ity tot Sf]E in the hands ot th(c
ISRO, th(,+ '_ov(.'l'lllll(:llltlllV,:itlillg]ylIlt'II(('dit illl() ;l nit(.'of c<)nllictor(,,,who "owtled" the
publi(,+sphere, l)oordmshml (th(,"Indian nalional Iclcvisionl)roadcast('t+)Ibh ithad sol(,"
responsibilitylbr broadcasting; <dlicialsfrom tile'Ministry of T(,'lecommtmicalions aFgued
Iha.I th<:'¢ _ontrolled telePhon',:. The other adminislralive units, .stwh as hvahh, vdmali<).,
agriculture, and [_unily planning, tot whose ])vogratns lh(: lcchnoh)_' was st)c(,ifically
designed to tacililale, f('h thai th(,' cxl)vritn(,'Hl was a dram on lhvir resl)(,'clivc rcsottr(,(,'s."
Its I)r()bj(.'llls W(+'rc c'¢(:ll Hl()l'(' it(,'ll[(', h()W(,'V(.'I_ lh(' I)ro_r_lm had tt() (ont(,'[)l of im audi-
(.'nc(.'In('it]]t'ri s_.:(._dslloritsd¢'sh_'s+
SITE st'triced 2,40() remot(' villages, each (d whi(,h was SUlH)li(.,d with batt('r,,.-driv(,q:_
tc+]cP'.+'isi(:)lls+zls tinder the care of a villagv gtuu-dian. Slwcially d(,'sign<.'d programs xxcrc
broadcast and lhcrl cvahtalcd bv teams of acadetnic s()<i<)h)gists+ psy(,hoh)gists, and dvvel-
Ol)m('nt+d th¢'orists. In nctroSF, CCt, Sf['l;, was ;l classic (,'xamp](, + of tOl)-dowr_ l:,ht],ti1+g and
¢'xectlt+(._ divorced from th(" t_(,'(,'ds oFits <lit:|.(,'h,'. ]x'¢'ht Rat) l>()inls <)tit that the (ustodian
()f th(. tt,h,,visi()n s(,,t was th(: shlg]+,' tn()st htll)()rt_tllt c(>tnl)<)n(,'tlt ()f tlt(." <'hah_ <)f (,-()mnl;t+)cl.
(,_uit(,' frc(]itc'nt]y, flit'st individuals w(:rc tt'ach(,'rs who+ its tit(.' state',< chief flt)l(,ti()t_arv in tilt.
villagt,, had a range (:dacliviti(,s (oln])('ting fi)r tht'ir li)n(: attd att(,')Iti()tl)' ht +n()sl ('as(,'s, tilt',,'
placed television last in th(,+it+F,rioriti(,'s. M<)r(,,()v(,,r, alth()l_gh SITICs ide<)h>hQ+ was vig()r<)ttsly
anti-ent('rtaintn¢'nt, it was the l)<)F.uhu +I lindifilms s(r(,'(,'ncd <)n Sllmlay xtights that ;alllil(,-t-
cd lh(,' Im'g(,'st att(li(,'n(,'(,'s and that sig.ifi(,ant]v l)r()xi(h,'d th(,' l)r()gralns at_(lit'nict's l(.iti(,,l]ll-
b(,'rtxi 1)(',+I.;" Th(" n(,'t (,'H('ct ()1 SITE wa', t() h)(k India int()a tcrr(,','+trial system ()I br(>a(h ast-
itlg and t('ht'c()mml.d(ati<)ns thal only (,(,'as(,'d to)(tom|nat(, iul Ih(,' lg(.)0s.
India c<)ntinttcd t() d(,'vel<)p cxp(,'rfis(,- in Sl>a¢c and satellite tc<hn()h)gy thr()ugh the
1970s and l(.)_)0s. ]]()v:('vt'r, it was ('Xl)(:rtis(,' larg(,'ly dir(,'(t('d |()ward s(:rvi(i_tg the Ittdiat_
I)urt._ttl(.ra(,",, litl]It'r Ill|ill Ill(' [)o])tl]itti()ll ;it ]iII_(+. ]l WilS also ,_'Xl)t'l'tis(' lit|l| ".+.'_t_,ri_.()l'()tlSI). +
l<)('alizcd, lndia Htanu[]t¢:tur('d th(.' ('<)mpotlctlt'+ tts+,'d it| Y;ITE--a lacl dct<,'rminv<] I)-,
._(t- ..... S'I'EI) inv()lv('da sal('llit(_"Indi,Cs ec<)n<)mi(,"l)()licyof s,ulI:-svfficien(,'v.During (','q'(),'q')
"(h'sign(,'d and f_d)ri(atcd in India ',:_ and latm(h(,'d ()n an Avian(." rock('l. Th(,, t'xl)(,'rtis("
thus acquired was transhlt(,'d into tilt' IN,SAT ilr<!jcct, which inchtdcd l()ur hldiat_ sat(,']]it('s
lal.whcd l)(,lw(,,(,.l_ I(.)Y,2 and I!)85. Th(," l)rol)l+.'m ol tlt(,' (,,xccss technical capacity (,r(,';t|t'd
l)y those' latm(h(,'s was solved only l)y Ill(," mort,' away from the l)ublic sphere and ch,.v(,lop-
mental idtx)l()gy ()f th(," l!)(_0s _t_(l l(.)7<)s I<) th(," markvtl)l_-tc(" idt'<)l<)g3+.' lhat ctH-r(,'tHly i)r(, "-
vails. Nevertheh.s,+, t(,q(,.visi<)n eXl)and(,,d (,,Xl)()nt.ntially thr()ughout India, as INS:\I"
l)(,'(';ltl+(,' ()I)('litti()l+_l], _Ind (r(,';it('d a tt)_issi,,(" +itri_] atld HFl)a]l _U_cli('ll(,'(,' [()) ('llI('IIililllll('tll
l.'ogralnS. "l'(,'h,'visi()tl als() l)(,'c'aHt(,' lh(' nil(.' I()r in_ t(,asing l)()liti(al _.-_ttmt'nt and int¢'lh'<-
lua] disl)t_t(', as ]tt<lia )t_<)v(,,d _x,+av [r()tl) it (()tl.l_it.d t() _ markt't (,'c<)t_<)m',',u"
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The second country in Asia to acquire a regional communications satellite was
Indonesia, which launched Palapa 1 in 1976. The nanle Palapa is highly significant in the
lexicon of Indonesian political ideolo_'; it has symbolized harmony and unity to
Indonesian people since at least the thirteenth ccntttry. The introductioll of Palapa 1,
according to Philip Kitcl++. was "driven hy political and ideological inlpcrativcs concerned
with nation building and circulation of ideas of national cttltttre. "_:+Indonesia is an avchi-
pelagic nation termed in 1945 anti composed of more than 300 ethnic groups with as
many langtmges and dialects. Bahasa Indonesian was invented as a language in the 1920s
and adopted during the 1930s as tile national language by the nationalists, who con-
sciously used the mass media and education to establish it on a national looting. However,
Bahasa has always coexisted in tension with local and regional languages, and it could
never be gtmfanteed pt+eeminence it+t tile face of tradition and custom ttntil the advenl of
satellite I)r<)adcasting. q_,chnocrats who (+;.title to l)r(miinence in the administration of
Indonesia during tilt" 1970s vealize(l that tile spatial att¢l (ttltttral l)ias of satellites setw,d
their ideological e|lds well and advocated the introductiotl of conlmtmications satellites
during tilt" early 1970s. In 1976, Indonesia became tile third country in the world, after
Canada and the Ullited States/' to install a geostationary satellite for domestic COtlltlltllti-
cations purposes.
Tile introdtlction of I>alapa 1 accelerated the growth of television and telecc, nlmtmi-
catiotls ill Indonesia. The government fimded the cotlsllttctioll of all additional eleven
grotmd stations, which distributed the stale-owned 'IX/RI chantlel throttghottt Indonesia.
Moreover, private capital constructed television stations on the otlter islands, giving rise to
a conlmercial regional television systemY:' However, these private regional stations were
prohibited, hy law, tiom broadcasting nationall,_, which was the preserve of the state-
owned TVRI channel. The pul>lic nattue of tclcvision in hldonesia was enhanced in 1981
when advertising was banned. Up until that tin|e, TVRI ha<l carried advertising, which cov-
crcd more than 90 pevcenl of its p|odlK'tion costs by 1976-1977.-"' The ban <m advertisitlg
nlarked a particular stage in develotmlental thinking in Indonesia, which emphasized
industrial development within a framework of "halanced growth. ''-,7
The particular convergence of satellites with state-directed patterns of growth had two
unintended consequences for communication in Indonesia. First, the use of satellites to
distribtttc informatiotl 111e_lllt that audiences were no longer del)endent on terrestrial ser-
vices to receive images, messages, and meanings. From the early 1980s, a prolii_'ration of
privately owned paral)olic dishes in urban centers had a p|<)fi,und eflk'ct on television
watching in hld¢.lesia.-" The possessi<m <>fa parahola eflkwlively meant that viewers were
no h)nger depetl<lenl on hwally I)|odttced television tot information and entertaim|wnt;
they could tune in to any provider that was beaming in thei| directio|t. CNNI (Cable News
23. I'hililJ Kiwi), 'Tim' "l'ulfil_g (:,,im,,l: (:Olmncrt ill Television in Ind<mcsia," Continuum: 77_e ,tu_tmhan
.]omn+do/Media and Cu/ture _4 (19!11): 102-23, csp. 103,
24. "l'llt'lt' is cl>tlhlniq_n tm this is_,ll+.'. Thc Sovicl Uilioll is ustmll_ +e,Tittt'll _)111 (if tilt' Ctlll_lliOII, 'l}lc (Otll]:
tlics arc tilt' l+nitcd Statcs, Cat+ada, and lnd_+ncsia.
2r). Kitcly, "Fine Tuning (k>ntlol," i). 10'i.
".2>I:,. Ibid.
27. 110wm'd Dick..lam,'sJ V,,×, :l,_,t.l,.ni¢' Mackic, cds., Balamwd IJe_mlopment: l"+a+t]<+va i_+ the .\7'w Order
(IJ_nd_m: ()Xlbld l.ltfivcrsity l'rcss, 19931, p. 13.
28. lhi:m Slmcsmith alld I larl (]ohcll, "(;ultm_d \]lltlt'S ot Media and Asian Audiences: I xwal Rcsl)ot_scs
to (;lol>al Media," Ibl th(omillg in A+ian]ouln<d o](:<mlmlltliretliolts. +['hcsc COlIIII](+Ill _, +rise _ttc I)+tst'(1 oil ICM'HIt h
cotldutlcd ill Easl .laxa during 1991-1995 on the iml>att of satellite h+<mdtasting on the mi<l<llc tlasscs el
,"Guval+aya wilh the author's colleagues, If;ill (;oh<'ll (tlnivcrsity ol _A2-slt'lll S'.,'dlxc'+: ;|t Nt'[:,t'all), Basis ,Susih>.
Andm+ini Susatlto, Rachmah Ida. _tvid Emv Stl'+_llllI) (l"_l< uhy c>lS<_<'ial +m<l PolitR al ScicII_ cs. [ fl+i'L¢critas :'kirlangga,
Sill +tl)_l+Va).
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mu_ti,'¢tli_m_ _<ttellile I.,_ th;' ,")_Ja_e '_hutth ¢5;7_g 7_. I_ulr@a "_wa_ /hi' s,_m,I <4 Iwr_ +r_mullt_ira/io_r_ _rd_'llilc_ ph.+'d m mhit
du_intZ/he STh7 mi_io_t, (( _()ut t+.,s', _)l N kS.\, ph<)t<) t_(), _?.-1 I(] IOft)
Ne)w()rk h_tt'rn,;ti()nal) thus gained _t fi)()th()ld iN thc middh,-class, t(,'rtiatv-(.'duc_tt('d
In(l(>v_esim_ au(li¢'tw('. |'It+." l)a_+_()n atl,,(,ttiscnwnts also h_d _tn inH)_wt oil h_donesian l('l('-
visiot+t ins()fat" as it "lesscn(.'d H_/RI's ,H)p,:'al. ''``'+This in tttvn (,n('<)t_vag('d vi+.'wevs I<) samp]c
Iot't'igtl laHgu_+g<.' ])tog-r,tm)ning--tn(',tnit_g that, ,dm()sl ))v (ht'l.tt)h, Inclon('sia aCCltfit('d at_
"<)t)¢,t_ skit.is" satcllit(,'-br<)adca>,ting p()li('.s th;tt has l)ct')) +]t_it(" :it ()d(ls with the ('Olllllltllli-
(ali(ms l)(>li(i(cs ()f its nt,ighl)<)vs.
The sc(()nd iwq)<)ittttll (<)t_s,t'(|tl('ll(<.' x,.,'_).sl[ittt It_(l()t_csi_ l)('c_utv." ;_ r('git)nal distril)ut()r
of television [)r()gratnmi)_g+ Int('lsat's initial approval fi)r l)alal)a l_)vl)ad+." intern_ti<)n_d
l)v()ad(,astit_g, l:,ttt th(.' Asian [+)toad(asting U,+_i<)t+_l)('g_H_ using the scrvic(" Ior l)rt),_r_un
(,'xchattge. l),v 1981, Thailand _md Pakistan l)()okcd lime ()n lh(e satt'llitc for th<.'iv ()v,n
dOlll(.'sti(+ ])FOgl';.ttllllllill_ [)(!(:iltts(." il was (']lC;tt])('l + t|lilll ]lll(.'lsal. ;<` ]lldon('silt I)(_('i:tlll(,' ])()lh it
(h)mcstic at_d ittltwnali()t+;tl stq)plicr ()f sittcllitc t)r()it(l('astitlg wilhin a very short lira(" t)('ri -
()d--som('thing th;tt hits (tcvcl()pt'd (onsidcral)ly as hl(l()n('sia has itt+pvox'cd its sittcllilc
capacity. ,-\+I_,', )he Auslt+itliaH intcrnatioual )(.'l('visi()tl s('vvi((', has rented a uanSl)()ndcv
t]om Palapa sill('(." its inccplion in l(,),t)3. ;+
I)lu-ing th(' tl_i(l-l(.)<"+()s, lhr('c cv<.'nts ()(cl)+trt'd i)+ Ind(lncsia thal radically altcrc'd Ill("
nitlio_+_al m(,(li_ts(_tl)(,--all ()f which v,:('rc ,('Ia1('d t() l)oth sal+.'llit(." c<)tl+mtt_li('_ti()t+ itnd
(It)int.'slit pt)]ilics. First, in 1986, a<:lvcrtisitlg was r(.'intro(htc¢'d to Ind()t+,csian Ich'vision.
S(.'c()nd, in l(.)<_t.).R(71I (Raja,,,,ah (:itra +lcl¢,visi Ind()n('sia), thc first (<)mmcvcially ()v,,n,vd
29. Kit,_'l_. +'Fiu(' Itmit+g (:()))tit)l.'" i ). I05.
'30. AMI(:..%)d;'l[ih "l},rhm,lo_,)': I'lu, (;otztmu)ii+rtlilm l,.'quulise). I_z ,t,tll( Cmnpih+timt (.%i))gap<))c: +\),ll(:,
I<:)_3), l>. 7fi.
?,l. [))t i_t_ P,h()('stt_ilh, "'<\si_ i)_ Th('ir Fih_t(h)w: Asia at_d ."G_tvllih's.'" ,_+mth+r_t +lsmt+s]OUt_ml ./_;mial '_<i+m+
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television station, was established in Jakarta. Third, ill 1993, the Indonesian government
lifted the bans preventing the commercial regional broadcasters from broadcasting nation-
ally. Subsequently, RCTI rapidly became Indonesia's most popular television station.
While the state retained ultimate control over broadcasting, the dontinance of com-
mercial television over the state system in Indonesia is a manifestation of what Philip Kitely
has called "patrimonial relations. "_'*-'RCTI is controlled by one of President Suharto's sons,
TPI (the educational broadcaster) is run by a daughter, and the owners of the other com-
mercial stations have strong links to Snharto family interests.
The other Asian nation in which notions of the public sphere and the public good
shaped attitudes toward satellite colnmunication is China, of course. China is discnssed
more extensively below, but two points should be lnade here. Compared with India and
Indonesia, China entered the realm of satellite broadcasting relatively late, launching its
first geostationary satellite in 1983. It can be argued that this delay reflected certain atti-
tudes toward communication and technology within the Chinese ideological framework
between 1949 and 1977, in which communication was geared around pervasiveness with
mininmm technology--namely, the press, radio, and loudspeaker? _Television, as a late
addition to the repertoire of propaganda tools available to the Comnmnist Party of(;hina,
never acquired the same status for propaganda as the press or radio, both of which res-
onated with Maoist principles about the mass line. Indeed, Chinese authorities have tend-
ed to see television largely in terms of entertainment r',tthev than political ideolo_a
view shared by tile audience. Consequently, tim provision of comnnlnications satellites to
distribute television was not a high priority of the (_hinese government. In tile period fol-
lowing the introduction of the Dcng economic refi)rms in 1977, however, television
underwent a surge in terms of both hardware and interest among audiences. Instead of
being a scarce leSotlrce, television I)ecalne commonplace throughout China and buih tip
expectations anlong tile audience that the government found (litticult to meet. :++
,aus in India and Indonesia, television in (]hina tmderwent dramatic changes dttring
the 1980s, with the introduction of advertising, access to toteign inogramming, and tile
presence of transbordcr connnnniration through Star TV. Nonetheless, the evolulion of
television flom the public sphere to the nlarkelplace in China is less lnnnonnced than in
India or Indonesia, hecause the (;hinese stale has apl)lied a unique set of conditions on
its development.
Transitions
No one event can be identified as the causal factor in bringing about the change from
public sphere I)roadcasting to connnercially dominated broadcasting in Asia. A combina-
tion of exogenous and exoganlous tactors are at play. Similar to the rest of the world, pub-
lit: sphere broadcasting in Asia canle under attack for economic and ideological reasons. :'_'
Moreover, Asia became enmeshed in international broadrasting events through Intelsat
and the various nongovctnntental <wganizations responsihle for the regulation of global
br<mdeasting, such as the allocation of orbit slots. :+';
32. Kitcl',. 'Tinc "l+tming Cmmol," p. 116.
33. A. l)oak Barnett. Jr.. "Chiua: ,';,omc (;cnmalizalicms, I lyl)otht'st's, and Qucsti<ms fi>v Research." in
Ma_ (;,,mmmmatim_ R,'vi+'w )}'a_t_+,r,l¢, Vol. 1 (London: Sag, e, 1(.)80), pp. 620-27.
3'l. l,Vang nalldOllg, "+(]hillCSC "l_'lcvision in the 1990s," in Brian Shocsmith. ed., Three A_peH_ o/ th+'
(;him'w' ,'tledm (|:'clth: (;Clltl'C f_)l Asian (;otllllltllli(alil)n, Mcdia and (]ultutal Studies, ]{)0(:,); JalllCS. hill, (,']li_ta
7)um'd 0_: 7;'hq,i_irm, f¢e/r_m a_M l{*<*istame (I,ondon: Routh'dge+ 1991 ).
'35. .Jonathan I_up. 'q'V Times," FarEa_tem+ lcronomic Itet&'w 157 (15 I)cct'ml)m 1994): 515-6{I.
36. Ihl+lson, (.'ommumratio_t ._,atelhtes. pp. 251-62.
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Tile shifts in tile changing mediascapes of India, Indonesia, and China outlined above
are in line with trends in international connnunication. Running parallel with these
trends is the remal'kable economic transformation d/at has gtipped Asia since the mid-
1980s, especially in urban centers. This economic tE-ansfornlation has led to significant
changes in consunlption habits, some would acgtte, fueled by television. The internal
dynamic oF countries such as China and Indonesia, wbich will have tilt,: tiEst and fiflh
largest econonlies, respectively, in ternls of gross domestic produc! by the year 2020,': con-
tribute greatly Ioward changing technological patterns. Significantly, however, these
changes emerged and developed as tile Cold War ended, suggesting tllat the respective
governments and peoples took stock of tile silnation and then deveh>ped new social and
cuhural practices that access to television encapsulated. Throughoul Asia ducing the late
1980s, television becanm a c<munon item in the domestic seuing, creating atEdiences wit<)
developed both expectations about what they wished tel see and sophisticated ways of look-
ing at what they saw. Returning to Carolyn Marvin, the history of tlle medimn begins
"when audiences become organized atomEd.., uses. "_*
The Level Playing Field
Much of wtlat has llappened in Asia between 1990 and 1995 regarding satellile com-
munications is too recent and too complex for detailed analysis in a work of this scope.
] lowever, it is argued here that the tvansf_wmati<m of communications in Asia associated
with the introduction of satellite lransnlissi<m is unprecedented. So powerful is the pev-
ceive<t influence of satellite broadcasting that we find Asian govevnnients adopting con-
tradi/+lovy positions regarding their legELlati()n+ National govetnments vatiouslv have
invented ideological systems t<_ conll+)al /be cuhuval p<dltElion tllat satellites are alleged to
bring in theit wake, atilt at lhe same tinle tiler Ilave COml)etcd fiercely to enter the salel-
lilt: age: all selt_cespecting Asian cEmntvies now I/ave a satellite or at h'ast Fellt IIans])ondev
space.
_'[ltthettllote, satellite relations are no longer <'ot)¢lucted /lit it g(Evectltttetlt-l/)-
govermnent basis. Wllen Rupert Mtttdoch visits an Asian Co/Entry, he is vit'lually actocded
"head-of:-natitm" stalus. _,_qlell hu visited hldia in 1993, it was alleged thai all that was miss-
ing was the twenty-one-gun salt/re. Mttrdoctl was the most obvious example <d this trend,
bul ;ix other powerful /ommeccial inleleSts entt!t" the satellile field, an analysis of tilt'iv
<+)peE'_tti()lES bec()lEleS its llltl/'h a (llleSlioll ot lnarket Iela[ions as international re[alions
between governments. (Mmplicating this even [ttt'ther .IFe the nongovernnlental organi-
zalions, such as lhe Asian BYoadcasling Union, the Internati<mal Telecomnnmications
UniotE, and UNESCO, which play a regul',ttory vole. TinEs, contemporary condilions sur-
rovnding satellite communications in Asia involve thtee levels at the very least: commet-
cial entecpvises (both indigenous and transnational), tilt': nalion-stalt', an(t nongovt+rn-
reel/Ill o]ganizations. These relationships ace explored here with reference to three
aspects o1 lit/' /inTent sill£aliotE--name]}, the introduction of Star TV into Asia, recenl
develol)menls in (:hina, and telec<mmntnications.
Altltough it was previE)usly algtEed thai there is n() ()ue d<)n+inanl causal event shaping
ve/ent deveh)pnlents in sate]tile/oninnEnicati()ns in Asia, thete can l)en/) (h)ubt also that
Ill/" launch of Asiasat 1 in 199<) t-,tdicallv ahered the c<mmnuli(ations eqttati(m in thc
t-egi<m. It ¢hdtnaticallv c×len/led the bc<_adtas! l_:+otpt'htt c<Evet'itEg virtually ,Eli el the
:+,7. "V,/alel tht +VG+Ih'l..: ,\ SUl _+e',<d tlt+..(.lohal E¢_motnx." l¢¢+,.omist::;?,'3((It tobt+i 19!11): I-II.
:+8. Matxin, IX/it,. Ob[ 7;,+h.rd._m_l{3,tl ,\)v', p. 3.
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western Pacitic rim, Central Asia, and Soulh Asia, providing a potential audience of three
billi(m persons Io advertisers. It also was privately owned ralher than a slate initial|re. The
principals were CTI (China), tlulchinson Whampoa (llong Kong), and C:ablc and
Wireless (Britain). Star (Satellite Television Asia Region) TV was ('r<:ale(!. shortly after--
mainly through the initiative of Richard Li, son of Li K.a-shang, a ltong Kong property
developen a billionaire, and a pritwipal of Hutchinson %q_ampoa.
Around the same period am the launch of As|;sat 1, China (Chin;Sat 3), Indonesia
(I)alal)a B2R), .Japan, and India all hlunched (ommunications satellites, lrresenting Star
"FV with massive (<mlpetition at the national level. (]onseqnently, Star "I%: had to invent
Pan-Asian lrr(m(Icasling. I! did st) by developing strategies wheret)y it piggybacked existing
services, stt(h as BBCWST (BB(; World Service "Ikqevision), MTV, and ESPN, while at the
sam(" time deveh_l)ing its ()wn pr(l(hwli<)n prolile. There was a degree of ambivalcn(e
toward Slat 'I_,: on the part of the television industry in Asia and lhe various nation-states.
As a new concept, it faced consideral)le criticism and mistmderstanding. For example, Iht"
(:hinese were alwavs sttsl)icious of lratrsl)order I)roadcasting for ideological reasons. The
fact l]l;ll St:u-l_r carried BBCWST, which ott+:nded (',hinese aulhorities <m a nunlber <>t
occasions, fueled their suspicions, ttong Kong, the base tk)r Stall TV, was rehlctalll Io lel
lhenl broadcast into the colon+x: The greatesl enthusiasm lor Star TV catne front the
lratrsnational advertising indttstry, which grasped at the possibility of creating a vast Pan-
Asian (OllSl.ltrtt!t itlarket. I lowevet, what transfornled Star 'IX: from a marginal operalion
in global broadcasting was News (3orporation's (Mtndoch's) decision to purchase a
64-percent contr<)lling i,lte,est in Star +I_: for $55<) million (U.S. dollars) in 1993.
Murdoclr quietly purchased the retnaining stock in January 1995, thereby gaining total
control of the broadcasting company, ahhottgh the original l)al+tners relained control ol+
the satellite, and Richard Li kept the I tong K<mg broadcast license. ....
Murdoch+s pronottncenlent Ihat "tire advancements in the lechnolog_' of telecomnut-
trio;lions have proved an tnlambiguotts threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere"'"
highlights the potential for ideological conflict over satellite broadcasting in Asia. China
immediately 1)armed its citizens ft+<lm watching Star and other transl)order televisi<m pro-
grams. As.lohn Sinclair pointed out, "1he announcement, which was designed for con-
smnption by Western shareholders of News (_orporation, seemed a fair characterization of
the attitude with which national leaders in Tile erstwhile Third World regarded this new
technoh)g_ in the 1970s attd 19g0s. _.k't it has proved hollow...."" Under Murdoch, Slar
TV con|in|rod a Pan-Asian approach built around English as the m+!j<w linguistic medium
and Iris Atlrelicatr Fox Television pr_>duct, t)nl the loss of the Chinese tnarket made thai
strategy' problematic. Aggressive marketing in India a,td the eventual purchase o[ 49.9 per-
cent of Zee TV in I)ecember 1994 partially compensated for the loss <_1China. 110weven
Star TV also continued to attract political and ctdtttral criticism front other Asian states.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir proved the most [brceftfl critic; he sug-
gested that Mnrdoch was seeking to impose Western values on Asia and thereby corrupt
and pollute Asian societies, while at the same time controlling Asian t)roadcasting. _+Such
criticism w;ts damaging and led Star to develop nlore "cuhurallv sensitive" programming.
Meanwhile, ,\'h|rdoch practiced shut;h" diplomacy, meeting with Malaysian, Indian,
Japanese, and Indonesian leaders seeking to establish Star IX: in their nations. Star also
3!1. AIkins, +' 'l+'ricndl', and Useful'," pp. 54-(H.
40. S;tvl>hcn ] [lllcht'oll, +'Murdoch Makes Amends,'" 7"1,,, AR'¢, 27 (]aml:u y 1995), 1). l 1.
1t. Jotm sin<Jail, "The l_,usincss ot hi|el'national I+lH_adc;tslinR: (Mhmal l:_ri{|gcs ;rod IL_rrims," papel
rt'ad a! Iht' (Z<_lllltltllli{';llil_llS Research Forum, S_dney, 19-20 Oclolmt ]t)_.)5, p. !{.
t2. Brian Shocsmith, "'Asia in Their Shad<,w: Asia arid Satcllilcs,'" .S?_lHl_e:tsl Asia_clour_+a! r!] ,%rial .'_+i+.me
22 ( 199+t ): 125-t+.{; Atkins+ " 'Fticndl} and t :sehll'," pl ). 5.1-6.t.
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dropped BB(70,rST fr<m_ its northeast Asian transpomlvr in an eftort to mollify Ihe
(:hinese authorities and at the same time prolniscd "nOllconlrowq-si+,tl "' programmillg on
its llOl[]l(qis[ N(:'lvic<2. +_
Underlying ,nltcll of the discussi_m al)Otll satellite COlmlnnli+`:ations art" assumptions
all<rill ghdmlisln and the delnisc of the llalio11-stal+`'. Mmjorie Ferguson has qucstion¢,d
these assumptiol_S and shown them t_ b+`" [_tllacious. '_ The Asian experience tends to sup-
[)oft Fcrgus(m's c(mtcrntioll thai argulncnts al)cmt glol)alisnl are prcdic,m'd on the desire
ofcapitalisln to maximize its [)rolital)ility. 7heEconomi_t'" obs¢'rw'd that Murdoch had heen
savaged CCOllomically by his expcri¢'ncc with Skv tclcvisi(m in Britain and that tllcrc was
no economic nor COlmncrcial evidence Io suggest lhal Slay 'I_ z WOllld 1)t_l-f()YIII _|IIV |),UIIuI"
in Ill<+' sll,._l'l to mid-term. Illdecd, it was announced in the I_tll of 1995 lh,tl .";tar I'V would
lose $100 million in lll+`r next }'car, _'_signiticantly higher Illan i)rcviously put_lishcd tigtn+`'s.
It is clear that if Star TV is to succeed tillancially, it cannot afford to ofli.md the IcadClS of
lilt Asian states, and it has t)cgun to dvvch)p progranmling shatcgics accordingly.
Conscqu(mtlv, critics scc Star as I)CXT,O|/lillg Ill<IF(" ;lll,f)(l}llCt alld COl!llil('rciallv ol-i(qrll<..d.
socking secut-ilv tor its itTveStlnCtn rather than blazing a trail tbr dcmocracv in Asia. _7
The p<>int here is that Slat-I+V t]nough its pt-axis, has t]nown illlO doubt all of the
progn_ses about the inq)ending demisc of the nail<m-state. On lilt' COlltl-al'V. whal the Star
+I_/ t'xpcrit+ncc has dcnlonstr+it¢,d is thal while lransl)ordcr l)roadcasting via satvllitc has
had a prol_mnd t'f+ect on tilt" way tcl-reSll+ia[ nlediascal)eS are Olgallized, it ill nq:+ WaY
tnld+`'rmines national sovereignly unless Ill+.! govt+rtmlcnt has lost the "+nandale of heav-
en." ('.]lina's role in this untblding history is a case ill p<fint.
(;hina has a comprehensive dOlnestic satellil+`' svst+.'ll! that was estal+lished in 1983 with
the launch <_t (;hinaSat 1. (]hina, including Tibct, is serviccd by satellite television: m'en
tht+ most rettlOlc areas Ilavc acc+`'ss Io _t nlininntm <ff Ibm ('.cntral China "lk'levision (C(71+V)
ch_tllll<.'ls. Ill the [_tl'g+`tl" lllb_ln illits|s, audiences +`'3Ill 3t('('(tss lip l<) lWelltV-tv,'o thanll¢'ls. Ill
addition to this +hmmslic service, (J6n,t, if it Ctl<_Oses, nlaV access a filll rangc <flglobal and
rc_iomll sawllitt" services. For CXalnpl¢', the lnd<mcsian I'alapa (; series satellites include
SOl_thcln (Jlina v,'ilhin their tO<nprint, 1)cspitc th+`' tact that thor+.' are an t'stinlat<.'d 40,00(t
parabolic dishes in (:hina, none <ff tllCSC services arc acc<.'sscd except under the inosl strin-
gent o[ +conditions. The (:hincsc polily alx,,axs has asstnn+..d th,tt il has total control over
connnunicalions within its lloundarics, irrcsllcctixc <flits political allegiances, and lit+`' pre-
sent decaying rcgilnc always has resisted tr,ulsb_>rdcl + incursions.
Stu-prisingly, tlm 1993 bans on lcl,kving Ntal 'I_ _ signals throu,ghout (;hina have bccn
successful tot two l+t+asolls. First, when t]lC 'd,ovt+t+nlllt'nl issued new l'cgulations that limit-
ed satellite rcccl:,lion 1<) three catcg_>lics ot t'+`'ceivers (l_>rt'ign enclaves, htxtuv, hotels, and
st'looted cducalionitl instiltttions), +_it had the Sill)pOrt ot Ill+," (Thinest Iclcvisi<m industry.
Sine+`' lDg.r'), lhe (;hinesc television industry has t:,t,cn turned b'+ the stale, but it has opct-
atcd along c<munercial lines. The indnstrv was unhappy that I1111+`tl nce+h'd advertising
vevc'ntte was lwing denied by lratlSbOl'd(q broadcasting. Nt'cond, since lit+`" talc l<.)80s, tilt"
(',hincst' lclcvision industry had l+cconlc pt+_fcssiomlli>'ed. Although i([c_+l<_gttcs still hold
13. (;ccfikm l'alhania. "Am1+i_ah'ncc in SIAR-_,, l".xcd I+and: l)_+¢+i¢la.q_an and the Sat¢'llim l¢'Imisitm
(:hallcngt.," ._,'-e++_I (19{11). http: ++Z*sni< .uh'xa'-,._'dtt asnit +sag;u "+,agar.lmtin.hlml.
It. Nlaul},)nic l"e_gusot_, "'Thc Mxlhoh*g3 .\hottt (;h>hali/ali_m.'" I(,+_+_/,,'a+P./+m+ua[ _4 (,,mmu,+ne+t+,m I
(19!)2): 1+!1-!)3.
.15. "Mund_+< h's A,,ian_ Bet," 7h,,L++momi+t328 C'.+l Jttl3 19931: 1'3-1'1.
t_. Dcl)_>rah l+,nt'wstct, "SI2+' I but PI,+Iit a New +,Rect-_rd." "lTicAushrtli+tn. 2?, ,\LIRIISl 1995. p. 12.
.17. l'alhania, "'.\llll+i*+;llt'll(_' ill ST.\R-I'+ ['?_+.'d[Atlld."
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23_ TIIF. [TNF<)I.DIN(; ()1; "['lie _'_'ORLI) SY";I'I'IM:(_,I'_)(;RAI'HY, POI.ITI(:S, AND (]t'ITtRE
key positions within the Chinese media administration, tile munerous local television sta-
tions that form the Chinese hybrid television infrastructure of cable, microwave, and satel-
lite are stalted by people driven by professional concerns. Chinese programs are now slick-
ly produced and marketed.
As television became woven into the fabric of contemporary Chinese lite, '_'the author-
ities understood that the), had to continue providing a service similar to that which had
developed between 1980 and 1993, when _breign programming had been freely available.
The Chinese governinent opted for a fully developed cable system, believing that it pro-
vided greater opportunity for the effortless conlrol of the circulation of meanings." More
than 5,000 cable operations exist in China. Many of these are Induslrial Community
Television operations set up (lu,'ing the 1970s and early 1980s to enhance the spread of
(XTI'V throughout China, while others are clearly illegal operations. The largest (al)le
operators, such as those in Shanghai, Beijing, and Wuhan, have an estimated 700,000,
{)00,1)00, and !_100,000 subscribers, respectivel}:
By attempting to create an environment that protects their conmmnications integrity
and political sovereignty, the Chinese authorities have created a highly contradictory sit-
uation for their regime. Satellites transcend space and create highly centralized institu-
tions, as well as particular textual communities :'_ consonant with Chinese political theories
that have emphasized centralized authority as tile preterred model. In contrast, cable teD-
vision tends to lean toward regionalism, both in terms of pragmatics and as a bias. In
(:hina, this problem is best exelnplified in hmguage. As W:l.E Jenner poinled out, '_ when
we talk about (;hinese dialects, we are accepting a centralized view of the world. What
passes for dialects in China are mutually unintelligible languages hotrod together by a uni-
versalizing script. Until now, no other medium of communication has been sufficiendy
i)owerflfl to challenge this particular hegemony. "I>levision may be the exception. A sys-
tem based essentially ahmg regional lines presents centralist ideologies willl particular
l)rol)lenls, not the least of which is a tendency for local languages to be beard more _?e-
quently. This fact has not escaped the attention of the Chinese Ministry of Radio, Fihn,
and lk'levision, which has deci(led I() reintroduce the concept of "one region, (me nel-
w()rk," in which domestic satellites coral)the with cable I() ensure the central amhorities a
degree of control, as the prevailing broadcasting model for (]hina in the 1990s. This sug-
gests that in a mediascape increasingly shaped by new commtmications technologies,
nation-states may survive tile trend toward globalism tot particularistic cultural reasons,
but may nc.t slnvivc the forces of localism. In many respects, the nation-stales of Asia, as
creations of cohmial powers in an earlier stage of gh>balism, are better e<luil)ped to con-
fiont the issues of globalism than tim prol_lems ass<>ciated with the prcnlodern articulat-
ed in localistic demands for ethnopolitical autonomy.
()ne may be forgiven for thinking trotn this account that communications satellites
are concerned almost exclusively with prohlems of transborder television. This is clearly
not the case; comnmnications satellites are capable of much more than merely broad-
casting television signals, hldeed, it may be that the role satellites have in the global capi-
t;11 syslem--tacililaling the inslalllaneous global elecllOnic transfer of trillions of dollars
on a daily basis--is more cuhurally tlanslorlnalivc than tile broadcast of soap operas.
|9, .]allies [.ull, Chiua 7'urm'd 0.: Tehq,i+iem,l¢+./+.ma.d R+<+i+lame([.4md, m: Routh'dgc. 1991 ), pa++im.
50. Tht'sc c, mmwnts arc based on research conduclt'd in Wuhan+ Pcopk"s Rt+l)ublic of China, in 1995
with the authol's colh'aguc Wang tlandong (Wuhan University).
51. (Ill It'xl/lal t ommunilies, see Stock. l.istem_:4li, the 7}'xl,passim; Mat vin, 14'7wn()hi 7kthm_low_:sPG'_e
A%w,pa_im.
52. WJ.F..Jcnncl; The 7].za,._ _4fti_tm_: 7 h ;tO.ors_:/Chi,a is (54_i_ (l.ondon: l'cnguin, 1994), passion.
BI_YONI) HIE [ON()SI'IIERE 23¢.)
Furtherna<wc, their increasing role in expandinu, telephony also may have radical imF, ti-
cations lot Asian cuhttres. It is to this aspecl of comnnmications satellites that this disctts-
sion turns.
With the exceptions of _illgllpOl'C alld t tong Kong, terrestrial teleph<+ne services in
Asia are anliqmtled and generally ineflicienl. For eXamF, h', it can take tip to two years to
have a telcF, h<me installed in (Jhina, tbllov,,ing normal channels. (]ommtmicali<ms satel-
lites have altered this siltlation dramatically, l-tandhcld telephony has developed into an
area oF int<mse activity and comptqition throttghotlt Asia. _,_,qmt we are wimessing is a cc, n-
vergence of Wcsttwn technoh)gy and local caF, ital Io establish satellilc-drive|l tt.chnologies
illal bypass older svslt.|ns of teleph<my. +I'hrec examph's will illustrate the signiticance of
this trend.
Asia (_elluhtr Satellite Syslenls (known its A(',eS) is based in Jakarla. tinanccd by
hl<hmcsian, Filipino, and Thai capital, and uses American techn<>h>g,y (l.<wkheed Martin
satellites and t+ockcts). It will service India, lLulgladesh, Btirnla, China, Korea, .]apan,
Ihmg K<mg, lndochina, Thailand, .Malaysia. mid Burma. The Air<t-Asian Satellite
(;mnpany is tinanccd with hldian n+loncv and serviced 17v tilt" [htghcs Space and
Connt|t|nicalit>|l International. Asia F'acilit; Mobile Telecmn is jointly owned by (;hina
(75 F,ercent) and Singal)ot+c (25 |/ercenl); Htlghcs, lxwkheed Martin, and Space
Systems/l+_,cl are all bidding to SUF,F,ly the Icchno[,_+L,,y. M<+reover, we arc nol discussirig
geostatiot/ary satellites here; thc companies im'olved in exF, anding telephony in Asia are
CXldoring mcdimn and low satcllile ml)its its options lilt t)r<widmg services. ?'_This sttggcsts
that lilt" lt+chl|ological lag of l]|e ])asl l)elv+,;ceil Eilsl ;tnd \Vesl in illOSl ¢;tst's has dissipated.
Parabolic dishes and handheld teh'l)h<mcs art' l;ugcly the tlomain <_l the Asian mid-
dlc chtsscs, l)tll their potential Io ;liter cndogamons ctdtural rclati<+ns may l)c of grcatcr
signilicance than tclcvi,si<m's capacily to t'll_,'cl chat+gt's, which has attracted s_) nmch
attcnliotl. Thc S_'SICIIlS slrt|cltn<cd al'Ottll(I lclcllhotty are lllOl-e illl¢+ilst']_ + pt'rson,d and
imn+ediatc than telcvisi<)n; they impact direcllv on individual len|poraI and spalial
regimes in t|nl)|cccdc|+led and n_v<_'l ++t_xPs.";l+,vconl|;tsl, Asia has been iml)ricatcd in var-
ious economic world systems since the Roman era, l)ecatLsc its prodtwts have been in high
demand on world markets. Asian ctdtmcs hart' learned I<_ ¢le,d cfteclivelv with tbreign
cconomic and ctthural incm-sions. (;lobal ec<)n<)mic svsl(,lllS itl-C llol ilCW phm+t)mcna; it is
lilt' conditions lllldt'l- which thc'+ <q)cralc to cslal)l'ish cc+.)nonlic asccilftancv thai has
changed, lit his classic accotmt <ff the Canadian fur indttslry, 1larold Innis observed Ihzil
Ihc "Firsl People of North America" became enmeshed in an international economic svs-
Icm with the slth" of their firsl t+ur Io a trader."" (;ommtnlications satellites in Asia, Io ,l
th+gree, rcgister a sel of changing economic l)<_wcr rclations where tecln|<dogical transfi_q
is 1)cing rcl)lact+d l)v lccln|oh)gic,|l dialogue--fi>r cxaml)lc, tlnghes Space, l.ockhccd
Matrli|l, and Spate Systenls/I+orcl bid l_w Asian I)usiness. Their success in lifts arena
1)cC()llles CFllcial l<) Ihei| st_¢cess as (,t iIilillUl(i_l] _)l)t'l':.tt<)l'S, which Call be viewcd its radically
diffcYenl l]<+m lhc ,\si:.tll Cllgillet'is who went to NASA dnring tilt' 1960s It) lear. al)mlt
Sl>:tcc tcchl,d<_gy.
53. F:dth Kct'mm, "l,c,_>ks Who',, hdki.g: Ncw_ mncls I"at c I tug<" Risks as \Vull as Vast I+_>tcnli;tl Market+,, ""
I'._ l'+asle_+ l'++m+..+ir Hc+,b'w I3_ ( 1995): ?,8-,16.
,r)'l+ Thc itltlhl)l's l)OM_l'_Idll_llt' MlldClll KcllIIClh Nl_Iplcs is Clll'tt'lll1_ It"+_'_w_ hill_ thc llltllli]t, i)hl_llC ill
Pcrlh. ()no <dhis lit]di.gs is huw iw<>plc tcthink thuir idc.s all<nil phwc x_llcn thc,, he_in nsi.g ;t mohih' phone,
5,5. Ilartdd 3.. [mils, Th,,' I'r. 7_.rle o/ ('._.da: ,Ur I./.Mu_ti¢.l to C:_.adm. l:¢:momir Ili_tm'_, rcx. cd.
( I],i.uit<_: {'iiixclsitx ol '[ilnllnltl> Pll'Ss, 197<))+ pH_i##t.
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However, it is 111¢' impact made by technologies at tlte microleve] thai is uhimalely
more important. Few media analysts in the V_'st accept arty longer the "bullet theory of
communications" that grants flw sender almost total (ontro] in the communicative
process. Rather, rite receiver is perceived as the most important element in the commu-
nications chain. This perception has led to notions of tile active audience becoming dom-
inant in thinking about the relationship among text, audience, and the institutions of
communications. This notion has been articulated clearly in respect to television viewing,
hut not so clearly in respect to the new telecommunications technologies. Nevertheless,
there may be a degree of correlation between the active television attdience at(el the active
user of teleconlnntnications. Furthermore, if' we accept that the Western audience is an
active l)t+o(lu(er of meaning, we also must accept that Asian audiences are active in the
same way. Any oilier approach is fi-aught with dangers. _i_rt, much of the discussion around
tit(" supposed impact of the new commtmicalions technologies on Asian attdiences and
receivers is cottched in terms of the l)assive. It is alleged that television inlrodtwes con-
cepts and ideas that traduce Asian cttltures, corrupt the young, and pollute the motal
environntent. These arguments are prot)ahly peddled n<)t hecause the Sl)eakers holier(
them, hut hecause they believe fllat the messages the technoh)gics make available to the
mass attdicnces, apparently without effort, challenge lit(: established hases of power.
Herein lies the terrain of the history of communications in Asia lhal has yet 10 he written.
Conclusion
Asia has hccn part of tile gh)bal satellite comnntnicati<ms scene since the 1960s, when
Intelsat parked its sccond satellite (>vet the Pacific Ocean. However, the major distin-
gttishing feat(ire of satellite comnntnicati<ms in the region has been the way in which it
has accelerated from a scarce resource t<) one of ahlmdance. Between 1966 and 1996, the
number of slttellites serving Asia has increased froth one to forty-six." It is too early to pro-
noun('( what el['e(t they have had, although it can be suggested that whatever the out-
come, their impa(t will be pr(ffoun(t and re<ire pronounced ill tile domestic Ihan the in(el--
national level.
It can als(i he sugges/e(t I]tat all te(hnologies have a contradi(t(tfy potential"V; they d(t
n<_t hehave in lit(' way they are expected t<> act. For example, it is now clc'ar l]lal tlt(" new
comnnmicatiolts technologies, in(+hlding slttellites, have not killed off lhe newspaper its
was predicted. ()n Ill(+ contrary, the press in Asia is t)o<)ming, especially at tit(" regional
level, in the local vernacltlars. Two examples will suffice. In India, tilt" local vernacular
press has ntohilized the new technologies to its own advantages and expande(t dramati-
cally. '_ In Surahaya, East lava, the]awa Po.+has increased its circulation from approximately
50,000 to more tltatt 715(),()00 in +ix,("years. It is it (ledi(aled exponent of using modern
(<)tlltltnnications technolog T ill pr<+duction."' So Itlttfh t'ol + the forces ot" holnogellizati/)n
and standardizalil>n SUpl)osedly inheres| in lh(' lecttttology!
56. "Regi(+nal Satcllitcs." A+ial+aci/icSalellitr 1 (Mar_ h 1995): 18-27,,
57, l)anicl l)ra(ht', "ltlt_<_dtwtion+" in Harold A, Inn(s, t'(l., Staple+, M(tthet_, and ('ultural Chan k_e: 5;elected
l'+'+_ay+(Kingston, (tnl.: M((;ill/'Ou<+cn's (31fivt't++it'+ Plt+Ss, IG)l.15)+ PF'" xii-lix+
58. l tarnish Mi l)otlahl, "Papt+f Tigtq s," I"¢t_ l'[¢+_lertt E+o+tomi¢ I+_+'view 158 ( I t_t.l.r')): 2,t-26, t'sp. '.2G.
59. See now 3. The.l¢+lt,a I%s employs Ihiltx-t'ight j_ntrnalists in Sttritl)a)it to product, it n]iljt_l rcgional
tWWSl>al)Cl. hi a< hievc (topless(re restflts, the paper hits il_vested ht'avily il, tn<)th'_ n techn<flo_,, inclt_dit+g _t'nt-
in K a t_a,_sp_nth'l Io t_,n+ittutfit atc I_t'tween .laki,rht ;tlt(l Stnal)aya.
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()n a moic caltlious ilot(', it is .c]_.';3rIll,it ColulnllllicaliOl'lS sal_qlitcs in Asia arc still con-
fronl,:'d bv tc,chnical and cultm-al iw_d:,h.*ms. T,.'chnicalh, there is tb.,_!issue of _rhit ;dhwa-
ti_m, ,,,,hich is also> a _c,.>politic,d issue, _l.sv,:,_'lla'-, lh,_' pr_i:,l,.*m of cougcsti,i;,n, t,]c_>rl,:>mic;dl,,,
thlmC is the l:,rot)l,.'m ,_ff_)','crsl.tl)l)l','; l_,)ll,,,,-o(ld salcllit.e'-, with an incrc;tsirLg nl.mfl)eF _)t mot,.'
l:JO.,,,-crtnl n-;mst)_;,ndcrs is ;m issue t_) I:,,.'CxF,h.,.'d iu its ,m,,,'nri_-hl. (?ullnr;dlv, lh_.'r,_' is the
pr,.)blcm of ,..mmci;i.li,:)n: whc, se ,,'_)icc is Io t)c huard? Mala,,'.,i;m Prime Minislcr M;.dunhil
has c;dh'd t_r ;m Islamic sal_.'llil,:' I,_ pr_r.4de s,..rvi,_,_", t_:, .\labi;t, S_..uh Asi;_. and _,,mnhca,,l
Asia. The most ,_:,b;ions gu,_!slion hcr_." is: Wh,_),,e ",crsim_ ot Isl;.mt ,.,.,'ill i)r,uvail? That of has
_,r S::mldi Arabia? Thcsu ;w,." ,..ssenlial]_ F,,_fli[ical F,r(d)h'ms. but lw_,l_,lcms _:,t cultl.nal idcnti-
Iv aim nali_mal so',,m_.g_nly remain I_ bc rl_-.,,.Ivcld ;,.s w,.'ll. Wh;_l is su!4_,.*stcd h.cr_." is lhnl
tim I)rc_,cnc,.' (d (,_,mnnmic;._ti,_:,ns s;n,.,llilcs in the Asian ('Olll('xl iS hi_hl_, si_nit]c;ml, bul
pr,. bl,,.'m ;._ic.
In constrnctin_ ;I partial history of I]w I)rcscnt, _)nc mnst l)c consch)us ol_hat is n(_l
said. In [his c_>nlcxl, ,];q)an has h;udh' I)ccn mcnlh)nc(I _.11(1 the rob' <d I'a(li(_ i'4n_rcd.
l l,_wc,,',_'r, in ;m;d_:,in_ _mmmnic;ni,)ns ,.,al,i'llims in Asia wilhin a hist,iwical F,CrSF,ectiv,:'.
this discussion h;_.stri,,.'d l,_ '.,u_es! b<_lh a Ir;!j,.'cl_)r _ _dd'.'vclolmwnl I_w sal_.'llilcs and ;_v,,a',
_t h_oking ;u lhc rclatim_'.,hi I) I:,,_,twccn ICl_hmd,_y and leullln-,.' l]_i_l (.'scal:,,i"., Ih<' '.,l_i( into,,
of tli.chm:,h:,_i,.al dct<,rmini:-,m.

Chapter 18
From Shortwave and Scatter to
Satellite: Cuba's International
Communications
by.Jose Ahshuler
Early ill the sixteenth century, the Spanish Col_quistadors p('rctqved Ilia! tiw island of
(]ul/a was a lnost important strategic outpost in tilt: New World--one l]l:.l| |equircd rapid
and reliable comnnudcations with Spain. These colnnlunicaliol_.S had to be essentially tlv
ship; hence, it was very slow tk)t centuries, until the tirst telegraph service by submarine
calllc t)ctWCCll Havana and Florida was establishcd in 1867.' l.ong before, the Spanish
colonial authorities had t(_jc(ted lilt: imph-mcntation of a sitnilar p|ojc(t lov fcav thai it
would serve the cause of the island's annexation to th(' United States. In ditterent histof
ical c()ntexts Sill('{" th(" l gB0s I<) this (lay, Cuba's insulal-ity and |Is pt()xilnity to tile United
Slates have strongly infhttmced tilt" developnlenl of its intt'rnati(mal c()nltnunications.
By tilt! end of Spanish rule in (:uba, ill 18¶)8, the island was linked telegraphically to
tlw vest (>1 the world I)y submarinc cat)los owned 1Lv U.S., British, and French companies.
Early ill tilt' twentieth century, SOlll{' spark radio telegraph stations went into operation in
(hlba, which ah-ead_ was a virtual l)rotcctoratt" of the United Stales. These spark radiolclc-
graph stations st'wed lnainlv. I)/ll not exclusively, to ¢()nllllltni(:atc with ships sailing ill the
(;ulfof Mexico and the (;at|hi)can Sea. The th'st two of Ihenl belonged to U.S. colnpanics.
t)ut in I_,)0U, so(no stations owned t)y the Cuban stall+ W('l{" |l/stalled.-' They all oper:tted on
long wart's or nlcdiuln wart's, tolh>wing the h/iernational standard practice at tilt' time.
Radio broadcasting cmnc to Cuba ill 1(,122 and cxpan(led Fapidly on a comnlercial
basis, with twenty-nine lnediunl-wave stations operating in IGt93 and sixty-one ill 1933. By
tilt' cnd of 19!{3, |nolt:ovev, Ill(" first shortwave conunercial I)roa(lcasting stalion was
installed. A fray other low-power shortwavc transmitters wt'nt into operation after_s:ards toI
tilt: purpose of serving the intt'vior of file island, bul they were not cffcctive enough, and
most of" lheln ceased to opt'rate at)oF solne tinle. ()nix' a fi'w shortwave low-power broad-
casting stltlions rcnllti|ted ill opt'vat|tin ill Cuba ill the l(350s, catch of which was dc(ticitl('d
to tl'allSlllittillg on shortwaves t]lc t)l'tlillalFv C()llllllt'l'cial ])l'ogl'alllS blOitd(+ilst I)v till atss()ci-
atc¢l nu'diuln-wave slat|on sewing a national audience. As [br internatio|lal point-to-point
sh()|-twav(" va(lio c(mlmtmi¢alions st'{vices, practically all of tht'nl were in the hands of pri-
vate colnpa,livs, tilt" nlost important of which 1)chmgcd to hltcrnational Tch,phone and
Telcg|aph (1TT).
1. 'lhanks I+) lilt" Iiansalhulti( tclcglaph tahh' link established bmwccn ,\nleri(a and Eul<,pc in lS(;(_.
tilt' [];lxana-Fh_tida sttlmlalthlc (ablt' madc il pos,,ihlc Ibl ILccat+;l and Madlid to cxt]l:uiRc mcsn;l<cs ahn<_,,t
itlStalltlx, ill t'I+ttll);tliS<lll ;_ith lilt + niXlt't*ll I_+ Iwt'nIx-(HI(' (ta_s l;Ikt'n I) _. lilt' (Ollli¢'l stt'atllships tht'll ll_lxt'l+ll_
b<'lwt'vn ll;0+ana ;uld thc Spanish pi>t Is ol C(tdiz and Vi+_o.
2. ,I,+s+ ,\fish(dot, "( '+tlb;t,'" in ;\st+( +;it iiSll [ lisl;a,l.mncl i( a,l;, +It' (_t'lltl c+sdc lIlxcstigat idn x l:ml). ,'sat +,dc
"h'lt't_mllunli(ationt's C\II(:II':II, I/as 7;,h'r+.m+.i,ari,:.es ,'. llis//a..ra..;_#+.' /rosa:do, /.*s, lill _ ]+lltur, (Madrid:
.\I I(:IEI. 1993), ill >. 7?,-SS.
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After the introduction of television to Cuba in 1950, the possibility of receiving "live"
television prllgrants from tilt' United Stalt!s (';,llllC under serious c<msidcration. (_tl|)an
engineers and tcchnicians tnt'l II1(: challenge by using an airplane 1lying tor Ihrct" to live
hours ovcr the sca ncar thc island. Equipmet|t alloard tilt' airplane rcccived video signals
from tell'vision stati<`ms in Mia.nli and rctr:msmittcd thcnl to a station I)clonging Io a
(_ttl)an television n<,'u+v<,)tk with <,'ovcrag<`: over a large part of the COtltltt'V (audio signals
w+,'re transtnilted separately by cabl<`' and sh+>rtwitvc).+ Ill this way, the ganlcs of Major
l,e;tgtte Baseball's World Series were watched by ('+ut>;m fans during 1955 and 1936. Bv the
same method, sc¢'nes from a cabaret show taking place in I lavana in 1955 were transmit-
lt'¢l to Florida and broadcast live on Iclcvision in the United Sl;.ll¢'s.
A stable Inoa<`tl)and comnnmications link via trop¢)spht'ric scattl'r, thc f]t'sl of its kiud
cvcr dcsign<:d and used to transmit comnlcrcial television, was in|plcntcnlt'd in Sepleml)<,'r
I{157 b<`'twccn (;uanabo, nc'ar I lavaml+ and Florida (3ty. It had a dcsignt'd Callat'ity of 120
lch'ph<mc circuits, in addition to one nton<lchrontc television channcl.' The (]ul)an sta-
lion bel<mRcd to ITT, and tilt" station in the Unil<`'d Slates was ill<`" ]lropert) of Anlerican
Telephone and Tch'graph (AT&T). Both conlpanies aheady had ass</¢iated with one
another t<+ sol tip :t tclephot]e link betw<`'cn Havana and Key \%?st in 1921. The link uti-
li/.cd the longest ;tnd most deeply stdmlerg<`'d subnmrine cables t"+'<`'t;tlll)licd in the world
at tilt' time. ITT and AT&T again colhlboral<`'d in 19:")0 l<> link the saulc locations by lilt'
Ihst dcvp-sca telcphon¢' tallies with sutmlergcd rcp<`'att+rs. '
Shortwave Radio Development in Cuba After 1959
At)or tlt<`" downlall of tlt<`+dictatorship that had lx'en in power +in (]ul:,a dttring the pre-
vious )'<`'at's, a l)Olluhu + govct+nntcnt was cslalllishcd <`'arly in 1959. The avow<:d purp<_sc of
111<." It<.'W lt'g_illlt' Was tO acconlplish deep social, ¢.cononlic, and political changes in ttIc
itHt'rcsl <)1" lhc <.'otmtl+y in general and of l]tc nt+cdv ill particttlar. As 111<`' c'vcnls lh;lt lollowed
h+d to tllOtt' and more radical tll<`'aSttlt's that :.tJt_._clcd hnt)ortant corp<watc intt-lCSls, both
tlaliotlitl and ltiltlsnati<>tlal, lhc ll<`+w ('.tlllatl g,i)v('t'tltllClll rt",tlizcd that thc {ottnltS tllttSt
have, as so<in as possible, ils own IllC;Itl',;, ()f int¢'t-tt_ttiOllal _,}I¢)I-IW_IVC radio (+OllllllttlliCali¢>tlS,
includin<_ I>roadcasting. This tncasttrc was st't'tl ;is :tit inlportant way to avoid c<mqllctc
intornt;ttional isolati<m by I)OWt'rfttl tmfricndlv interests, CSl)ecially in 111<`"case t>f ,t toreign
ntilitarv altack. Such a point ¢>f vicw was akin tt> the one prevailing at the close <if \Vorld
War 1 ;t'ntong high-ranking U.S. govt,rnmcnt <dticials, who twlieved that 'Tor¢'ign <)wnership
of ally patt o[ ,\t/n,ricatl l¢+lc<`<_lllttlttllicali<)ltS wottld plOVC datl'_CtOllS in HID: ['tttllt-¢" w;.tr.'"'
3. Emiquc Valdt '+, PaRt's, "l.a N'+ic Mundial l)_l I.V. cn {hdm," h+g+..ieda l(h;+lH+a 1(1 } ( 19."+7): 1B-IS.
I. Mauuit¢' l)ch>laim +, lJr',, :mrl,'_ c! ,'b'_ hrm_;.,",: ]+..+,.'_',c ,l_:s "l_;h;+o._.++_+i+.tir.+_ rt :h' I'ITT (l';uin:
l+hm;mari<m, 1971}, pF +. 70-71; "El Enht_c Ra¢liot+l&Ith- l)<_i l)ilusi(m [tOl)I)slgqha t'nHc (hlba ",.
Xl >l t¢'alllt+'l it a," lll_r+'PlH'l[a I#1+;rtri: tt 3 [ I } ( 1U7_9 ): I7_ 19.
5. lhcsc v,cl c p,'.+ c ablcs (217, and T.+,2 kilolnctv_s long) laid })cl_,_t'('tl ] laxall;t and K+.'x 'Wt'_t ',vilh lhrcc
lh.'.:ihh' iCl:,,palct., vath, v,(,Ikinng at a tnaxhntttn depth ()lal)l:,r_)xitnalvl_ 1.9(10 lllClt'is, lhcx v, vtc actnm]l) U)Ut t<_
x;<)ik ;in ;i l>loh>l',}v. ' 11+r ;i similar it;tn.,;tllmtti,: tth'F,h_mv link imtuRmattd a It.;,. '_carn lat¢'t it'_ cml", 1957, xvhi(h
.tdd t_tl t x l[lil l_-_.ix It.]t'[lh<)tIc +.halmcls, \tthic ('+It>:',. "];il sl "l'ransntlat+ti¢ Tch'phtm<" <.',able." ++#,,;tee X'c_+,'+14
(1!!;,7): 7,_1-6S. E;.h i)114.` tit |hc 1 la',mm-Kt", x,X't+st t ahles was ttst*d to I]at'tsmit, sitnullalw<np.,l'¢ it+ onv dir¢*¢li_m.
t':,clll", l}llt'C t4.'lc}:,h<mc chanll¢'ls and Iv, clxt + xoil ¢' hcqttcntx tclcRlaph channcl_..
6. +\_ t_u ding I_ Rol>ct t S<_ht'l. I7"17 H; M..:tgw..'.t ./()p/m,t..i 0 (N4`'w Yo_k: New _,tk ['im¢'s Book (_o..
l!),q_), pp. '3 t-35, _l_is x_r;ts tht' I>clict ol ,\ssislant .t'_t'l I('lill '_ ()t lhc Na'_; t"t at_klin D. Ro¢>,+t'vcll. Whih' P_ t'sidcnt Wils, m
h'at cd I}l;tl tilt' I_litisll IlliR}ll {Icxch_ I) "a _,Clital)lc Illl>llOpl>l'_ ill Ilu' It an_snli'-,sion _d intclliu, cn_ c lhl_un_ll_nll the world,"
Admiral William l+,u]hu,'l ttlR4.'d a small ,_l¢,llp ¢1t husm4..ssp,t.<q:,l,v "10 tt'taill ill AlllClit ;[II hands lh<' +Olnplctc (¢HltlO]
ol ladio ¢i_lllllltlili¢ ;tlioll, not onl', in the Ittlil¢'¢l 5,1arcs, blll in (]¢'illn,tl ;tnlll S.uth +\mc+i_ n as +_cll, [thu. <mtlimn R ] a
polk"+ .I x,,it<.h.ss thu Irin+.' n_>l iin]ikc fl_at <_I [thc] glcatc_ M,+m<,c l)<r t_inc,'" a'_ tcp_iI_'d hx (.+.'n..I.(;, llmh.td.
"Radio in lilt" W,,, td _x.';tl ;ulil lhc ( )t gaifi.'ati_m ¢_I an Aln+.'l it all_W,'In'd [i anso< t'alli< Radi. _.'t _i_ c." ii_ Ant<m d,L' I la;ts+
cd., 17,¢' Itadio I.d.+hw "1t: ,",lr++'_o] _ls l):_lr]O]_*r+,"1*! (( ',hit ;1<_<1alld Ntgs _btk: .\.\V. S}mxx. 19'.28 I. pp. (+7-!11i,
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Nut too long afterward, a shortwave transmitting radio station was designed by the
Cuban Ministry of (;ommunications. It included a 100-kilowatt Swiss-made broadcast
transmitter, as well as a twenty- to thirty-kilowatt (;erman-made point-to-point conmmni-
cations transmitter, complemented by a British-equipl)ed receiving station. The transmit-
ting station was built near ttavana in record time and was operative a few weeks beflwe the
middle of April 1961, when Cuban airports were subjected to enemy bombing in prepa-
ration for the Bay of Pigs invasion, which took place immediately afterwards. The short-
wave station was used quite successfully to counteract hostile propaganda and to
announce the defeat of the invaders, thus contradicting Ihe totally different picture
reporte(l by international press agencies.
Direct shortwave radio communications circuits were established for the first time
during the 1960s by the Ministry of Communications to support telegraph, telephone,
facsimile, and telex international services with Prague, Moscow, Mexico City, Berlin, Paris,
Algiers, Shanghai, and other distant places. Radio communications services with the
United States continued to be bandied by the older companies, as were communications
with the United Slalcs via the (,uanabo-Florida City scatter link. Prensa I,atina, the Cuban
international press agency, developed its own facilities utilizing Chinese and U.S. trans-
mitting and receiving equipment, and the agency established shortwave press circuits with
its offices in sewwal countries.
The COlllllrV's ilew illlerest ill tlxe develol)lnent o1' sllortwave radio COllllllllllicatiolls
required adequate training of technical personnel on the characteristics of the ionos-
pheric propagation of radio signals. Pertinent training material was prepared in the early
1960s, first by the Ministry ()t (;ommunications and afterwards by the University ()]"
Havana, for courses taken there by electrical engineering students. ,,{ program ()f ionos-
pheric research also started at the Institute of (;eophysics of the (_ttban Academy of
Sciences, backed t)y important scientific research institutes of the Soviet Union.
After a decade of operation and progressive expansion of shortwave i'adio services in
Cuba, however, it became clear tt|at additional measures would have to be taken to meet
the demands of growing traffic. In addition, the prospect of getting rid of the vagaries of
the ionosphe,e as a transmitting medium, which was incapable of accommodating broad-
band channels, made tile idea of setting up a ground station for international communi-
cations via satellite seem exceedingly attractive.
The Beginning of Satellite Communications in Cuba
l.ess than three weeks after the launch of the Intelsat Early Bird geostationarv satel-
lite on 6 April 1965, which established broadband transoceanic comnmnicafion between
North America and Europe, the Soviet Union put into orbit its first communications satel-
lit(?, Molniya 1. Its orbit was a very ehmgaled ellipse, strongly inclined with respect to the
equator and with its apogee above tile Northern ! lemisphere, so that it spent most of the
time over tim territory of the tormer Soviet Union. Suitable tracking of the satellite by
ground stations made it possible to set up an experimental link t)etween Moscow and
'_qa(livostok lasting eight to ten hours.
In November 1965, representatives of the Cuban government attended ;t meeting in
Moscow, whose purpose was to discuss a Soviet proposal to use its launch facilities and
basic know-bow to implement a comprehensive program of scientific cooperation among
socialist countries "lbr the peacefifl study and use of outer space." This was to be known
later as the lntercosmos Program. r Following subsequent discussions tteldjust a few weeks
7. ,Jos(' Altshulct and Kiril Scfadimov, I,a hma del *<',]mrio (lta_ana: Edilofial (ficntilico-T&-nica, 1991),
pp. 255-81.
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after the Soviet Union placed a second Mohliva 1 satellilt' into orbit, it becanle quite clear
that an internati<mal (ommunications syslenl llascd on a few essentially similar satellites
Col|ld 1)c used to ('slal)lish a l)c|mane|ll (+onmllUlicaliollS link 1)elwt'e|l (hd)a and Eastern
Europe. "In coniparison with shorlwave links," i+enlarked S<wiet Minister of
(]C, lllllllltliCitli()llS N.I). I_'stll'lscv, "Sllch a sVSlt'lll 'W(Itl]d lit' aCCel)lat)le and tl()l lot) t_xpOtl -
sire, and under cxtraordinary conditions it nlighl c()lne lo provide lilt? only possibh'
transmission channcl. ''* Needless to say, tilt" ()clober 1962 missile crisis had nladc it dva-
|naticallv clear to all how iml)Ol-mnt it was tol- (hd)a to have rcliat/lc long,-dislance com-
inunicalions the:lilies mldC| c('rtain +'extra<)rdinarv condilions," qttitc :par! fi'om the
convcnien(e thai a satelliw link ottercll to cslatllish broadband channels (apablc of Irans-
milling color tell,vision progranls anti other kinds of intT_rmation.
At Ill(' lilnc, however, space rest?arch was far [l()ltt t)cing regardcd as a priorily ill all
t0r lilt: newly toundcd national research instilutions, and only lilt" (',ullan Minist|-v ot
(:tmunlmications look lilt: in:tim:re to fully SUpl/<Wt lilt' I.'Oilllll'V'S, pa|ticipafion ill tilt,
ItltCTC,{:.y, ll/t)s Pl'o<_l'alll. Acc<)rdingly, 1,vht'n thc (_llilall goVt'ltllllCIlt Clt'illed a national
agcnty tk)r the el>ordination of lilt" pcacefiil slttdv _llld list' of ()tilt+l" spac{" ill 1966, it> f;tcil-
it:to tilt" country's parlicipalit>n ill lilt' [ntercosmos F'rogram, the agcncy was placed under
Ihc |)alrona<gc 0t lilt" Ministry of('xmununicalions. This activity slnuTed the counlrv's early
introduction lo space research, which was to reach ils highest point when some I,wctlIV
cxpcrinl('nls prepared l/v Cuban scienlists, ill lilt" Jialncwork of lilt" lnlcrcosnlos Pirolgram,
wcrc pcrforlncd ill space during the [lighl of a (hlban COSlllOllalll ill St,ptend)er 1980. '_
Slill, lilt' main inlcrcsl o( lilt" Ministry ot (:omnnulicalions was to establish a broad-
liand conmnlnications link via satellite t)etwct'n Cuba and olhcr countries, especially
those with which il was oh)stir ;tssttcialcd ill the lilnc. That l)ossibility crone within reach
by lilt" end of 1971, when work in lhc ;u-t'a of space conlnmnit'ations, again within the con-
tt'xt of ]lllCt'('OStltC, s, [cd to tilt" t'realiotl of IIlltqSplllnik, at1 itt[t'l'_OVC'l-tlttlClllill organiza-
lion intendt'd to meet the need fin long-dislancc teleph(me and tclegra])h circuits, its well
as exchang('s of radio and television progranls, among diftTeferit c(nmtrics through lilt" use
o[ COlllll/lltlicitliOllS salclliles, t''
A bilatcral ilgI-UUtlIcIll ])('DArt_t:tl lilt' (Julian and Sovict Minislrics of (_()nununitations
soon materialized, and ctmstruction of an lntcrspulnik receiving and lranslnillinlg ground
slat:on bt'gan in (;ulla. lhis slalion was vsscntiallv similar to S[;lll{[al'(l ()lilts used in tllc Soy:el
()rbita coninnnlications systcin lhat utilized lilt" Molniya 1 salellilcs. (]onstruction of lilt" so-
called (_aiil)e ground station 1)cgan in Fel)rualV 1(.172. It was at)It to receive live ti-oln
Moscow Ihc lirst color Iclcvision iirogranis on 7 Novcml)cr 1973. On 1 ,January 1974, live
illlagt:s _:,1"the celebration then taking place ill It:van: wcr(' lrallStllillcd to N'Ioscow. add I]/ev
wtrrc |clvansmittcd ftonl there to other Ettropcan cottntrics via lhc Intcvvidcnic systcnl.
The Caril)c station, pi-ovidcd with a twck,t+-nlt+tcr-dianlclcr tracking parabolic atilt'li-
lt;t+ Wil,% (?l+Ct'ted ill it valley nc;,tl" tilt! lOWlt o['.laruco, al)l)roxiln;.itely t(ll'ly kilonlclCrS easl <if
| |avana. It was dcsigncd Io work with Inlerspulnik satellites, which were initially of thc
Molniva 2 type." The station otlcl-aled around Ibm and six gig:hertz and was ca|)itl)lc of
,<.4. Roll{'rto liiaz Maltfn, "(;(;lll'_,is dc las _mlnlni_ a_i_mc _,CSl)aciah's cn Cill)a+" (hbila 6 ( I':IN.l): 39- tO.
9. .ills(' All++Jnllci, +'Npace AI lixrilil'S ill (;tltllt," in llw procct'din_s ot lilt' Sludv Vtt't.k i)11 Ihc Ill:pal t lit
,_t)aCCI']xpl<ltati_ln im Mankiiid, I-_'_()l'l_lllt'l 19_,I, Valican ( lily, I .til41i,pp. 2<'t7-17. The palrOlia_l" <if I]11' ( ;titian
space t'llllililis_,ioii was hand<'d over io thc AI adt'm'+' <it <_licnt t',; iii 1074.
10. Ralph (',hipnlan> i'd., TDe /t,?Md iu 3,pray,(Enl41cw,)c_d (:lit:s, Hi: I'rt'niicc-I lall+ 19<_2)+pl _. 3_-t-_6.
1I. l'hc M_lni_,a 7 salcllitt's _t't c' F, ul int_ a _el}< t'longalcd i'llipii_ ot bit, in_ lined ilt:,lliil sixi'+-tive dc<e,icc',
with rcspcct Ill lily t'l'llltill>i+ wiih its al)l)14t'e ,ll).li(lll killlnlell'is iit)llvt' lhc NorthtTn I lclni,,p]lcic :lid it++p,t'l i_t't'
_11(Ikiloinclcr', ;il)ll'+t _ ihc ,N<lillht'rn 1 lCliiisl)herc+ inakin<g a t imlplele rt'vllhilioi+i :fell:lilt Ihc F]ailh in al)olit txvclx_'
hour,+. Thrct' ,_atclliil", +,innlltanellusly in orbil WtTt> used Ill Ill)lain arllund-lhc-clotk ,+elvice..\ctuall'+. Ihc
l%'[ohliva 2 was all ilnpr<_,cd Vl'lSi_<lil tit Jill+ ]X,'l_lliib,'a 1 p, pc _,uitat)lc tor il_iei'nalilmal iisl', lls w<)rkinl4 frcqiicnt il's
WCll" itl)l)lll 9<)0 iiit'_iilit+il+ ', It coilliinil'd ll) I)1" ip,_'d t_li _i Ion_ iiiiil' tO: it._illii_tl ((i;Cla_<+'+
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simultaneously handling one television channel and sixty telepllone channels. This system
was nsed to connnunicate with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and, through them,
also with France, Italy, and Spain.
ttowever, liloadhand com,nunications with countries in Latin America, Western
Europe, and other impoitant regions of the world through Intersptttnik was dift]cuh. The
system had lintited coverage. This fitct became an obviotts hindrance when l tavana was
chosen hy the nonaligned countries as rite site of their sixth sumtnit, which took place in
September 1979. As a palliative for the occasion, a Standard B Intelsat ground station was
installed close to the original Carilie station.
l)nring the early 1980s, htlersputnik shifted from Molniya to Stalsionar geostationary
communications satellites, which the organization leased from the Soviet Union. These
satellites operated in the same fleqnency bands as the old Mol,fiyas (six gigahertz uplink,
Ibm" gigahertz downlink), but their transinission capacity was much greater. One of fllem
was placed at longitude 53 ° E (htdian Ocean), and the other was at longitude 14 _` W
(Atlantic Ocean), '_ which gave Cuba the p(issibility of delivering television progrants to
large regions abroad, especially in Africa, beginning in 1986.
In Ihe meantime, telecomnnmicali(ins between Cuha and the United States contin-
ued to depend basically on the use of submarine cahles and tropospheric scatter tech-
nologies. When the deterioration of the old Cuba-Florida cables made their operation too
troublesome and costly, they were replaced in November 1989 by one with sttl)merged
repeaters between West Pahn Beach and (_oj/mar, a sntall town approximately tell kilo-
meters east of ttavanaY:' However, the newly laid cable, which was capable of ca,+rying
144 telephone circuits, rentaincd idle lora hmg time. No mttlually satisfactory business
agreement could he reached nnder the pressure of tim embargo conditions imposed by
the U.S. government on (:uba. As a result, only the eighty-nine telephone circuits provid-
ed by the deteriorated tropospheiic scalier systenl were available fin" direct contmunica-
lions hctween tim two countries. Fttitlwimore, even those circuits disappeared suddenly
in August 1992, when thtrricane Andrew seriously damaged the Florida City station, and
its owner, AT&'I; sttbsequenlly decided to abstain tiom repairing it.
The Current Situation
The current tense relations hetween the United States and Cul)a have made bilateral
negotiations on the replacement of the old teleconmnmicalions links stagnate for more
titan two years. Nonetheless, despite the political situation, an agreement was reached to
operate fliture links on an eqttitahle basis from an economic point (if view." In Novenfl)er
1994, telephone an(t ottter telec()ntnmnications services were rest()red in part througl+ the
AT&T-owne(l (]ojintar-_,Vest Pahn Beach stthnmrine cat)le, hut mostly 1)y lntelsat commu-
nicali(ms satellites, and this continues to be the case to this (lay. k'
12. (;hiptnan, The U,_,Ud in Space, p. 585.
13. +'\pl_aZently, this table came flora at suitabh' recoveit+d length ot a SUblnarine telephone cable laid in
thc late l!R;0s across the All;ratio ()cean. All of the Ctfl)a-Florida tclclJhone cables bclonged to the (]uban-
American Telcphont' 8,: Telegraph Company, jointly owned equally by FIT and AT&T. In the early 1990s, AT&T
bought out ITT and became rite company's sole o',vneI.
14. The Tori'ioelli bill, approved in 1992 by the U.S. Congress, authorized paynwnt to Cuba ot its share
in the leh'clnnnnnlications business established with the United Slalt's,
15. A _tandard A tnielsal tiilil had bet'n added io the (]arihc ground slalioll ill 1991, Io hi" able to etti_cl
all et't]cieni television transniission tot tiillqsal ilscrs llfilie elevenlh Pall-;%.lnel-ican (;atilt!S, which took place thal
)t'itl in (ill}ill,
[_l-:'_)Xl)"l'lll,:I(}Nf)NI'III-:RI, _4_,)
Xl_'atY+vhilc', (;ub_t's inl_rttlalh_n _,xch:tn_t.s with tl:uc" r<:st ol +the" world :dso hav,_" contill-
ttt'd to ¢'XF,_md ttsit+_ l>_th the lnt_,rs])tttn+ik _tnd tlt<.' [tlt,L'Isat s_tt¢']lit¢' s_+stt'I+tS. Tht" cttrr_:]+!
itll<+'tFl;tlh)n;tl c_)tltt'xl ++ (lUit<. • c|i[lt+1+('111 from tllal whi<h <'xistcd "+vh¢'1+ th<' (_;_ttil)t' _1<+ul_d.
starlit)t+ was ittatt_-ttr_ttt'd In,_:,1c thorn twenty y(._trs :t_<_. From today's pt'rsF, cctivc, th,_' ( :_tt+il)¢•
_,l_ttlh>H +.;+in bt' vi<.'x+,;.t'd it:++;;t xvorkin_ tl+_:)tlttltlf'llt t++>tlt<.' b('st lh;tl th+: Sl)a(t" ,<,.+,+tu.<+'<;_ttt _)I'I_'F Io ;t
sm_tll islaIld I1_ttit)n '+trttf4_lin _ to dcvclo I) Ult<h'r ;trdtl+)tts ;tnd d+umtin_ cit+.(lllt_sl_+iIIC,_'m.

Chapter 19
The Recent History
Communications
of Satellite
in Cuba
by Roberto Diaz-Martin
This chapter discusses tile development of satellite communications ill Cuba--begin-
ning with the first ground station, named Caribc 1, which was installed because of Cuba's
early participation in the Intercosmos Program'--up to the present day. Satellite commu-
nications in Cuba can be said to have begun in 1965. 2 In that yean the Soviet Union invit-
ed several countries to attend a meeting held in Moscow between 15 and 20 November
1965 to address "space research and the peaceful uses of outer space." At this conference,
participating countries were im,ited to join a new "Collaborative Program for Research
and Peaceflfl Uses of the Outer Space." The program proposed to extend to collaborat-
ing countries the satellite colnmunications know-how and facilities aheady available in the
Soviet Union. At this meeting, the Soviet minister of communications offered to provide
reliable direct conmmnications between (hd)a and the European continent, using tim
existing operational Molniya communications satellite system. Subsequently, Cut)a joined
another new program known later as lntercosmos, as well as its successor organization,
called Intersputnik.
Within a relatively short time period, the (3aribe 1 ground station was erected in 1(.)74,
in the town of Jaruco near tlavana, so that (]uba could participate in these satellite com-
munications programs initiated by the Soviet Union. The site selected for tim ground
station was l)crtk'ct fiom a geographical poim of view: a small valley surrounded by hills
t)rotected the station from undesirable city noise and from electromagnetic interference.
The Caribe station was Cuba's crucial link to the lntcrsputnik satellite system.
An intergovernmental agreement establistaed lntersputnik on 15 November 1971,
and the signatory nations ctmlirmed the agreement on 12.]uly 1972. Cuba has been an
Interslmmik member nation since the organization's beginning. Tim Caribe ground sta-
lion, COml)leted in 1(.t74, t)ecame only the second such station outside tit(' territory of the
Soviet Union. The Interspumik system utilized three Molniya l-class satellites in eiliptical
orbits. The station's initial capacity was one television channel and twenty-four analog tele-
plnme circtfits (expanded later to sixty). In 1978, tim Intersputnik system switched to geo-
stationary satellites of the Horizont, an(t later Statsionar, series. This change eliminated
interrupt'ions caused by the need to switch from one satellite to another so as to lnaintain
a Conlintlolls colnlntlnicatiolls link.
1. .los(' Ahshulcr, "El primer sputnik, tm ( uarto tit' siglo desire(s," Orhita ] (1) ( 1983): 1-20; S('crcmry
ot UNISPA(]E '82, Cooperati/m inteTLruluqnamental mullilatervd erz hzs actividnde_ e_paciale_: I)ocumento de antecedt'nte_,
U.N. d[)cumt'nt A/'(;()NF. 101/BP/'I0 (New ¥_rk: United Nations, 1981 t.
2. Rol)crt(_ Diaz Martin, "l,as comunicacioncs cspacialcs cn r_il)ido (h'sarvollo," O_bita 2(1) (198,l):
32-,t0: R. I)iaz Mm lhl, "( ;0nesis tic las ( Olmmi_ a(iont's cspacialcs ('n ( ;ul)a,'" Orbita d( l ) ( 19_6): 7-15; Pedro latin
"l'¢nles, "'hdormc ¢h' la (;onlctcn( ia tic M¢)scu scd)r(' la ilwestigacion v uliliza( i(m dcl csp;wi(, (()smi( o ((m fines
l)a(flicos, "' 19fi5, ([mti'lcntc pal)tq, t)twsonal _ommtmi(ation.
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Figure 32
The Car|be _ald/ilc,rm+mu_+i:aliolt_:_'_ouml_lallot_Heat llava_m, Cuba, t'qui/qwd /b_ w_./¢z_igwilh both l_le_:spul_Hkand
I_teZ_at _atellites. ((:ourtcsv ofJos(' Ahslndcr)
The thst television program received by the stalion, and rcbroadcasl nationwide later
because of the lime diffe,ence between Europe an<l (h,ba, was lhe Moscow commemora-
live parade of 7 November 1974. Some weeks later, the ttavana commemorative parade of
1 January 1975 was transmitted to Europe fr<ml Havana. The Cuban public also m_joyed
fit television transmission of the Montrcml Olympic (;ames in 1976. To exchange televi-
sion programs am<rag Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, it was neces-
sary to overcome the handicap of diffi, rent television broadcast standards. The television
standard used in (:uba was NTSC, while tim Soviet Union and the majority of Eastern
European cotllltries used SECAM. This ditticuhy was resolved in 1975 Ihrough lhe use of
camera tubes that carried out the conversion optically. Later, an electronic standard con-
verter replaced this analog system.
Selection of a Color Television Standard
()he of lhe key factors affecting the operation of satellite communications in (:uba
was the selection of a standard liar color television broadcasts. The availability of regular
color television programming through the Car|be station encouraged the introduction of
color television broadcasting, which was not generally available at the time because of the
lack of a single television standard. A large numl)er of NTSC black-and-white television
receivers were in use lhrotlghotll (;uba. ] lowever+ llle color television receivers available
from Eastern Ettrol)e were all SECAM receivers. Financial support to replace all the NTSC
black-and-white receivers with NTSC color sets was not available. Moreover, complicating
the switch fiom NTSC to SECAM was the difference in electrical power standards. The
Cuban electrical power system universally supplied 110 w)hs at sixty hertz+, while SECAM
receivers required 220 volts at tifty hertz, the European standard. Voltage differences
aside, adopting the SECAM standard would cause screen images to tlicker, because of
SECAM's tifty-hertz time bast:.
BEYOND I'IIE ION{)M'ItERk 2_)_;;
(_ohw television arrived in Cuba m 195_. ttavamCs (:h;mnel 12 aired in color usin_
sore<`" R(:A lt'lClil()vic t'quil:,mmtt capaM<`" of F,rOccssing color tch.'vision images. ,\t]cr 1959,
however, Channel 1'2 no longer broadcast color Inogramming. Many years Ialt'l, on<`c lhc
('4tribe station ])<`'g;+Ul operati<m, the technical staff of the (]Ubalt ]nstitttlc o[ Radio and
Television began to reactivate tilt+ old Chalmcl 12 ¢<>h)r television equipnmnt and to
redesign and adapt itcw SI_]('_A_I studio cquipnmnl <d)taint'd li-om the Soviet Union. These
eflorts dcnlonstratcd the possibility of transmitting in color using the NTS(] stand,u-d
through the existing broadcasting nctwork. ()thor t¢'sts wcrc <`atried out with tit<." SE( ;AM
color standmd with acceptably results.
Seh'ction of a color standard for Cuba ++'its conditioned not only by technical |,utors, Innt
also llv ccc, nt)lllica], sodal, and political (lllCS. The final government decision reached al the
end <4 1974 was to stick to thc national color xclcvision standard (the NTS(; stmlda]d). This
Wits lit(" slmtdard used It}, lll<:,st countries ill tilt" (;aril)bean geographical illCir. Using it dif
liwcnt standard would isolate (:vba li-om its neighbors. Once tlt<`" governnwnt made this
dc(ision, lit,.' c(mnlny ral)idly aC<luircd color t+cmot¢ ' control equil)ment front NE(; in Japan,
whih' existing Soviet equilmt<`m! +.+'its duly ntoditicd tiw color ttansnlission. The first standard
color transmission in (hfl)a via Ill<.! Car|be gr<mnd slat|on look place in 1975.
Cuba Joins Intelsat and the Global News Network
Ill 1979, th<,' Sixth Stunmil ot Nomdigncd (',ounlrit's took place in (]ul)a. The summit
i-Cqtlilcd (OVCla_c o1 all tilt" (OllltlltlllicatiOllS ncc(ly; c,t the lllClllltCl COtlntlic:,;, illchldiltg
worldwide tt,lcl)lume and lelevision scrvi(cs. Most of tilt' i)articipating counlrics wcrc
located gc<_gratlhit'ally alottnd lh¢' Pacific, In(lian, atnd S<)ttl]l Allanti( Oc(,ans--ar<.'as not
(omplctcly c()vmc(111y lntcrsputnik. _ti:t, lnlcrSl)utnik was (;uba's (onllnunicalions satcllilc
s+vslcnt. As it rcsuh, Cuba had to find an appr<ipriale technical solution that would pct+ntit
it to ofR'r Iclccomnnmications services to cotmlrics outsidc the Intcrspttlnik footprint.
()no pt+<q>osal was to install additional equipnlcnt in Algeria, in the Sahara Desert, to
I+Ctl+allSllli110 al'<:as al'olltld tho Indian, South Athuttic, and Pacitic Oceans. This pr<q)osal
was discarded in favor of installing a new "Standard B" hltt,'lsal ground station in (htba.
Thus, in 1979, in a rcc<+rd lithe of three nlonlhs, (]ttba bccmnc an lntclsat user. Tit<`" new
ground station |lad twentx-ti)ur telephone circuits and <me telc',ision channel, ll pr<)vidt'd
conuntutications s<`,rviccs slttisthctorily during lhc Stuntnit of Nonaligned (k)untrics,
thanks to the,joinl Olmiation of both tht" httcrsputnik and Inlclsat stations.
BCCaIIS<.t <)1" satellite Ct)lllllltllliCalit>ns, Cul)a was able to parti(ipate c'arlv <)n in the
international exchange of television news. ht 1977, supported by the Intcrnati<mal
()rganizalion ti_t Radio and Television, (]tlba cntcred into television news exchanges with
Ihc [nlt,Yvisioll Nctw<)l-k, televised ti-oln the nclw<)fk's ccnttq in Prague. F+vcrv. day ill !+:00
ll.m. European (',cntral l'imc, tlt<`" broadcast exchange rook place during apl)roxinmtelv
()tic h()tlt +. A h'ascd ('()llllll<)ll ;tttdi</ channel ])lovided SilllllhallCC, tls SOIlll(| [)rOgl'allltllilt_
to atulicnces s(att(+rcd ar()und the gl()l)c, t](nn Managtta, Nicaragua, t() Ulan B:tl<)n
Mongolia, ml(l I [allot, Vietnam. The lnlervision N¢,tw(n-k ('(InlilltlC(t l() broa(lc,lst unlil tilt"
disappt,arance of Ihv International Organization tor Radio and Telcvisi<m, when
l_)u-<_vision and EUTEI,SXI' picked ttp flit" service. All participanls shancd in thc CXl)Cnscs
of this service.
(hd)a's slttdlitc conunttnications ca|tab|lily also ttenctil<.'d groups of intereslcd uscns
located in Eur<q)c and o4wr regions ot the world. For this |ranpose, Cubavision wits pro-
duccd and transmitted I+Cglt]arl ", through at h,ascd transponder on a Statsionar salellitc.
The pr¢)graun included llC_,%'s ti-otn (_/lt)a, ;is well as ClllCl-lilillill('lll num'rial.
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Space Communications Research and Special Services
Cttha participated in the International Space Communications Work Group of the
Intmcosmos Program. Within its framework, the Cubans conducted research to study
radio propagation in the tropics in the ten- to thirty-gigahertz frequency range. Existing
data from radio telescopes, which had conducted geophysical studies of the Sun's impact
on the Earth's i_mosphere, were compiled and analyzed. (;uban researchers conducted
additional studies using equipment obtained through, attd with the hacking of, the
Intercosmos Program.
Beginning in 1981, Cuba launched a project to develop the Central National Science
and Technolog 7 IAhrary. The objective of the library, inaugurated in June 1988 in the
Capitol Building, was to promote the expansion of inlbrmation services to the entire
country. As part of the library project, Cuha instituted national and international net-
works to provide computei_assisted exchanges of information services, el'he Caribe ground
station provided these networks with communications support.:*
As an island nation, Cuba has a close relationship with the sea. Political and econom-
ic reasons have pushed Cuba to broaden its merchant and fishing fleet. Cuban vessels now
cover large distances to maintain the COl.lnlry's needs. For this reason, ntaritime connnn-
nications, especially maritime satellite communications, has taken o,i greater interest and
importance. Therefore, on 27July 1989, Cuhajoined lnmarsat to modernize its maritime
communications capabilities.
Conclusion
The Caribe ground station has been the suhject of continuous technical improve-
ment. The Intersputnik system featured time division muhiple access and a single carrier
per channel--fi'atures that made it compatible with the lntelsat system. The Intelsat B
ground station increased its telephone capacity to eighty circnits, and the Intersputnik sta-
tion expanded to 144 telephone circuits. However, to meet the needs of the constantly
growing nuntbers of toreign visitors, businessI)eople, and tourists, (]tl.ba ha(l to enlarge its
telephone and data commnnications facilities even more.
Consequently, a new Standard A Intelsat station, named Carihc 2, became operational
in 1991. This new ground station, equipped with the latest digital technolo_', l)rovided
the necessary capacity to cover present and fltture island needs. This station satisfactorily
covered the eleventh Caribbean and Pan-American Games. In addition, small-capacity
grotmd stations were installed in outlying areas to serve the needs of remote zones and
the small islands of the Cuban archipelago.
3. R. l)iaz Martfn, "Actividades Espaciates en Cuba, Diseminacidn de la inlbrmacidn via satetites,"
paper read at Taller tie Nacioncs Unidas sot)re Sistemas Regionales tie lnf_rmaci(m Espacial, Lima, Peru, 24-28
October 1988, copy in United Nations library.
PART III:
The Unfolding of the World System
Applications

Chapter 20
Project SHARE and the Development
of Global Satellite Communications
by.Joseph N. Pelton
The past is often prologue, and the history of satellite communications is no excep-
tion. The two earliest practical concepts of satellite comnnmication were offered by
Hermann Noordung, the Polish writer who used the pen name Potocnik, and Arthur C.
Clarke. ht articles published during the 1930s and 1940s, the), fi)rnaed the first specific
image of what a communications satellite might he and what it ntight do. Certainly oth-
ers, such as H.G. Wells, Everett Edward Hale, and Jules Verne proposed earlier concepts
in fancififl fiction, but Noordung and Clarke had specific ideas based on scientific and
even quasi-engineering principles. These first "practical" views included the idea of geo-
synchronous orhit, the use of radio-relay technolo_', and the belief that these space sta-
tions would be large, manned contrivances that would have on-board personnel replacing
radio robes and repairing electronic equipment.
The suhsequent invention of the transistor, reliahle solid-state circuiny, and high-
speed computers served to alter the ultimate reality of communications satellites that
materialized during the late 1950s and early 1960s. These technological breakthroughs
allowed satellites to be smaller, cheaper, more reliable, and, most critically, unmanned
remote-controlled versions of those proposed by Noordung and Clarke. The initial con-
cept that these communications satellites essentially would be radio broadcast towers in
the sky endured, however. Clarke's earliest vision, in fact, was at very convenient one for
telecommunications carriers and broadcasters. These entities, which frequently were
monopolies with huge investments in terrestrial networks, very lnllch wanted communi-
cations satellites to become an adjunct or extension of their large and expensive
terrestrial switching systems. At the dawn of the age of space communications, telecom-
munications moved through the key hubs of Paris, London, New York, and a few other key
urban centers of the world, such as Tokyo and Rome. Thus, the early history of satellite
comnmnications was a story of the technical triumph of electronic and rocketry technol-
o_', as well as a political struggle to retain a global hierarchy for the dominant communi-
cations carriers of the day.
There was nothing sinister or even conspiratorial about this situation. The concen-
tration of traffic through hierarchical switches for many decades was considered the
ultimate network strategy. Suddenly, the network architecture dictated by wire and terres-
trial switches was confronted with a new option--that of the communications satellite.
The satellite did not depend on physical wire connection, but rather wireless links
through free space. Network planners, however, saw satellites as long-distance trunk lines
that simply augmented the terrestrial telecommunications network. Because the first
ground stations were of necessity large, expensive, labor-intensive operations ($10 million
each and staffed by forty people operating over a twentDfour-hour shift), the nuntber of
points where satellites and wire networks could link together were small in number. Even
so, the new comnnmications satellites immediately began to make a difference.
Developing countries could build a national ground station to link via satellite not with
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one or two major world centers, but with dozens of places. Chile could call Colombia or
Brazil directly without going through New York. Nigeria could contact Ghana or Senegal
without going through London or Paris.
Thus, by 1969, satellite communications, which began in large part with lntelsat's
launch of Early Bird in 1965, had affected the fi)rm and structure of global telecommu-
nications in a decisiw_ manner. Chile, tot instance, was the first country to initiate direct
satellite connnunications in South America. Santiago Astrain, Intelsat's first director
general, was the head of Entel Chile during the middle to late 1960s. For an investment
eqnivalent to the purchase of a Boeing 707 jetliner, his country could enjoy global com-
munications. Suddenly, we could connect directly with a growing tamily of nations, rather
than transit through a handful of major powers.
The existence of national telecommunications monopolies and the high cost of large,
high-gain ground stations, however, served to limit this "satellite revohttion." Comsal's
chief seienlisl, Sid Metzger, who then headed the team responsil)le for the technical
design characteristics of Intelsat's ground stations, c<)ndt|cled a number of ongoing sys-
tems studies, which showed that the best "balance" of capital investment between lntelsat
satellites and gronnd stations strongly favored the big and expensive thirty-meter Intelsat
'%" stations. The key assumptions of these studies (which were indeed quite valid at the
time) inchtded the R_llowing:
• The power of satellites will be largely limited, and greatly increasing their power will
be quite expensive.
• (,round stations generally will be international gateways, and most countries will have
no more than one or two.
"I'o the extent that the Intelsat system must have smaller, low-gain antennas for special
reasons, such as in the case of a shipborne antenna to support a ntanned space mis-
sion, the satellite access charge should have a rate adjustntent factor to charge much
lnore for access.
This type of' design engineering and charging policy reinained in place through the
1960s, but as the next decade approached, the new and dramatically more powerflfl
Intelsat IV satellite was being built by the Hughes Aircraft Company. This satellite, with
about sixteen times more capacity than the Early Bird satellite, permitted new approach-
es to satellite communication. In an unusual move, Comsat organized a special study
team, called the lntelsat 1V Charging Policy group, within its system manager's organiza-
tion. Instead of being an engineer, the head of this group was the director of the firm's
International Division, John A. Johnson, who also chaired the Intelsat Interim
Contmunications Satellite Committee, whose eighteen members from around the world
decided overall tnanagement policy. That group recommended a new policy: a new fami-
ly of ground stations of different sizes and greatly reduced rate adjustment factors for
smallm, cheaper stations. The new policy envisioned the use of satellites for regional,
national, and international comnmnications services, as well as services to smaller termi-
nals in rural and remote regions. Experiments supported by NASA and Canada through
their joint Communications Technolo_' Satellite program in such locations as the
Brazilian Amazon supported the technical feasibility of such a concept?
1. It was the author's first impot'tant assignment at Comsat to head the lntelsat IV Charging Policy
study ill 1970, with a team of eight members drawn fi'om the procurenmnt, finance, legal, technical, operations,
and international divisions of (;omsat.
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Tile reconnnendations of tile Intelsat IV Charging Policy group report were quite
controversial. Some recommendations im:olving the use of excess Intelsat capacity fbr
domestic conmnmications had to wait approximately two years for Algeria to tormally
request this service frmn the lntelsat hlterim (;ommunications Satellite Committee ill
1973. As it turned out, the United States also directly benefited from this policy. "File com-
mittee decided that traffic between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii and Alaska could be
considered under bulk lease for "domestic service."
As the "decentralization" of the satellite network went torward with tile approwd of
the lntelsat Interim Communications Satellite Commiuee in 1971, during tile fiHlowing
years Intelsat designed and buih bigger and more powerful satellites, authorized smaller
and smaller ground stations, and offered a flfll range of national, regional, and interna-
tional conmnmications services. Still, there was a tk_eling that nmch more could he done.
By the early 198(Is, lntelsat began to define a new type of international service that could
use the Intelsat V and V-A satellites to go directly to customer prenfises. This became tile
lntelsat Business Service. lntelsat even defined a service for rural and renlote services
known as VISTA, as well as a microterminal-bascd service fi_r medium-rate data called
Internet, which could operate via a sixlDtive-centimeter "desktop" dish about title size of a
pizza pan.
This burst of new services occllrred ill close parallel with the 1983-1984 annmmce-
ment of plans for competitive services. Critics claimed that Inlelsat needed competition to
develop and deliver new and imlovalive services. The t:act that Intelsat's twentieth birthday
was coming up on 20 August 1984 suggested to a number of people that hltelsat should do
something particularly noteworthy and innovative to mark that upconfing anniversarv.
The Beginnings of Project SHARE
This author was named the lntelsat director of strategic policy in 1983 and, in that
capacity, proposcd an activity to promote access to educational and heahh services in
rmal and remow areas via satelliw. Because Imclsa/ dM have spare sawlliw capacity for
enlergen(y resloralioil, it was possibh' to think ot oflk'ring tile space segment Ira fi-c(' _)ll
tile tm(lersta]l(ling that any such tree ([emonstralions would be pl('t:mpted in the ('ant" of
a failure of regular commercial service.
h was not easy to COllvert a vague idea into a ch'ar specific proposal acceplal/h' to
lntelsat managemcnl, lnlelsat signatories from aromld the world, and the lntelsaI Board
of (',overnors, This Board of Governors replaced tile old lntelsat hawrim (;ommunications
Satellite Committee in 1974 under file newly negotiated Intelsat Definitive Agreements. It
required a lot of hard work and a lot of cooperation among a number of peoph" to make
this vague idea truly workable. Marcel Perras of (]allada, who ',','as a former hoard chair-
man and ;it that time [ntelsal's director of husiness l)lanning, came up with the ilamc:
Project SHARE. SI IARE was the acronym li)r Salellites lor Heahh and Rural Education in
English, but Intt'lsaI operated with three written languages: English, Spanish, and Frt'llch.
Those involved ((mid not gel the same acronym or meaning to work ill the other two hm-
guages. Finally it was simply decided that tile tlitlDe would have to be Project St lARK in
English+ l'r,!jet S]IARE in French, alld Preyert<) SI IARE in Spanish. Ariel" test-lllarketillg
the idea, it till-ned olll Ihal the English word "share" was rather universally understood
around the worl(I.
The advantages to hltelsat of making ti-ec satclliw capacity availahle to test rural and
renmw health and educational services were nol har(l to understand. These were pown-
lial nt!w Illarkels. The exlensioll el grolllld sl;llions lille inore renlt)le I('lTiloli('s
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f'_Wct SItAI¢I,"e.visimwd .mking /iee hdel_a¢ _atelIite_tJJ._iO;available toJm_iuh Iwolth _s_t edm'alional ',e_,ifes lr_rtt_al
aml tetttote te[_rit;tls. The It_e./ satellile_Io lip_k_vmotepeople_appeared mu_h eadi_; howeT,et;as thi_ NA.%.tdrawi_q._datmff
]mm the ear& 1961)gillu_trate_.(Cotutcsy of NASA)
expanded the <we>increasing interconnectivity of the Intclsat system. The capacity was not
being used tot olher purposes. Most importantly, it was a very good and exciting lhing to do.
The twentieth annivcrsaly celebration took on an illlportallt substantive dimcnsi<m
that went beyond throwing a big party. The rest of the world could celebrate also. The
lnle]s}l| signatories around the world had a .%Ollle_vh}tl different perspeclive. They needed
to make available ground station equipment aim terrestrial tc]ccommunications systems
to make the texts and demonstrations work. How wouht they I)c able to pick and choose?
How much additional etlorl would this require? Wouhl it interti_re with paying commer-
cial customers? If they allowed free service to start, how could they gracefhlly end the
service when the tests elided?
tterc, the Intelsat Board of Governors and the individual signatories were extremely
helpfhl in working ()tit a detailed 1)rocedure that limited requests in terms of scope, aim
duration and that eliminated trivial or frivolous proposals. ,As at result, Project SHARE
activities were meaningtul, focused, and oriented toward participants who had a serious
interest and intent to ilnplemcnt a test program, it took months of drafting and coordi-
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mlting thrse pr()c('ihn<,'sfor finalal)pr<)valby t|leBoard <if(;overnors, but evrnluallv th<,"
fi)rnlal auth()rizalion was in plat<,,.
Another setiotts prol)lenl, h()w<,'ver, hall to lie ,id(h'rssed. httelsat kn<,'w Inlt<,h about
satellite <,:<)nlmttni<,'ati()ns, but very litth, ab()l,t rural ('dlt('ati()n (it+ ll<,'atth car<.'. Again, will-
ing help ++,itsfi)ttnd in the internati()na] t()nnnunitv, hltelsat aj)pr(ta(hed th<,' Intcrnati()nal
hlstitut(" of (_()nulnulicati<)ns, head(iIUUtered in l,(m(h)n, fit, h<,'Ip. This noIH)r<)fit organi-
zati<)n, with a gl<)l);tl span ()Iacadenli<, +, pr()fessi<),lal, and i,ldUstrial tnenlb('rs, agreed It)
h<,'l1) (i)rln an int<,'rnational advisory Ill)art[ t() assist in assessing inc(mling proposals .tnd
ex'en It) help getlelal<,_ i)r()posals fr<)m relevanl gh)b.tl organizations, such as the Pan-
Anlerican Heahh ()rganizatiol). Ibe World I lealtll ()rganization. and t}l<,' open tmiv<,wsir<
systcnls aroun(I the W()Fld. This advisory c()nnnillce l)roved invah,lbh + t<) the planning.
inll)lenlentati()n, an(t evalltati()tl (if ongoing Pr()l¢'CI St tARE activities.
After nnt(:h hard work, the l+oat'(t ()[ (;()vert+<)rs gave its ap])roval, the a])plic.tti()n
ti)rnls xvcr<," printed, the Intelsat signatories' ground rules [i)r parti(iltati()n wme ill place.
anti the stage was set fi)r the launch of the l)rog,am. S()n1<,'thing slle(ial in ternts of pub-
li(ity and lanfar<,' s('emcd apl)rOl)riat('. So, those inv()Iv<,'d tul+nrd It) (:luul<,'s Schulz (if
"P<:;inuls"lanle.Res<,'archhi(li<,at<,+dt|latlt(,conli(+strip'1)<,,anuts"was })erhaps th<,"InOSl
wi(I<,,Ivrea(Iand recognized cart(tonin the w()rld.Becaus<,+edtwati()n and h<,'ahhcar<."fi)r
chil(h<,+n were key objectives of Proj<,'<,:t SIIARE, t!nited F<,'alurt,s and (;harl<,.s Schulz were
(<mtact(.d to as<,<,'rtain whether he nlight throat<," a ([islinttive all([ al)p<,'aling h)go--on<,'
that would lie appealing to a l)r()a(l all(lien<,<,' rather than.just scientisls and <,'ngill<,'et's. hi
(:})ala(:t(')isti<,:ally g(+neroIlS fashion, }It,"+igt('c(]. Will)in a )natt<,'r (>f w<,'<,+ks,w<,"]lad a I))-0je(l
SI IARE log() I<lturing Sn<)opy atop a d<)gh()usc, whi<,h also s<,Wveli as the inain body oi an
Inte]sat V satellite.
The "]aun(qt" of Projel:t SHARE sul)s<,'qu('ntly occttrr<,'d ill August I(.)84 at th('
hlt<,'rnational (;tub in Washington, I).C., anlid nluch l_ulfar(x Sn()<)py presented an ('llt,-
catiOlUll (Icgree (<,'rlificate to tilt+ hlt<:Isat's director gcn<,'ral. ++ksit tttrn('d out, it was avcrv
hot (llt}. and the (liminutiv<," a<,tt+<,+ssinsi(le tit(." Snoopy ('()StllnW went t() her changing r()()ln
and pr()nll)tly t_finted. She was qtti(kb,' revive(l. Th<," press in attendance gave Pr(!ject
SI IARI £ enthtlsiastic sul)port. Th<,' fiani<,+work was in place, tilt' pr()j<,'<,t was ann<)unced,
and the a(lvisorv c()nnnitt<,,e was (in alert, l)ttt (hi're "ever(' n<) pr(!j<,'('ts. Th(' I)e()ple inv()Ive(l
waite<,l l)atiel+tly fi)r a COlII)le (If months and th<,'n begat+ to "+vail inlpati<,mtly. Finally, pro-
l)osals w<,we recruite(I <in a very active l)asis.
A Few Notable Projects
The turning l)<)int canl(' ill the form of a (lel<,'gation i)f the Posl anti
Teleconlnltmi(ati<)ns Ministry fr()m Ihe Peopl<,"s Repul)lic of (i|lina. Tile), requeste(t tile
use <if an hltelsat transp<)n(Icr ((tr al full television <,'hann<,'l) ti)t ;1 sevel+alimonth test of a
new National Television University. Aft<,w some (lis(ussion, an(t ;I couple i)lannirtg an(t
c()o)+(tinati<)n trips, the lit'st major Project St IARE activity was laun('hcd with a signing ('<cr-
('tnonv at hltelsat hea(hluart<,'rs in Attgust 1985.
The tirst phase involve(l distribution <)f e(hlcational pr<)granls (lev('loped by (]entral
(]hina Television and the Ministry of Fducation. Initially, thirty h()urs of progranlnling
wcrc (listril)tttc(l to S(mle flirty rcgi()nal television receiv('rs with a test au(lience of s<,'v('ral
thousand SIlld('lltS and Inore than I00 inslrttclors. The lesls wet(." so successful that the
Chinese sig, nat<)ry r<.:(llteste(l ;i thre<,'-nlonth ('xtension+ which was l)ronlptly grante(l. By
the <,:n(1 o[ tim s<,'(()l|(l trial, China fornlallv l<,'as<,'d a transpon(l(w fronl hltelsat anti t)egan
ilttl)l('lllellting ;t full-scale cle(-ll-oni( university n<,'twork ,t(r()ss ItlOM of rural anti r<,'ni()t("
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China, as well as in many other locations. As of 1996, this network is still very much in
operation. Approximately 90,000 terminals have been buih and deployed in every part of
(:hina, and the number of students now exceeds 3 million. Eventualiv, a target of more
than 10 million teachers and students will be served by this satellite network started tinder
Project SHARE. This is the world's largest single educational network, and even if noth-
ing else arose fiom Project SttARE, one could claim that this program alone made it
extremely worthwhile.
Fortunately, many other proiects quickly followed. Everything started to colne togeth-
er. The advisory committee hegan to bring forward key projects. Signatories hegan to rec-
ognize tiom the experie_we in China that Project SHARE could attract new customers and
[_vorable publicity. The early successes tended to breed new opporttmitics and innovative
suggestions. The case of Dr. Max I louse of the Memorial Hospital of Nova Scotia and the
Canadian signatory Teleglohe Canada was a key case in point.
In the 1970s, Max t l<)tisc started a highly innovative project to hring health and lned-
ical assistance to reniote areas of Canada. His initial mission was to extend the treatnlent
coverage of Meinorial Hospital to drilling rigs off the coast of Nova Scotia. Using
c<)mmunications links, tlouse helped assist with the brokcn limbs, diagnostic tests, and
medical emergencies of workers on those remote ofl:shorc towers. In light of this p<>sitive
practical experience, llouse began to consiih with hospital and clinic officials in East
:Mrica and the Caribl)ean regarding the provision of their medical treatment needs via
satellite links. Varions suppliers of spccializcd medical tcrnlinal equipinelll and videocon-
felencing coders (that is, encoders/decodcrs), such as Colorado Video, donated approx-
imately $300,000 in equipment thai could be used at renlote medical facilities to help with
nledical testing and training.
in parallcl, officials ;it Teleglohe Canada and lntelsat developed plans to set up the
satellite links. The plan was to operate the Canada-to-Kenya medical link seven hours a day
and then switch to a link between Canada and the Caribh_:an lot another seven-hour shift.
The link was designed for multit>le purposes. Thc most frequent use was t<) be for train-
ing nurses and doctors on a variety of medical techniques. The link also could serve to
relay medical infbrnlation and records, such as tile results of EK(;s, EE(;s, x-rays, sono-
grams, and blood seruni <)v urine tests.
Intelsat approved the request, and the Canadian signatory in_plemented it without
delay. The service operated for more than one ),ear. In the cast, of the (]aribhean link, the
existing network serving the entire region, known as the UDIWITE network, was ahle to
reach dozens of clinics and hospitals. During the test period, the network was able to pro-
vide effective new training to paramedics, nurses, and doctors, as well as diagnoses of
many rare medical conditions that could not have been lnade at the remote locations. The
narrowhand link also was highly efficient. The use of slow-scan video over the equivalent
voice channel was found to he adequate for most needs. When higher resolution and
color images were required, air conrier systems were employed instead.
Over a period of nearly two years, Project SHARE covered a large number of projects
and inw_lved more than 100 different countries. The intent of the project was to develop
specific educational and heahh services for remote areas that were geared to specific
needs and suited technically and financially to implementation on a practical basis. The
range of projects was geographically, technically, and fl, nctionally diverse.
The largest single project in terms of coverage was the so-called "Day of Five Billion"
glohal television prodnctitm created by CNN. This show included footage from dozens of
cotmtries around the world and addressed the educational and environmental issues
arising from the Earth's total population reaching 5 billion people. Its satellite distribu-
tion network reached more than 150 c<>untries and showed the potential of developing
countries being ablc to supply, not just receive, programming.
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Conclusion
Rather [hitn att('lnDtin _ t() _,tlllllll_+,l'iZ(," O1" ('h;lt';tCl('liZ(" t]l(" lll;tllV (|o/('llS of pl+O_l'_,llllS
that were tested, d<.'monstraled, or cvahtatcd du,iug Pr<_jcct St IARE, il is more itnp_irtanl
to focus on what _r_s learned from the (ollc(tivc CXl)eri¢'nce and the trends it hell)cd crc-
al(" [4)i- lh{. tllllllC+ 1]1 I('i131s <)f k('v c<)n(-h.si<ms, lh(' final r<'vimv of Pr_!jvct SI IARE sevmcd
to suggest the following:
TPlc pf(igl'/tfils fttat w('r,." cPI+: mosf succ('ssttl+ itl fh(' t'esf ant+ O_cmoHsf_'af/oN slag,:, an{+
that w(+'nl on to op(,'rati()nnl in+l)lcmenlali_>n, weft" typically otws iu which th(' 1)arlici -
pating (ountry dcvclol)(+d its own l:uoRt'anmlh+lg and dl'sigm'd its mvn i)rojc(ts.
" "I'll(' I-t'V(?I'S(" V','31_, _tlSO ll'lt('--th_lt is, st|('('t!'is I,t"+'(!ls W('l'(: llltl(.'h l(w+r('t + wh('ll dt'v('l()|)l'd
coullll'iCs ])rodttc¢'d t)rogralns 1o dClllOllSllal<' ill (l('veloping cliUllllil,s.
The al)l)cal of video-based services was sli-Olig and broadly based ill llic" lesls and
dcinoiisilaiiolis, t)ill lhl' ccoil_)illi( lcalilics _t liarl-o_llaiid voicl' and (lala s_'rviccs
w_'ic rctlcclcd in lhe aclual opei-Cllional inii)lmnc, nlalions in viYluallv all cases, wilh Ihc
cxccpiion of Cliina.
The itnportancc of using small, low-cost glottnd ('qUil)ineni in rural and rclnotc loca-
li(/llS t(ll a wide I{lll<_t" ()[ social s_.,l*,'il,l,s was sh(iwn in Iocalions in Aliica. iiie
(;ai-il)t)can, Soiiih Anicrica, and Asia. hi sh(iri, ihe ('slahlishcd inodcl of ]aigc _round
shili(ins alld ]alg(' SllCalllS ()t salellil{' Ii-alllc WCl(" llt>l w_ql Slliit'd Io Ill(,! illCl'eaSillg
d('illalidS t)li" disiril)ulcd iicl_:oi'ks ail(I Nila] ali(I IX>lllOi(" scrvic{'s.
1)uiin<_ ihc five y_'ars lhai tbllowed Pr_liect St L\RE, which ended in l{lStl, a ie'c_llulion
in salelliic COlilllliinicalioiis occurl,.'d. :\ h(isl of iil,w services Sillall<_ ti)rlh. Tllcsc inchid-
cd ct_sloillcr-l)iclnis(" ,_round slalioi/s with ai)i'ililii's lhrce lll_.'I('lS in diaillClCY (klloWii as
"Vt'ly small apt'lItllt" lernlinals") and (,v¢c,ll Illi(TOlCl'lllillal distlcs (_._ ('t'l/lilll('lCl'S in diain_'-
tel-. Dhccl t)lOadcaSlillg also Clll{'lgl'(I. New COllllller('ial api)licali_lns, especially lht"
deiliaiids o[ oil COliipalli_'s, l)ailks, alld iilsul;tncc coiill)ani/'s, Wi'l(' lhe t)iinlaiy diiV_,lS
t)('tlili¢l Ill<. cl('al/<m ollhc_(" ll_.'w sat{'llil{' _;{'ll'i(¢'s an(l/}1¢_" (t<'liiall(t l(_I",_nlali_.'l ,_Fouli(I l{'l-
illillals. Ncv('liheic'ss, Ill(' vision of the flllllll._ enll)odied bv Proieci SttARE Ic,sls aild
deilloiis_ralions also aided and spccdcd lhis process. Their inipacl was large. PrRicci
SllARE CXli(iscd dozens of heads of stale', nlilliSlt'lS, and high p()lilical leaders 1o lhc
potcniia] of ri'illolt" salclliic t'ducaliolial and ht'ahh services. Doclors, ll'achcrs, politi-
ciailS, 1.31liicd Nali(illS otlicials, t)l-Oaidcasll'l-S, and l('le('(lllllllUlliCaliollS exl)ol'ls ,tl'ollnd Illl'
world learned how to woYk l(l_.'lhCl [o (l('{l[(." llCW and even reniarkat)lv innovative cal)a-
bililies. The lllliqli(' s(l)i)(' ;Hid icil(h ()[ Pr_!jcct SI IARE was Iflily a ph(!lllilllt'nc)ll. |11 S()llll"
ways, Ilic woild of inod{Tn sal{'llil{" coinlnlinicali(ins did cilange l|ie way w_" lhink al)oul
services 1o l(!lllOl(! {tl-(._lS ill alp in(T('asing]) slnalit'l- and iillel(onileCled world.
(]()ilillil.'i('i;il ll'h'l)holi¢, dala, and television requir('ill('nls played a |]uldainClllal i-olc
in ill{' rapid dcv{'lol)nl{'nl of salcllil_" conunul_icalions and in ilw utilizcilion of the
7,(il)()-told iliCicas/, in salcllilc Cal)aciiy [roln Early Bird in 19(_3 Io lnlelsal Vl lwl'nlv vc:.tl-S
laltu. Ncvt:llticlcss, lhc uni(]uc lCqllilClilcnls for illnovaliv/- social applicalions of salti_'lliic
lcchiiolog}, in dmclopiug counlries and rcino[e areas of iht" world sirengihencd, and l)os-
sibly ,,!v(!n accclci'alcd, Ihal ti(!l/(I. I_.1"_ iniil)valioils expedited by ihe Pr<wci StlARE ini-
lialivc illchidl'd lll(" bulk prl)Clil'l'llll'iil pl'O_l'aiil till-low-('osi Illlclsai vez'v small al)('lllli'l'
ttwlniilals ki/own as VISTA _roiliid sialiolls, _iicii 1)tilk [)rOClll01iil'ni progiaills cll'ai-lv
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advanced tile cause of delivering educational and health services to remote areas. The
development of spread-specnmn microterminals for remote data services again promof
ed satellite-based services in very rural and isolated areas. This started as technolo_, fi)r
national satellite services by the Equ;ttorial Communications (hnporalion, and it was very
much the personal mission of fin°met Stanford University proff'ssor Edwin Parker. h'l
short, []leFe ;tl'e llllllleFOllS exalnples of how bllsilless _ltl(| elltel[itilllllelll reqllirelnenls
drove satellite and ground-station technolog T forward, but likewise there arc iml)ortanl
examples from Prt_ject SIIARE, in which social mM educalional requirements helped
sh:ll)e l[le technical, operational, and market agend;l _.s well.
Ultinlately, only about one l'rt_ject St tARE program in ten made it past tile demon-
stration stage into operatiomfl service. This result is in a way still remarkable, given the
prt!ject's highly experimenlal natule and the lack of a firm flmding I)ase for tests ;uld
denlonstv:ttions at the prograln's outset. As anniversary celebralions go, Pr_ject SI tARE
must be considered a significant success, fin it created a new fl-amework for internalion;fl
cooperation in providing educational and health services Io remote regions, mM it
spawned dozens of prt_jects fllal ;lfl_'ctcd ne;irl), 100 countries and millions of people.
Chapter 21
The Evolution of Mobile Satellite
Communications
by Edward J. Martin
The developmcnl of motfilc salt'llilc systems and inslinuions Iraccs its tools to Ihc
close of World Win Ii and pt+ocet'ds along a lollUlOUs |)alh with a mmlber of t,tls_, sliu-ls iIil,{l
sut-ccsscs in lhc ensuing yems. (;aining ;m tmd(.'rslallding of hoxx. wc arrived :It where wc
are tud;_y is worlhv of some scholarly r(*search. This ch,)plt'r. Ihoug]), does l)ol pretend to
produce a well-docmm'nted historical review; rathcl-, il is an ;itlelllpt to sketch file Otlllin¢'
o[(.W('lllS (]v(.'l lh(" ",,'e;U",, relying _thll(')sl enlirt'lv on lhe author's pcrsonal rcc()lh'clions, hav-
ing ])m-ticipalcd in re:my of th<)s(' err'his. Many other iml)Orlan! dev('h)|)menls, particular-
ly in Em-()pc and in Ja])an, arc ()milled l)(,causc <)[ :t lack ()f a(h'qtmte I)ers()md re(olh,ction.
B(.'C_t/LSU IlI('IllOIV is this (list'tlsSiOll'S Illilill s()tlrtt.'+ i11_111",,'('l'l(')Fs ill fitClS, (t;tl(.'S, ;llld
olhec derails may t)(' found herein. It i,_ h()pcd, n()nvlhclcss, th:n the gcn(,ral coverage ()I
(W('HIS iS }}'¢)th ;tC('HF:U¢" ,t|Id intvt('stittg ('n<)ttgh l<) stimttl:ttc some c<)nth)sions <)n why
Ihings went righl when lll(,'v went right, as well as wlml err(ns w(.'rc made when they did
11ol ,_o right. The various D.Ilt'IlIplS tO achi('vc mobile salcllitc Cal)al)ility in the t)r('-
[lllll;tlS;.tl _.'t':_tt'S :ll't" II(>! VtWV well known, t)ul the"+' ('()l/l:lhl itllt'l'eStillg lcssons fi)r 1|1(' i)()li-
cv-mak('r and (']m+el)rencur alike. Thcrel_)r(', lifts (liscussi<)n dw('lls more heavily ()n tll;+.t
('I'll, ;ISSlIHlilI_ |]1_1I ll)()l'(' I'('C('I)| (,'V(')IIS ;IF[" _';-II b(+l[('F kll()Wl).
Thc dct'adc and a half llml has .iusl passed m;w 1)(" called in th(.' ttlllll(" the +'g()ltl(,n
age" <){ [mmusal--;t period whcn a mfitlUC inlt'rm_ti<)nal I)olili(al and commercial ins(i-
lllli()n ,t'I'ljOyt'd <_l-(.';ll su('('t'ss hl dcv('h)l)ing a global systt'lll of satcllit(" c'OIlltllllnit'altiOllS ()II
||I(' SCkl+ hl the :tit, _.III(| ()ll lh(" gl'()llll(l. This SII('((.'SS 'W_IS 1)()III OUt Of" the ('OIIVt'Fgt'IIC(+" ()["
many, htrgt'ly un(()<)rdinatcd inilialivt's lh:tt placed th¢' m'ccssmy tt'chnical, financial, and
political rcs<)tu(es in Ih(' hands ()t a cht)st'n inslrmnent, th(" lnmavsat ()rganizalion.
Inmarsal's grt':tl success can b(, )))(':)s)ltt,<l l)y ils [)crsiste))t !+,0-l)(')cenl a))))ual growth r;tl(,s
in 1)<)Ill i(WCllllCS an(I (l.lSIolil(,l+ bast'. T()day, regional ,rod dom('sti( tool)lie s;m'llitc svs-
teIllS ;lI'(" |)[()SSOIIliIIg llOl OlIIv in North America, btt(als() in A_ia and file Pacific. More()ver,
after I]IFUC (|('(';t(lus O[' {'Olllllli|lll('nl 1)%' ('()llllll('l'('i;Al sal('llile op('F;tlt)lS t() I|IC gt-()slationary
orl)it, a numl)er of ])ri+c;m • enlhics now ])fan )() ()fief glol)a] m()l)ilc s('rvi(cs in c()mpetilion
_.Vi|h ]lll)l_ll'Sit| IISillg ('onsl('l]il|i()ns o['satt']lil('s ill low- (:,1 int('rm('(|i;tl(*-;).hitu(|(- orbits. Also,
other pt-ivat(' entities are plmming ,_(,ostationary orbit systems for regional coverage, pvi-
matily over land ;t,t';ts, froth :t nttnlb('r of orbit locations atound the gl<)bc. Wht'rcas tlt('
first connnct+cial mobile let'nmmls, which were dcsigned fl)r 'dfipb<)ard use, weighed up t()
a ton and cost $,')0,000 to $7,"),000, tc(hn()logical advan('cs and higher l)OWered satellites
t(>day arc (hiving (h)wn size and (<)st. N()w, ()n(" (an buy a sitt('llite ph()ne that fits into a
l)ricl('as(' [k)r tm(ler Sit),()()(). Within ,t ['t,w ",'ears, thc phonc will fit in your l)ocket all(l (ost
wcll u))der $,r),000. Tl)t" mark('ts ol th(" Jura)-(" will b(' )n(':_stl)t'd in the n)illi<ms of users, as
c()mpat+('d to lhe thousands or tens ()I lhousands t()dav. This chal-)ter attempts I<) outline
the tm!j()r events that set the st:tge fl)r tht" establishment of hmmtsat and Ithe fitctors th;tl
have, in mote recent years, led t() a prolif('rati<)n of conq)cting systems.
_(-;6 TIIIr [_!NF()I,DIN(; OF "I'IH(WORLI) Sx,N'I'EM: ;_PPI,ICATION,"G
Mobile Communications Before Sputnik
Between the end of World War II and the dawn of the space age, tile U.S. military
engaged in an intensive search tor a reliable means of air-to-ground connnunications. The
U.S. Department of Defense required reliable control of its airborne nuclear forces and
its interceptor fleets, which might have to shoot down enemy bombers threatening U.S.
population centers. To maintain a credible counterthreat, Strategic Air Conunand
bombers would be deployed toward the North Pole to await a signal to continue or to
return home. Reliable contact with these aircraft, as well as with airborne command posts,
was absolutely imperative. It was essential to extend reliable communications ranges well
beyond the line of sigttt, High-flequency communications offered long-range but highl)'
unreliable performance, especially in the polar regions.
Although Arthur C. Clarke's classic Wireles.s WorM article appeared M'ter the war, recog-
nition of the possihilities offered by the satellite relaying of air-to-ground colnmunications
did not emerge until several years later. Clarke's concept, which involved the use of
manned television broadcast stations operating more than 20,000 miles in space'., was
more the stuff of science fiction than a practical alternative. Theretore, U.S. military
research efforts concentrated on terrestrial technologies. Much effort went into intprov-
ing the reliability of higtl-frequency air-to-ground c(mmnmications, but no fhlly satisFac-
tor)' solution emerged.
At the end of World War II, little was known about the ability of radio waves to pc'he-
Irate the atmosphere. The war, howevcn had spmvned a powerfifl new tool: radar. The U.S.
Army's Project Diana succeeded in detecting ladar signals bounced off the Moon's snr-
t_tce in 1946. Ten ),cars later, British scientists using the powerfid Jodrell Bank radar tele-
scope discovered and measured the Faraday rotation of a very high-frequency (VHF)
radar signal reflected from the hmar surface. This type of information was to become vital
to the planners of VI tF mobile satellite systems several ),ears later.
During the late 1950s, U.S. _'Mr Force scientists began to explore the prospect of using
the Moon for communications. Unknown to them, though, the U.S. Na_ T already was
heavily engaged in hmar communications work, with the idea of eavesdropping on line-
of-sight connnnnications half way around tile world in the Soviet Union. The Na W star/-
ed the design and construction of a 600-foot-diameter steeral)le antenna tot this purpose,
hilt the project failed because tile cost was unreasonable'; in any case, spy satellites were on
the horizon. Nonetheless, the Nax T realized a hmar-relay communications system between
Hmvaii and the U.S. east coast--a system about which little has been published. The U.S.
Na_ T also placed large antennas aboard nvo ships fi), Moon btnulce commtmications on
the high seas, but the large antennas and small signals associated with this technique
offered no prontise fbr widespread future use.
l)uring the 1950s, the U.S. military also undertook tests to assess the potential of using
radio wave scattering from irregularities in the aunospltere to generate usable signals on
a reliable basis. An Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories research teant demon-
strated that tropospheric scattering could support coinmunications out to several hun-
dred ntiles. Scattering from the ionosphere extended that possibility out to well over 1,000
miles. An elaborate test bed was established on a ('-t 35 aircraft (more commonly recog-
nized as a Boeing 707). Directive transmit antennas were titted in the nose and tail, each
fed by a muhikilowatt transntitter; two parasitic arrays were fitted to the wing tips to
receive signals. The ground station had an array of six diversity antennas to ,'eceive. The
goal of this investment in eqttipment was to establish a two-way teletype link between the
grotmd and aircraft. The test program was coming to a close just as Sputnik heralded the
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opening of tile space age in October 1957, and it l)ecame clear that better ahernativcs to
this brute force scatter technoh)hp., were availal>h +.
The Dmvn of the Space Age
By 1959, the U.S, Air Force had studied a number o1 ahcrnativc space lechnologics
for in+proved Cot++lllltt+ic;-tliol+s ilt+d had conchtd(,cl that a(tiw' elcclronics in orbit were nol
praclica], at least tbr at wbih-. Instead, lbCV thvorcd tim us+ of passiv¢* sathvlliles-- thai is,
radar reflectors--in orbit. NASA, the fledgling- st>at(, agency, latin+bed into orbit the two
Echo l)alloons, the first artilicial satellil<.'s visible to the naked +'re. If ro+'k('l l<'chn<)logy
could lannch those balloons, tlm tnilitarv tcasc, n(?d, t|l(ql tlt(' same tcchn<+l<_gy could
destroy the satellite ;is well.
MIT's Lincoln l+aboralory &'visvd ;m in+g('nious |csponse to that (li](+mma: Pr(+j<xl
+v_'st Ford. (:omm<mly known its Proj('(.l No+dies, this l+|<+gram involved dcphLving a bch
of tit+}, dipole "nee(lh+s" in <)l}}il about th(" plallCt. If (wo at+l('tmas w<'r(" ditto+ted :t_ lit<'
satne beh location, Ibm could +stablish it reliable link by scattering ct+,e|h_' from tit<"
dipoles. ()he such tmh was suc(cssfully deployed. Sore(' <>[ the signal prt>ccssi|Lg rcs<'arch
carried ot|t f<)r atntosphc|+i( + s+atte|-ing now wax applicd to a Sl)a<+c systmn. \'ari<)tts ('<m>
mltnicali<)ns cOnflgt|rali<)ns, incht(ling ground-I<)-sul)marin(h wcr(' successfully tcste+l.
I,incoln l+aboratorv in+hu'cd t}w Air F<_rcc (:a|nbridg_: R('s('arch I+al)<>ral<>|+i<'s t,> exl>h>rc
the I<.'asibility <)t ('ommttni(atitlg with an airl)oruc lertni|+al using the _'st Ford l)<'lt. The
cnsuitLR stu+ly program l-<,sttlt<:+l it+ a s(:t <>f design l)a.rant<'ters lhat in('htdc(t a lw<)-|(+<)l
(().6-meter) tracking X-ha.rid dish mount('d ttndcr a radomc on tit<' top of an aircra[t's
fuselage, a ten-kilowatt tr;tnstnhlcr, iUld a maser r<_'ceiv('r with :t noise temperatttrc of fifty
degrees Kelvin. Subseqttcntly, the studies were trat+st_'||ed to the Air Force's Wright Air
Development (;enter at \_qighl-Pallcrson Air Force Base, Ohio, for implementation, at++|
at+ airborne X-band systcnt even+ruffly came it+to scrvic(', Ira! ++ilhottt the West Ford bell,
whose ttsefttlness was cndvd by tlt(' advent of the activ(' |epcatcr satellite.
NASA introduccd tlt<" active +atvllitc era with tim launch of the +'xperint('ntal Telstar
and Relay slttellites--l)rOglams carried out it) coop+ratio++ with Bell Telel)hone
l,abot-at<:+ries and R(:A's/\stro Division, rcspccti'+(-ly. N<_ mol>ih" applications were torcsevn
all lit:all St.agC" be+aus(" _>t the low power of ill{" early salclliles, but I]leSe satellites showed
conch|sively that (qc(tr(mics (<)ttl(l Ol++!ral<" r('liablv it+ Sl+a(c. In what may argual)l:v ha\'('
bccn its most important early dec/st<m, NASA decided to supp,c>l+t l|l(e }htghes plan to pitt
a satellite it+ the "Arthtu + ('.lark+" or gcosynchronous orl)it. Ahhough Svnc<m+ was not
expected to have till't, ' I+CI("f_HI('( ' I(7 n+ohilc cotnltltn+ications+ Roland [+tIIIC|ICI, ;t I-]ttg+l('S
engine+|', showed otherwis+'.
The Syncom comn+unications transl)ond<.'r its('(| a IWO-W:,ttt [+-band trat+st||htct; which
was tar too weak l_t- znobile c<mm)ttnicati<ms applications, i lowm¢t; as Bott(-hcr +h'moz_-
stratcd, Svncom's VIIF l('lcmctr'+ and conunand system could b<" fooled into relaying a
('ont|nuni(ati()ns |n<'ssag('. Std+s('(lt|<'ntly, a Pan ,kin Ait-lincs 707 (argo airplan<', tilt+,(| with
a set of experime|ltal <,'h'(tr()t|ics, flew out <dl h)ng Kong in early 1¶)65. The pih>t I)()h+t('(|
his aircraft tmvard the Pacific S'+'tlcom sat('llile and relayed a tnessag<, to the gt+otul(t sta-
li(:,n al (:al]lp Roberts. (:alitht-nia, scndin<g 1he thsl satel]it< + rues+tag< • front a reRtd,u+]:,
scheduled airliner in fliRhl. Thtts was horn the t_rst hlilialiv<," |(_1 Coltnn('l+<ial tnobih' s,tlcl-
lit<" c(mtlnutti+atiot+s.
Meanwhile, NASA had staltcd ils Ai}l}licatioins T('(hnoh) D' Sat<'llile (:\1'5;'1 seri+'s. Two
of these, XI'_I and ATS-3, inc<wp<)t+ated V|IF transpt)ndcrs lhat <,nabled th+' airlin('s atnd
t_t|ters to cot+duct extensive l<'sl ]no_lal+lS. I'hcsv satc|litcs w('rc s<) stuc('sstul that N_.\_'_:\
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_as under constant pressure to employ thcn_ in operational roles. The ATS-5 had an
IA)and transponder. ]Jtt! this regrettably provi(tc(t only limited test potential because its
attitude control system, a gravity-gradient stabilization experiment, failed.
The United States and Europe had great interest in using geosyuchronous satellites
in a satellite-to-aircraft ranging system for posilion determination--an interest spurred
largely by the increase in North Atlantic air traffic. Because of the range errors produced
by the ion()sphere im the satellite-to-ground path at VI tF t?equencies, many in ihc field
believed thai the Vt tF band was unsuitable for position fixing and l]lat the 1A)and was the
only sound option. Howevm; Roy Anderson, a (;eneral Electric enginem; (lem(mslrate(I
I|lat differential ranging techniques using fixed relc'rence stations could reduce most o[
these errors. Anderson's scheme, of course, was a progenitor to the (titt}wential tech-
niques now in use with the (;Iohal Positioning System. In any case, NASA and the Fe(leval
Aviation Administration (FAA) agreed with their European colleagues that tile aeronauti-
cal system of tile future would involve aircraft-to-ground communications and ranging ill
the L-I_and. Finding little support tiom tile U.S. airlines and F,,L,\ operations, NASA
turned to the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). The ensuing cooperative
et'fovl involved the deployment of two IA)and satellites over the Atlantic ()cean fiw com-
munications and ranging and sought to achieve closer spacings for more efficient bill safe
traffic tlow. The airlines now feared IhaI a new expensive system would resuh without their
participation and that they eventually would bc required to pa) tot it lhr, mgh user tt:es.
The Rise and Fall of Aerosat, 1963-1975
The Boucher Syncom demonstration tired the imagination of the airline industry,
particularly Frank White of the Air Transport Association (ATA), Ben McLeod of Pan Am,
and (;ap Petrie of ARINC Radio. Quickly, ATA, ARINC, Pan Am, Boeing, Bendix Radio,
and t lughes Aircraft formed an intovmal industry cooperative in consultation with NASA.
The commtmications satellite firm Comsat was now in operation, and the thst commer-
cial satellite was aheady under construction. In mid-1964, ATA, on behalf of the group,
asked Comsat about the feasibility of a VHF aircraft voice link via a geosynchronous satel-
lilt. (:omsat gawe an enthusiastic aftirlnative reply and,joined the group. To assess tile
experimental perf(wmance of VHF satellite-to-aircraft links, Hughes presented Comsat a
proposal to piggyback an experimental VI-IF transponder on the third tlighl model of the
Early Bird satellite at an incremental program price of $250,000. NASA dissuaded Comsat
fiom this course, however, for the reason that it had just decided to deploy a much more
powerful VHF package on its ATS spacecraft.
The E_L,\ would be an important player in any planning tot aeronautical sevvice, but
the agency did not have all internally agreed policy. The air traffic service staff was espe-
cially interested because of the explosive growth of Irat]]c in the North Atlantic and Pacitic
corridors, where high tiequency lhen was the only available hmg-range communications
technique. The lack of reliable comnnmications precluded any major reduction in the
standards fi)r separating aircraft on those routes. The FAA research and development
stall, on tile other hand, seemed totally engaged in designing and implementing five-year
plans t;c_r developing salellite applications and had no interest in near-ternl applications.
In 1965, Comsat proposed to tile FAA a VtIF aeronautical satellite service in tile Atlantic
region. The proposal was extremely sketchy, so Comsat was asked to put together a more
comprehensive plan.
Meanwhile, (]olnsat also was planning a tollow-on to Early Bird with cost-sharing
arrangements that set a useful precedent for the establishment of the t]rst commercial
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mobile system, Marisat, several years later. The follow-on, designated by Hughes as
H&303A and later known as Intelsat II, devoted 75 percent of its capacity to connect
NASA's ground network in support of the Apollo program. The balance was available to
extend the coverage of Intelsat communications prior to the establishment of the "global
system." Along with its proposal to ht,ild these satellites, ltughes offered two unsolicited
options, the tlS-303-B and tIS-303-B-E. The H&303-B satellite was a VHF version of
Intelsat 11, equipped with VHF hardware developed for NASA and two ground-to-air chan-
nels. The HS-303-B-E version simply doubled the size of the solar array to double the
power and, therefore, the channel capacity to four channels. The price for four satellites,
enough for glohal dephlynlent, was.just under $10 million.
(;omsal did not evalnale these options; rather, it was considering a novel concept:
"cross-strapped" communications lranspotlders thai used VItF only for the mobile links
and C-band for the ground t¢'eder links. Comsat elaborated on this plan in a 1967 pro-
posal to tile F,¥& and incorporaled in it a number of technical schemes later used in the
Marisat and Inmarsat programs. Comsat then solicited industry bids. It soon hecame
apl_arent that the change in satellite design flom a simple VHF repeater Io the
(:-hand/VHF "cross strap" sharply increased the price, and the proposal failed under the
weighl of the additional costs.
ARINC Radio ofticials then suggested that (]omsal reissue the proposal Io them,
because that firm already operated the airline high seas communications facilities serving
tilt" F,_'_ for air tratt_c control and tile airlines for operational control. The cost bmden
was still too high, however. AR1NC asked Comsat to return to the simpler alI-VHF design.
As a result, Comsat gave ARINC a design proposal tbr a four-channel all-Vl IF satellite ill
1968. FAA operational staff were enthusiastic, but they wanted to initiate operalion in the
Pacific region tot a number ,_lt"reasons, inchtding tile very long flight routes over the
Pacific Ocean with highly unreliable high-frequency communications, as well as the ditti-
cuhy experienced in coordinating the use of VHF frequencies with the European aviation
communily. This design looked promising. The airlines, led by Pan Am, persuaded
Boeing to incorporate VHF satellite capability on tile world's tirst jumbo jet, the B-747. All
early 747s were wired tot \rHF satellite comnnmications and carried a \q IF slot-dipole
antenna mounted under a radome on the fuselage jusl behind the familiar nose hump.
All of this effort came to naught, however, as policy issues at both the national and inler-
national levels intruded.
Europe viewed these U.S. efforts with alarm. The United Slates was pursuing satellile
plans with global implications, but with very little international consultation. Comsat, ha>
ing established its dominance ill tile development of Intelsat, now appeared to be largel-
ing a new conquest ill the field of mobile connnunications. Moreovm, the Etuopcans R'h
thai VHF, while a feasible near-term solution, did not seem to be the way to proceed in the
hmg run because of a perceived shortage of assignable VHF frequencies as well as propa-
gation anomalies ahmg the North Atlantic aviation routes caused by ionospheric el'tt'cts.
Perhaps even more conclusively, European industry wouhl not have enough time to catch
up to the United States and play a meaningfttl role in space system development. These
and other f_/CtOl'S pointed tile Europeans in the direction of a move into a higher fre-
tll,cncy range--namely, tile L-band--and a slowing down of progress. The 1_¢ research
and development staff, contrary to the agency's air traffic service, supported the
Europeans' "go slow" and IA)and viewpoint. Given the F._Vs lack of a consistenl in-house
policy, one could hardly expect the United States as a whole to t)e in lune.
As lhe IDt_Os drew It) a ch)s¢', lilt' [' .S. g(l/erlllllelll, h_t)kin R l_)r a way out ()f the VHF ver-
sus l ,-band dispulc, reli'rred lilt* acronaulical salellile queslion Io Ihe hlleragency Group on
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International Aviation (I(;IA). [.cd by tile White House ()ffice ofTclcctmnnunication I+olicv,
lhc I(;IA nicd to draw up a national plan for aeronmnical services.
(]omsat submitted a (haft plan for the Office <ffTclccommunication Policy to [)rvscnt
to the I(;IA. The phm called tot the development of two hybrid satellites with both VI|F
and lAmnd capability to I)e deployed ovt'r the Pacitic Ocean. :\n early <)l)eratiomtl capa-
bility would bc provided at VIIF, as hmg-ranRc development of IAmnd capal)ility
advanced. Tim plan was well received as a uscftd COml)r<mfise, and (;omsat prepared an
implementation proposal. VtIF communications services would tm leased to ARIN('. <m
behalf of the airlines, while an advanced test [)rogr,ml o1 l+-l)and apl)lications was to bc
conducted through a Sl)ot-I)cam ].-band transpondt:r I¢'asvd to the t;AA. ()nlv one satellite
was needed to t)ro'+idc communicatitms serviccs; the scc<md satvllitc could bc dcph)ycd its
an optitm to ])<'vmit two-salcllite ranging l¢'sts to bc [)crf<wm,ud in both l]-,vqucncy bantls.
(_omsat's pr<itp<_sal set o11 alarm bells in Etlrol)t* and at NASA. It was a oh'at threat to
tlmjoint venture ol NASA and ESR(). Pierre l,;tngcrcttx, a le;tding l+'renclit aviation ])undil,
called lilt' hybrid schemv "dangcr<>us." Finally+ it+ carlv 1¢.t71, the \_,']litt' [ louse intervcm'd,
issuing an ()ffice ofltqccommunic,llion Policy st:tIcIIIcIll ;tlttq" cxtcnsiv,e consuhati<m with
industry and go'¢ct'ntllt'llt ;itgt+ilt'it's. Tim sl;tlCllitCtll dcclal'c<l thai Ihc [l.S. gOVClIItlllClitt
would SUl)pOrt only l+-baitt+d al)plicati<ms, that the l+':\A--not NASA--was the aplitropt+iatc
aRcncy Io manage any satcllilc t'fl_>ll, alitd that lilt' spaltt' SCglllt'llt should bc turnishcd
tiom ct>nmlcrcial S<Hll'+,:t's, if practical)ha. Thus, :\crosat was born. Thc work 1)cing carvicd
_llll I)V NASA ill I)artncrship with ESR() was, in cfl_.'ct, ttUllCd ,OVCl to t]lc F:L,\.
Altlittmgh practically no trot' was c(m+l)h'tcly hal)py with the ()tt]c( ` of
'['elt,((immtnlicatilm Policy st:atcm<.'nt, at ]{'asl it cslablishcd some clt,ar('r ground ritth's.
(;all:d: nowj<+incd whal had bcc<mlt +lilt' FAA-ESR() clllerl)l-isc, making it a tripartitt' vet>
turc. l)isscnsi<m was tm+ troth m+cr, howvvvt. EkA matmgcmcnt t+_mcltldcd thai Ihc pro-
t'ttl'Clll('lll ()l" SCl'vic( + Oll _l comtn,.'rcial basis would not be pl+actic:ll)Le+ and the age+toy
attcmptcd to shut out (]l)litls;it and any <nht'r potential smvicc providt'rs. The \Vhilc [ |oust:
again had to intervene. This time, t|cm-y Kissingcr spoke tot the Nixon achnhlislrati<m
and c<mtirtnud its COlllllitillllCIItt Io comlllctcinl pr_)t urtqncnl. [qnallv, n two-lit'r ;itt'l';lllgC-
lnCllt '++,':its,itgl('('fl on It>l-Aci-os;.tt: Ihc ];A+\, (]an:atl,I, and ESR() wcrc tilt' l>pCl'atol" IISCl'S <)t
Ihc system on ore' level, whih" th<" FAA would In' Vcl)hlccd I) x+ra| [!.,¢_1. scrvi<'c I)rovidcr m+
thc scctmd level.
The n<'xt qut'stion w,ts how the I!.S. t)pcvating cntilv wmthl lw sclctlt'd. (_olnsal was not
the only [.J.S. ('OlII]);_+lly that cx])rt'sscd illtCl't'sl. l'hc Ullitcd Sl,tlcs I<+ld lhc Eur<_pcalls tllltt
il xv_uld stqq)orl any qu,dil]t'd ILS. t'ntilv fi>r that role and Ihal E,%R() ilst'lf could makt • that
tlccisitm. This news was l+l<_ttghl to ESR() ht,,tdquartcrs in Paris I)v a member ot thc ESR{)
ski[T, who rcportt'd that hc was not t,lkcn seriously at thst. Th,iI Iht' tr.s. govcrmncnt would
at+tin +lilt' EluOl>Catits I_ select a I +.S. [)artntq was c<msidcvcd t_) l)c a hilavitmsj<_kc.
()ncc ESR() realized lhat lids was in t_atl l_+.S, policy, lllal sl:,_lt't+ _lgCllCy had l<_ dcsiRn
a selection pr<_t css. It tlccitlcd ¢m c_mtl)Ctitixc bi<ldinR. ,\ 1)rioting t_l bidders t_<_k plaWC
in Paris: (:on>at and tht' lhrcc 1.%. inlcrnattiot_al record carticrs--R(_A+ IT+I, and \Vcstcrn
['tliOll Inlcrnati_mal--nltcndcd. The request tbr proposals lhal cnsut'd consislcd of a
set'its <>t ttucsli<ms u,cncrallx :tong the lines: "",Vouh[ I]lc [',N. tonal>any agvct" I{_ this?" ol
"\Vould the (t,N. c_m_I)any agr+,'c to Ih:,tlT"" Tht: qucslions wcrc intcnth'd t_)Ix" answcrcd bx
cssavs, I)ul ('JHtlsal conclt_dcd l]l:ll t]'l( 'x, X_'t']'t', t_)1" It/,+' III<ISl pall, sitnpl?, inuhi[)h' ch_icc
r,t,tlu[rhLR either ;t "yes" or 'm_.'" (i_m+sal stll)lllillt'd at pt_ql_sal t_ ESR() lh:.tt consisted
heavily <fi_mt'-wo_d paraRvnphs. (:only<rated Wil]l (_otlls;.tl's propos:d, ESR() had dilt]ctfltx
in using ils carchtllx crcalcd 1)r_)p<_sal c'_aluati_>n scoring system. ;\s later _t'l_rl<'tl, Ihc'+
xvcr¢' ctmfitlcnl lhnt sim[itlc '+vt,s" ov ++no" nt_,;wcvs dvsm"+cd cilhct I f)(l [itcrccnt ot il ])cwcnt
in the SCOl in R, ]Hll lilt\ wcrc 11<1| :l]t,'_:l\'s _,lllt' xshich. (;OlnSal, ill Jill _, ( :l_.t ', "_x'()l+lht' COllllaWl,
and the Acrosat ln<!jt'ct _;ls lattt_chcti.
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The partics estal)lishc<t two Aerosat b()(iics: one represented the customcrs, tile F'&&+
ESRO, and t|tc Catla<lian g(wcrntncnt, and the other-vtq)rescnted the providers, (:omsat+
ESR(), and the (:anadian g<)vet+tHnent. Also, the parties agrce<l on the creation of a joint
progt+am office Iocate<l in the United States with a European director, if a U.S. l)Hmc con-
tractor w(wc sele(ted, or l()(at(xl iH Europe with a I_!.S. dirc('tol, if the contractor wt're ",t
Etuol)ean <-otnpaHy. Until the salcllite (:(>ntra(t was away<to<l+ the itHerim .joint ])t+ogvam
office was set u 1) it1 1975 aF the EIwopeail Space lkwhnoh>_, 3, (;el)tel [|1 No(wdwijk, The
Netherlands. An inlernati<mal proposal evaluation I)oat-d under (:anadian lcadetsl]ip eval-
uated the r_'sponses to the rcqttest tot pVOl)osals, and General Electric won the conFvact.
Signed in 1975, the contracF reqHired a "Notice to Proceed+" Although (;elwral Electric
rt'ccived an eatnest nl<)nev chcck tot $1,0(t0 ([.].S. dollars), the "Holice" was not tbrth-
coming.
It shottld lie noted that lq) F() lifts point, lht+ ustws (if the air + Sl)aCe--tl,utlc.ly , the ,fiv-
lin(_'s--had had H() v<)icc i)a any <if lhe plan,ring. II ('v('r th('re wt+rc a r('cil)c' f()v disaster,
this was it, _/l)d a (lixasl_,q it b(!(itllle. ()utraged ov('r lhe pr()(('ss, Fit<" airlines lol)l)icd Ihv
U.S. Congress, which ('limitlated the FAA's flmding shar(- (if lhe l)r()gvam and, instead,
applOpliated $1 million t() sludv w|la! realb: sh()vl(1 be dotw. The d,-vam ()l_t sat('llilt' ,;vs-
t('m (Oml)letcly d¢,v()F(,([ Io a'¢iali()H died Ih('n and IHere, n¢'v¢'l t() 1)(' revivt'd. At that poiHt,
maritime al)plicalions wt'vc' I<) lake (enter stage.
All during the t]uvrv c)t activilies during the mi(1-19(i0s, ('.()msal atlemt)led 1<) ilv¢<)lve
ltltelsal iN Ille pr<)visi(>n ot aerollatHi(:al selvit'es, hllt'lsat see]ll<.'d l() I)e .tilt af)l)r()l)riate
itH('rtlali<)nal m('¢hatfisnl, l)e(.aHse lh(' l)r<)vision of ael()ll_ltlli(al st!tvit:e_; ]la(l l)(_,t-ii in(ht(l-
i'd in the hHelsat charley+ allh<)tlgh ttndt+r the ))tore sFHngent teqttitvments of "'specialized
services." [)tiling the earliest discussions l)eFwcen (:omsat ,rod lhc E&A, the Intelsal g-t)v-
erning body f_)rmt'd a sl)t'(ial advisory ('ozpmitte(: on aeronattti(al lllaltt'l'S, chaired by the
FAA, to provide a Ik)tll)_i lot aviation altlll()rities lr())it the ValiOtlS lllelil])er ('()t)tltti(.'s t() dis-
_,'tLNSlilt" topic. \Vithitl th(' first live minutes <if the c()mmitwe's titsl lIIt'eFing, tile L!.S.
chairtnan matlag¢,(l F() offend the French delegatic)H, and Fhe silHaliol+ neveY Yec()vere(l.
The committere never m('t agaiH. Nonetheless, <)vet +()l)ie('tions li()m the Fret+oh, ItHelsat
a_ye('(t t() at)lh()Hze (',<)lllSa[+ +IS ]lllelsal lllall't(r('l" |() ('()ndtt('l an itt'l-()llatlFi(':l] satellite sys-
tems engitteeHng stud'+: Com,,+at awarded the (Onll_l(l I() l)hil(o Ford, whi(h did what all
h,tve a(kt_owl(.dg_,d as a_ ()tttstanding.i()l). t:nf()vttm:t_(.l_+', Intelsat iiH('r('sl ;,',::is l()sl fi)rev-
el-. (:()lllSaF, h(:,weVt'l +, ITS('<] Fhe r('slllts <l[ the stud:, F() stillltllaFe 15\A interest it_ its hvlwid
scheme, until thv ()ffi(¢, ot Telccomlntmicatio_ Poli(v tOrl)t,(loed that pv()gran,, as men-
lioned al)()vc.
Inmarsat Is (,oncev ed, 1962-1979
Meanwhile, the mariFime (:()mtmlnily was moving slowly huF surely l<)ward a mobile
(+omtntttti('ations satellite system. The maritime arm <if the Unitc<l Nations, the
hHernational Maritime (]()llStl]llttive ()l+g_.tniztllion, stan+ted to examine the ttsc of saFelliFt"
teclmiqttt_s during the ¢'arly l(,)(i0s in iFs radio comlntuficati()ns std)(ommitte(,. Captait]
(:haH¢'s I)orian of the lyrniled Stair's chaired the std)commillcc; (:aptain Yuri Atserov of
the Soviet [Ynion was its vice chairman; and good rcpr('setHati()n fron+ the world's major
s('a|iu-ing nations rottnded ottt ils mcml)ershil).
Although maritime satellite developments lacked the excitemt'nF trod urgency of the
aeronautical iniliatives, Ihev showed far greater promise of veachiHg litfition. Among
other advanlages, the Soviet 1.:tdon had a significanF voice in die lwoceedings; in Intelsat,
the" S<)viel Union wotdd never g¢'t a seat al the lal)l<: l)e('atts(.! it lacked lhe level of inter-
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national traffic necc_+siu-v to generate a sHffici_'ntly lat+_<' inv+`'sltn_.nt s]larc. Th+`" Ncts,ict
Union sttggcsled tlt(' cstal)lish]nt'tH ol a new ittlcrnl,tti<mal slttcllilc <wganizltlion, scpitralc
front Intelsat, and c+cn p]oposcd it nittn¢': "hHtutrsitt" ([ttl+`wlt_tliotl_t[ M_tt-ithttt' Sitlc[lilc
( )l'g_ttlization ).
Thc work <fl" thc Intcrnati<mal Maritime (:onsultalivc ()r_anization _'xl<'ndcd ovcr
a])|)roximalely I0 years and rclicd oft, fi)r thc most piut, a pitncl <.ff exl)erts drawn [font
the various tll_+lltl)t+t" naliolts, [+",' 1973, Ihc (:,l_itlti/;tti,C)ll ,Igi'<.'c'd I<+ C()IIYCIIC ;tl'l int<.'l'llit-
riot+hal +`:onl_wt+t+ncc• to "decidc _+tt tit<.' I)rinciF, h" <tt scttit/g ttp im itH+.'rnittiotla[ rnitrititn¢"
salcllite syslcm." l'hc conti'rcncc met thr¢'c times dr,ring 1975 and 197(,. ,-\i its tinal scs-
sioIl, tlt{"('olt_(!l'Ultc(!_l(]OD|('(] [wl_,;tgl'('('t}}<.'}]+|s;_t "c()[tv<.'l+ll}{)tl,'itltlol'Ig g_+'+'('rDtllcIlls ;.tlt([till
"operating agtt+cmcnt" atnong <'ntilies dcsi_natcd ])y govcrntntmts to lh+ancc and o|)ct+alc
the system. This tw<Hit'rcd <)rgitnizati<m l)ortowcd ht'+tvilv ft-<m) tit<, lnt('lsat ex]writ'n(c,
but it exhibited ntanv simp1ific,ttions and itttl)]'<wctnc]+ts. No signat(wy could volt' itlt
it+w'stnt¢'nt share grcittc+r than 25 l)crct+nt, fl>r eXaml)h', unless it first oll_'rcd lltc t'xccss
+_h+tic [_>r s_t+<;+ to olh¢'r siglt,tl<)l-ic`+. +|his pi+`_visioll w_ts ;t thht]'+' veiled cI+_wl to pr+`'vettt lit<+"
United Slates l]otn hltving a totally dontinaul -__>icc' in [nntitrsitl, its had }+t'_'tt the (,ts(, ill
tile earliest days <)[' httclsat.
The i)ttrl)OS(_ <)f lh(' tww Inntittsat wit`+ d<..Ihwd ()tigiuid]:+ ' t(): "+ntak(" l)r(),,i_,i()t_ fiw tltt"
Sl)a(+`" scgn)¢'tll tt+.'ct'ssi,ry R)r itttl.<)vinE miu-itint(' c()ntmtmitati<)ns, th('rcl)y assisling in
itnl)r<)ving dislrt'ss and sal<.'tv ()l liE+ itt sea c()tnnttllli¢"alic)its, cfl-lcictwv and nl_lnil_,<+'tll+.'itt
of ships, tnarititnc pt_hlic corrcst)<)tMcncc scrviccs and radio dctcrntinatiott ¢al:,id)ililit's."
I,at<.'h it,'+ Chill'It!l" Wits l>r<>adezlcd t,_ itt_ludc iter,>naHti<al services+ l:tll'l|lCr illll<.'lilllllUltlS |<)
inchtdc land mohilc services art`' aw,titing rittil+icittion. Also _+t significance ,,sas
Rc+`:<mnt+ncndatiott 4 of tit<.! COlttt'r<.'ncc; it CltCotlr,tg_'d the early study <ff the l)ossihlc ttsc
<)[ nnthil)ttrl)oSc sat+.'llit<.'._ to provMc h_th tnarititnc and ,t+`'ronattti<'al scvviccs+ This mca-
mitre clearly rccogtfizcd tlt+`' l)Otcntiitl ccoNottfic hcncfils of nlc+`qit+L+qtniuititnc and acto-
It_lttli+'+t] l'+`'([tlil'+`'lllelltn l]tl()llgll it COIIIIIIOII spitcc svsl_'lll--;+l [+H'osp+.++"liv<. + b+`'ll<.'_it flOW _v+`,ll
t'¢'c<+gnizcd altcr tlt<.' .M'rositt d<'hach_'.
Tit+`+ lnn_arsitt ilgl-<.'+`'tll<.'itts Wt'lt' _)l)+,'tl l_:>r sigtlilltll'<.' ill 1976. Tlw+v l)r<,vidcd that invest-
tnct+t _;,]IkII'CS in |lltllktl'sktl w<_ttld l)c dct<.'rmittcd l )+r itctttal ttsc <+1the `+l)aCc S+`'glll(+lll, much
as was tit<.' case li+t+ItHt'lsal..m'_| tit<." _+tttsct. ]t_>WcVer, it WaS n¢'CCsN,Uy for signal_+ries t<+ hM
[br a shatx" it+ the invcstnlcnt. Tw<_ oY tln+`'+`"vcitrs l:tlct, itfIcr tlt<.' cstahlishnwnt _tfa glohal
satellite s+vstctn, llllllitlS;tl w<)ttld rcdctcrmin+`, inv+`'Stlllt'llt share ill prol)orti<m 1<) actual tlS+`'.
tlowcver, fbr llltil+tl`+;l[ ll) I"()lltl' itll<l t':"-;J_,t,t'll('C, illili;t] ilIVCMIII('III c<m+tnilxltcnts of :tl ]<.'3tsl
95 percent of total Cal/ititl oHtlav was t+t.qtfir<.,d; if lit+.' 95-1)crcer_t t]gtnx" wetc, not achieved
by Jttly 1979, the cnt<.'rlMsC wotfld lail. Two year-'+ into this interval, the ncccssiu+v
95-F,crc+`mt (+()mmittncnt had not 1)con iwhicvcd, and the l_!nitcd StktIcs had vet to desig-
ttatc at_ <_l)Crating cntirv. I.'ittitll,,. in lt.lTg itftcr a m_tst a¢ritnorfi<_tts del)at'c (:ongrcss
.'++_q<+_ct+`'d(:ott_sitt a.'+ lit<.' t!+++";,sigt+alor,, l<_ IIIlll_lt's_ll tllld+`'r c<mdili<ms Sl_,ecified by the"
Maritime Salellilc Acl _>11978.
Cotnsat, as llte [:..g. opcr;tling cntitv, closed lhc ittvcsltm'ttt gap hy ol+f_'rit_g to sttl:,-
.'+crit:,c to all of the ttnsttl:,scrihcd initial itw+`'Nltn('l_t sh_u',e:'-, alld lh<.'rcby guitratnecd the
eslablishn_cnt of Inmarsat. Ettrol)C met this news with mixed era<tit<ms. Sonic I/tared that
(:lmtsa1's hug<.+ inxcslnttT_t shitrc w_mld alh>w it to (tc>ntinitlc lnmarsal dttt+ing ils crilicitl
start-ttp l)+`'riod. The 2.-_-l:wrccHt voting linfil dM t_ot sccm to lotally allay Ettt+<q_car_ t+eiu_+.
If initial itY,'cstn_ct+n in ltntt_trsal was _v,crstd:,scriht'd, lhen all shares w_ttld I:,c r+`'duccd pro
rata to rt-ach 10(i l)CrccIH. l+he Ettrol:,Cat_ I)kw d<..cided to increas<+' its hide+ 1<_ drivt'
(:otnsat's share dow,t Io a level ,WCClmthh+ t_, Europe. The bidding war was on.
As the deadline Ibr Inmat+sat invt'Mn+<.'tH tonllnitntent n<.'at<.'d at mi<Inight on StnMitv,
15 .luly 1979, signori<w:+ rt+l)t("..,cttlitti',,'t's galhcrcd itt lhc l+_mdon h+`'itdqtutrters of lhc
274 TIlE UNFOI,I)IN(; ()F Tl IE _V()RI,D S\,N'I'EM: AI'PIM;AI IONS
International Maritime Consuhatiw" Organization on Piccadilly Lane. The Comsat dele-
gation waited until thirty mimttes befi>re the deadline to arrive at the final session. Among
those in the room were the Chinese delegation ably assisted by British Post Office repre-
sentatives, as well as a huge mechanical calculator to hel I) in fi_llowing any changes in
im,estment bids to interpret the impact on China's share.
By midnight, the bidding had risen to a total of close to 300 percent. Comsat made a
final oftcr at approximately ten seconds betore the tinal bell. immediately tollowed by a
joint European offer. This offer contained a formula by which the amotmt of their invest-
ment would increase to wlmtever level was required to ott;set any increase in the U.S. offer,
after calculating the pro rata adjustment. Comsat objected to the bid as iml)rol)er; only
numerical values, not tbrmulas, should be accepted. The next day, at the very first meet-
ing of the lnmmsat Council in Brighton, England, Comsat filed the first and, to <late, the
only signatory dispute. The dispute <ttti(:kly reached a negotiated resohttion, thereby
rem(>ving tim tincat of lengthy ;trhitration procedures and saving Inmarsat's cre(lil)ility
fiom severe damage.
Throughout tile events that transpired fiom Sunday night through Monday morning,
when tile first Inmarsat Cottncil met, n<) one pointed out the sad news to the Chinese del-
egation. The pro rata a(!jtlstnlent ior the artificially high investment bids had forced their
share down too low to qualit}' fi)r a seat on the lnmarsat Council. Not realizing this, the
Chinese delegation showed up on opening day in Brighton to lake their seat. Some quick
quiet diplomatic conversation was required, and the Chinese disappeared the tollowing
clay. Thus was Inmarsat launched in a most colorthl tashion!
Marisat: The United States Takes the Lead
Spectrunl allocation for mobile satellites was ahwtys a critical issue. At the tirst
International Telecommunication Union Space Conference in 1963, maritime mobile ser-
vices received only a tootnote in a small piece of VHF spectrum for the developlnCnt <)f
space techniqttes. The more organized aviation cotntnttnity sttcceeded in having bands
allocated to aeronautical space services all tim way front VHF to the Kn-t>and. It was not
until the next Space Conference in 1971 thai a meaningful fi-equency arrangement was
made to the maritime services: a piece of the IA)and speclrunt was wrested away fi.om the
powerful aviation lobby. With the aim of t_teilitating tile sharing of satellites by both aero-
nan(teal and maritime mohile services, the Space Conlkrencc placed thei, satcllite alloca-
lions it] a<!jacent I)ands. A single translation fi'eqnency, 101.5 megaltertz, thus could serve
both se,vices. This allocatitm was significant, because the initiative to estahlish a dedicat-
ed aeronatttical satellite systent was at)ottt to self-dest,ttct.
For +tlt{+ first time, tlt<+ nlaritintc contnntnity now had a nteaningfttl place in the radio
t+eqncncy s])ectrttnl to plan its services. Ahn<>st innnediately after tiffs frequency alloca-
tion, the first high-i)rofile demonstration of satellite cal)al)ility using a comntercial satel-
lite took place. (,(,Ins, at, Intelsat, and Cunard Line cooperated in a live test program on
the high seas. An eight-fi+ot (2A-meter) Wo,kt War II radar <:<reverted to C-band and
installed on the Queen lqizabeth 2 served for this demonstration of ntaritinte satellite com-
nnmication. Two entire transpondets of an Inlelsat I_ +satellite werc required tor a voice
link, one for each direction of transntissi()n, but tit(" lest was a ptthlic relations success tltat
hastened ettbrts to dewqop a comntercial systent.
Dming the 1970s, as httnarsat was coming into existence, an important parallel activ-
ity had begttn in the United Stales. In earl} 1972, lhe U.S. Na D, ntade (;ontsat an urgent
request for satellite services to meet fleet cotnnnu_ications re<luivenlents for ultrahigh-
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tiequency (UttF) capacity during the period between tile expected failure of tilt" first-
general!tin experinmntal satellites, TACSAT and I.E_6, and the deployment of the first
<)l)eralional system, FI.EETSAT. Initially, lhe Na_ T contacted Comsat staff with Nax T back-
grounds, Commander Burt Edelson and Captain Bill '0,_od, who in turn referred thenl to
the Comsat prt_ject office set up to dcvclop domeslic and mobile applications. Comsat rec-
ognized the Na,_ T inquiry as an opportunity to introduce a commercial mobile service.
The concept of a hybrid satellite for two diflk'len[ services, as proposed a few years ear-
lier by (:omsat lot aeronautical applications, was adapted for this program. A system was
designed to share satellite power in a flexible manner between Nax y UHF transponders
and an IA)and system. Each Mar!sat satellite had up [o 75 percent of its capacity available
at Ut tF for use by the U.S. government; the remainder was L-band. In.June 1972, Comsat
presented an unsolicited proposal to the Nax T for a three-channel UHF service--specifi-
cally, one wideband channel and two narrowband channels, each of which could be acti-
vated independently by ground command. The l.-band system had three levels of l:t)and
translnit power, st) that commercial 1,-band service could increase an the Nas T withdrew its
UttF service.
The prol)osal required the Na D' It) con|lnit to all three UttF channels on tw<> satcl-
lites--<>ne over the Atlantic Ocean and one over the Pacilic--for a period of three years,
by the end of which time, it was hoped, gr<>wth in l.-band service would take up the rev-
enue slack. The size of the financial commitment required for the UHF service, $69.8 mil-
lion, was more than the Na D' budget could support; the proposal was not accepted. After
a difticult internal evaluation <>fmarket rink, ('.!tulsa! decided to ofler a revised proposal
in I)ccember 1972. At that point, the Na'_ T was required to commit tt) a wideband chan-
nel in each of the two satellites, but for only two years, ahhough with options to extend
both lime and capacity, and the initial monetary commitment was reduced to $27.9 mil-
lion, an offi.q sufliciently allrac[ive for lilt' Nax_¢ [o proceed.
The U.S. regulalory process did pose a brief threal. Word of Comsat's elforts leaked
out, and the U.S. itt[ernational record carricrs ;tsked the Fedcral (:ommunicalions
(;omminsion (F(](;) !o insist [hat they have an opportunity to compete. The Na_ T proml)t-
15 issued a request tor proposals for the UI IF service anti required a response within a troy
wct'ks. The c,u-riers complained that they did n_)t haxt' enough time, so the Nit', 3' provid-
ed a one-week ex[eltsioll, Tilne was it critita] [at[()r l)ccause the l)lannet| service date was
July 1974. Still Con!sat was the <rely bidder and won th'e contract.
The FC(: issued many instrttctions to (_<mlsat about the l:,rogrant, including !llt"
rctluirenten[ Ilia! other service providers be ai]brded an opportunity to share in system
ownership. AT&T decided not lo particil)at¢' <m the grc, tmds that the limited shil)-to-shore
l.-lmnd telephone cal)ability would not be larRc enough to support a viable Ires!hess. The
fltree international record carriers, though, did join in. RCA optcd [or an ,_-percent
inx'es[tnelH share, Western Union Internation,d had a 3.41-percent share, and ITT had a
2.3-percent share. (]t)ltlS;.t[ tornted a st,bsidiarv called (;on!sat (;eneral to SUlve its the
(]Oltlna[ inventor and system tttanagel tk)l-the Mar!sat jt,i,tt venture--a partnershi t) alltt)llg
the li_tt,- companies owning the system.
FI(Hll 1]1(" Outset, (]Oltlsa[ had concluded tl|at a st._,]e-sollrce coll/ra([ with it satellite
lllaltllfaCltlrer would be essential [o ntcc[ [he.]uly 1974 target arid that tlughes was the
only crcdil)h' nUpl)lier. B) May 1973, (_omsa[ and t lughes had c<mcluded a contract for
[hr_'e Mar!sat hvt)rid satellites at a pricejun! over $40 million, ht taking this m,trke[ing risk,
('.OlllSa[ rem,ullcd ¢Ollfidell[ that once the Naw,' started usitl_, the service, it would _anl all
channels liw an indelinitely long lime. This .iudgmen[ proved more than correct; [hc
Marisat I!I IF service still coll[illtlt'n L)O V<,':trs [al(!r.
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Thc /hst ,,nine. m/ ship .+sta//a/i+m+_[a mohih++ommu+ti+rtli.++++atv/lite /mint,a/ahoa+d Hw1'.'3"S0Wilhclmsha_('n I,
197& I'he aule,++ais +h+lh'_+'dinside the +:ulomepmrhed :tl+>/JIhe +htplsa,lenmt ma+t. ((;otn't<'sy ot S( ()It '¢C()o<+ls
In Ftq)ru;tr_ 1973, immediately after lh(' Na+ T contract award, ('OlIlS_:t[ mmotmced the
Marisat plan at an intcrnalional mobile satellite symposium in London. The Ettropcan com-
mtmity was in a slate of shock. The Ettropt'an nominal gatnc plan for marititne satcllile ser-
vices itp:olved a [hirly orderly st_t of asstnnplions. The International Maritime Constfltativc
()rg;tni/atit)n was ()n Ihe verge of convening a conlk+rcnce it) set the stage lot the eslat)lish-
m('nt of Inntars:tl; Etu+<)pt'an gov¢'rnmt'nts weft' investing |wavily in their indttstrv to put it
into a F,()sition it) stq)ply lhv Inmarsal Sl)aC(+ segment; and the process of designing a com-
municati<)ns system was well tnltltw way. Western Europe had I() dcciclc whether to r.'t),.)l)cr-
ate with Ibis U.S. initi;ttiv( +or t<) II-V tO Stlpl)l-t'Ss il. Many decided on suppr¢'ssit)n.
The satellilv design had to be compltq<:lv dclermincd before any significant work
began to select :t c<nmmmications design. +l'ile satellile had a shore-i<)-ship C-band-to-
I+-l)and transponder and ;t ship-to-short+ l.-I)and-to-(]-lmnd transponder, both four-
nwgahcrtz wide. (_t)lll_;itI assembled a small engineering design team that was led by l)avid
I+ipkt +and incltldcd l),m Swearingen and Tom (]alvil, aided by Dick McChtre from <_]omsat
l.at)oratories. Their ch;tllcngc was tt) d,uvisc a system It) tttilize tit( + I:l)and transponders t6r
ship-to-shore ((mmtutficalions and to have the system ready lot service in eighteen
months. Ahhotlgh lmcd with a (latmting task, th¢" tt'anl put together a careful blend ()t
digital and analog technologies fin a coml)incd telephony and lclex svst('ilt.
The limited capal)ilily <)f the satellite's l:t)and system reqttired a cmcftfl evaltmtiotl of
shil)l)oard anti'rata size. If it wete too large, it wottld cost too mttch, and no one would
inslall il; if it wt'r(" too small, t]it" svsl(,lll'S (h;|Iln(:l capat:ity wottld b(" I<)o ](>w to bc coo-
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n,clmical.Em-l:,pt'ans l)+`qim:,.'dthal a l)laclica]shiF,l),.lardantenna would h:.tv<."Ic,hav+`'a vvrv
h)x,: gain. lu tlt<.' I.htitcd _lalt's. lovttmal<.qy+ Scicnlilic Atlanta had inv<+'stcd internal ltmds
,{),l the dcv¢'lopmcnt of a low-cost stabh' [)Isltf(),,,+ capal)h' of slq)p<+,tin_ a ,{)ll('-lll('l('l"
l+-band antctlna, l_n<.ottragcd bv this work, ('.<imsat chose' the higher l._ain ant<.'n,la and. i,,l
a cOtnl)Ctitivc pvllcu,'l'mcnt, otdcvcd _00 units lr_m_ _c+t'itt+IIC Atlan1'a to s+`'c'd thc mm-kct.
Tim shil)-basc'd stati<)tl, initi,dlv called shnply Mmb_at. +,+known t)ctt¢'v now as InnlaVSs_l-
A, tilt' wovkh<wse of the hlnla,sat svstmn. T_)day, t'+.,t'tlt)yt.,t,s lat,.'v, it still ac<++o,lmts Io, about
90 pe,ccnt of [n,,l,arsal's r+.'v+`'nt,+`'s. ]n l+'+m-<q:,c, work (<mlinucd on an all-digilal sxstc,n.
which lit<+' Eurol)<+'ans t<.'lcrrv(l to as the "Forward l.o_+king System." Th<.' Europcan sxsl<.',vJ
was intended to ,+`'place .\la,Nat +,,+hlcn I,inla,sal ll<+'Ra,l, <q:,v,-ati,t_',, how<.'vvv. Marisat's Itch+
ni<.a] s,lwccs.., l)Ul off convv,+si<m to an all-digital +,vslcm to the ,'i'M,ill<.' ft_t,ltve.
After +ov+`.rc<lminR s<lmc satellite d+`'vch)Imtcnt l))voblcnls. +`au',,.'d in no small measttvc
by tlt+`" l>r('sstu<' of lit<.' schvdul<.', lit<.' Ma,-isat s'+s,cm inau_tnat+`'d c<mm)¢',-cial sc,vicc it,l lh('
Atlantic and Pacilic v<+.gion8 th,ouRh its stalif),+s ill S<)t,lhl:,,l,,'v, (:Oll,l<+'('tict,l, and .qatlta
I+aul,t. (;alifovnia, in th<.' stmlnl<.'," ol 1976. Pl<.'ascd with the t:l I1+"sc,vicc. ,hc Navv ask+`'d
thai th<.' third sat<.'llit<.', lh<.',l hchl on t]l<.' ,gvotmd ;is a spar+.', llc la,lmcll<+'d ovc, + lit,t, lndinn
()ccan t<> c<)tnlllcl+`' lit<.' global set-vice'. '['his rc/lt,<.'sl prcscnl{'<l ('a)ll/SStl :tl,l ol:,llo,ltmity Io
expand I+-ban<l scvvic<' int_) thc Indian ()+`+`'an vcRion. (_>msat n+`'R<_tiat,.'d .a,t agJt'<+'mcttl
wilh KIll) (Kokusai. Dcn:,,hin. Dcn;va), lh/<.'.lal)atticst' i,ltctmttiott.,1 carrier, which ,dlowcd
it t<) +`.stablish st third Mmisat slali_:.ll at "_.lmagtt( hi. latl+a,I. In No'_c,nl+ct" 197S, Ms:tvisal SOl+-
vice l/<.'gan tol ships in lhl" Indian ()cl'an v,pgi_m lhl_)ttg]+ II1+.' _.lmalgtwhi stali<:,ll. Iht,s
,pxtcn,:lin g Mat-isat I<J Rh>bal c_>vCVst',..+,c.
( (-Inmarsat ()pens for Business, 197.)-1982
Alter the <..slablishm,unt ol hmlm+sat in 197% a n,ltntll<+'v of sta,t-Ull iss,tcs a,os<.', such as
thc scl<+'cti<m ol a directs), gcnc,al and tlt+`' location _l a h<..adqt,;u-tcvs sit<.', but lhC ovcv-
iiding issu+`' was Ih<.' I)rOc,iHctnt',lt _>t satcJlil<+" Catl)acily t<) l+cgin oln'r'.,ti<ms as s+.)l:,nas p<_s-
siblc, l)tning ,lie y+`':_tt-s.ittsl bclbrc 1979, Ill<.' dcb,tl<.' .Ih-I'ad ', had I++`'gmt. Th<.' Eurol)<.'a,t
,tation,tl SllaCc ag<+',tci<+'s had i,t,,cst<+'d latgc std+sidics i,/ lhc d+`'vch>l)nt<.'nt ot the M.t,<.'cs
sat{'llitcs, st mmilimt + ",ctsi<m ol the' Etuopc,ul ('+<mmnmicali_)tls 5;al<.'llit<.'. tTud<+'t . lit<+'
l:.u,-l)l)<.'an plat,l, l,,imars:at would l:,voct,tc Ibur Mat<+'cs sat<+'llit<.'s (t)nc sl,lstr+`') and deploy
t],+`',tt t:,v<+'l the till+.'<." l)CCal,l vcgions. The United Statt's l+ca,t'd that lit<.' size of th<.' tn:uk<.'t
would not SUl)ll<)rt lhc c<_sl _)I these dt.dicatcd sntcllilcs. \Vithin Intclsal, anolh<.'t initiati'<c
was ,imdm considcrati<m with str_>nR U.N. s,ltppovt, h +<resisted t)l :m l+-bat+d pig,e,Tlmck
lvanSl)<mdcr plac{'d <m at ,nnnl>vt ol It,lt<.'Isat \+ satcllit¢'s. A comp,omisc "th,t'<.' plum three'"
ptoposal was pitt t_+rth: tit+`" ltllnsllss,lt sl)ac<." s<.'gll,lc,lt wo,ldd comprisv tllrc<." Mm-ecs and
th,l<.'<.' Int<..lsat V satellites. The p,op<+sal ass,lmmd that lit+.' ]Maris.It sat<.'llitcs would die con-
veniClttlv in 19gl atl<.', tht'i, non+inal t_v<.'-'+<.mr lives ,,vt've tip+ and that lilt'++ ' would play tl<+
l'<>]t" i,l hllllal-Sal. "I'll+" Mavi:.,at concept was far liom d<.'ad, llowcvcr.
In t 97,"+, thv U.S. Na':,; still woHi+.'d al:,o,ltt the d<.'lays i,ll its FI+EI_71'SAT p,llRram, dccid-
c+`l t_) s<.'t'k all<>t]t('l ,_,(:,,ll,ll('r{ial l('ast" of t:llF capacity. In a most tll,l,llmtta] I)r,t:,<.,l,r<.'l,llt'llt,
(;<)n+sat [_ntnd that its <rely c_>mpctit<w fiw the lollo'++v-<l,l Na_.w business was I lug, hcs, which
also was its s,tl<.'llitc suppli+`'r. Th<.' (:o,nsat apl),oach to Ill<.' Navy requiv<.',n<.'nls was to d<.'si,Rn
a Marisat I1 satcllilc with lh<+' sam,:' bc,mlits to all as lilt' cxistin g Marisat. Th<+' S/)vi,pt l.'ni<:,l,l
and \_k'st<.'vtl lGtuop<+ • alik+`" wetc distvcsst'd that Ih<.' thv<.'.tt o[ this "Milit.,irx/'(]onmwrci,tl
l lvbnid," as il was c,tll<.'d, had nol gore' av,'av. In [)<..<.<.'ml)cr I_.)78, al sl ])l<..nan-y s<.'ssion <_f t]it'
ll{ntal-Sal Prc[)a,;al<)ly (;ommittcc--thl<.' inlernstti<Inal <)rg;mization cv<.'atcd to prcpatc l]w
way for lit<.' <.'slal_lishm,lcnl <>I Imnmsat--(_onts',tt put lorwm+d i_s Matisat II plan. The opllo-
silt'on Ivo,n lCl),'t'St'l+llStliV't'S <_I lilt' _tp])roxintal<.'ly l_+vtv [llllhl,'sstl counl,'i<.'s would havc bct'n
imanimotts. <.'x<.<.'pl I;:ir thc xvat-n,l SUl)llOtt accot:dl'd the hvb,id I)'+ the U.S. Stale
I)cpavtm<.'nl. The Martsar con+sept was not I<_ go _XX_t} r compl<.'tcly, h,_wmct.
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In one <)f its very first actions, the Inmarsat Comwil appointed a special working
group to develop plans ti)r establishing its first space segment. Three options were on the
table: tile purchase of Marecs satellites; a possihle lease of I.-ba,ld transponders on Intelsat
V; and a possible lease of the |.-hand capacity on the three Marisat satellites already in
orhit. Europeans supported their "three plus three" (hltelsat plus Marecs) solution, With
the assertion that the Marisats, with lifetimes of only five years, would he dead soon anv-
wa); The United States argued that the cost of three dedicated Marecs might entail too
large an invesmmnt for a limited market and that tile Mar|sat satellites showed great like-
lihood of surviving for a very long time.
lnmarsat issued a request for ])roposals to all three suppliers. The United Stales took the
position that all proposals should be on a lease hasis to allow tot tair comparisons. The
Emopean Space Agency (ESA) notified the Inmarsat Ctnmcil that a Marecs lease was not
possible, ht a tough weekend negotiating session, (]omsat, pointing to the procttremenl
rules in the hlmarsat agreements, argued that if the purchase of Marecs satellites were to t)e
considered, then the procureinent must be delayed to allow all potential hardware suppli-
ers in the world lo compete. The tbllowing Monday mo,ning, the Inmarsat Council learned
that ESA had made arrangements with a European bank to finance a lease deal. ESA fur-
nished an amended offer, and Inmarsat negotiated contracts with all three suppliers.
In addition to procuring its own space segment, Inmarsat had to arrange for all the
details of transferring the operation of a global system from the Mar|sat Joint Venture to
hlmarsat, lnmarsat and Comsat staff; in a spirit of mutual cooperation, worked out the
myriad technical, operational, and administrative details. Atier considering the possibility
ot: making the transition on an oceail-b.v-ocean has|s, the parties decided to switch the"
whole world at the same moment. Thus, Inmarsat launched global operations on
1 February 1982, only thirty-one months after its establishment.
Inmarsat had hoped that tile first Marecs satellite, with its higher capacity, would he
available for service over the Atlantic ()cean at the time of transition, hut program delays,
plus some early operational hiccul)S in orhit, served to delay its entry into, service. /ks a
rest|h, all three Mar|sat satellites were reqtfired for the transition. Mar|sat made three key
contril)utions to the rapid development of hlmarsat: a global constellation of three satei-
lilts, an initial customer base of 1,00(I ships, and an operating communications network.
The Golden Era of Inmarsat, 1982-1995
Alter elllry into service, hllnarsat was able to COllCelllrale Oli devclolfing the lnarkcl
and planning for its next generation of satellites. The internationalization of the system
removed those lorces suppressing growth in the Marisal era, and Im'narsat 1)egan 1o enjoy
allntlal growth rates t)t 30 perceltt ill holh (llStomer hast' and reventies. A numl)er of relat-
ed issues immediately arose in 1982. |tow big would the future market t)e? _¥hal should
the next generation of satellites It)ok like? Also, should lnmarsat fi_llow the Inlelsat
approach of huyiug and operating its own satellites, or should it conlintte with the lease
approach? Both metllo(ts were authorized by its charter agreements. The "conservatives,"
left by (]omsat, p,evailed in the decision to select a "simple" gh)bal t)ealn satellite and to
seek prol)osals for I)olh purchase and lease l]om industry, lnmarsat issued a request tbr
proposals i,t 1983, following resolution of a nmnl)er ()t contentiotts issues, including orbit
h)catitms, the |teller link t]equency plan, and the inclusion of a 400-ntegahertz receiving
antemla It) support an emergency heacon system. After reviewing lhe only two prol)osals
received, lnm:usal decided to i)ur,'hase Ihe satellites, ahhougll il lal(/r negotiated a
Iinanced lease.
I_I:Y()ND t111, ION()M'IIERE _7 _-)
The <)rganizati<m now had to face tlt,." n+arutg,mn(.'nt ()[ a major SF,a<c l>rogratn, as did
Intelsat, but with stMl +rcsour<es n()wh<.'re neat + the h.'v,:q <)f those available to Inl<.'Isat.
.Manag(:ment oversight was l>rovi<le<l at a dangcrottsly h>w level, and n+J;):j(.+rdevelopmt'nt
tn<)l)l(,ms mosc both with the I+'m(+p<'an bus an<t Ihe Atncri(:an payload. The sigrtatori<:s
l)<mred in assistance and autlmrizcd ;-tm+tjor stall" inct+(.'a.sc, which put the prt)gram back
on track. Finally, in late 1(.)90, the first lnmms;tl-2 was latmchcd, m<)re than seven years
after the issuance of the recltk+sl li)r proposals. As of today, all f(mr satellites of the
Intnarsat-2 series art" per|orming well.
Even l)cforc the deph)ymenl of Inmarsat-2, work hml begun on the next generation
of satellites, Inmarsat-3. These satellites, dcph).vcd beginning in Fcl:,ruarv 199(£ constitute
[nn+arsat's |h+sl use of sp()t-be:m_ tcthnoloh_:..-\s a resulh the size and cost of uscr t<.'rmi-
rials will decline. The procuren+cnl of I.mnch scrvic(:+ has pr<)d.ced a signitJcanl p()litical
l)reaklhrottgh: the U.S. g<)vetntn(.'tll has agreed to sttp|>t)rt the use of lhc Russian Proton
hmncher vchMe tot one of lhe ]nnlarsal latmchcs. That will l:,c the firsl ttsc of .t lh+otc, n
rotk('l with a U.S. (:otnn+(.w(ial sal(.qlitc.
In 1(.)85, the Inmarsat As,;('mt)lv :tdoptt'd ,Ullt'll(hllt'l/Is t() thc :tgt't't'lllelll_; It) ext('ll(t
InlllaF_,it.l+s, ]cga] (omp('tt'n(c, illt]lOll<_h ()I1 it nont'x('hlsivc basis. 1() provide it(.'l'<)ll,tllti(';.d
s('rvi(t's. These am(,ndtnt+nls WCnl into Ik)t-((, in 1989 at)t'r ralification t)v it stffticit'nt rmm-
bt'r of signatory (otmlries. Aviation wits hack in the piclur¢" Mt+.'r an al)sen¢(.' of tnor,t' lhim
tw¢'nty ycm+>,. [t_mms;at l)rOccedcd I()ch'sign a system Cal),d)Ic ()f sharing the satellites <+rig-
inally pr<)cttrcd only Iot + maritime service. It c().rdinatcd its activities carefully with orga-
nizations, such as tlt,.' lnlernali(m;d (;ivil Aviation ()rganization, the Airline Electronic
Enginct'ring (]()mmitt¢'c. and th¢" Radi()Technical (;()mnfissi()n fi)r Acronattlics. This catc-
fttl inlcrnatiot)al (()()rdimui()n ha'; ]cd t() tlt(.' gh)l)al ac(el)lanc(' <)f lnmarsat as a standard
svstt'm. Avit)ni(s t<),- It+(" llmtal',;at ;t(,rOtlattti(:;tl sxsl('m hay(. i)]<)x'¢'n 1<)be qllitt" CXl)cnsivc,
and hlln;ar:-;at is, ('ttl'l't'llllx' pl,mtfitLg t() intro(lu<:<.' a h)w('r (()st a(.r()nautical servi(c to b<.'
()lIt'ved in lh(' sp<)t-bcan_ (()vt't:l+_.)(' ()f Ill(+" lnmmsat-3 satellites.
As lcclm()l<)gy dev,.qOl)mt'nt.s shrank lh<.' w('ighl and size ()I lhc st)-callcd "standard-A"
ship t,mminal, (<)nsid(.'r:d+h' intcrest dcvch)l)('d in l+r()dmitL'e, " p()rtable terminals that couM
h(. F,ackcd in +)m" ot +m(>r¢' suhcas,c'-sizcd c()t_iah)¢'rs and t;tk('+'J 1() rcnt()Ic l,:>cali()ns ()ll ]iltld.
I.i,_(..t,smg isstt¢',, av(." tfouhles<)m¢', h,ut this kind <)f u',(' has m+_j<)yed exp]osivt' gr()wlh
rcc(:'ntlv. Th(' hnnarsal Assembly in I(.)8(.) adoptt'd n<)twxthlsiv(' anlcndmenls I(.) its agr<.'c-
IllCI/IS, 'VCI'V :++;illli]ltl"Io thc it,:'r(:,llallti('al _),lll('lldlll(.'Ill'.;, |o ('nal)lt" hllll_tl'sitl t<) cII1Cl land
mt>hih' mm-kcl,+. .L_s () t t()day, h()wcvcr, a sulti(i('nt ntnnl)cr ,.)t countrit's have n()t r;ttifit'd
them.
The United States and Canada Make Their Own Plans
As thc Inn+msal svst('m w;ts t)cin_ cstablishcd, i)m-alh'l a(livitit's w('r(" ttn(t('r way t()
cstat)lish a m()l)ilc s;m'llit(" sv,q('lll It+)'_('l-',,t" the t "nitcd Slill('s itllld (_itll;itlit. In l(.)H3, two 1+.S.
coml:,,tnics, Mt)l)ilcs,tt and Sk',link, lih'd ti)r CXl)('ritm'ntal m.horitv t() latm(h and Ol)Cratc
tn()l)ilc s:tl(.'llitc svsl(.'ms ti)r tJ.S. s(.rvict's. NASA, with thc (_ana(limt I)t'l)mImt'nt ol
('i()lnttmnicali()ns, s('l tl|) th(' MSAT--N (,xl)t,rim('nhd l)rOgram to t_t)rlh(.'r cxph)r(" and dcvcl-
_)]:, Ih(' tcchn()l()(_?. (;(,()slat, a ('()lllpillly that ttllitn;,tl('lv pr<)vi(h'd Ilcct llI;Itlit_,('Illl:'l/| SI'I'-
vi('cs vi;_ ',;tl(.'llil(' (()mnttmi(:tlions in lh(' I;tl(.' lt)8()s, lilcd it:.; tirst ,tpt)licati()n with lh(' I;(_(_
t() pr()xid(' l>()siti()n (Iclcrmin;,tti()t_ ,-,.<..rxi(cs using s;11t'llit(+'s.
In 19N4. the F( '+(_t,sh11)lish('d a d('adlin(' hv which an', ('tltil,, intt'r('sted in <)p('radng in
the l+_r1_il<.'dSt;tt('s w()ul(l 11(' t('(llfir('d I<) iilc an apl)li(alion. lw('Iv(" ,_pl)li(arus lih'd, setting
<)ff ;I r('guh11<)ry [);ttllt.' I]I;|I l()()k V('311".;|() F('_()IvI.'. l)t, in¼ thc next s<'v('r,t] v(.,_l+|_,xshi]c
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inmarsat was expanding its custonmr base, tim U.S.I.-1)and mobile satellite comm),mica-
tions industry consisted p,incipally of legal briefs presented Io Ih.c FCC.
ttowevet; interest in mobile satellit(" al)plications stimulated developments o),ttside the
IA)and spt'ctrttm. In 1985, hwin.lacol)s and Andrew Viterbi launched Qualcomm to pro-
vide satellite-hased mol)ilc l)ositi<ming and messaging services using Sl)),ea(t-spt.ctrum
techn),)log, T through Ku-band domt,slic salcllites. Quah:omm cmTcnlly is tim largest oper-
ator of mohile satellite commtmications services in the world in ICll),ls f)t CtlSlOl),lCt hase,
with m<)rc than 100,000 <)f its unils on Ir),lt:ks and other vehicles in the United States, its
well as tin)re thatl.._,000 in Brazil, Japan, Easlcrtl Europe, and Russia.
Meanwhile, Ihe F(;(_ ruled that the lw(:lvc original tool)tie salellitc communicalions
applicants had to form a single tonst)rtium, indicating its belief thai tic|they tlR' Sl)eCt]um
nor lhc mark('l would s),lp|)orl morc than one li(cusce. More legal and corporate baltics
ensued, hut lhlallv, in 1088, a consorli),mL now known as the American M()hilc Satellite
(_orporali<m (AN'IS(:), was tormcd, lls l)cincil)al shareholders arc lhugh(:s (:ommunica-
titres, Siugapo,t' 'Ikqt't'om, AT&T Vqivch'ss S(_:rvices (formerly M((_aw), and Mwl
(]Orl)Oration.
,-\MS(: receiver!, its F(:(; operating li(cnsc in 1089. That li(cnsc at,thoriz('(t the con-
sottittm to provide a full range of mohile voice and dala services via satellite to (),tstonlct's
<)n land, in the air, and or), the s(:a within a service reca coz,sistip.g of the continental
United Stales, Alaska+ llawaii, Pttcrto Rico, the I_!.S. Virgin IslaHds, atnd coastal waters ),tp
to 2()0 relics offshore. In additi<m to m<)bile services, AMS(', was attthorizcd to provide
tixcd voice and data services xia satellite to locations within its scrvice area that arc 1),ol
scvvcd l)y cclluhu- ov fixcd telephony. Thc licvnsc authovi/t,d up to th),ee g(:t)synch,ono),),s
satellites to pr()vide Ih,esc smvices.
()n 7 April 19!}B+ almosl ('xacll} thirty yc'avs aftcr the launch ()| the wovltt's first com-
met+cial satcllitc. Early Bird, AMS(; hum<hcd its first satellilc, AMSC-1, on a I.ockhccd
Martin :\lhts II i-ock('l+ It was the most p<)w(_'vl_fl m()l)ile satellite deployed t() date. Servi<e
was inaugur,),tt,d over Norlh Am('rica. Early in 1996, Tt'IcsaI Molt|It h),c., the consottittm's
CaHadian ])_),lll)Cl, launched an identical c(m),panion satellite. AMSC has an alTallgel),),(qll
,,,,'ill), its (_ana(lian i)artnc) thal will ('nahl(.: each satellite It) provi(l(.: l)at:k),q) t() the services
provided by the ()th('r salcllitc. Thc initiation of this scvvice c),lhl),inatt'd nt'avlv it d('cad(.,
()t l)rotvattt.d t'ntrcpr(,ncurial and t(.'gulat()ry activity.
New Low-Orbit Systems
In It,)(,)(), Motorola announced plans lor h-idi),m),, a global svslcm of h)w-orbit satcllitvs
Ibr moI)ilc h,aHdhmld comm),micati()n. S),fl)scquently, ()lhmv proposals al)l)(:arcd, and
lnmavsat had t<) shill its own thinking into hfigh g('av. It wished to t,nler the h,andlmld mar-
k('t in comp('tition with, hidium and the other propt)scd SySIcIIIS, but lnmarsal soon dis-
c()vcv('d lhal its own decision-making processes pr('scntcd a scvcv,v ha),l(licap compared to
/hose of the private vtrnl)u|-(._s. In particular, lnmavsat ()wn('vs w(.le sharply divided ovm cen-
tral issues, in(huding the apprt)priatcncss of lnmarsal's cntv'¢ inlo that marke! in the thsl
i)tac(:. Olht'r ()wncls saw thc implementati(m of Ih,(" land _nohile program as a natural
cxl('nsion o| hlll),alSal's other systems, while still oth(:rs wantc(l to take the venture out o|
hnmarsat cnlircly, ahhm),_gh allowing tot the l)<)ssil)ilily of using hnmarsat as a management
colltractol.
.,\|let .v('avs o| (l(.,t)al(!, a compromise was Sll),lck. A scpal'alc aHHiate organization was
formed it,), which, lnmarsat hmh| a l g)-pcrtcnt illvt'Stll),Clll share. This compromise I),lCalll
that all Inmarsat signatories have an iuvcstmcn[ in the att]liale, whmlh,(q or not they oth-
t[I,.Y( )ND II I1._[( IN( )Y,I'I It,IRE _ I
(.rwisc chose to t)articiPat('. The Imlancc of tilt' hlilkll mvcslnlt'nt ol)ll(nlnnity, o])('n irti-
tklllx only t() Inni_lnsat _ignatorit'n, w_ln oversnl)ncrihcd. (:onnt'qtlcnll_,', _ts w]lcn Ih(' ou+iginal
Illll/_lrs_tl ]l/',,'('5,|lll('l/| ()p])(>llllllh). _ ',',,l_, of[bred, a pro rata l'('dll('li,C)l] ',V_LS illlr(:,dllCt'd.
_:|(}rt'f)V('l-, ill lilt(' ](,)(,),")+ tilt' _lllll()llll('('lllt'llt C'illll(' that the first ()tttsidcr, I [llgh('s A[l(lilft,
had,ioiuccl thc l)artnmshil), l lttgllt's also was selected to) btuild tht" sl);Icc segment, a c(m-
stellmion o[ tcn ol),mational satellites in nlcditnn-,lltitnd(' orbil. Innnars_tl als() Illllst [_l('C
c(lml)Ctilion [i'onl a host ol+ regis)lull Sx+Y, lt'lll i)])('I'_II<u'S l]l_ll will blank¢'t llloM ()f tilt' l_ttll(l
_lf(+_lS <)tI It/(.' gl<}t)t + with St'l'x.'i('C+ t)rovi(lc(1 h+<)ln hi,_h-l)':)wt'rt'd g(..()sl_ttionnf} sutellilcs I(}
han(thc]d itnit'+ much like th<)sc cnvisi(}nt'd t() 1)c u,,c(1 with ](r,v-()rl)il sv,,It'nls. In |he
{'ulIII'(L In{" l'()](' ()1' hllll;4r:-;itl ill gl(d);d m()l)il(' s,ttt'llit(' ('()lllllllllliC_llions "CI('m'Iv ;'..'ill b('
diminist/('(l, 1)ut lhc ",,.'q)rk ;l('('_)lllllli_ll('(1 in (hweh)l)in _ lilt' t(.t-hnoh)gy :.m(t mark,rts has
clcarcd th{ • v'r_lv tor Ill'..' coming v,'_)rhl r(;v,:)ltlii()n ill F,<.'r_.()mll (-(,nnnnnhati<)ns.

Net Gain:
Chapter 22
The Use
at MCI
of Satellites
by Adam L. (;ruen
Fronl 1983 to 1987, MCI used satellilcs Io enhance its nalional lclc[)hone network
during a critical period in the (:o,poration's history, cvrn though M(3 realized lhat using
satellites tor voice transmission _r_s _ bad idea and thal olhcr tcch|fit:al ahernatives were
available. In 1985, M(3 knew Ihal il was acquiring a money-losing op,,'ralion called
Satellite Business Svstclns. M(;I's use of satellitrs (hwing lilt" [(,)SOs was llOl al all a mistake,
howew.q; but i_tlh('t _-illt'(('mSally l)arl ()t gl-(_'ll('l" and (h'lil)cralc business schcnlCS.
The Background
The MCI thal cxisls to(la,, began in 1968 wilh a krv decision 1)_ lhc U.S. Federal
(]ommUlficali(ms Commissit)n (F(:C) al]irming Ihc tightof Iclrphone users to conne(t
privalc COllllntlnitaliOllS cquipmcnl Io tile XF&T nrlwork. This was lilt" so-called
CarteffOne decision of.lunc 1968.' In August 1968, William (;. Mc(;owan eslablishcd
Microwave (]onnnunicalions of Amrrica, which changed its name to M(_I Ihrec )ears
hllc1-, e
A later decision in May 1971, called the Specialized Common Carrier ,%'rvir't<_ decisi(m,
afthmcd tile right c,f corporations Io oflbr only specialized services. _ (;arrit, rs were only
supposed to col**le¢l lo the AT&'[" SVSICIII; IlOI)o(|y had said anything atb()lll allowing anyone
to compele with XI'&T by oft_'ring basic photo" service. This tormula was ;t recipe tot
shrnanigans. Whal cxaclly was a spccializrd sorrier? Also, whal was Io prrvcnl AT&T from
gouging (llSlOllltqs trying lo connrcl Io Ihc svstc|n?
Mc(;owan lovrd lhr polrntial of salrllitcs ior Iwo rrasons. Filsl alld IllOSt inll)otlanl, he
SIIW lhclll ;IF, ;I Way It) b,,pass Ilw rxisliug AT&I nclWotk. Sccol/d, hc I)rlirvcd thai satellites
would lm a ('hrap and cite'clive way to |ra(h ,emote areas wilhoul thc necessity of building
nlicrowavc towers cvmy Ihirlv or si×lv nlih-s (torly-eighl or ninety-six kilomclcrs) from ont"
poinl to another. In October 1970, Ihrrc[bre, even bef(nc MCI h_ld actually tinishcd selling
u I) its towers I)clween (]hicago and St, I.ouis, McGowan set Lip a sul)sidiary (:orpo|ati()n
called M(]I Satellite hlcorporalcd. Three months lalcr, M(3 anIl Lo(khccd Missiles &
Si)acc (:()mpany fornlc(l a,join_ Vt'lmlrc (allc(l lhe M(3 l,ockheed Satcllilc Corporation.
I. Fr(Irral (:Olnlmllfi(ati(ms (_ommissi(m (F(_C) l)ockvt 16942, "'Ca_tvltbnr l)rvi(c," l)e_i_inn, 21i.lum'
I':)fi;g, 13 F(;C 2(1, ,120.
2. Mivmtcs. M[C()M Bored oJ l)ile_lors, Special Mrrting ot 27 ,\ugusl 1968, Mimm" Book ,\. M(:I
C(np(,ralc Ar(hi_cs, D,_anhinglon, I)C. MI(:C)M changed its namr to M(',I Communitali_ms (]_lpolalioll ()11 II,I
luly 1971. I'hili l) l,. (:anlrhm, "l'he Ili*tm 3 n/MCI. 1068-1988: The Ifad_: }?a_ (l)aHas: l I,:'z ilagr Ihrss, 19¶)5,), pl ).
117, 570, th. 10. The lli+l+,_+ _,/MCI is ihc prol)rrty ol M( 3; Ihr work is m)l availabl<' Io tlw gctwral l)ulflic. All ot
Ihc tiles alld dl)c. iiin_.'l|lS _ olh.t ted |or the v-,*ol k al.p h+(alrd in thr M(',I (iorporatc Alchivcs. which is not (q)rn to
iiiciiIt)UlS, (1t lilt' i)llt)]ic.
3, FCC Do,, krt 18920, "Spr,.ialized (_omtn,)l_ Cm rirr S,..i vi_ rs," 1'7_st 16'pint and (h*b'_; 3Junr 1971, 29
I:C(_ 9d, S72.
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Tim plan was to build a $168 million satellite connnunications syslem. MCI I,ockheed
indeed was one of the lhst (ompanies to request FCC anthorizalion for domestic satellite-
based conununications.
Tile problem was that $168 million back then was really big money, the equivah'nt of
about $400 million today. In 1{t72, MCI I.ockheed nee<led casll and acquired a new part-
nor called tile (:omnnmications Satellite Corporation, known as (]l)lIIsal. AI lhat point, the
enlerprise becanlc a three-lwaded joint venture called (:Nil. Satellite Corporation.*
Dl,,ing the following two years, 1973 and 1974, howevc,, MCI was in deep financial lron-
ble. Undercal)italized to I)egin with, it had nlanaged It) survi'+'e by selling stock and
borrowing money. To nlake matters worse, AT&T decided It) pull the plug on inlercon-
nection, meaning thai MCI could not use the existing network to oltiw ils serviccs.
Uhimalely, this was the kind of monopolistic behavior that was the basis tot AT&T's detk'at
in the antitrust suits brottght againsl il, but Ihat was six to seven years in tile fllture, hi the
meantime, all tllat M(:I could see was that it had a lot ofcasb going out, but very little conl-
ing in. Theretore, M(:I sold its third of CM1, Salellite Corporation 1o IBM in late 1974.
Lockheed, which also had hi( hard times, did file sanle. IBM and (:onlsat added a ]lt_ r
partner, tile Aetna Satellite Comnmnications Company, and the entire emerl)rise was
renamed Satellite Business Systems (SBS) in 1975."
What Comes Around Goes Around
l)uring the fi)llowin g seven years, MC1 survived mostly by winning court decisions.
There was a joke around lown thai MCI was actually a law firm with an antenna on its roof.
The first victory came in 1977 and 1978, when MCI bypassed the F(:(: and won the right
essentially It) ottkw common carrier services.'; The second major victory t:ame in 1980,
when MCI won a nlassiw" antitrust case against AT&T. r Ariel exhausting the appeals
process, AT&T agreed in 1982 to divest itself of most of its local holdings by 1 January
1984: These '+,ictories meant that M(:I could conlpete head-on with AT&T for '+'(,ice, data,
and video conmmnications cuslt)mers. MCI had a one-shot, roughly five-year chance al
Imilding a new nationwide coast-to-coast netwo,k in tile period from 1979 to 1984 and
grabbing as nluch residential market share as possible.
4. Cantehm, The tfi_tm 3' ol MCL p. 341.
5. "l'Heo*mmunication_ I¢@,.1_ 51 (21i) ( 1July 19851: 4.
6. In lhe so-_ ;ltled l:'xecunet decisions, lhc t.S. Collll cflAl)l)cals ol lilt' I)islricl ot (:ohlnlhia OVelruh'd
lilt' FCC's decision to prohil)il MCI froln ot]kwing ExectllWl, a shared privale-line SClViCC. Sec (:allltqon, The
Ill,to U ¢_]MCI, pp. 250-56. hi eflk'cl, the oliginal aml)iguil'¢ lit'till' ,S_eciahzed Commrm Carrier &'lvi¢es (h'¢ ision had
thulllv come back to haunt tile FCC. The tk'decal tllUrl ;u gued Ihat if Exuclmel was a spvl ialized service similar
1o a regular long-distance service, thal was loll bad. ()ncc tim F(:C had come out in thvor ot compelifion and
innovalive ser;,ices, il could not diclale the validily of SlW_ ilic _tfi'rings.
7. Tilt. 1¢.1811tase ol MCIv. AT&Tlwgan in 197,t, wtltm auornc,,s ,ll ]umler and Block tiled a suit tot
d;imagcs ml tmhalt id M( :1 in I}n' t r.S. l)islrict (:lnUl |or Norlhmn Illinois on Ihc gl'tllUldS that AT&T had vio-
lated the Sherman :\lHitl usl Acl ot 1887. (In 13JlUlc It.iS{t.a Iwelvc-nlCnlbCl jury tound AT&T guihy i)l abusing
nlonopoly II<nVt'lill ;t lelevanl lllal'kel, and it aw;+tl/d+.'dMCI tilt: aslotulding SUll| lit ${i1:1(Imillion in dalnagt',+.;,
which tultlcr tk'd,+'lal law had lo be Ireblcd to $1.8 billion, making il Ihe largest monetary award in U.S. history
Hllwt'ver, lifts amounl Sllt)sequenlly was reduc¢'d to $113 million on al)peals. Tilt' real damage to AT&T was not
monetary, hut in public policy; having lost such a suit in civil courl, lh+.'rc seen;ted It) be no real hope of defend-
ing againsl pendil_g anlitlttSl action br<nlght by the U.S. [)eparlnlei+t o1 Justice. See Ibid.. pp. 2¢27-.'$13.
8. AT&T and tilt' U.S. l)cpartnlent ofJustict + agreed to in+phmleltt divestittu'e of twel+ty-two lo<al oper-
ating conq)auies--at)<mt lWo-lhildS of AT&T's assels--_m 24 Augusl 1982+ This agreen'mnt modified the Consent
l)ecr¢'t' ot 1956 (kmlwll also as Ihc FinalJudgmeln ). This agreelnelH, which t:,,:came known as lhe Moditied Final
Judgnwnt, scl the botmdarics and conditions o1 divestiturc Ihat wcrc lo take effi'cl on 1 .[anuary 1984. Sec Ibid.,
pp, 326--27.
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Building a c()ast-m-c<)ast network wits a daunting proposition. Three new kinds of
technologies c(mld be mnl)loycd as ])art of a n('lwork: nticrow;tvcs, salcllites, and fil_er
optic cables. Microwave repeaters could carry only so much lraffic before the quality of
transmission sufl_qetl. For examphx an analog FM radio could carry _,1()0 circuits. Using
a technique called single sidt'l)and radio, (,nginccrs (<)tLl(l t),::,osl this to 5,4()(1 circuils with
some loss <d transmission quality. Digital i-atli<)s, alth<mgh ptoviding it nntch clean('r sig-
nal, could carry <mlv 1.$44 circuits. It was ol)vious that <ligital techn<)h)_' was I)cttev tot
transmitting data, but MCI at this point nccdcd t<) build a nationwide nclw<)rk t_)r voice
its quickly att(l its chcal/ly as possibl(x Thcrctorc, lit(" old analog microwave tcchnol<)g_',
SUpl)l(,ntentcd b v single sideband radio, had to sufticc.
+I'<)accomnlodatc the growth in network Cal)a(:ity thal sinely would It(' needed lolh)w-
ing 1(`)82, M(;I had two all<'rnaliv('s: slucllitcs and Ill)or optics. Each Icchn<)l()g 3' had its
;l(['¢()Cal('s within the (()rporation, and in tilt" (:lid, as with most iilslilllti()ltS struggling with
a choice l)t')wccn two optil)ns, MCI dvcidcd It) l)ursu( • both.
Mc(;()wan and his chi('f of c()Vl)<)ratc dcvcl<)pmcnt, II. Brian Thonlpson, favored salel-
lit('s fi)r tw() l'UiD;()llS, ()st¢'nsil)ly, th(' lilltiil iti-gtilil('llt ill t,tv()r <)1"sal('llil('s was all ill_tiill¢'nt
against t]t)('r <it)tits: fiber <)plies was an untried, tlntt'Sl('d Icchnology unavailabl(' in large
(lttailli|i(,s. Ignoring iiHcrnal advicc t() lit(' (()nlrar}, in 1{17(.)?vl((',()wan staled lltat it w()ttld
bt" g(mcrations I)e|i:)r(" fiber <)plies bccmn(.' signit]tan! lor h)ng-dislance l/oint-l<)-l/<)inl
transmission. Pcrhal)S lit(" real reason h(" fav<)rcd satcllit('s was thai th('y had sex appeal
fr()nt at marketing pcr,,,p(:ctive. Using satellites math' MCI a Sl)aCc age c(mtl)any inst('ad of
()no with.just 1toting nlicr()wav(.? I<)x+¢t!IS.')
tlowcvt:r, MCI's chi('f operating ()lticcn V. ()rvillc !,_'riglll, and Ihc chief <If transmis-
si()tt .+,;vsl(qns, Tholnas l.cnting, conlcild('(| thai slttcllil('s 'were nol at)l)r<)priatc for donlcs-
tic '_.'()i(e lranstnissi()n. '') Sal(!llil('s were appr()l)viatc Ik)r inl('rnational v()i((', bc(aus(" it was
lhc (rely obvious alternative to un(lcrsca cal)lcs. ,.\ls(), satcllitcs would I)(" l('rrific [or digital
video and data ])t'{ittis(.: ()1 |IS, "1)Ill'Sty'"nattllC, t)tll ill 1!18_ thcsc inat+k('ls x+,,'('i(',just ()pt'ning
u t) t_)r M('.I. l+eniing and Wrighl argued against usht'd, slttt'llit('s tor voice (in the very siin-
pit basis thal they caused a delay and an ('oh(), which nt<)sl custonlcrs w<)uld 11rid unac-
cc])tal/lv irrilating.
Acknowledging the h)gic of thai ;lFg/iilit'nl, 1)itl t,mvilling It) abandon the alhuc of
sal('lliles allog(gher, Tl:loml)son pushed lit(, rt()ti()n that ¢+vcn if salellites were not ideal for
volt:c, t]t('v ott_,'rvd network r(.(lundanc',, which was critical to t)verall network operations.
In oilier W()rds, Thompson t+,'lt that cusl()nl(:rs w<)uld bc willing to sultk'r the indignity of
a d('lay or an echo rathcr than fat(' the outright loss (if s(Prvicc in the cv('nt of a partial net-
work t_lilurc.
In the thlal analysis, it was Mt(;owan's dctisi<)n to make, attl(I he decided in favor <it
salcllhcs. In Fcl)ruary 1{)8,3, MCI ann()unccd the lar,gcsl purchase of satellite trtulspondcr
capacity in t(?]e(-<)nununit:alions history: lw(,iltV-fotti transponders, (:arrying 4g,000 cir-
cuits, st(ere to be purchased f()r tlt(' Galaxy II and (;alaxy 111 spa(e(:raft under (onstru(+ti<)n
l)v I lugh('s Aircraft. +MCI phuulcd to spend bctwc('n $'200 and $300 nli]lion for the satel-
lite p()t+ti<m (if its network. In September I(.)83, and agaiu in August I(.)84, two Dcha
launchers wotkcd pctI_.'ctly, and t]IC two spacecraft began to <)perate. +' Neither I+etning
nt)r Wright had given up <in the t)elicf that single-mode tibet optic cat)It was the pipclin("
()1 tilt' |lillii(', h()v_r(?V('l".
9. M((,(),.',an (lu()lc([ hi I+'.[,R. ;\ss()( ialc,, Int.. (,.)po)a/e (..,/i,w)l<_., MCI ('+....,+:+i+alJ+,;,+s ¢;r.p._a6r.a, 15
["('l)l uat,. I':)7(,), p. IN, |]i_,l()rv l)r(!j('ct Files, MCI C(>tporatc At('hixes.
I0. Th()mas l,cming, intcrvit'w with l'hilip Cantchm, '2,1 l:cbt u:u',, 198& San l;)ancis( o. CA, lip. 81-S6.
M( :I ( )lal I lisl()l"., Vohmlt's, 5.1( '.I (:()rp()talc I lislol",. :\r(hix t",.
I 1. M(:I l'l(.Ss Rclcasc, '3 Fcbvu:u_, 1983: WaO_i.,k_/o. 7"..es, t Fch) u;trv 1983, MCI (i<)rp()tatc ,\1< hix('s.
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Bell Laboratories had invented--and AT&T aheady had deployed--multimodal opti-
cal cable. Single-mode optical cable theoretically was cheaper: it did not need to use as
many repeaters. This could only be proven over fairly long distances. I,eming reasoned
that if MCI deployed single-mode cable overt long enough stretch of distance fi_r a high-
traffic-volnme ronte--tor example, t_om Washington, D.C., to New '_Jrk City--then the
economies of scale would bring the cost of the new technology down to the point of prof
itabilip,/. ': This was a gamble, probably the biggest gamble MCI made in the 1980s. MCI's
Washington-to-New _brk City tiber optical system was operational bv March 1984, artd by
the end of that year, MC1 proved that single-mode cable was enormkmslv profitable.
Meanwhile, as Leming and Wright had predicted, in 1984 the number of customer
complaints about delayed voice transmission skyrocketed. In 1985 and 1986, even
McGowan had to acknowledge defeat. MCI eventually leased back some circuits to
Hughes and rented out some transponders Io other companies. _' This brings tts 1o the
curiosity of the MCI decision to purchase SBS in Jtme 1985, a lull year after the decision
to deploy fiber optic cable had proved itself.
Satellite Business Systems
Back in early 1984, MCI executives did not know that the fiber optic gamble would
work. _'|c(;owan set tip a corporate development group, code-named "Orbit," to study can-
didates in the satellite industry for possible acquisition. One of the candidates was SBS.
I)nring the eight years from 1975 to 1983, SBS produced no profits and demanded peri-
odic intitsions of cash. Orbit discovered that SBS in fact had lost exactly $120 million ti)r
tire last three years in a row. By July 1984, as SBS was on its way to losing another $120 mil-
lion, Comsat finally backed out, selling off its one-third interest to IBM and Aetna?'
IBM kept a 59-percent share of SBS, because the satellites' digital data capacity was
usefifl to IBM internally. In East Fishkill, New York, IBM had a laboratory devoted to com-
puter modeling of semiconductor interaction and stn'face physics interactions. Anyone in
IBM designing a semiconductor chip contmtmed with the Fishkill laborator,_'. This
required a huge amount of bandwidth for data, wltich SBS transponders satisfie_-l. IBM
paid cheap bulk rates tot the bandwidth, and SBS took tire loss. Meanwhile, Aetna and
Comsat lost big, in eflect paying fi_r two-thirds of what would have been IBM's costs. Ira
1984, then, IBM found itself" stuck with a majority interest in what one journalist called "a
dog it did not know how to make grow." According to Richard Liebhaber, then IBM's
director of business policy and development, IBM realized it had three options: sltut the
whole thing down and write it off as a loss; continue to lose $120 million a year; or sell it
tO sorneone. I_
If MCI knew that SBS was losing money, tlten why did MCI want to acquire SBS? The
answer has to be tmderstood within the context of the larger business picture at the time.
Tire 1980s was the decade of the takeover, the corporate raider, and innovative financing
tactics, such as the issuance of unsecured corporate bonds or raids on pension surpluses.
Mc(;owan and other MCI executives realized that MCI was vulnerable to a hostile
takeover +. What MC! needed, tltey realized, was an alliance with a company so big that no
one would dare attempt a raid. Mc(;owan called this "shark repellent. '''+ An arrangement
12. lxqmng imct view, 24 Fel)rtl;u_ 198_, pp. _q4-_6.
13. Camelon, The History 0] MCI, p. 343.
1.t. Telecommuni_atians Repor_* 51 (26) (1 July 1985): 4; see also The Ecfmomist, 29 ]tme t985, pp. 69-70.
15. Richard 1Ael)haber, intevvicw with l'hilip (]anielon, 1 and 13 April 1992, Washington, [)C, p. 8, .MC;1
()ral ] [istory x,'ohmles, M(][ (]orporate Archives.
16. Canl_-ton, "l'hetti_tm_ _[Mr;L p. 434.
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Figz_re 36
77+r/h:_t _/ there ,gatellite Busit_e_ ,_._lem_ f.'_'B.Y_ _at+'llil_* ,le_i_vu,d _,,b_/_' I. _,', ve the commul_i_alio_ m_ed_ ,,/_ '.S. l,u_im_
tl_td h_u_h_'d /'3' +\_L'_\L MCI purchased a,_ i_tleve_l i_l g_+tellite lhtsi_te_ ._;_lem_ i. 1975 i)t the hope_ o/a_qui)4_t._ need_'d
,','t_4el _+';++,i,+e!_.(( i_)ml,t's_ <d NAN,\+ ])hoto no+ NO-] |-873)
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with IBM was tile pertk_ct "shark repellent." By sclling ott a chnnk of its stock to IBM and
announcing the possibility of joint ventures and partnerships, MCI gained capital and,
perhaps more important, instant credibilily with Wall Street and potential business clients.
In fact, two (lays after the alliance was announced, MCI's stock price jumped more thin)
30 percent. _
Meanwhile, IBM also gained. It purchased 16 percent of MCI stock. Many analysts
expected Big Blue to purchase the rest of MCI within a few years. Howcww, whether by
partnership or acquisition, it seemed evident that IBM ha(t gained an important toehold
in the telecommunications industry, thereby hedging against tim very real threat that
AT&T posed as it moved into computers. Finally, a very specific part of the overall deal
was that IBM wotfld finally get to unload SBS on someone else.
By the time this deal was consummated in March 1986, MCI was well aware that satel-
lites did not compare with fiber optics for either voice or data. The reason MCI wanted
SBS was not for its transponders in space, but tot its business cnstomers on Earth. By this
time, the battle fi)r access to residential customers was waning, and M('I was beginning to
chart ()tit a new direction for its business policy during the rest of the 1980s. While it
would continue to scrap tot residential market share, MCI decided that its future lay with
obtaining business and government contracts. Here, the rolodexes of the SBS sales rep-
resentatives were golden. That was the theory behind the acquisition. As it turned out,
M(:I swallowed SBS whole, but it had trouble digesting tim meal. Contacts were one thing,
but business arrangements for new telecomnmnications services were another. Eventually,
SBS was dismantled, and the unprofitable pieces were written off as losses. Some peoph"
stayed on with MCI; most left to find new jobs elsewhere. '*
Conclusion
MCI got ont of the satellite business as much as it possibly could after 1988. Only
recently has the tirm expressed interest in getting back into the game.'" The reason why,
again, has to do mostly with context. MCI is moving away fl'om its traditional long-distance
voice transmission business into the business of packaging, distributing, and owning digi-
tized content. Its alliance with News Corporation was one step in this direction. MCI
recently expressed an interest in purchasing rights to direct-broadcast satellite technolo-
gy. The lesson in all of this is a simple one. Private industry will embrace unprofitable tech-
nologies because companies do not see them as unprofitable, even if they lose money.
One has to be willing to expand one's definition ¢7t profitability fiom the narrow frame of
return-on-investment to the bigger picture.
17. Ibid., p. 436.
1g. IBM., pp. 437-,t4.
19. M(]I wanted to bid in an FCC auclion fi)l licvnsing dirctl-bll)adcast satellite television service. On
2!1 S¢'])It+llli)t+t" ]t_lt+)5, Ill'.' Nt'llatt' tmanitnlmsly agreed t. ditt'tt lht' F(](; to pv<w++'t'd "+'+'ill+all ;ttlCtiOll. alld Oil lli
()clol)cr 1995, the F(;(: annc, unced Ibat il would do so. "M(',I Wins Round in Salcllilc 'l_ + IJcens,r ]+altle."
VL't+shi.%krlo,_+Po',l, +_,()S<'l)lt'ml)t'r 1995, p. :\14.
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Appendix B
Timeline of Selected Events in the Development
of Satellite Communications
Pre-1940s
18c.)5
1929
The 1940s
Oclobet 1945
loJammry 1946
6 February 1946
12 May 1946
()clobtq 1946
The 1950s
21 October 1951
8 Novenlbcr 1951
24 July 1954
April 1!)55
29 November 1955
1956
Tsiolkovsky describes a geosynchrotmus orbit.
Notwdung describes radio colllllltlnicatiotls with a space st;),tioll ill a
,gt'osynchronotls otbil using l;uge ;tvtl(_'nnas and solar l)OXscr.
Arthttr (]. (3arkCs article, "Extra-Terceslrial Relays" ill l++Ttvh_+,sHbrhl,
suggests global c<wcragv wiflt three satellites in a geosyn(hronotts orbit.
U.S. At'my Signal (;<)t-l)S under John }l. D('Witl, Jr., succeeds it+
bouncing radar waves <)11tlt(" Moon.
Z(>luin Bay r(qh'(cs radar waves off lit(" Moo)).
A RAND study proposes a synchtt)notts (onnnunicati()ns relay svstt'm.
,%lall|()l'd University t)cgills IIICICOI" l';.td_tt" studies; this is the Sl_tt't O1"
IIICIC(II" bill+S1 (Olllllltlni(aliOllS.
"Fhc Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) carries ()tit the thst use of thc
Moon as a relay in a radit) commutficali()ns circuit.
Researchers at the National Burc'att o[ Standards (_enlra[ Radio
t)rol)agalion Lal)oralory (Sterling, Virginia) and Collins Radio
((:edar Rapids, Iowa) relay a felt'graph message via the Moon.
NRI, achi(+ves the first voice traHsntission via the Moon.
.loire R. Pi(,l-cCs at-licIc, "()rbilal Radio Relays," is pt0)lished in .let
I'ropuZ+h,+.
NRI+ (l(?mo)7)stialcs lranscontila(:ntal teleprinter communicalions
from Washington, I).C., to San l)icgo via lh(, }IOOll.
The th+st lransa.tlatHi( +lcl(.'phorJe cable (TATI) starts service between
Britain and (',al+la(|a..
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23 January 1956
4 October 1957
1958
29 July 1958
October 1958
November 1958
18 December 1958
1959
1959
May 1959
6June 1959
16 December 1959
29 February 1960
August 1960
The 1960s
12 August 1960
October 1960
October 1960
4 October 1960
NRL achieves first transoceanic communications, fionl Washington,
D.C., to Wahiawa, Oahu, Hawaii, via the Moon.
The Soviet Union launches Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite, into
orbit.
The first teletype relay is accomplished by satellite (Courier 1B).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is created.
A synchronous communications satellite project is prol)osed for the
U.S. Department of Detense (DoD).
NASA and DoD split the satellite communications program; NASA
gets passive systems, while DoD has active systems.
DoD launches Project SCORE, which hrings the first broadcast from
space of a voice message, with a delayed and real-lime repeater.
The second transatlantic telephone cable (TAT-2) begins.
DoD's Communication Moon Relay system becomes operational
between Washington, D.C., and Hawaii.
Jodrell Bank begins hmar connnunications relay tests with Pye
Telecommunications equipment.
A lunar communications demonstration occurs at the opening of
Canada's Prince Albert Radar Laboratory.
A letter of agreement between NASA and Canada's Defence
Research Board is signed for the Alouette satellite.
Department of l)efense combines synchronous satellite conmmnica-
tions projects under Project Advent.
NASA decides lo pursue active satellite communications research;
works out agreement with Department of Defense.
Echo 1 is launched.
AT&T requests a license from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) for an experimental satellite.
NASA and Dol) reach agreement that NASA will leave synchronous
work to DoD.
DoD's Project Courier is launched, with a delayed repeater.
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November196(/
December196()
30December1960
4.January1961
March1961
May1961
23June1961
24July1961
28July1961
11August1961
21October1961
May1962
10July1962
31August1962
29September1962
4October1962
December1962
13December1962
1February1963
7May1963
NASAawardsa contractfor theRelayproject'srequirementso
SpaceTechnologyLaboratories,awhollyownedsubsidiaryof Ramo-
Wooldridge(lalerTRW).
AT&Tproposesajoint satellitecomnmnications effort m NASA.
President Eisenhower gives NASA the lea<t role in salellile communi-
cations.
NASA requests proposals for an experimental commtmicati<ms satellite.
NASA's communications budget is increased by $10 million.
RCA is selected over AT&T and Hughes tbr the Relay project.
DoD approves NASA's Syncom project and the use of Advent ground
stations.
President Kennedy signs a policy statement on space conmmnications.
NASA signs a cooperative agreement with AT&T ti)r Tt'lslar.
Hughes is sele(led for Syncom (a sole-sotn-ee procurement).
The launch of l'ro.jecl West Ford is unsuccesstifl.
DoD's Project Advent is canceled.
Telstar 1 is launched, resuhing in the first transatlantic television via
satellite.
The Communications Satellite Act is signed, and tile Connnunica-
lions Satellile (_orporafion (Comsat) is created.
Alouette 1, Canada's top-side sounder and the firs_ satellite by other
than the Sovie_ L'nion or the Unite<t Sta_es, is launched.
Presiderlt Kennedy names tile Comsat board ofdireclors.
The Conti'rence of European Postal and Teleconmmtfieations
Administrations [kwms a collllllillee to study joining a U.S.-led global
satellite COlnmunications system.
Relay 1 is launched, the first communications satellite to transmil
television worldwide.
COlllSal is incorporated.
l_'lstar 2 is launched.
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10 May 1963
26 July L963
August 1963
November 1963
1964
21 January 1964
25 January 1964
May 1964
August 1964
19July 1964
1965
11 February 1965
6 April 1965
April 1965
6 May 1965
28 June 1965
21 December 1965
26 October 1966
7 December 1966
1967
Project West Ford (also known as "Project Needles") launches mil-
lions of hair-like copper wire dipole antennas into orbit, creating an
artiticial ionospheric communications relay.
Syncom 2, the tirst geosynchronous communicati_ms satellite, is
placed in orbit; Syncom 1 had [hiled during launch.
An agreement is signed with NASA for Canadian participation in test-
ing experimental communications satellites, including a commit-
ment to build a ground station.
The Advanced Technolo D' Satellite (ATS) program initiated.
The European I,auncher Development Organization is established.
Relay 2 is launched.
Echo 2 is launched.
The ATS project is approved at NASA headquarters.
lntelsat is created (Interim Agreements).
Syncom 3 is launched.
The Initial Defense Satellite Communications System, which at first
is called the Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program
(IDCSP), begins; this will lead to the first operational military com-
munications satellite.
The tirst I+incoln Experimental Satellite (LES-1) is launched.
(:omsat's Early Bird (lntelsat I) is launched.
Molniya 1 is latmched; this is the first Soviet communications satellite.
LE_2 is launched.
lntelsat I begins routine operation between the United States and
Europe; this is the beginning of commercial satellite communications.
LES-3 and I,ES-4 are launched.
Intelsat IIA is launched.
NASA's ATS-1 is launched.
The Intelsal II series begins; this is the first communications satellite
capable of multiple-access transmissions.
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February 1967 II is *ccommettded that the prime Canadian space wclmolog,, T objec-
live be its applications to domestic telect)mmuzticali(ms and resource
SlllV(_tys.
1 July 1967 I,E_5 is launched.
8 November 1967 NASA's ATS-3 is launched.
1968 TACSAT, lhe ti/sl sawlliw to provide UHF mobih" COlnlntznications,
is launched.
26 Septemlwr 1968 I,F_6 is launched.
Janttary 1969
30 January 1969
20july 1969
12 August 1969
1 September 1969
The 1970s
2t) March 1970
16 May 1970
31 March 1971
20 April 1971
May 1971
3 Nm, cml)er 1971
20 l)ecember 1971
10 Novenlbel- 1972
Jail tiary 1973
The litst Intclsat 111 slitellitc begins service over the Atlantic Ocean.
The titst, International Satellites tilr Ionospheric Sliidies progl'atI1
sawlliw, ISIS l, is launched.
The landiilg of U.S. aslrollaillS Al'lltSlrollg and AIdrin oil lhe Moon
is rclliyed to F.arlh via Inlclsal I11 satellites.
NASA's ATS-5 is launched.
Telesai (]aliat-ia iS established.
NATO I is launched.
The firsl aircrafl-to-aircrafl voice transnlission occurs using I,E_6.
1SIS 2 is latmched.
The (:ommunications Technolog T Satellite (CTS) agreement signed
between Canada and lhe Uniwd States.
The lnielsat l)efinitive Agreements are signed.
The first two l)e|ense Satellite (]Olltllitlllicaliolls Sysl('ilI (DS(]S)
military satelliws are launched.
The |irst lntelsat 1V satellite is put illto service.
Anik AI, the tirsl Canadian domestic gcoslationary communications
satellite tiM)and), is launched.
NASA quits fOlilliicrcial sawllite (olIlilitliiicatiolis rt'search aiid
deveh)plnenl tlnti] 11178; Soille projects l'elli;-iJn ilnlil colnplt'liorl; alld
Ihe :"i'F_(; (at'l(t']('(t.
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20 April 1973
July 1973
13 December 1973
311 May 1{,t74
19 December 1974
26 September 1{,t75
7 May 1975
26 August 1975
17January 1976
19 February 1976
8July 1976
14 March 1{,t78
15 December 1978
February 1979
July 1979
16July 1979
Noven]ber 1979
The 1980s
6 December 198{}
1982
3 December 1982
4 August 1984
8 May 1985
The Canadian Anik A2 satellite is launched.
The Eur{}peans decide to build their {}wn launcher.
DSCS llI and DSCS IV are launched.
NASA's ATe6 is launched.
The Franco-German geostationary commtmications satellite.',
Symph{}nie 1, is launched.
Intelsa/ 1VA (a m{}ditied lntelsat IV) is launched.
Anik A3 is launched.
Symphonie 2 is launched.
The CTS (also known as Hermes)--the thst high-powered, Ktt-band
satellite and the world's most powerfifl to date--is launched.
MarisaI 1, the tirst commtmications satellite to provide commercial
mobile satellite services, begins operation.
The first Indonesia satellite, Palapa-A1, is brought into service.
I,ES-8 and I_ES-9 are launched.
Anik B, the tirst commercial hybrid satellite, is launched.
France decides to create T616com 1, a comnlunications satellite
system f{}r d{}mestic and overseas markets.
ATS-6 is turned off.
The lnmarsat Convention is entered into force.
The CTS is turned off.
The tirst Intelsat V satellite is launched.
In,narsat begins operation.
The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS)
Mission Need Statement is signed by the NASA administrator.
France's "I'_qg'com ]A is launched.
Ftance's T616c{}m 1B is launched.
B1..",'()ND'IfIE|()N( )SP| IERE 2_)_)
20 Novenlber I987 "[_:-SAT 1, anod_er Franco-(;ernlan sate]lilc, is launched.
11 March 1(.)88 France's T('l('com l (] is laml(hed.
2b_ Oclober 1988 TDF-I, a Franco-(;crman geosta/ionary (lire(l-1)r()a(l('asl lrlevision
salc[lilc, is [attnched.
TV-SXI' 2 is l;umchcd.6 August 1989
The 1990s
24July 1990 TDF-2 is launche(I.
12 Scplrnfl)er 1993 NASA's A(;TS is latm('h(_d.
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A(7I'S
:_'B
AFCRC
?d:SPACE(X)M
AHCIET
AI,_A
AMIC
AMS(
ARPA
ASC
AT&T
XI'A
£I'(:
ATS
Az-EI
BB{',
BBCWST
BMEWS
(2altcch
(;( 7IX r
(;EH
CERN
CETS
(](}lllSat
CNES
(2NN
('_NNI
(;SIR()
CTS
1)( :A
I)(:S
DEC
1) EW
DFt I
DoI)
DS( _S
DSIR
EBU
ECS
Glossary of Acronyms
American Aslr(mautical Society
American Br(}adcasting {;ompany
Advanced Communicati(}ns Technolo_' Satellite (NASA)
Air Force Base
Air Force Cambridge Research Center
Air Force Space Command
Asociaci6n Hispanoamericana de Centros de Investigaci6n y
Empresas de Telecomunicaciones
American Institule of Aeronattlics and Astronautics
Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre
American Mobile Satellite (;orl)oration (satellite)
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DoD)
American Satellite Company (also the acronym for the company's
satellite)
American Telephone and Telegraph
Air Transport Ass()cialion
Air Training (:ommand
Applications Technoh}_' Salellite (NASA)
azimuth-elevation (type (}f antenna motmling)
British Br(}adcasting Company
BBC World Service Television
Ballistic Missile Earl.v Warning System
Calitornia Institute of'Ii:chnolog T
Cenlral China Television
Eur(}t)ean Contk:rence of Postal and Teh'communication
Administrations (translated from French acronym)
European Organizalion for Nuclear Research (English translation)
European {2onference on Salellile (]ommunications {translated fl-om
French acronym)
Communications Satellite Corl}(}ration
(;enlre Nati(mal d'Etutles Spatiales (French space agency)
Cable News Network
Cat}le News Network Internalional
C{mmmnweahh Scientific and Industrial Resear(h Organisalion
Communications Technolob,_ Satellile (NASA-Canadian program)
Defense Commtmications Agency (DoD)
1)eli'nse (2mmumicati(ms System (DoD)
declinalion
Distance Early Warning (IAne)
I)ong Fang Hong (Chinese salellite)
(U.S.) Departmenl of Defense
Defense Satellite {2ommunications System (DoD)
Det)artment of Scientific and Industrial Rescar(:h (Manchester
University)
European Broadcasting Uni(}n
European C(}mmunication Satellite (ESA series) 0r Environmental
(2)mmuni(:ati(}n Satellite ((ihina)
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EtlF
ELDO
ESA
ESC
ESRO
Euratom
EUTELSAT
FAA
FCC
FEP
GAO
(;EOS
GNP
[IA
t I.M.S.O.
II)CSP
IDS( ;S
IEEE
I(;IA
IGY
INCOSPAR
Inlnarsat
INSAT
Intelsat
IRE
ISIS
ITF
ITU
JPL
KDD
I,ES
I,ET
MBB
MII.SATCOM
Milstar
MIT
MLF
MSAT
MUSAT
NACA
NASA
NAT()
NRI_
NRO
NSAM
OCS
OECD
extremely high frequency
European I.auncher Development Organization
European Space Agency
European Space Conference
European Space Research Organization
European Atomic Ener_, Community
European Telecommunications Satellite (Organization)
Federal Aviation Administration (DOT)
Federal Communications Conmfission
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